JP2006221566A - Caring service support system using network - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a caring service system stable against a danger on a network and capable of certificating electronically authentication of the subject, in the caring service system using the network. <P>SOLUTION: A caring service user carries a user token 20 (USB key herein) storing an open key cipher type cipher credence, the caring service user or a care giver connects the user token 20 to a user PC 40 installed in a user house or a care giver PC 30 carried by the care giver, to be communicated with an enterprise server 10 installed in a caring service enterprise via the network 60, enciphers a data flowing to the network using an open key cipher type, and generates a digital signature for information transmitted to the enterprise server 10. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2006,JPO&NCIPI

Description

  The present invention relates to a care service support system that supports a care service using a network (for example, the Internet), and more particularly to a care service support system that is robust against network threats such as leakage of personal information.

  In response to the advent of a full-fledged aging society, the “Long-Term Care Insurance System” was introduced in AD in 2001. The “nursing care insurance system” is a system established for the purpose of supporting the care of elderly people who cannot live independently and reducing the burden of family care.

  When receiving care services using the Long-term Care Insurance System, various documents are exchanged among care managers, care service providers and care service users in the process of home care support and benefit management. . For example, a care plan (including a plan) or a written document such as a benefit management slip.

  When such a document is exchanged in writing, there is a problem that a reliable and quick care service cannot be provided. Therefore, a system and method for facilitating exchange of digitized documents using a network (Internet) is disclosed in Patent Document 1. It is disclosed.

However, according to the conventional technology, information such as digitized documents is exchanged in plain text on the network. Therefore, leakage of important personal information (physical conditions, etc.) of care service users and falsification of care service units, etc. There is a threat that illegal payments will be implemented. In addition, a document relating to a care plan or benefit management work may require the insured's seal, and it is also necessary to electronically prove that the person has made the seal.
JP 2003-16190 A

  Therefore, in view of the above-described problems, the present invention provides a network-based care service system that leaks important personal information related to the privacy of care service users, and fraudulent benefits due to falsification of care service units, etc. An object of the present invention is to provide a care service system that is strong against threats and that can electronically prove that the person has made a seal.

  1st invention which solves this subject is a nursing care service system using a network, and the nursing care service system includes at least a nursing care service provider server possessed by a nursing care service provider, and the nursing care service provider server. An information terminal connected via a network, and a care service user or a user token possessed by the caregiver, and each of the care service provider server and the user token is a secret of a public key cryptosystem The information terminal having the key and the public key, to which the user token is connected, and the care service provider server use the public key / the secret key to exchange information exchanged via the network. A nursing care service support system characterized by encryption / decryption.

  According to the first invention, information exchanged via the network is encrypted using the public key, thereby preventing leakage of important personal information regarding the care service user's privacy from the network. be able to.

  Furthermore, a second invention for solving this problem is the care service support system according to the first invention, wherein the user token is input using the secret key of the user token. Digital signature generation means for generating a digital signature of information, wherein the information terminal generates a digital signature of transmission information to be transmitted to the care service provider server using the digital signature generation means of the user token The care service system is characterized in that the digital signature generated by the digital signature generation means is encoded into the transmission information and transmitted.

  Preferably, in the second invention, the user token includes owner authentication means for authenticating the identity of the care service user, and the user token is provided only when the owner authentication means is successfully authenticated. It is preferable that the digital signature generation means provided operates. Here, the owner authentication means means a means for collating a PIN (Personal Identification Number) and an authentication means using biometric information of the care service user.

  According to the second invention, by encoding a digital signature in the transmission information, falsification of a care service unit or the like is prevented and the digital signature is authenticated using the public key of the user token. Thus, it is possible to electronically prove that the care service user has performed the seal.

  According to the present invention described above, in a care service system using a network, it is robust against threats on the network such as leakage of personal information required for privacy of care service users and fraud benefits due to falsification of care service units, etc. In addition, it is possible to provide a care service system that can electronically prove that the person has made a seal.

  Now, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a care service support system to which the present invention is applied. As shown in FIG. 1, the care service support system includes a personal computer 40 (hereinafter referred to as user PC, PC: Personal Computer) installed in the home of the care service user and hardware possessed by the care service user. A token 20 (hereinafter referred to as a user token), a portable information terminal 30 (hereinafter referred to as a caregiver PC) possessed by a caregiver who cares for a care service user (hereinafter referred to as a caregiver PC), and a server installed in the care service provider 10 (hereinafter referred to as a company server) and a server 50 (hereinafter referred to as a local server) installed in the local government. The user PC 40, the caregiver PC 30, the business server 10 and the local server 50 described above are respectively connected to the network 60. Connected to. Here, the network 60 means a network composed of a plurality of data communication networks such as a mobile phone communication network, the Internet, and a LAN. A mobile phone 30a is connected to the caregiver PC 30, and the caregiver PC 30 wirelessly connects to the network 60 using the mobile phone 30a. This connection form is merely an example, and the present invention does not define any connection form.

  In the care service support system of FIG. 1, a care service user (or a family member) connects to the network 60 using the user PC 40 and refers to the “home care support business operator list” published on the local government server 50. While selecting a nursing care service provider that has been designated by the local government and taking a nursing care service estimate from the nursing care service provider's business server 50, etc., The caregiver creates a document such as a care plan or a benefit management slip using the caregiver PC 30 and transmits the created document to the business server 10.

  As described above, the use of the network for the care service support system improves the convenience of the care service, but the personal information of the care service user (for example, classification information and salary management information for "care required 1-5") ) May leak from the network. In addition, the care plan and the payroll management slip require the consent of the principal, and it is also necessary to prove that the principal consented electronically.

  The care service support system in the present embodiment uses a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) to solve the above-mentioned problems, thereby preventing personal information leakage of the care service user and the care service user has agreed. Provide a nursing care service support system that can prove this electronically.

  The care service user has a hardware token (user token 20) for storing cryptographic credentials used for identification authentication of the care service user. Hardware tokens can store cryptographic credentials (public key cryptography private keys and public key certificates) as data for identifying and authenticating care service users, and encrypt and decrypt data using cryptographic credentials. This means a portable device that has a function to generate a digital signature using a secret key of cryptographic credentials. In the present embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, the hardware token (user token 20) possessed by the care service user is disclosed by the present applicant in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2004-264915. USB key with a built-in SIM and a USB communication function.

  FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining the user token 20 and the SIM 21 built in the user token 20. As shown in FIG. 2A, the user token 20 has a built-in SIM 21 (Subscriber Identity Module), performs data communication with the SIM 21, and uses a USB port 22 to make a computer (in this case, a user PC 40 or It has a function of data communication with a caregiver PC 30).

  FIG. 2B is a diagram illustrating the SIM 21 built in the user token 20. As shown in FIG. 2B, the SIM 21 has a shape obtained by cutting the periphery of the IC module of the IC card into a shape of about 12 mm × 25 mm. The detailed shape of the SIM 21 is standardized by a standard such as GSM. Yes. The SIM 21 has all the data stored in the user token 20 (to be described later) (encrypted credentials, etc.) and the functions of the user token 20 (data encryption function, famous name generating function, etc.).

  In the present embodiment, the user token 20 is a USB key, but an IC card can be used as the user token 20 in addition to the USB key described above. However, since the reader / writer is not necessary for the USB key, the convenience is higher than that of the IC card. Of course, an IC card can be used as the user token 20 if the PC is equipped with a reader / writer.

  FIG. 3 is a block diagram of the care service support system shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 3, in order to use PKI, the local government, the care service provider, and the care service user each possess an encryption key pair (private key and public key) of the public key cryptosystem.

  The local secret key 500 (hereinafter referred to as the local secret key) is stored in the local government server 50 so as not to be leaked to the outside, and the public key 501 (hereinafter referred to as the local public key) is distributed to the care service provider and the care service user. And stored in the operator server 10 and the user token 20. The care service provider's private key 100 (hereinafter referred to as the company's private key) is stored in the company server 10 so as not to leak outside, and the public key of the care service company (hereinafter referred to as the company's public key) is stored by the local government. It becomes a CA station and is stored in the business server 10 in the form of a public key certificate (hereinafter, business public key certificate 101) issued using the local government private key 500. The care service user's private key 200 (hereinafter referred to as the user private key) is stored in the user token 20 so as not to leak outside, and the care service user's public key 201 (hereinafter referred to as the user public key) is Becomes a CA station and is stored in the operator server 10 in the form of a public key certificate (hereinafter referred to as a user public key certificate 201) issued using the local government private key 500.

  FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining a public key certificate issued by a local government as a CA station. As shown in FIG. 4, the public key certificate 70 includes a message part 71 and a digital signature part 72. In addition to the public key data 71a, the message part 71 includes the CA station that issued the public key certificate. Data such as information to be specified (here, the local government), expiration date, subject (here, a care service user or a care service provider) is described, and the digital signature unit 72 stores the hash value of the message unit 71 in the CA station. A digital signature 72a encrypted with a private key (here, the local government private key 500) is described.

  The validity of the public key certificate 70 can be authenticated with the public key of the CA station (here, the local government public key 501). That is, the PC or server that has received the public key certificate 70 calculates the hash value of the message part 71 of the public key certificate 70, and uses the CA signature public key (here, the local government public key 501) as the digital signature 72a. Compare with the decrypted value. If the calculated hash value matches the decrypted value, the received public key certificate 70 is definitely authenticated as a public key certificate issued by a CA station (here, a local government).

  In the present embodiment, the local government is a CA station and issues a public key certificate. However, even if the CA station is not a local government, it is a third party, preferably a public third party. There may be. When the CA station is not a local government, the public key certificates of the local government, the care service provider, and the care service user are issued by the private key of the CA station, and the validity of each public key certificate is determined by the public key of the CA station. Authenticated.

  In addition to encryption credentials, the operator server 10 uses PKI to perform encryption communication with the user PC 40 or the caregiver PC 30 and identification / authentication of the care service user accessing the operator server 10. An encryption unit 110 that encrypts / decrypts data and a signature generation authentication unit 111 that generates and authenticates a digital signature are provided. The business server 10 also includes a web page 520 distributed to the user PC 40 or the caregiver PC 30 via the network 60 and an electronic form 521 (for example, a care plan or a salary) that the care service user or caregiver fills in. And a database 522 for storing a completed electronic form 521 transmitted from the user PC 40 or the caregiver PC 30.

  The user token 20 includes an encryption unit 210 that encrypts / decrypts data, a signature generation authentication unit 211 that generates and authenticates a digital signature, and a user token 20 in order to use the encryption credential in addition to the encryption credential. PIN authentication means 220 is provided for permitting login to.

  The reason why the user token 20 includes the PIN authentication means 220 is to perform personal authentication of a care service user in order to prevent unauthorized use of the user token 20 by a third party. Unless the PIN input to the user token 20 and the PIN secretly stored in the user token 20 are successfully verified, the cryptographic credentials stored in the user token 20 cannot be used. In this embodiment, PIN authentication means 220 is provided as means for authenticating the care service user. However, the means for authenticating the person uses the biometric information (for example, fingerprint information) of the care service user. Authentication means may be used.

  Further, in order to browse the web page 521 and the electronic form 521 of the business server 10 and to transmit the electronic form 521 that has been filled in the business server 10, the caregiver PC 30 and the user PC 40 are connected to the browser 31 and the browser, respectively. 41 is provided. The browsers 31 and 41 have an application that performs encrypted communication with the provider server 10 using a session encryption key, and a user token API (Application Program Interface) for using the user token 20.

  From here, in order to prevent leakage of personal information of the care service user, a procedure for encrypting data flowing through the network 60 and a procedure for electronically proving that the care service user has agreed will be described. By showing these procedures, the functions of the operator server 10 and the user token 20 shown in FIG. 3 become clear.

  First, a procedure for encrypting data flowing on the network 60 in order to prevent leakage of personal information of a care service user will be described. FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a procedure for encrypting data flowing on the network 60. In order to prevent the leakage of personal information of care service users, the public key certificate is exchanged between the user PC 40 and the business server 10, and after mutual authentication using the public key certificate, the data is encrypted and exchanged. Is done. Although FIG. 5 shows the procedure between the user PC 40 and the operator server 10, the procedure between the caregiver PC 30 and the operator server 10 is also the same.

  In order to perform mutual authentication between the user PC 40 and the operator server 10, the care service user accesses the operator server 10 using the browser 41 of the user PC 40, and the browser 41 of the user PC 40 uses the user token 20. The user public key certificate 201 is read from the server, and the user public key certificate 201 is transmitted to the operator server 10 (T10).

  When the business server 10 receives the user public key certificate 201, the signature generation verification unit 111 authenticates the received certificate using the local government public key 501 (T11). When the prominent generation verification unit 111 succeeds in certificate authentication, the business server 10 generates a first random number and transmits the generated first random number to the user PC 40 (T12).

  When the user PC 40 receives the first random number, it transmits the first random number to the user token 20, encrypts the first random number with the user secret key 200 by the encryption means 210 of the user token 20, and The encrypted first random number is transmitted to the operator server 10 (T13). Note that before the first random number is encrypted with the user private key 200, the PIN authentication means 220 of the user token 20 needs the PIN verification of the care service user.

  The encryption unit 110 of the business server 10 decrypts the encrypted first random number with the user public key included in the user public key certificate 201, and the business server 10 generates the decrypted value and the generated first Are compared (T14). If the values match, the access to the business server 10 and the user PC 40 authenticates that the information terminal has a valid user private key 200, and from the message part of the user public key certificate 201 The care service user who is accessing is specified (T15).

  Next, the provider server 10 transmits the provider public key certificate 101 to the user PC 40 (T16). When the user PC 40 receives the business operator public key certificate 101, the famous generation verification unit 211 authenticates the business operator public key certificate 101 received using the local government public key 501 (T17). When the authentication of the business operator public key certificate 101 is successful, the user PC 40 generates a second random number and transmits the generated second random number to the business operator server 10 (T18).

  When the business server 10 receives the second random number, the encryption unit 110 encrypts the second random number with the business private key 100, and the business server 10 transmits the encrypted second random number to the user PC 40. (T19). The encryption means 211 of the user PC 40 decrypts the encrypted second random number with the operator public key included in the operator public key certificate 101, and the user PC 40 decrypts the decrypted value and the generated second random number. Are compared (T20). If the values match, the accessing business server 10 authenticates that the server has a valid business public key.

  After authenticating the business server 10, the user PC 40 transmits an authentication result to the business server (T21). If the authentication result is information indicating that the authentication is successful, the business server 10 generates a session encryption key (for example, a triple DES key, DES; Data Encryption Standard) to be used in one time (T22), and the encryption means 111 encrypts the generated session encryption key with the user public key included in the user public key certificate 201, and the operator server 10 transmits the encrypted session encryption key to the user PC 40 (T23).

  When the user PC 40 receives the encrypted session encryption key, the user PC 40 transmits the received data to the user token 20, and the encryption means 211 of the user token 20 decrypts the session encryption key with the user secret key 200 ( T24). The decrypted session encryption key is temporarily stored in the browser 41 of the user PC 40, and information exchanged between the user PC 40 and the business server 10 is encrypted with this session encryption key (T25).

  As described above, when the public key certificate is exchanged and mutual authentication is successful, information transmitted thereafter is encrypted with the session encryption key and transmitted. For example, when the care plan created by the caregiver is accessed from the caregiver PC 30 to the web page 520 of the business server 10, the caregiver acquires the electronic form 521 of the care plan. The caregiver confirms the medical condition / life status of the care service user and decides on the care service to be provided, then the name, household status, current medical history (including mental and physical conditions) of the care service user, and weekly care Fill out the electronic form with service plans.

  As described above, since the care plan contains extremely important personal information about the individual (care service user), the care plan created by the caregiver PC 30 is encrypted with the session encryption key and encrypted. The care plan is transmitted to the business operator server 10 via the network 60.

  Next, a procedure for electronically proving that the care service user has agreed is described. FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining a procedure for electronically proving that the care service user has agreed. In FIG. 6, the procedure between the caregiver PC 30 and the business server 10 is shown, but the procedure between the user PC 40 and the business server 10 is also the same. Note that FIG. 5 shows only a procedure for electronically certifying that the care service user has agreed, and all data transmitted and received between the caregiver PC 30 and the business server 10 is encrypted by the above-described procedure. Has been.

  In order for the caregiver to obtain the electronic form 521 in which documents (for example, care plan and salary management slip) necessary for the care insurance system are digitized, the caregiver can use the business server 10 from the browser 31 of the caregiver PC 30. To request the electronic form 521 (T30). The business server 10 transmits the requested electronic form 521 to the caregiver PC 30 (T31).

  The caregiver enters necessary items in the electronic form 521 transmitted using the browser 31 (T32). The contents entered are agreed with the care service user, and after obtaining the consent of the care service user, the completed electronic form 521 is transmitted to the user token 20, and the famous generation verification means 211 of the user token 20 is used. The caregiver PC 30 generates the digital signature of the data of the completed electronic form 521 using the caretaker secret key 200, and transmits the completed electronic form 521 encoded with the digital signature to the business operator server 10 (T33). Before generating the digital signature, the PIN authentication means 220 of the user token 20 requires the PIN check of the care service user.

  The famous generation verification unit 111 of the business server 10 authenticates the digital signature added to the received electronic form 521 with the user public key included in the user public key certificate 201, and if it is a valid digital signature. The filled-in electronic form 521 with the digital signature added is stored in the database 522 (T34). The completed electronic form 521 to which the digital signature stored in the database is added is used when applying to the local government.

  For example, when a caregiver creates a care service provision certificate in the pay management operation and needs the consent of the care service user to the created care service provision certificate, the caregiver PC 30 sends it to the business server 10. The caregiver obtains a template of the care service provision certificate with the electronic form 521. Then, the caregiver enters the content of the care service provided to the care service user, the service code, the number of units, etc., and confirms the entered content with the care service user.

  The care service user confirms the contents of the entered care service, and if there is no error, after performing the PIN verification of the care service user, the digital signature for the contents entered using the user token 20 The caregiver PC 30 encodes the generated digital signature in the entered care service provision certificate and transmits it to the business operator server 10.

  The provider server 10 authenticates the digital signature encoded with the content of the received care service provision certificate using the user public key included in the user public key certificate 201, and if the authentication is successful, the digital signature Is stored in the database 522. The stored care service provision certificate is used when submitting it to the local government.

Overall view of a care service support system. Explanatory drawing of a user token (USB key) and SIM. The functional block diagram of a care service support system. The figure explaining a public key certificate. The figure explaining the procedure which encrypts the data which flow through the network. The figure explaining the procedure which electronically proves that the care service user agreed.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 provider server 100 Nursing care service provider's private key 101 Nursing care service provider's public key certificate 110 Encryption unit 111 Signature generation authentication unit 120 Web page 121 Electronic form 122 Database 20 User token 200 Nursing service user's private key 201 Nursing Service User Public Key 210 Encryption Unit 211 Signature Generation Authentication Unit 220 PIN Authentication Unit 30 Caregiver PC
31 Browser 40 User PC
41 Browser 50 Municipal server 500 Local secret key 501 Local public key

Claims (5)

  A care service system using a network, wherein the care service system includes at least a care service provider server possessed by a care service provider, and an information terminal connected to the care service provider server via the network, A care service user or a user token possessed by the caregiver, wherein the care service provider server and the user token each have a secret key and a public key of a public key cryptosystem, and the user The information terminal to which the token is connected and the care service provider server encrypt / decrypt information exchanged via the network by using the public key / the secret key. Service support system.   The care service support system according to claim 1, wherein the user token includes digital signature generation means for generating a digital signature of input information using the secret key of the user token, The information terminal generates a digital signature of transmission information to be transmitted to the care service provider server using the digital signature generation unit of the user token, and transmits the digital signature generated by the digital signature generation unit A care service support system characterized by encoding and transmitting information.   The care service support system according to claim 2, wherein the user token includes owner authentication means for authenticating the identity of the care service user, and only when the authentication of the owner authentication means is successful. A care service support system, wherein the digital signature generation means provided in a user token operates.   5. The care service support system according to claim 4, wherein the owner authentication means provided in the user token is a means for checking the PIN of the care service user. system. 6. The care service support system according to claim 5, wherein the owner authentication means provided in the user token is means for authenticating biometric information of the care service user. Support system.

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