JP2005149011A - Data processor and history verifying method - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a data processor and a history verifying method for detecting the alteration of a processing history. <P>SOLUTION: When the capacity of a history list Li in a tamper-proof device is short, history information is saved to an external list Lo in an external storage device, and saving records S for guaranteeing the contents and order of the history information to be saved are generated and stored by using uni-directional functions in the tamper-proof device. At the time of verifying the external list Lo, the history information in the external list Lo is read in the order of saving, and a check value C is generated by using the uni-directional functions identical to those at the time of generating the saving records, and collated with the saving records S. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2005,JPO&NCIPI

Description

  The present invention relates to a data processing apparatus capable of preventing forgery, duplication, deletion, and falsification of history data in which operation status is recorded.

・ Communication devices that are charged according to the size and number of packets sent and received,
・ Viewing and browsing system for paid content charged per program and title,
・ Operation logs of computer systems that require auditing,
・ Flight recorder, etc.
For services that require a fee depending on the contents or number of times the system and equipment are used, and computer systems that require high security, historical data that records the operating status is important. We must protect against unauthorized operations such as counterfeiting, duplication, deletion, and tampering.

  Further, in the electronic value receiving device such as an electronic ticket or electronic money in JP 2002-157532 A (Patent Document 1), the electronic value recorded by recording the electronic value transfer information received in the past is recorded. Re-transfer with transfer information is refused. Records need to be securely stored to prevent duplication of electronic value due to replay attacks.

  In such cases, the history data must be prevented from being illegally operated by the user. However, in an open system composed of the Internet and a personal computer, it is not possible to assume the use of equipment with special measures such as physical sealing. For this reason, it is difficult to protect the data stored in the storage device of the user terminal.

  Storage in a tamper-proof device such as an IC card is an effective means, but it is less expensive and less expensive than other storage devices, so it increases with the progress of operation, processing, and time like historical data Not suitable for storing information. In the above-mentioned Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2002-157532, it is determined that electronic value transfer information older than a certain period is not received, the history data is deleted, and the capacity necessary for holding the receipt record is kept within a certain range. Although it can be mounted on a card, in this case, the possibility that the electronic value cannot be received due to communication failure or delay must be allowed.

  Further, if an electronic signature method using an encryption technique is used, data alteration can generally be prevented. In particular, in the method of Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-337600 (Patent Document 2), the signature of the previous data is included in the signature of each data, the key information used for the signature and the signature of the latest data are concealed in the IC card, It is possible to guarantee the contents and ranking of the entire history data and to detect data deletion.

Open 2002-157532 gazette Japanese Patent Publication 2001-337600

  However, the method disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-337600 can guarantee the contents of data once input, but it does not perform data manpower for concealment, forgery of input data, or before input to the device. In addition, there is a problem that it is not possible to detect fraud such as tampering with data. Further, in a device with low processing capability such as an IC card, the cost for signature processing is high.

In order to solve the above-mentioned problem, the invention according to claim 1 is a data processing device capable of detecting falsification of a processing history, comprising a tamper-proof device and an external storage device,
The tamper resistant device is
History information generating means for generating history information R that can specify the content of data processing;
A history list holding means for holding a history list Li having a plurality of history information R as elements;
Data processing means for atomically performing data processing and processing for adding corresponding history information R to the history list Li;
A saving unit that saves the history information R in the external storage device when the capacity of the history list Li is insufficient, and generates a save record S that guarantees the contents of the history information R to be saved and the order of saving;
A evacuation record holding means for holding the generated evacuation record S;
The save record S is generated by applying the one-way function f to the concatenation of the history information Rn saved at the nth time and the previous save record Sn−1, that is, the save record Sn = f (Rn | Sn -1),
It is characterized by
The external storage device is
A means for holding an external list Lo for adding history information R saved from the history list Li to the top in the order of saving;
It is characterized by that.

  According to this data processing apparatus, the history information is stored atomically together with the data processing in the tamper resistant apparatus, so that forgery, concealment, and alteration can be prevented. Further, by saving the history information in the external list, the storage capacity required for the history list in the tamper resistant apparatus can be suppressed. Further, the save record that needs to be retained in the tamper resistant device may be a fixed capacity regardless of the contents and number of data processing, and the amount of calculation required for generation is less than that of the signature processing.

The invention according to claim 2 is the data processing apparatus according to claim 1,
The tamper-proof device takes in history information again in the order in which it was saved from the tail of the external list Lo, and generates a test value C for the entire external list Lo by using the same method as the generation of the save record in the save means. It is characterized by having external list verification means for verifying the contents and order of history information of the entire external list Lo by collating with the record S.

  According to this data processing device, it is possible to insert, delete, change or change the order of history information to the external list so as to maintain consistency with the evacuation record held in the tamper resistant device. Since it is difficult due to the nature of the one-way function, it is possible to prevent (detect) an unauthorized operation such as falsification of the external list while being in an external storage device that does not use a special fraud prevention measure.

The invention according to claim 3 is the data processing device according to claim 1 or 2,
The tamper resistant device has reprocessing verification means for verifying whether or not it has been processed before by referring to the history list Li and the external list Lo for history information generated prior to data processing,
The data processing means does not perform processing when there is a past processing result in reprocessing verification.

  According to this data processing device, when the user can enjoy profits according to the contents of the processed data, such as receipt of electronic value, duplication of illegal value due to the user's replay attack can be prevented. In addition, in a service in which a fee is generated according to the contents of processed data, such as browsing paid content, it is possible to avoid multiple charges due to browsing the same content.

The invention according to claim 4 is the data processing device according to claim 3,
The history information generating means includes
・ Include data ID, which is a monotonically increasing value included in the processing data as data identification information, in a format that can also be referenced in the history information,
The history list holding means is
-Keep the history list sorted in descending order of the data ID included in each history information,
The reprocessing verification means includes
-When the history list and the external list are scanned from the top and the corresponding data ID cannot be found even after scanning up to a record having a value smaller than the data ID of the target data, it is determined that the processing has not been performed previously.
The retracting means is
-Save history information from the history list to the external list in order from the smallest data ID,
If the ID of the target data is not previously processed and is smaller than the minimum value of the history list, the corresponding history information is inserted into the correct ID position of the external list after the corresponding data is processed, and the save record S is used using the external list. Recalculate
The save record holding means updates the save record S after the data processing.

  According to this data processing apparatus, it is not necessary to scan the history list and the external list all when determining whether the processing target data has already been processed in the past, and efficient determination is possible. Even when the ID of the symmetric data is smaller than the minimum value in the history list, the correct save history is held in the save history holding means.

The invention according to claim 5 is the data processing device according to claim 4,
The external list verification means includes
-The inspection value of the entire external list is obtained based on the inspection value from the end of the external list Lo to the front of the scanning range, and verified by comparing with the saved record in the tamper resistant device,
The external storage device
A test value holding means for holding the order m from the tail of the external list and the test value Cm of the history information from the tail to the m-th;
A test value generating means for generating test values Cn up to the nth (m <n) based on the test values Cm from the tail of the external list to the mth;
It is characterized by having.

  According to this data processing apparatus, since a part of the verification process of the external list can be performed in advance outside the tamper resistant apparatus, efficient verification is possible.

The invention according to claim 6 is the data processing apparatus according to any one of claims 1 to 5,
The data processing device
A history request receiving means for receiving a history submission request from an auditor including an arbitrary value (challenge) generated by the auditor for each data processing device for each audit;
A communication device having an external list Lo, a evacuation record S, a challenge, and a history information transmitting means for transmitting a signature Sg to an auditor;
The tamper resistant device is
A secret key holding means for holding the secret key Sk enclosed by the auditor at the time of manufacturing the apparatus so that it cannot be referred to or changed from the outside;
Signature generating means for generating an electronic signature Sg using the secret key Sk for concatenation of the challenge and the evacuation record S;
Have
The retracting means is
Prior to submitting the history, all the contents of the history list Li are sequentially saved to the external list Lo.
It is characterized by that.

  According to this data processing device, the auditor can detect the alteration of the external list by verifying the match between the saved record and the inspection value and verifying the signature of the saved record without directly verifying the data processing device. By collecting data using a general communication path without using means, it is possible to efficiently audit a device installed at a remote location.

The invention according to claim 7 is a method for verifying that the external list Lo has not been tampered with in the data processing device according to claim 1,
Using a method similar to the generation of the save record S in the save means, a plurality of history information R constituting the external list Lo is processed by a one-way function in the save order from the tail to the beginning. Produces
By comparing the inspection value C with the evacuation record S in the tamper-proof device, the external list Lo is not altered.

  According to the present invention, it is one-way to insert, delete, change, or change the order of history information with respect to the external list so as to maintain consistency with the evacuation record held in the tamper-resistant device. Since it is difficult due to the nature of the sex function, it is possible to prevent (detect) an unauthorized operation such as falsification of the external list while being in an external storage device that does not use a special fraud prevention measure.

  According to an eighth aspect of the present invention, in the method of the seventh aspect, in the case where the nth history information Rn from the tail of the external list Lo has been verified in the past, the inspection value Cn obtained in the past is used as a base point. If the inspection value C of the entire external list Lo is obtained and compared with the saved record S in the tamper-proof device, the contents and order of the history information from the (n + 1) th to the top of the external list Lo are correct and not altered. It is characterized by doing.

  According to the present invention, since it is not necessary to generate a verification value of the external list of a portion that has been verified in the past, efficient verification is possible.

  As described above, according to the present invention, forgery and concealment of history data can be prevented by atomically performing data processing and history creation within the tamper resistant device, and further, hash values of history data can be chained. In addition, by holding the anti-tamper device in a tamper-resistant device, it is possible to guarantee the contents and the order of the records saved in the external storage device that does not use special fraud prevention means, and detect forgery, falsification, and deletion.

FIG. 1 shows the configuration of a data processing apparatus of the present invention. The data processing device 100 includes an external storage device 10, a communication device 20, and a tamper resistant device 30.
The external storage device 10 includes an external list holding unit 11, an inspection value generation unit 12, and an inspection value holding unit 13.
The communication device 20 includes a history request receiving unit 21 and a history information transmitting unit 22.
The tamper resistant apparatus 30 includes a data processing unit 31, a history information generation unit 32, a reprocessing verification unit 33, a history list holding unit 34, a saving unit 35, a secret key holding unit 36, a signature generation unit 37, a saving record holding unit 38, The external list verification means 39 is comprised.

FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram of the pay content browsing system according to the first embodiment. This system includes the data processing apparatus 100 shown in FIG.
In the present embodiment, the function of each means constituting the data processing apparatus 100 will be described in relation to browsing of paid content and charging processing. In the figure, S000 to S017 indicate a paid content browsing and charging processing sequence in the present embodiment.

(S000) (S001): The paid content is distributed in the encrypted form from the distribution center 300 via the network or stored in the recording medium 310 and processed by the user's playback device 200.
(S002): The playback apparatus 200 inputs the encrypted content to the data processing apparatus 100.

(S003): The tamper resistant apparatus 30 uses the secret key Sk held in the secret key holding means 36 to decrypt the content by the data processing means 31. Further, the history information generating means 32 generates the history information R of the process from the content ID and title.
(S004): The history information R is added to the history list Li of the history list holding means 34.

(S005): When the number of history information included in the history list Li reaches a predetermined fixed number, the save means 35 saves the oldest history information in the list to the external list Lo of the external list holding means 11. . FIG. 3 shows the structure of the history list Li and the external list Lo at this time, and the data flow between the processing of the saving means and each related means.

(S005a): History information Rn saved for the nth time in total is obtained from the history list Li. At that time, the history information Rn is deleted from the history list Li.
(S005b): obtaining a saving recording _{S n-1} which is generated during the evacuation of the previous ((n-1) th) from the retracted record holding means 38.
(S005c): The concatenation of the history information Rn and the previous saving silver S _n-1 is processed by a one-way function, for example, a hash function such as SHA-1, and a new saving record Sn = H (Rn | S _n-1 ) And is held in the save record holding means 38.
(S006): The history information Rn is added to the external list Lo.

(S007): The tamper resistant device 30 outputs the content decrypted by the data processing means 31 to the playback device 200.
(S008): The playback device 200 plays back the decrypted content.

(S009): The charging center 400 generates a challenge that is arbitrary for each user and difficult to predict for each predetermined period, and transmits the challenge to the data processing apparatus 100 as a history submission request.
(S010): The communication device 20 inputs the challenge received by the history request receiving means 21 to the tamper resistant device 30.

(S011): The tamper resistant apparatus 30 saves all history information in the history list Li to the external list Lo by the save means 35 prior to the history submission.
(S012): The signature generation unit 37 performs signature processing on the concatenation of the challenge and the save record S held in the save record holding unit 38 using the secret key Sk.
(S013) (S014): The communication device 20 obtains the external list Lo from the external storage device 10, and uses the history information transmission means 22 together with the save record S, signature information Sg, and challenge output from the tamper resistant device 30. Transmit to billing center 400.

(S015): The billing center 400 verifies the signature Sg and verifies that the saved record S is valid by verifying that the challenge sent in (S014) is equal to the value sent in (S009). Validate.
(S016): Billing center 400 further verifies whether falsification has been added to external list Lo by the following method. A value obtained by processing the history information R ₁ at the tail of the external list Lo with the hash function H is set as a check value C _1, and a check value Cn from the tail to the n-th history information Rn is defined as Rn and C _n− Obtained from the hash value of _one concatenation.
C ₁ = H (R ₁ )
C ₂ = H (R ₂ | C ₁ )
C ₃ = H (R ₃ | C ₂ )
:
_{C n = H (R n |} C n-1)
The inspection value C of the entire external list thus obtained is compared with the save record S sent in (S014), and if it is the same value, it is determined that the external list has not been altered.

At this time, if the nth history information Rn from the tail of the external list has been verified in the past, the inspection value of the entire external list Lo is obtained from the inspection value Cn obtained in the past, and the save record S and By comparing, it is possible to determine that the contents and order of the history information from the (n + 1) th to the top of the external list Lo have not been tampered with.
(SO17): Content reproduced by the user is identified from the external list Lo, and billing processing is performed.

  Here, the same secret key is used for content decryption and signature generation, but this encryption method may be a public key encryption method using a different key pair for each device, or within the distribution center and all data processing devices. A common key encryption method using a common secret key assigned by an inspector of the system may be used. The public key cryptosystem has an advantage that even if a secret key leaks, the damage can be kept in the corresponding device. In this case, it is necessary to encrypt the content for each device. In general, a public key cryptosystem is used for an electronic signature. However, since it is only necessary to detect falsification at a charging center this time, it may be encrypted using a common key cryptosystem. However, in this case, ID information that is unique to the device and cannot be altered is held in the tamper-proof device and included in the encryption target, thereby preventing fraud due to separation of the device used for playback and the device used for history transmission. There is a need.

FIG. 4 shows a configuration diagram of an embodiment of an electronic value transfer system, and this system includes an electronic value transfer apparatus 500 including the data processing apparatus 100 shown in FIG.
In the present embodiment, the function of each means constituting the data processing apparatus 100 will be described in relation to the electronic value transfer process.

  The electronic value is composed of a right content m representing the value and a token T = H (m) consisting of a hash value of the right content m. Electronic value can be transferred and exercised only when the token T is held in the electronic value transfer device 500. The token is held in a token storage unit (not shown) in the tamper resistant device 30 and is deleted from the tamper resistant device 30 when the recipient creates a token exchange format TEF which is electronic value transfer information designated. In addition, the electronic value transfer apparatus stores a token only when correct receipt processing is performed. In this way, the electronic value is held in the tamper-proof device of the electronic value transfer device as a token, or the electronic value is present only outside the electronic value transfer device as a token exchange type TEF designated by the recipient. The originality of target value is guaranteed.

  In the present embodiment, the electronic value is received by one message transmission / reception by the same method as the electronic value transfer apparatus disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2002-157532. In the present invention, the received list that is necessary for preventing the receipt is not deleted in the present invention, and is saved in the external storage device 10.

In the figure, S200 to S208 show an electronic value transfer processing sequence in the present embodiment.
(S200): Create a token exchange format TEF in which the recipient is designated by the electronic value transfer device on the transfer side. The token TEF includes a transferor's signature, a tamper resistant certificate (TPG), and the like in addition to the token T and the recipient information that are the hash value of the right content m.
(S201): The corresponding token is deleted from the electronic value transfer device on the transferor side.
(S202): The right contents m and the token exchange format TEF are delivered to the recipient.

(S203): The electronic value transfer device 500 on the receiving side first generates a hash value of the received right content m by the data processing means 31, and verifies whether it is equal to the token included in the TEF.
(S204): Next, whether the TEF is valid is verified by confirming the recipient information, the signature of the transferor, and the validity of the TPG.

(S205): Further, the history information generation means 32 generates a TEF hash value as history information, and the reprocessing verification means 33 verifies whether the TEF has already been received against the history list Li and the external list Lo. . At this time, the external list verification means 39 verifies whether the external list Lo has been tampered with by the following method. First, history information is fetched from the tail of the external list Lo in the order in which it is saved, and the inspection value C for the entire external list Lo is generated in the same manner as in S016, and then this is saved in the saved record holding means 38. If it is the same value, it is determined that the external list has not been tampered with.

  Also in this case, if the nth history information Rn from the tail of the external list has been verified in the past, the inspection value of the entire external list Lo is obtained from the inspection value Cn obtained in the past, and tamper resistance By comparing with the saved record S in the apparatus, it can be determined that the contents and order of the history information from the (n + 1) th to the top of the external list Lo have not been tampered with.

(S206): When all the verifications of S203 to S205 are successful, the token is stored in the token storage unit (not shown) of the tamper resistant device 30 of the electronic value transfer device on the recipient side.
(S207): The history information R indicating the TEF received this time created in S205 is added to the history list Li.
(S208): When the history list Li reaches a predetermined capacity, the saving means saves the history information to the external list Lo in the same manner as in S005, and also generates the saving record S to save the saving record holding means. 38.

In the first and second embodiments described above, the history information is stored in the history list in the order of occurrence, and the history information is saved to the external list in the oldest order, but the present invention is not limited to this.
In another embodiment of the present invention, the history information generating means 32 includes a data ID that is a monotonically increasing value included in the processing data as the data identification information in a format that can also be referred to the history information, and keeps a history list. The means holds the history list in the descending order of the data IDs included in each history information, and the saving means saves the history list to the external list in order from the history information having the smallest data ID.

  In this case, the reprocessing verification unit 33 scans the history list and the external list from the top, and if the corresponding data ID cannot be found even by scanning up to a record having a value smaller than the data ID of the target data. It can be determined that it has not been processed before.

  The external list verification means 39 obtains the inspection value of the entire external list from the inspection value from the end of the external list Lo to the front of the scanning range, and verifies it by comparing it with the saved record in the tamper resistant apparatus. The external storage device 10 performs a test value holding unit 12 that holds the order m from the tail of the external list and the test value Cm of the history information from the tail to the mth, and m from the tail of the external list. The test value generating means 13 for generating the test value Cn up to the nth (m <n) based on the test value Cm up to the nth is provided, and a part of the verification process of the external list is performed by the external storage device Implemented in advance, the external list verification means 39 can use the result to calculate the inspection value of the entire external list.

  In this embodiment, when the ID of the target data is not previously processed and is smaller than the minimum value of the history list, the saving unit 35 inserts the corresponding history information into the correct ID position of the external list after the corresponding data processing, The save record S is recalculated using the external list, and the save record holding means 38 needs to update the save record S after the data processing.

  The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiment, and each means is constructed as a program, and a disk device, floppy (registered trademark) disk, CD-ROM, etc. connected to a computer used as an electronic value transfer device The present invention can be easily realized by storing it in a portable storage medium and installing it when implementing the present invention. In addition, various modifications and applications are possible within the scope of the claims.

It is a figure which shows the structure of the data processor of this invention. It is a figure which shows the structure of the pay content browsing system in Example 1 of this invention, and the sequence of the content browsing in this system, and an accounting process. FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a history list and an external list and a save processing sequence according to the first embodiment. It is a figure which shows the structure of the electronic value transfer system in Example 2, and the electronic value transfer process sequence in this system.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 100 Data processing apparatus 10 External storage device 11 External list holding means 12 Inspection value generation means 13 Inspection value holding means 20 Communication device 21 History request reception means 22 History information transmission means 30 Tamper resistant device 31 Data processing means 32 History information generation means 33 Reprocessing verification means 34 History list holding means 35 Saving means 36 Private key holding means 37 Famous generation means 38 Saved record holding means 39 External list verification means 200 Playback apparatus 300 Distribution center 310 Recording medium 400 Charging center 500 Electronic value transfer apparatus

Claims (8)

A data processing device capable of detecting falsification of processing history, comprising a tamper resistant device and an external storage device,
The tamper resistant device is
History information generating means for generating history information R that can specify the content of data processing;
A history list holding means for holding a history list Li having a plurality of history information R as elements;
Data processing means for atomically performing data processing and processing for adding corresponding history information R to the history list Li;
A saving unit that saves the history information R in the external storage device when the capacity of the history list Li is insufficient, and generates a save record S that guarantees the contents of the history information R to be saved and the order of saving;
A evacuation record holding means for holding the generated evacuation record S;
The save record S is generated by applying the one-way function f to the concatenation of the history information Rn saved at the nth time and the previous save record Sn−1, that is, the save record Sn = f (Rn | Sn -1),
It is characterized by
The external storage device is
A means for holding an external list Lo for adding history information R saved from the history list Li to the top in the order of saving;
A data processing apparatus. The data processing apparatus according to claim 1,
The tamper-proof device takes in history information again in the order in which it was saved from the tail of the external list Lo, and generates a test value C for the entire external list Lo by using the same method as the generation of the save record in the save means. A data processing apparatus comprising external list verification means for verifying the contents and order of history information of the entire external list Lo by collating with a record S. The data processing apparatus according to claim 1 or 2,
The tamper resistant device has reprocessing verification means for verifying whether or not it has been processed before by referring to the history list Li and the external list Lo for history information generated prior to data processing,
The data processing device is characterized in that, when there is a past processing result in the reprocessing verification, the data processing means does not perform the processing. The data processing apparatus according to claim 3, wherein
The history information generating means includes
・ Include data ID, which is a monotonically increasing value included in the processing data as data identification information, in a format that can also be referenced in the history information,
The history list holding means is
-Keep the history list sorted in descending order of the data ID included in each history information,
The reprocessing verification means includes
-When the history list and the external list are scanned from the top and the corresponding data ID cannot be found even after scanning up to a record having a value smaller than the data ID of the target data, it is determined that the processing has not been performed previously.
The retracting means is
-Save history information from the history list to the external list in order from the smallest data ID,
If the ID of the target data is not previously processed and is smaller than the minimum value of the history list, the corresponding history information is inserted into the correct ID position of the external list after the corresponding data is processed, and the save record S is used using the external list. Recalculate
The data processing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the save record holding unit updates the save record S after the data processing. The data processing apparatus according to claim 4, wherein
The external list verification means includes
-The inspection value of the entire external list is obtained based on the inspection value from the end of the external list Lo to the front of the scanning range, and verified by comparing with the saved record in the tamper resistant device,
The external storage device
A test value holding means for holding the order m from the tail of the external list and the test value Cm of the history information from the tail to the m-th;
A test value generating means for generating test values Cn up to the nth (m <n) based on the test values Cm from the tail of the external list to the mth;
A data processing apparatus comprising: In the data processing device according to any one of claims 1 to 5,
The data processing device
A history request receiving means for receiving a history submission request from an auditor including an arbitrary value (challenge) generated by the auditor for each data processing device for each audit;
A communication device having an external list Lo, a evacuation record S, a challenge, and a history information transmitting means for transmitting a signature Sg to an auditor;
The tamper resistant device is
A secret key holding means for holding the secret key Sk enclosed by the auditor at the time of manufacturing the apparatus so that it cannot be referred to or changed from the outside;
Signature generating means for generating an electronic signature Sg using the secret key Sk for concatenation of the challenge and the evacuation record S;
Have
The retracting means is
Prior to submitting the history, all the contents of the history list Li are sequentially saved to the external list Lo.
A data processing apparatus. The data processing device according to claim 1, wherein the external list Lo is verified to be not falsified.
Using a method similar to the generation of the save record S in the save means, a plurality of history information R constituting the external list Lo is processed by a one-way function in the save order from the tail to the beginning. Produces
A history verification method characterized in that the external list Lo has not been tampered with by comparing the inspection value C with the evacuation record S in the tamper resistant apparatus.   8. The method according to claim 7, wherein when the last list from the tail of the external list Lo to the nth history information Rn has been verified in the past, the test value of the entire external list Lo is based on the test value Cn obtained in the past. The history verification is characterized in that C is obtained and compared with the evacuation record S in the tamper-proof device, so that the contents and order of each history information from the (n + 1) th to the top of the external list Lo are correct and have not been tampered with. Method.

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