JP2007043475A - Information communication system, information communication apparatus, and information communication method, and computer program - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To keep confidentiality by managing a key shared via AKE (Authentication and Key Exchange) by a communication protocol layer which cannot be accessed from application. <P>SOLUTION: In executing the AKE between Source equipment and Sink equipment, a confidential data operable layer capable of directly operating confidential data value and a confidential data inoperable layer which can not be directly operated are provided, K<SB>x</SB>is managed by the confidential data operable layer, and K<SB>x</SB>identification information connected with the K<SB>x</SB>is stored in the confidential data inoperable layer. Through the K<SB>x</SB>identification information inside DTCP-IP application and the confidential data inoperable layer, the K<SB>x</SB>inside the confidential data operable layer is accessed. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to an information communication system, an information communication apparatus, an information communication method, and a computer program for transmitting and receiving transmission contents encrypted for copyright protection or other purposes, and in particular, other information compliant with DTCP. The present invention relates to an information communication system, an information communication apparatus, an information communication method, and a computer program for executing mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedures with a device.

  More specifically, the present invention relates to an information communication system, an information communication apparatus, an information communication method, and a computer for managing a key shared between DTCP devices through mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedures while maintaining confidentiality. -In connection with the program, in particular, in the DTCP_Sink device that activates a plurality of DTCP-IP applications, while maintaining the confidentiality of the key shared with the DTCP_Source device through the mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedures, the same DTCP_Source device The present invention relates to an information communication system, an information communication apparatus, an information communication method, and a computer program that share information related to a shared key between DTCP-IP applications to be authenticated.

  Recently, distribution and distribution services for content such as video and music via a network are actively performed. This type of service does not require movement of media such as CDs and DVDs, and can distribute contents between remote terminals via a network. On the other hand, content handled via a network is protected from unauthorized use such as unauthorized duplication or falsification under copyright law as one of the copyrighted works. According to the Copyright Act, Article 30 of the Act allows the user to reproduce personally or for the purpose of use at home, etc., while in Article 49, Paragraph 1 of the Act, private use is permitted. The use of duplicates in other places is prohibited. In addition, since illegal operations such as copying and falsification are relatively easy for digital content, not only legal maintenance but also technical aspects are allowed while using personal or household content. Protection against unauthorized use is necessary.

  For example, DTCP (Digital Transmission Content Protection), which is an industry standard related to protection of digital transmission content, defines a mechanism for transmitting content in a copyright-protected form (for example, see Non-Patent Document 1). ) In the DTCP, a predetermined mutual authentication and key exchange (Authentication and Key Exchange: AKE) is performed between an authentication protocol between devices at the time of content transmission and a transmission protocol of encrypted content, that is, a key exchange necessary for decrypting the encrypted content. ) Arrangements to be made according to the algorithm.

  A server (DTCP Source) that is a content provider and a client (DTCP Sink) that is a content provider share a key through an authentication procedure by transmitting and receiving an AKE command, and encrypt the transmission path using the key to create a content. Is transmitted. Therefore, an unauthorized client cannot obtain the content because the encryption key cannot be acquired unless the authentication with the server is successful. Also, by limiting the number and range of devices that transmit and receive AKE commands, the range in which content is used can be kept within the personal or home range as defined by the Copyright Act.

  DTCP originally defined the transmission of digital content on a home network using IEEE 1394 or the like as a transmission path. Recently, development of a technology in which the DTCP technology defined on the basis of IEEE 1394 is ported to an IP network has been promoted (hereinafter, this technology is referred to as DTCP-IP). In DTCP-IP, an IP network is used for a transmission path, and HTTP or RTP protocol is used for transmission of encrypted content. In addition, since various devices such as PCs are connected on the IP network and there is a high risk that data can be easily wiretapped or tampered with, DTCP-IP performs network transmission while protecting the content. Further methods are defined (see, for example, Non-Patent Document 2).

  FIG. 14 illustrates a key exchange procedure based on AKE between a source device and a sink device compliant with DTCP_IP, and a mechanism for performing encrypted content transmission using a key shared by key exchange. In the example shown in the figure, the HTTP protocol is used for content transmission.

DTCP_Source and DTCP_Sink first establish one TCP / IP connection and authenticate each other. This authentication is called DTCP authentication or AKE (Authentication and Key Exchange). In the DTCP compliant device, a unique device ID and an authentication key K _auth are embedded by an authorized organization called DTLA (Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator). In the DTCP authentication procedure, using such information, after confirming that each other is a legitimate DTCP compliant device, the authentication key K _auth managed by DTCP_Source for encrypting or decrypting the content is exchanged with the DTCP_Sink device. Can be shared.

If the AKE procedure is successful, the DTCP_Source device and the DTCP_Sink device respectively perform the same processing inside and generate a key K _x that is a seed of the content key from K _auth . The key K _x is used to generate the content key K _c during content transmission (described later).

  Then, after the AKE authentication and key exchange procedure is completed between DTCP-compliant devices, DTCP_Sink requests content on DTCP_Source. The DTCP_Source can transmit in advance a content location indicating an access destination to the content on the DTCP_Source to the DTCP_Sink through a CDS (Contents Directory Service) or the like. When requesting content according to the HTTP procedure, DTCP_Source becomes an HTTP server and DTCP_Sink becomes an HTTP client, and content transmission is started. Also, when transmission by RTP is requested, DTCP_Source becomes RTP Sender and DTCP_Sink becomes RTP Receiver to start content transmission. Alternatively, a transmission protocol such as RSTP (Real Time Streaming Protocol) is also applicable.

  When performing content transmission by HTTP, a TCP / IP connection for HTTP is created from an HTTP client separately from a TCP / IP connection for DTCP authentication. Then, the HTTP client requests content on the HTTP server by the same operation procedure as that of normal HTTP. In contrast, the HTTP server returns the requested content as an HTTP response.

  Here, the data transmitted as the HTTP response is data obtained by encrypting the content using the key shared after the AKE authentication is performed by the HTTP server, that is, the DTCP_Source device.

Specifically, the DTCP_Source device generates a nonce N _c using a random number, and generates a content key K _c based on K _x and N _c . Then, the content requested from the DTCP_Sink device is encrypted using the content key K _c, and a PCP (Protected Content Packet) composed of the encrypted content and the nonce N _c is placed on the TCP stream and transmitted to the DTCP_Sink device. The IP protocol then divides the TCP stream into packet sizes as a predetermined unit, further converts the TCP stream into an IP packet with a header added, and delivers it to a specified IP address.

When the DTCP_Sink device receives each IP packet from the DTCP_Source device, it assembles it into a TCP stream. When the nonce N _c is extracted from the stream, the content key K _c can be calculated in the same manner using this and the key K _x obtained from the authentication key K _auth , and the encrypted content can be decrypted. Then, processing such as reproduction or recording can be performed on the plaintext content after decryption.

  When the content transmission using the HTTP protocol is completed, the used TCP connection can be appropriately disconnected.

Here, if the same encryption key is continuously used throughout the long TCP stream, the risk of the key being decrypted increases. For this reason, in DTCP-IP, the source device is arranged to update the nonce N _c, that is, the content key K _c for every 128 MB of content. In the byte stream, the range of data encrypted using the content key K _c generated from the same nonce N _c is a decryption unit that can be decrypted using the same key.

  Also, since the decryption key is dynamically changed in the middle of the byte stream in this way, a content key confirmation procedure is required. Therefore, the DTCP_Sink device further establishes a TCP connection for confirming the content key separately from the TCP connection for content transmission, and performs a procedure for confirming the content key for the DTCP_Source device. When the DTCP_Sink device needs to confirm the content key, it establishes this TCP connection as appropriate.

  In this way, DTCP-IP performs authentication between devices that comply with DTCP, shares a key between devices that have completed DTCP authentication, and performs encryption and decryption when transmitting content, thereby transmitting a transmission path. It is possible to prevent content eavesdropping and tampering in the middle and provide a safe content transmission method even on an IP network.

DTCP Specification Volume 1 Version 1.3 (Informal Version) http: //www.DTCP Specification Volume 1 Version 1.3 (Informational Version) http: // www. dtcp. com / data / info — 20040107_dtcp_Vol — 1_1p3. pdf DTCP Volume 1 Supplement E Mapping DTCP to IP, Version 1.0 (Informational Version) http: //www.DTCP Volume 1 Supplement E Mapping DTCP to IP, Version 1.0 (Informational Version) http: // www. dtcp. com / data / info — 20031124_dtcp_VISE — 1p0. pdf /

DTCP_Source device and DTCP_Sink device as described above, by performing the AKE procedure conforming to DTCP-IP, it is possible to share the key K _x used for the exchange of content. And, by encrypting and decrypting when transmitting the content using the shared key, it is possible to prevent content eavesdropping and tampering in the middle of the transmission path and to realize safe content transmission over the IP network. Can do.

In such a content transmission system, a use case may be considered in which one or more DTCP_Source devices are used as communication partners on the DTCP_Sink device side, and a plurality of DTCP-IP sink applications are started simultaneously. The key K _auth exchanged between the DTCP_Source device and the DTCP_Sink device in the AKE procedure is built into the device by an authorized organization called DTLA. Other words, those are the same DTCP_Source device to a communication partner among the plurality of DTCP-IP for Sink application activated in DTCP_Sink device would use the same exchange key K _x.

  Here, since each application is divided into units called processes, the data held by each other cannot be shared unless a special mechanism such as inter-process communication is realized. However, interprocess communication is not useful in terms of cost and performance.

  For this reason, when a plurality of DTCP-IP applications are activated in the sink device, it is not possible to determine whether or not the authentication is for the same source device, and as a result, a useless authentication procedure is likely to be activated. Become.

Of course, it is determined if managed in (K obtained from _auth) K communication protocol such information accessible to the user application as _x, whether the authentication for each same Source equipment DTCP-IP application together easily it can. However, information such as K _x is important information for decrypting the content in DTCP-IP, when considering confidentiality, it is inadequate in terms of safety to manage information related with user application It must be said that it is a simple information management method.

  The present invention takes into account the technical problems as described above, and its main purpose is to suitably execute a mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedure with another information device compliant with DTCP. The present invention provides an excellent information communication system, information communication apparatus, information communication method, and computer program.

  A further object of the present invention is to provide an excellent information communication system and information communication capable of suitably managing a key shared between DTCP devices through mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedures while maintaining confidentiality. An apparatus, an information communication method, and a computer program are provided.

  A further object of the present invention is to provide a plurality of DTCP-IP applications that authenticate with the same DTCP_Source device while maintaining the confidentiality of the key shared with the DTCP_Source device through the mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedure in the DTCP_Sink device. It is an object of the present invention to provide an excellent information communication system, information communication apparatus and information communication method, and computer program capable of avoiding useless activation procedures.

  A further object of the present invention is to maintain the confidentiality of a DTCP_Sink device by managing a key shared with the DTCP_Source device through a mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedure in a communication protocol layer inaccessible from an application. However, it is an object to provide an excellent information communication system, information communication apparatus, information communication method, and computer program capable of sharing information related to a shared key between DTCP-IP applications that authenticate with the same DTCP_Source device.

The present invention has been made in consideration of the above-mentioned problems. The first aspect of the present invention implements mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) between information communication devices compliant with DTCP-IP on an IP network. An information communication system comprising:
In each information communication device, a secret data operation layer that can directly perform operations such as reference and change to a confidential data value, and a secret data operation that cannot perform a direct operation on the data value the No layers provided, as well as manage the confidential data operably layer exchange key data K _x generated or obtained by carrying out the AKE, stores K _x identification information associated with K _x is the secret data nonoperational layer ,
For each application activated on the information communication device, one secret data operation impossibility layer is activated, and each application accesses K _x in the secret data manipulatable layer through the K _x identification information in the secret data operation impossibility layer.
This is an information communication system.

  However, “system” here refers to a logical collection of a plurality of devices (or functional modules that realize specific functions), and each device or functional module is in a single housing. It does not matter whether or not (hereinafter the same).

The present invention relates to an information communication system for transmitting information content that requires copyright protection on an IP network, and more specifically, specifically, mutual authentication and communication between information communication devices compliant with DTCP-IP. and receive AKE commands for key exchange (AKE), safety performed information communication system the encrypted content transmission using a key K _x covalently through the mutual authentication and key exchange. According to DTCP-IP, authentication is performed between devices compliant with DTCP, a key is shared between devices that have completed DTCP authentication, and encryption and decryption are performed when content is transmitted. Content eavesdropping and tampering can be prevented, and safe content transmission can be realized over an IP network.

The DTCP_Source device can simultaneously start a plurality of Source applications with a plurality of DTCP_Sink devices as communication partners. Also, on the DTCP_Sink device side, a plurality of Sink applications with one or more DTCP_Source devices as communication partners can be started simultaneously. Here, since the key K _auth exchanged in the DTCP-IP AKE procedure is unique in each DTCP_Source device, the same DTCP_Source device among the plurality of Sink applications running on the DTCP_Sink device is the same. It will be using the exchange key K _x.

The present inventors have, (K obtained from _auth) information, such as K _x, rather than managing the accessible communication protocol layer from the user application, usually inaccessible communications protocol from the user application・ I think that it is appropriate to manage by layer. In the case of adopting such information management techniques, it must be devised how to access the K _x.

Since the application is divided in units of the process, the DTCP-IP application that performs the same DTCP_Source device and content transmission is considered to share K _x from each other by a communication between the example process. However, interprocess communication is not effective in terms of cost and performance.

  For this reason, when a plurality of DTCP-IP applications are activated in the sink device, it is not possible to determine whether or not the authentication is for the same source device, and as a result, a useless authentication procedure is likely to be activated. Become.

Therefore, in the present invention, when an AKE authentication procedure is executed between a source device serving as an authentication server and a sink device serving as an authentication client, a direct operation such as referring to or changing a confidential data value is performed. A secret data manipulation layer that can be used and a secret data manipulation impossible layer that cannot perform direct operations on such data values are provided, and a key K _x exchanged between devices via AKE authentication is managed in the secret data manipulation layer as well as, the confidential data nonoperational layer was set to store the K _x identification information associated with K _x. Then, from the DTCP-IP application, and access to K _x confidential data manipulation allows the layer through K _x identification information of confidential data inoperable within the layer.

Specifically, when AKE is executed between applications of two information communication devices, the confidential data operation impossible layer passes the identification information of the counterpart device acquired from the application to the confidential data operable layer, and the confidential data operation is possible. The layer returns device authentication session information for identifying authentication with the counterpart device to the secret data operation disabled layer. When the AKE performed between the applications of the two information communication devices succeeds, the secret data manipulation layer generates or acquires the exchange key data K _x shared with the partner device, and identifies K _x as the partner device. register in connection with information, confidential data nonoperational layer, acquires and stores K _x identification information associated with K _x from the secret data operational layer. Here, an IP address can be used as identification information of the counterpart device.

When the present invention is applied to an AKE executed between a source device compliant with DTCP-IP and an information communication device operating as a sink device, a sink application started on the sink device side is DTCP with respect to a source application started on the source device side. requesting -IP encrypted content, from the Source application to Sink application when the content is transmitted, Sink application receives passes the confidential data operably layer together with the identification information and the K _x identity of Source equipment Then, the secret data manipulating layer requests processing of the content, and uses the _Kx at that time to process the content.

In addition, when the sink application that is started on the sink device side performs AKE on the source application that is started on the source device side, the secret data operable layer is the source device that is passed from the sink application through the secret data operation impossible layer. Check the identification information. When a sink device acquires K _x identification information unique to a source device by registering the K _x identification information in association with the identification information of the source device in the secret data operable layer, the sink device operates on information for identifying the source device. It can be determined whether the authentication has already been completed.

  Here, the secret data operable layer, when the identification information of the source device is checked, and if it is found that the authentication session for the same source device is ongoing, the secret data operable layer notifies the sink application through the secret data not operable layer, and the sink In response to the notification, the application causes the active AKE to fail. That is, when the sink device executes the AKE authentication procedure with the source device, if the second and subsequent authentications are executed before the first authentication is completed, the second and subsequent authentications are performed. By making it fail, useless authentication traffic can be avoided.

Further, confidential data operable layers as a result of checking the identity of the Source device, when it was found that the exchange key data K _x that share the same Source device already produced or acquired, through confidential data nonoperational layer The Sink application is notified, and the Sink application does not perform AKE in response to the notification. Then, the secret data manipulation impossibility layer acquires the corresponding _Kx identification information from the secret data manipulation capable layer. That is, if the authentication Terminated and the Source device, Sink device without actually performing the authentication procedure, can either be obtained K _x identification information associated with Source device at that time.

Thus, according to the present invention, DTCP-IP applications to important information confidentiality is demanded, such as K _x, confidential data inoperable layers can not be operated such information directly operating on DTCP device Therefore, sufficient confidentiality for the exchange key is ensured. Further, since the DTCP-IP application is provided with an access method of operating _Kx through the _Kx identification information stored in the non-operational layer, each DTCP-IP application is authenticated for the same Source device. Therefore, it is not necessary to start a useless authentication procedure.

A sink device may simultaneously activate a plurality of sink applications using the same source device as a communication partner. In such a case, the sink device can decrypt the encrypted content acquired from the source device by using the _Kx identification information linked to the source device.

  In addition, the information communication apparatus according to the present invention can have both functions of a source device and a sink device.

Also, the second aspect of the present invention is a secret data manipulation layer that allows direct manipulation such as reference or change to a secret data value, and one for each application that executes AKE. In order to perform a mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) with another information communication apparatus on the IP network by providing a secret data operation impossible layer in which a direct operation on a secret data value cannot be performed. Is a computer program written in a computer-readable format so as to be executed on a computer system,
And procedures for managing the exchange key data K _x generated or obtained by carrying out another information communication device and AKE in the secret data operably layer,
A procedure for storing the K _x identification information associated with K _{x in the} secret data non-operational layer;
A procedure for accessing K _x in the secret data operable layer from the application through the K _x identification information in the secret data not operable layer,
Is a computer program characterized in that

  The computer program according to the second aspect of the present invention defines a computer program described in a computer-readable format so as to realize predetermined processing on a computer system. In other words, by installing the computer program according to the second aspect of the present invention in the computer system, a cooperative action is exhibited on the computer system, and it operates as an information communication apparatus. By activating such an information communication apparatus as a source device and a sink device and performing DTCP-IP AKE, the same operational effects as those of the information communication system according to the first aspect of the present invention can be obtained.

  According to the present invention, an excellent information communication system and information communication apparatus capable of suitably managing a key shared between DTCP devices through mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) procedures while maintaining confidentiality. And an information communication method, and a computer program can be provided.

Further, according to the present invention, the DTCP_Sink device, while maintaining the secrecy of the key K _x shared with DTCP_Source device through the procedure of the mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE), a plurality of authenticating the same DTCP_Source device DTCP- It is possible to provide an excellent information communication system, information communication apparatus, information communication method, and computer program capable of avoiding useless activation of an authentication procedure in an IP application.

Further, according to the present invention, the DTCP_Sink device, the secret managed by the mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) DTCP_Source device key K _x inaccessible from the application communication protocol layers that are shared through procedures An excellent information communication system, information communication apparatus, information communication method, and computer program capable of sharing information related to the key K _x shared between the DTCP-IP applications that authenticate with the same DTCP_Source device while maintaining the performance Can be provided.

  According to the present invention, in a system in which security (tamper resistance, robustness, etc.) such as DTCP-IP must be kept high, information belonging to an area that cannot be normally operated / referenced is stored. A method for operating can be realized.

  In addition, according to the present invention, a plurality of processes (which make it difficult to exchange information) can be performed by suitably using information belonging to an area that cannot normally be operated or referred to or information associated therewith. Even if it is activated, if any one of the processes has already been authenticated, when other processes authenticate with the same target, useless authentication is omitted (that is, no authentication is performed thereafter). B) It can be in the same state as the one that has been authenticated.

  In addition, according to the present invention, a plurality of processes (which are difficult to exchange information with each other) can be started by suitably using information belonging to an area that cannot normally be operated or referred to or information associated therewith. Even if one of the processes is authenticating, if the other processes authenticate with the same target, the latter authentication can be canceled (eliminating useless authentication).

  Other objects, features, and advantages of the present invention will become apparent from more detailed description based on embodiments of the present invention described later and the accompanying drawings.

  Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.

  The present invention relates to an information communication system that accepts and decrypts encrypted data as a byte stream from a network such as TCP / IP or from a file system. Specifically, the present invention is performed between a DTCP_Source device and a DTCP_Sink device. The content transmission system using the HTTP protocol is used, the content key is dynamically changed during the content transmission, and the sink device appropriately performs the content key confirmation procedure for the source device.

A. Content transmission according to the system configuration DTCP-IP is performed by a source device as a server that receives a request for content and transmits the content, and a sink device as a client that requests the content, receives the content, and plays or records the content. Composed. FIG. 1 schematically shows a configuration example of an information communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

  In the illustrated example, the DTCP-IP AKE system is constructed by the entities of the source devices A to B, the sink devices A to B, and the relay devices A to C.

  A source device A, which is an authentication server compliant with DTCP-IP, and a sink device A, which is an authentication client compliant with DTCP-IP, are connected by a network via relay device A and relay device B.

  Also, the source device B, which is an authentication server compliant with DTCP-IP, and the sink device B, which is an authentication client compliant with DTCP-IP, are connected via an IP network via the relay device A, the relay device B, and the relay device C. Has been.

  However, the gist of the present invention is not limited to the illustrated network topology. Here, on the DTCP_Source device side, a plurality of DTCP-IP applications with a plurality of DTCP_Sink devices as communication partners can be started simultaneously. On the DTCP_Sink device side, a plurality of DTCP_Source devices with a plurality of DTCP_Source devices as communication partners can be started. It should be understood that DTCP-IP applications can be launched simultaneously.

  A sink device as an authentication client and a source device as an authentication server can execute an authentication procedure and a content transmission procedure by using a connection established on a TCP / IP network.

  A sink device operating as DTCP_Sink in accordance with the DTCP-IP standard has a DTCP-IP authentication function, a DTCP-IP content reception function, and a content reproduction / recording function.

  The DTCP-IP authentication function includes an AKE function that realizes an AKE mechanism (DTCP_Sink side) in DTCP-IP, and a content decryption function.

The content decryption function calculates a decryption key of the content using a key K _x exchanging the content data encrypted received from the server in AKE, can decrypt the encrypted content. Then, the content playback / recording function performs content playback in the playback mode, and stores the decrypted content in the recording mode.

  The DTCP-IP content reception function can execute a content transmission procedure after performing AKE. For example, it is configured as an HTTP client, requests content from the HTTP server, and receives the responded content from the HTTP server.

The HTTP client performs HTTP request management and HTTP response management. Further, HTTP request management is divided into HTTP request transmission and HTTP request generation. That is, an HTTP request as a content transmission request is generated and transmitted to the HTTP server. When an HTTP response returned from the HTTP server and the encrypted content are received, a check is made by interpreting the HTTP response. Here check is decrypted using the decryption key if the OK calculated from the key K _x replacing the encrypted content received by the AKE, this check in the case of NG performs processing as an error response .

  The sink device establishes an individual TCP / IP connection with the server device in DTCP-IP authentication and DTCP-IP content reception, and executes an authentication procedure and a content transmission procedure independently of each other.

  Also, a source device that operates as DTCP_Source in accordance with the DTCP-IP standard has a DTCP-IP authentication function, a DTCP-IP content transmission function, and a content management function.

  In the DTCP-IP authentication function, the AKE block includes an AKE function for realizing an AKE mechanism (DTCP_Source side) in DTCP-IP and a content encryption function.

  The content management function manages the content to be protected using the DTCP-IP mechanism, and the content data is read in response to the DTCP-IP content transmission request.

Then, by the content encryption function to encrypt using the content key generated from the key K _x was exchanged AKE the content data read in accordance with the DTCP-IP content transmission request. The decrypted content is passed to the DTCP-IP content transmission block for transmission to the client.

  The DTCP-IP content transmission function corresponds to an HTTP server, performs HTTP request management and HTTP response management, receives a request from an HTTP client, and executes processing according to the request.

  The HTTP server interprets and checks the HTTP request received from the client. If the check here is OK, an HTTP response for returning the encrypted content is created. On the other hand, if the check in the HTTP request interpretation block is NG, an HTTP response for returning an error is created, and the HTTP response is transmitted to the requesting client. If the check in the HTTP request interpretation block is OK, the content encrypted by the content encryption block in the DTCP-IP authentication block is transmitted following the HTTP response header.

  The source device establishes an individual TCP / IP connection with the sink device in DTCP-IP authentication and DTCP-IP content transmission, and executes an authentication procedure and a content transmission procedure independently of each other.

B. As described above, on the DTCP_Source device side, a plurality of DTCP-IP applications using a plurality of DTCP_Sink devices as communication partners can be started simultaneously. Also, on the DTCP_Sink device side, a plurality of DTCP-IP applications can be activated simultaneously, and a plurality of DTCP-IP applications may be activated simultaneously for one DTCP_Source device.

DTCP_Source device and DTCP_Sink device by implementing the AKE procedure conforming to DTCP-IP, share the key K _x used for the exchange of content. The key K _auth exchanged between the DTCP_Source device and the DTCP_Sink device in the AKE procedure is a unique one built in the device by an authorized organization called DTLA. Therefore, the same DTCP_Source application among a plurality of DTCP-IP applications running on the DTCP_Sink device. which has a device to the communication partner, it will use the same exchange key K _x.

Information such as the K _x, rather than managing the accessible communication protocol layer from the user application, which is usually reasonable to manage in inaccessible communications protocol layer from the user application, and The inventors contemplate. In the case of adopting such information management techniques, it must be devised how to access the K _x.

Therefore, in the present embodiment, when an AKE authentication procedure is executed between a source device serving as an authentication server and a sink device serving as an authentication client, a direct operation such as referring to or changing a confidential data value is performed. it and confidential data operable layers can, confidential data inoperable layers can not be carried out direct manipulation for such data values provided, the key K _x was exchanged between devices via AKE authentication concealment data operably layer as well as management, the confidential data nonoperational layer was set to store the K _x identification information associated with K _x. Then, from the DTCP-IP application, and access to K _x confidential data manipulation allows the layer through K _x identification information of confidential data inoperable within the layer.

In such a case, DTCP-IP application running on DTCP device to important information that confidentiality is demanded, such as K _x, only the manipulating through confidential data inoperable layers can not be operated such information directly Thus, sufficient confidentiality for the exchange key is ensured. Further, since the DTCP-IP application is provided with an access method of operating _Kx through the _Kx identification information stored in the non-operational layer, each DTCP-IP application is authenticated for the same Source device. Therefore, it is not necessary to start a useless authentication procedure.

  FIG. 2 schematically shows a stack structure of communication software in the Source device. As shown in the figure, the source device can launch a plurality of applications for realizing DTCP-IP as a source (hereinafter also referred to as “source application for DTCP-IP”), and each source application Corresponding to, the secret data operation impossible layer is activated.

  Only one secret data manipulation enabled layer is activated for a plurality of source applications, and can communicate with each secret data manipulation impossibility layer activated for each source application.

Source application, can also generate a plurality of exchange key K _x for sharing a Sink device, in the following description it is assumed that produces only one. When generating the K _x with confidential data operably layer, it K _x identification information corresponding to the held in the secret data do not disturb layers, the confidential data nonoperational layer side with respect to K _x by utilizing this K _x identity Operation can be realized. Here, it is assumed that a plurality of secret data nonoperational layer can obtain K _x identification information for a single K _x. In the example shown in FIG. 2, K _x _1 is generated in the secret data operable layer, and K _x identification information_1 corresponding to the generated K _x _1 is held in the secret data not operable layer corresponding to each of the source applications A to B. operation to K _x - 1 is performed by utilizing _x identity _1.

  FIG. 3 schematically shows a stack structure of communication software in a sink device. As shown in the figure, a sink device can start a plurality of applications for realizing DTCP-IP as a sink (hereinafter also referred to as “DTCP-IP sink application”). Corresponding to, the secret data operation impossible layer is activated.

  Only one secret data manipulating layer is activated for a plurality of sink applications, and can communicate with each secret data manipulation impossible layer activated for each sink application.

The sink device can simultaneously start a plurality of sink applications, and can simultaneously start a plurality of sink applications for one source device. Each Sink application can ensure a K _x shared with Source device. However, the same Source equipment can be shared by securing only one K _x in Sink application to the other party.

When holding the K _x with confidential data operably layer, it K _x identification information corresponding to the held in the secret data do not disturb layers, the confidential data nonoperational layer side with respect to K _x by utilizing this K _x identity Operation can be realized. At this time, in order to determine which source device is shared with K _x , the secret data operable layer holds the source device identification information together with K _x .

In addition, when the source devices holding the K _x to be shared for authentication are the same despite the different sink applications, a plurality of secret data operation impossibility layers started corresponding to each sink application correspond to a single K _x It is assumed that _Kx identification information can be acquired.

In the example shown in FIG. 3, in the secret data operable layer, when K _x _2, K _x _3, and K _x _4 shared with each of the source devices 2 to 4 are held, the source device identification information is held together with these. is doing. Then, each secret data operation impossible layer started corresponding to the sink applications D and E with the source devices 2 and 3 as communication partners is held when K _x _2 and K _x _3 are held in the secret data operation possible layer. , The corresponding _Kx identification information 2 and 3 are held.

Also, we want to share the K _x by authentication and Sink application F and G are both Source device 4, the confidential data nonoperational layer F and G corresponding to each is held only one in both confidential data operably layer K get the K _x identity _4 for _x _4, either it is possible to realize an operation for K _x _4 by utilizing this K _x identity _4.

C. Implementation of DTCP-IP AKE between the Source device and the Sink device In this section, the procedure for implementing DTCP-IP AKE between the Source device and the Sink device is considered.

  In DTCP-IP, mutual authentication, key exchange (AKE), and content transmission are performed by network transmission using a TCP / IP stack. However, for convenience of explanation, a DTCP-IP Source application and a Sink application are used below. It is treated as realizing these network processes.

  DTCP-IP does not define the AKE trigger method itself, but defines information for triggering AKE (hereinafter also referred to as “AKE trigger information”). The AKE trigger information is defined in a form including a combination of an IP address and a port number for accepting an AKE in the source device. Therefore, after the AKE trigger information is passed from the source device to the sink device, the AKE is triggered by establishing a TCP connection from the sink device to the source device based on the information. As is obvious from the nature of the AKE trigger information, it is not necessary to consider that the source device is going to establish a TCP connection with the sink device. In the following description, AKE trigger information is passed from the source device to the sink device via the network (actually, it is passed using the UPnP CDS), and before the AKE trigger information is passed from the source device to the sink device. Suppose that the source device is in a state of accepting AKE from the sink device.

  The following describes a mechanism in which a Sink device performs DTCP-IP AKE with a plurality of Source devices in accordance with a specific example in which DTCP-IP AKE is performed by Source device A and Sink device, and Source device B and Sink device. .

  Here, the source application A and the source application B are activated in the source device A and the source device B, respectively, and the sink applications C to E are activated in the sink device.

In the source device A, the source application A is activated, K _x _1 is generated in the secret data operable layer 1, and the corresponding K _x identification information_1 is acquired in the secret data not operable layer A.

Further, in the source device B, the source application B is activated, and K _x _2 is generated in the secret data operable layer 2, and the corresponding K _x identification information_2 is acquired in the secret data inoperable layer B. .

  On the other hand, in the sink device, the sink application C, the sink application D, and the sink application E are activated, and the secret data operation impossible layer C, the secret data operation disable layer D, and the secret data operation disable layer E corresponding to each of them It is running. Further, there is a secret data operable layer that is common to the sink applications.

C-1. Normal Authentication Process Flow A processing procedure for performing DTCP-IP AKE by the source application A in the source device A and the sink application C in the sink device will be described.

  First, the source application A makes preparations such that data transmission / reception through the TCP / IP network can be performed with the AKE trigger information.

  Subsequently, the source application A passes the AKE trigger information to the sink application C via the network. The AKE trigger information is, for example, a combination of an IP address and a port number for accepting AKE in the source device (described above), and has a configuration as shown in FIG.

  Subsequently, the sink application C prepares for data transmission / reception via the TCP / IP network based on the AKE trigger information.

  Then, DTCP-IP AKE is started by the source application A and the sink application C. FIG. 4 schematically illustrates a state before the DTCP-IP AKE is performed by the source device A and the sink device, and the source device B and the sink device.

In Source application A, through K _x identity _1, acquires implementing authentication information related to K _x required DTCP-IP AKE. During this authentication, by passing the information of the sink device to the secret data operable layer 1, the source authentication session information that can identify the authentication with the sink device can be acquired in the secret data operation impossible layer A. .

  In the sink application C, during authentication, by passing the information of the source device to the secret data operable layer, the sink authentication session information that can identify the authentication with the source device is acquired in the secret data operation impossible layer C. be able to.

In the Sink application C, to produce a K _x with the authentication is successful, obtains the K _x identification information _3 corresponding to the previous K _x at confidential data inoperable layer C. Then, from the AKE trigger information, retrieves information on the Source device A shared the K _x, is registered as a Source device identification information _3 to (through K _x identity _3) confidential data operational layer _3_4. FIG. 5 shows a state when the DTCP-IP AKE is finished and the registration of the source device identification information_3 is completed. At this time, and registers in connection with the Source device identification information and K _x. Further, in FIG. 7 illustrates the combination of K _x to be shared by the authentication and IP address as Source device identification information.

After performing the above-described DTCP-IP AKE successfully, the sink application C can request the source application A for DTCP-IP encrypted content. Then, the source application A transmits the content to the sink application C in response to this request. In this case, Sink application C is at the same time that pass information Source device A with K _x identity _3 to confidential data operable layers _3_4, when a request for the content data processing confidential data operable layers _3_4 Then, content data processing is performed using _Kx at that time.

  Next, a processing procedure for performing DTCP-IP AKE by the source application B running on the source device B and the sink application D running on the sink device will be described.

  First, the source application B makes preparations such that data transmission / reception by the TCP / IP network can be performed with the AKE trigger information. Then, the source application B passes the AKE trigger information to the sink application D via the network.

On the other hand, the sink application D prepares for data transmission / reception via the TCP / IP network based on the AKE trigger information. Then, the sink application D passes the information of the source device to the secret data operable layer _3_4 through the secret data inoperable layer D, and confirms that the source device does not yet share a valid K _x. DTCP-IP AKE is started by application B and sink application D. Further, the secret data operation impossible layer D passes the source device information to the secret data operation enable layer_3_4, and acquires the Sink authentication session information.

In Source application B, through K _x identity _2 acquires implementing authentication information related to K _x required DTCP-IP AKE. During this authentication, the source application B passes the information of the sink device to the secret data operation impossible layer B, and the secret data operation impossible layer B passes the information of the sink device to the secret data operable layer 2 so that the secret data cannot be operated. Source authentication session information is acquired at layer B. Also, Source application B, depending on the circumstances, through the confidential data nonoperational layer B, the confidential data operable Layer 2, and acquires information related to K _x.

  In the sink application D, during authentication, by passing the information of the source device to the secret data operable layer_3_4 through the secret data operation impossible layer D, the sink authentication session information that can identify the authentication with the source device is concealed. It can be acquired in the data manipulation disabled layer D.

In the Sink application D, and generates the K _x with the authentication is successful, it obtains the K _x identity _4 corresponding to the previous K _x at confidential data inoperable layer D. Then, from the AKE trigger information, retrieves information on the Source device B which share a K _x, is registered as a Source device identification information _4 (through K _x identity _4) to confidential data operable layers _3_4. FIG. 8 shows a state when the DTCP-IP AKE is completed and the registration of the source device identification information_4 is completed. At this time, and registers in connection with the Source device identification information and K _x.

Thereafter, the sink application D requests the source application B for DTCP-IP encrypted content, and the content is transmitted from the source application B to the sink application D. In this case, Sink application D is at the same time as pass information Source device B with K _x identity _4 to confidential data operable layers _3_4, when a request for the content data processing confidential data operable layers _3_4 Then, content data processing is performed using _Kx at that time.

C-2. Flow of authentication processing for the same source device When DTCP-IP AKE is started by the source application B running on the source device B and the sink application D running on the sink device, the source device B is further started on the source device B. A processing procedure for performing DTCP-IP AKE by the source application B and another sink application E running on the sink device will be described with reference to FIG.

In the sink device, the sink application D prepares for data transmission / reception based on the AKE trigger information received from the source application B. Then, the sink application D passes the information of the source device to the secret data operable layer _3_4 through the secret data inoperable layer D, and confirms that the source device does not yet share a valid K _x. DTCP-IP AKE with application B is started (same as above).

When DTCP-IP AKE the Sink application D is started, Source application B through K _x identity _2, is ready to acquire the information relating to K _x required DTCP-IP AKE. During this authentication, by passing the information of the sink device to the secret data operable layer 2, the source authentication session information that can identify the authentication with the sink device can be acquired in the secret data operation impossible layer B. .

  Here, the source application B further passes the AKE trigger information to the sink application E via the network. On the other hand, the sink application E makes preparations such that data transmission / reception by the TCP / IP network can be performed based on the AKE trigger information. Subsequently, the source application B and sink application E try to start DTCP-IP AKE.

  In the sink application E, the information of the source device is passed to the secret data operable layer_3_4 through the secret data operation impossible layer E. Then, in the secret data operable layer _3_4, since the source device information matches the source device identification information_4, it is determined that the sink authentication session information indicating authentication with the source device has already been acquired. Further, it is determined that the authentication session is ongoing with the source device. This result is notified to the sink application E through the secret data operation impossible layer E. When the sink application E recognizes that the authentication for the same source device is continuing, it handles the DTCP-IP AKE procedure as a failure.

  In this way, when the sink device continuously executes authentication for the same source device, if the second and subsequent authentications are executed before the first authentication is completed, the second and subsequent ones are executed. By avoiding the authentication procedure, unnecessary authentication traffic is avoided.

  Subsequently, a processing procedure when another Sink application running on the sink device further performs DTCP-IP AKE for the same source application in a state where the authentication is once completed with the source device. Will be described with reference to FIG.

  First, the source application B makes preparations such that data transmission / reception by the TCP / IP network can be performed with the AKE trigger information. Then, the source application B passes the AKE trigger information to the sink application E via the network.

In the Source application B, through K _x identity _2, it is ready to acquire the information relating to K _x required DTCP-IP AKE. During this authentication, by passing the information of the sink device to the secret data operable layer 2, the source authentication session information that can identify the authentication with the sink device can be acquired in the secret data operation impossible layer B. (Id.)

  On the other hand, the sink application E makes preparations such that data transmission / reception by the TCP / IP network can be performed based on the AKE trigger information. Subsequently, the source application B and the sink application E try to start DTCP-IP AKE.

Here, the sink application E passes the information of the source device to the secret data operable layer_3_4 through the secret data operation impossible layer D. Then, in the secret data operable layer_3_4, since the information of the source device matches the source device identification information_4, it is determined that K _x already shared with the source device has been generated or acquired. .

Sink device, the confidential data nonoperational layer _3_4, because in connection with the identification information of the Source devices have registered K _x identification information, when acquiring the Source device-specific K _x identification information, such as IP address that It can be determined whether or not the authentication for the information for identifying the source device has already been completed.

Further, when it is determined that the authentication with the source device is completed, K _x identification information_4 corresponding to K _x _4 linked to the source device identification information at that time is transferred to the secret data operation impossible layer E. Get. FIG. 9 shows the situation at that time. Further, if the sink application E determines that the authentication has already been successful, the DTCP-IP AKE procedure is not executed. In this case, Sink application E, by utilizing the K _x identification information has already been obtained, it is possible to implement a content transmission and reception of the Source application B.

In this way, the sink device does not perform the authentication procedure with the source device determined to have been authenticated, and acquires _Kx identification information associated with the source device at that time, so that useless authentication traffic is obtained. Can be avoided.

C-3. Processing Operation in Source Device FIG. 12 shows a processing procedure for realizing the operation in the Source device described in the sections C-1 and C-2 in the form of a flowchart.

First, the confidential data operably layer generates K _x (step S1), and acquires the K _x identity in secret data nonoperational layer (step S2).

  Every time an AKE standby process instruction is issued until an instruction to end the entire process is issued (step S3), the process proceeds to step S4, and the subsequent processes are performed.

  In step S4, preparations are made so that data can be transmitted and received over the TCP / IP network. Then, the process procedure of steps S5 to S9 is repeated until the end of the AKE standby process instructed in step S3 is instructed.

  In step S5, it is checked whether there is an instruction to pass AKE trigger information to the sink crisis, and if there is support, the AKE trigger information is passed to the sink device (step S6).

Next, it is checked whether or not an AKE is accepted from the sink device (step S7). If an AKE is accepted, the source authentication session information is acquired by passing the information on the sink device (step S8). Then, the DTCP-IP AKE process is performed until the AKE ends or there is an AKE process stop command (step S9). During this time, Source application, if necessary, through K _x identification information, is ready to acquire the information relating to K _x required DTCP-IP AKE.

  When an instruction to end the entire process is given to the source device, the activated AKE process is stopped, the stop is confirmed (step S10), and the entire process routine is ended.

C-4. Processing Operation in Sink Device FIG. 13 shows a processing procedure for realizing the operation in the sink device described in the sections C-1 and C-2 in the form of a flowchart.

  The sink device proceeds to step S22 each time an AKE standby process instruction is issued until an instruction to end the entire process is issued (step S21), and performs the subsequent processes.

  In step S22, preparations are made so that data can be transmitted and received over the TCP / IP network.

Then, it is checked whether or not producing or acquiring a K _x from the same Source device (step S23). This determination can be made based on the source device information extracted from the received AKE trigger information.

Here, when the K _x from the same source device is generated or acquired, the content receiving process can be performed from the source device using the already acquired K _x (step S27). The entire processing routine is terminated without performing DTCP-IP AKE.

On the other hand, if not to generate or obtain the K _x from the same Source device, then, to check whether new can obtain Sink authentication session information (step S24). This determination can also be made based on the source device information extracted from the received AKE trigger information.

  Here, when the sink authentication session information cannot be newly acquired, it is handled that the authentication process has failed (step S28), and the entire processing routine is terminated.

Also, when the sink authentication session information can be newly acquired, the sink authentication session information is acquired (step S25), and the DTCP-IP AKE process is performed until the AKE ends or an AKE process stop command is issued (step S26). ). During this time, Sink application, if necessary, through K _x identification information, is ready to acquire the information relating to K _x required DTCP-IP AKE.

  When an instruction to end the entire process is given to the sink device, the activated AKE process is stopped, the stop is confirmed (step S29), and the entire process routine is ended.

  The present invention has been described in detail above with reference to specific embodiments. However, it is obvious that those skilled in the art can make modifications and substitutions of the embodiment without departing from the gist of the present invention.

  In this specification, an embodiment in which a TCP connection is established for each procedure of mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE), content transmission, and content key confirmation between information communication devices compliant with DTCP-IP will be described as an example. However, the gist of the present invention is not limited to this. The present invention is similarly applied to other types of information communication systems that manage keys shared between devices through a predetermined authentication procedure while maintaining confidentiality and need to be used as needed when decrypting contents. Can be applied.

  In the present specification, the embodiment in which the present invention is applied to DTCP-IP has been mainly described. However, DTCP technology using IEEE1394 as a transmission path, or USB or MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport (for example, URL: http: // /Www.mostcoorporation.com/))), or a network system using Bluetooth communication or the like as a transmission path.

  In the example shown in FIG. 2, the secret data operation impossible layer is activated for each source device for DTCP-IP on the source device side, but only one layer may be activated for each source device. Good. In the example shown in FIG. 2, only one secret data operable layer is activated for each source device on the source device side, but one layer is activated for each source device for DTCP-IP. May be.

  In the example shown in FIG. 3, the secret data operation disabled layer is activated for each sink device for DTCP-IP on the sink device side. However, only one layer may be activated for each source device. Good. Further, in the example shown in FIG. 3, only one secret data operable layer is activated for each sink device on the sink device side, but one layer is activated for each DTCP-IP sink application. May be.

  In short, the present invention has been disclosed in the form of exemplification, and the description of the present specification should not be interpreted in a limited manner. In order to determine the gist of the present invention, the claims should be taken into consideration.

FIG. 1 is a diagram schematically showing a configuration example of an information communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is a diagram schematically illustrating a stack structure of communication software in the source device. FIG. 3 is a diagram schematically showing a stack structure of communication software in the sink device. FIG. 4 is a diagram schematically illustrating a state before the DTCP-IP AKE is performed between the source device A and the sink device, and the source device and the sink device. FIG. 5 is a diagram schematically illustrating a state after DTCP-IP AKE is performed on the source device A and the sink device, and on the source device and the sink device. FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of AKE trigger information. Figure 7 is a diagram illustrating a combination of K _x to be shared by the authentication and IP address as Source device identification information. FIG. 8 is a diagram showing a state when the DTCP-IP AKE is finished and the registration of the source device identification information_4 is completed. 9, Sink application determines that the K _x shared with Source device is already generated, and, Source device determines that authentication and its Source device is complete, then is a diagram showing how to obtain a K _x identity _4 corresponding to K _x _4 that are attached to the identification information on a confidential data inoperable layer E. FIG. 10 shows an operation sequence when the second and subsequent authentications are executed before the completion of the first authentication when the sink devices continuously execute authentication for the same source device. FIG. FIG. 11 shows an operation when another Sink application running on the sink device further performs DTCP-IP AKE on the same source application in a state where the sink device has once authenticated with the source device. It is the figure which showed the sequence. FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure executed in the source device. FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure executed in the sink device. FIG. 14 is a diagram showing a mechanism for performing a key exchange procedure based on AKE between encrypted source devices and sink devices compliant with DTCP_IP, and transmitting encrypted content using a key shared by the key exchange.

Claims (28)

An information communication system that performs mutual authentication and key exchange (Authentication and Key Exchange: AKE) between information communication devices on an IP network,
Each information communication device is provided with a secret data manipulation layer that can directly operate on confidential data values and a secret data manipulation impossible layer that cannot perform direct operations on such data values. ,
With the exchange key data K _x the AKE generated or obtained by performed between information communication devices managed by the confidential data operably layer, stores K _x identification information associated with K _x is the secret data nonoperational layer ,
For each application activated on the information communication device, one secret data operation impossibility layer is activated, and each application accesses K _x in the secret data manipulatable layer through the K _x identification information in the secret data operation impossibility layer.
An information communication system. When performing AKE between applications of two information communication devices, in each information communication device,
The secret data operation impossibility layer passes the identification information of the counterpart device acquired from the application to the secret data manipulation layer,
The secret data manipulation-enabled layer returns device authentication session information for identifying authentication with the counterpart device to the secret data manipulation-impossible layer.
The information communication system according to claim 1. When the AKE performed between the applications of the two information communication devices succeeds,
The secret data operable layer generates or obtains exchange key data K _x shared with the counterpart device, registers K _{x in association} with the identification information of the counterpart device,
Confidential data nonoperational layer, acquires and stores K _x identification information associated with K _x from the secret data operable layers,
The information communication system according to claim 2. Each information communication device uses an IP address as identification information of the information communication device that is the AKE partner.
The information communication system according to claim 3. AKE is performed between a source device compliant with DTCP-IP (Digital Transmission Content Protection over IP) and an information communication device operating as a sink device.
The information communication system according to claim 3. When the sink application activated on the sink device side requests the source application activated on the source device side for DTCP-IP encrypted content, and the content is transmitted from the source application to the sink application,
Sink application requests the processing of the received content by passing together with the identification information of the identification information and the K _x of Source equipment confidential data operable layers,
The secret data operable layer processes the content using the K _x at that time.
The information communication system according to claim 5. When a sink application that is started on the sink device side performs AKE on the source application that is started on the source device side,
The secret data manipulation enabled layer checks the source device identification information passed from the sink application through the secret data manipulation disabled layer.
The information communication system according to claim 5. As a result of checking the identification information of the source device, the secret data operable layer notifies the sink application through the secret data uncontrollable layer when it is found that the authentication session for the same source device is ongoing.
In response to the notification, the sink application causes the AKE in progress to fail.
The information communication system according to claim 7. Confidential data operable layers as a result of checking the identity of the Source device, when it was found that the exchange key data K _x that share the same Source device already produced or acquired is Sink applications through confidential data nonoperational layer Notify
The secret data operation impossibility layer acquires the corresponding _Kx identification information from the secret data manipulation layer,
The Sink application does not perform AKE in response to the notification.
The information communication system according to claim 7. An information communication apparatus that performs mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) with another information communication apparatus on an IP network,
A secret data manipulation layer capable of performing direct operations such as referencing and changing secret data values;
It is activated one by one for each application that implements AKE, and includes a secret data operation impossible layer that cannot perform a direct operation on a confidential data value,
The exchange key data K _x generated or obtained by carrying out another information communication device and AKE well as managed by the confidential data operably layer, stores K _x identification information to confidential data nonoperational layer is associated with K _x And
Each application has access to K _x confidential data manipulation allows the layer through K _x identification information of confidential data inoperable within a layer,
An information communication device. When performing AKE between other information communication devices and applications,
The secret data operation impossibility layer passes the identification information of the counterpart device acquired from the application to the secret data manipulation layer,
The secret data manipulation-enabled layer returns device authentication session information for identifying authentication with the counterpart device to the secret data manipulation-impossible layer.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 10. When the AKE performed between the applications of two information communication devices succeeds,
The secret data operable layer generates or obtains exchange key data K _x shared with the counterpart device, registers K _{x in association} with the identification information of the counterpart device,
Confidential data nonoperational layer, acquires and stores K _x identification information associated with K _x from the secret data operable layers,
The information communication apparatus according to claim 11. An IP address is used as identification information of the information communication device that is the counterpart of the AKE.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 12. In accordance with DTCP-IP, AKE is performed as an information communication device serving as a sink device by operating as a source device, or AKE is performed as an information communication device serving as a source device by operating as a sink device.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 12. When a sink application is started and operates as a sink device, a source application started on the source device side is requested for DTCP-IP encrypted content, and the content is transmitted from the source application to the sink application ,
Sink application requests the processing of the received content by passing together with the identification information of the identification information and the K _x of Source equipment confidential data operable layers,
The secret data operable layer processes the content using the K _x at that time.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 14. When starting the sink application, operating as a sink device, and performing AKE on the source application started on the source device side,
The secret data manipulation enabled layer checks the source device identification information passed from the sink application through the secret data manipulation disabled layer.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 14. As a result of checking the identification information of the source device, the secret data operable layer notifies the sink application through the secret data uncontrollable layer when it is found that the authentication session for the same source device is ongoing.
In response to the notification, the sink application causes the AKE in progress to fail.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 16. Confidential data operable layers as a result of checking the identity of the Source device, when it was found that the exchange key data K _x that share the same Source device already produced or acquired is Sink applications through confidential data nonoperational layer Notify
The secret data operation impossibility layer acquires the corresponding _Kx identification information from the secret data manipulation layer,
The Sink application does not perform AKE in response to the notification.
The information communication apparatus according to claim 16. A secret data manipulation layer that can directly operate on a confidential data value and one for each application that executes AKE, and a direct operation on the confidential data value. An information communication method for providing a secret data operation impossibility layer that cannot be performed and performing mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) with another information communication device over an IP network,
A step of managing the exchange key data K _x generated or obtained by carrying out another information communication device and AKE in the secret data operably layer,
Storing K _x identification information associated with K _{x in the} secret data non-operational layer;
Accessing a K _x confidential data manipulation allows the layer through K _x identification information of confidential data inoperable in a layer from an application,
An information communication method comprising: When performing AKE between other information communication devices and applications,
Passing the identification information of the counterpart device acquired from the application by the secret data manipulation impossible layer to the secret data manipulation layer;
Returning the device authentication session information for identifying the authentication with the other device to the secret data manipulation disabled layer to the secret data manipulation disabled layer;
The information communication method according to claim 19, further comprising: When the AKE performed between the applications of two information communication devices succeeds,
Generating or acquiring exchange key data K _x shared by the secret data operable layer with the counterpart device, and registering K _{x in association} with identification information of the counterpart device;
Acquiring K _x identification information associated with the secret data manipulation disabled layer from K _x and storing it from the secret data manipulation layer;
The information communication method according to claim 20, further comprising: An IP address is used as identification information of the information communication device that is the counterpart of the AKE.
The information communication method according to claim 21. In accordance with DTCP-IP, AKE is performed as an information communication device serving as a sink device by operating as a source device, or AKE is performed as an information communication device serving as a source device by operating as a sink device.
The information communication method according to claim 21. When a sink application is started and operates as a sink device, a source application started on the source device side is requested for DTCP-IP encrypted content, and the content is transmitted from the source application to the sink application ,
A step of Sink application requests processing of the received content by passing together with the identification information of the identification information and the K _x of Source equipment confidential data operable layers,
A step in which the secret data operable layer processes the content using K _x at that time;
The information communication method according to claim 23, further comprising: When starting the sink application, operating as a sink device, and performing AKE on the source application started on the source device side,
The device further includes a device identification information check step in which the secret data operable layer checks the source device identification information passed from the sink application through the secret data disabled layer.
24. The information communication method according to claim 23. In response to determining that an authentication session for the same source device is ongoing in the device identification information check step,
A step in which the secret data operable layer notifies the sink application through the secret data inoperable layer;
Causing the Sink application to fail the AKE in progress;
The information communication method according to claim 25, further comprising: In response to the fact that exchange key data Kx shared with the same source device has already been generated or acquired in the device identification information check step,
A step in which the secret data operable layer notifies the sink application through the secret data inoperable layer;
A step of acquiring the K _x identification information corresponding to the secret data manipulation incapable layer from the secret data manipulation capable layer;
Sink application does not implement AKE,
26. The information communication method according to claim 25. A secret data operable layer that can directly operate on a confidential data value and one for each application that executes AKE are activated to perform a direct operation on the confidential data value. In a computer-readable format, a process for performing mutual authentication and key exchange (AKE) with another information communication apparatus on an IP network is executed on a computer system by providing a secret data inoperable layer that cannot be performed. A described computer program for the computer system,
And procedures for managing the exchange key data K _x generated or obtained by carrying out another information communication device and AKE in the secret data operably layer,
A procedure for storing the K _x identification information associated with K _{x in the} secret data non-operational layer;
A procedure for accessing K _x in the secret data operable layer from the application through the K _x identification information in the secret data not operable layer,
A computer program for executing

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