JP2005020536A - Electronic data signature device and program for signature device - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To totally manage two or more kinds of electronic certificates as a set including a public key and a private key, and improve the reliability and safety of an electronic signature. <P>SOLUTION: The device includes a means 2 to store two or more kinds of electronic certificates together with data of an administrator and an access enable person for every certificate, a means 3 to confirm that the signature request person is the access enable person stored in the means 2 responding to input of data for the signature request person and a target certification person to use the signature, and a means 4 to perform a electronic signature for the inputted electronic data using the object certification after the confirmation. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2005,JPO&NCIPI

Description

[0001]
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to an electronic signature system for electronic data, and more particularly, based on a public key infrastructure (PKI), for example, an electronic data signature apparatus for performing electronic signature on electronic data to ensure communication reliability, and its The present invention relates to a program used in an apparatus.
[0002]
[Prior art]
A public key infrastructure PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) that enhances data reliability by encrypting data and digitally signing communication data using a public key system is used.
[0003]
FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram of a conventional example of an electronic signature method using such a public key. Conventionally, an electronic certificate (digital certificate) as a set including a public key and a private key issued by a certificate authority is stored in the personal computer 51, the IC card 52, or the server 53, and is used for electronic data. The electronic signature is sent to the other server / client 55 via the Internet 54, for example.
[0004]
That is, when the electronic certificate as a set including the public key and the private key issued from the recognition station is stored in the personal computer 51 or the IC card 52, the electronic certificate including the private key is stored by those users. There was only personal management. Even when stored in the server 53, the management of a plurality of electronic certificates is generally not performed uniformly.
[0005]
Therefore, when managing a plurality of electronic certificates, whether to store a plurality of electronic certificates in the personal computer 51 for personal management, whether to have a plurality of IC cards 52, or to be managed by a plurality of servers I had to take such a method.
[0006]
There are the following documents as conventional techniques related to such an electronic signature.
[0007]
[Patent Document 1]
JP 2000-224164 A
"Device that supports multiple cryptographic algorithms simultaneously"
[Patent Document 2]
JP 2002-171289 A
"Policy Server, Proxy and Router"
[Patent Document 3]
JP 2002-207427 A
“Public Key Certificate Issuing System, Public Key Certificate Issuing Method, Information Processing Apparatus, Information Recording Medium, and Program Storage Medium”
[Non-Patent Document 1]
http: // job8. nikki. ne. jp / Companyarticle / 79773 /, VeriSign Japan “Roaming Service” (2002.7 NEWS RELEASE)
Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2004-151867 has the disadvantage that only one encryption algorithm can be supported at a time. 509 techniques are disclosed that allow certificates to support multiple cryptographic algorithms simultaneously.
[0008]
Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2004-151867 is a technology that enables all devices to be controlled by the same policy even when the network operation method for realizing the same function in a policy-controlled network is different for each vendor or for each device. Is disclosed.
[0009]
Patent Document 3 discloses a technology that enables mutual verification of a public key certificate between devices that can process different signature algorithms in order to ensure security in data communication via a network, for example. ing.
[0010]
In Non-Patent Document 1, as system development / software news, an electronic certificate and a private key necessary for its use are stored on the server side, and an electronic certificate can be obtained without purchasing special hardware from any terminal. The provision of digital trust services that can be used has been reported.
[0011]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
However, in such a conventional technique, when a set of a public key, a private key, and an electronic certificate is individually managed, a management security problem and a plurality of electronic certificates are managed. Problems such as complexity and increased costs for management occur.
[0012]
Even when such a set is managed collectively, setting IDs and passwords for a plurality of sets of PKI certificates, private keys, and public keys will be cumbersome, and the actual signature operation will be difficult. There was a problem of becoming complicated.
[0013]
In addition, new re-signing of electronic data is required before the certificate expires, but if there is a large amount of electronic data to be re-signed, it is difficult to process the signature request personally. There was also a problem.
[0014]
In view of the above-described problems, an object of the present invention is to collectively manage a plurality of sets of electronic certificates, private keys, and public keys, and to sign and encrypt electronic data. In order to improve the security and re-signature of electronic data before the certificate expires, for example, by enabling an automatic signature request from the application side, a large number of electronic signatures This is to simplify the process.
[0015]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the principle configuration of an electronic data signature apparatus according to the present invention. In FIG. 1, an electronic data signature apparatus 1 includes an electronic certificate storage unit 2, an access control unit 3, and a signature processing unit 4.
[0016]
The electronic certificate storage unit 2 stores a plurality of types of electronic certificates based on a public key, for example, an electronic certificate including a public key, a private key, and other certificate parts, and an administrator and an accessible person for each certificate. Is stored together with data indicating.
[0017]
In response to the signature request including the signature requester data input together with the electronic data and the data designating the electronic certificate to be used for the signature, the access control means 3 performs the electronic certificate storage means 2 The signature processing means 4 uses the designated electronic certificate after the confirmation to confirm that it is a legitimate accessible person of the electronic certificate stored in the electronic data. The electronic signature is executed for the.
[0018]
In the embodiment of the invention, in the electronic data signing device, the registration, update, and registration of the certificate in the electronic certificate storage unit 2 based on the agreement between the key manager and the accessible person for each certificate Certificate registration means for performing deletion can also be provided.
[0019]
In the embodiment, corresponding to the electronic data signature device, the electronic data signature device is based on the same or different data indicating the accessible person stored in the electronic certificate storage unit 2. An authentication device that authenticates whether or not access is possible can also be provided.
[0020]
In the embodiment, the administrator of the electronic data signature apparatus is designated as the above-mentioned signature requester, and the access control means 3 confirms a valid accessible person in response to the signature request given from the application side. This makes it possible to automatically process a large number of signature requests given from the application side.
[0021]
Further, as a program for an electronic signature device of the present invention, an electronic signature request including data of a signature requester input together with electronic data and data designating an electronic certificate to be used is received, and a plurality of types of public key infrastructure are received. The signature requester is a legitimate accessible person by referring to the stored contents of the electronic certificate storage device that stores the electronic certificate together with data indicating the administrator and the accessible person for each of the plurality of certificates. And a program for causing the computer to execute an electronic signature for the input electronic data using the designated electronic certificate after the confirmation is made, and the computer storing this program A readable portable storage medium is used.
[0022]
As described above, according to the present invention, multiple types of electronic certificates as a set including a public key and a private key are collectively managed together with data indicating an administrator and an accessible person for each certificate. The
[0023]
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
FIG. 2 is a configuration block diagram of an electronic data signature method in which the PKI key management server 10 as an embodiment of the electronic data signature apparatus of the present invention is used. In the figure, a PKI key management server 10 plays a fundamentally important role in a signature operation for electronic data together with an authentication server 11 that determines whether or not access to the server 10 is possible.
[0024]
For example, a signature application from an EC (electronic commerce) client 12 is made to the EC system 13, and a signature request as a result of settlement is sent to the PKI key management server 10. Alternatively, a signature request from the client 14 is sent to the PKI key management server 10.
[0025]
The PKI key management server 10 inquires of the authentication server 11 whether the client as the request source has the authority to access the server 10, that is, generally the authority to request the electronic signature, and the authentication server 11 This is determined by the contents of the database 15. The database 15 stores IDs and passwords of persons who can access the PKI key management server 10, and the authentication server 11 has authority to access the PKI key management server 10 to clients who have requested a signature using these contents. Check if there is any.
[0026]
If there is access authority, the PKI key management server 10 is designated from the client side among a plurality of electronic certificates (a set including a public key and a private key) stored in a certificate key storage database to be described later. The client is further confirmed whether or not the client has the authority to access the certificate. If the authority is granted, the electronic data is digitally signed and encrypted, and the destination server / client 16 is connected to the backbone LAN. The data is sent via the Internet or intranet (WAN) and further via the Internet, LG (local government, local government) WAN, or the like, and the original data storage server 17 sends the original data to the original storage server 17 for storage.
[0027]
In addition, between the PKI key management server 10 and the authentication server 11, the original storage server 17, and each client, data transmission is secured by using encrypted transmission or a closed network such as a backbone LAN, an intranet, or a WAN. I will secure it.
[0028]
FIG. 3 is a basic processing flowchart of the electronic data signature method according to this embodiment. When the processing is started in the figure, first, a confirmation notice of accessibility from the authentication server 11 is received in step S1, and the access authority of the signing requester to the target electronic certificate is confirmed in step S2. In step S3, the target certificate is taken out and an electronic signature is applied to the electronic data. In step S4, the original is stored in the original storage server 17. In step S5, the electronic data with the electronic signature is transferred to the partner server / client 16. To finish the process.
[0029]
FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of a software configuration in the PKI key management server 10. In FIG. 1, the PKI key management server 10 is provided with a certificate key storage database 20, and this database 20 includes basic certificate key storage tables, certificate key access management tables, and system management tables described later. Three types of tables are stored.
[0030]
In FIG. 4, a key storage processing unit 21 registers, deletes, and updates a certificate issued from a certificate authority such as G (Government) PKI. The processing is performed based on an instruction by the administrator for each certificate or an agreement (electronic approval, that is, an agreement by workflow) between the certificate administrator and an accessible person (owner) for the certificate. The key storage processing unit 21 sets, changes, and deletes the accessible person ID and password for each certificate.
[0031]
The access control processing unit 22 is stored in the certificate key access management table and the confirmation result by the data of the person who can access the PKI key management server 10 stored in the database 15 of the authentication server 11 described in FIG. The access to the electronic certificate is controlled using data indicating the certificate accessible person. If it is determined that the signature requester is registered as both accessible persons, the next certificate selection processing unit 23 is activated.
[0032]
The certificate selection processing unit 23 selects an electronic certificate that is approved for access by the access control processing unit 22 and designated by the signature requester from the certificate key storage table, and the electronic signature processing unit 24 selects the selected electronic certificate. The electronic signature is executed on the input electronic data using the certificate.
[0033]
The transmission / reception / original storage processing unit 25 executes transmission of electronic data with an electronic signature to the partner server / client 16 in FIG. 2 and original storage processing to the original storage server 17. In the original storage process, the original storage server 17 executes storage corresponding to a set storage level such as encrypted storage + signature storage, plain text storage + signature storage, plain text storage, no storage, etc. as the storage level. The original storage server 17 can refer to the stored electronic data.
[0034]
In other words, the original storage server 17 guarantees the integrity, confidentiality, and readability of the original document, thereby preventing loss of signed electronic data, proof of signature time, and long-term data reference. Become.
[0035]
The access log processing unit 26 logs logs for access to the PKI key management server 10, access to certificates stored in the certificate key storage database 20, and electronic data transmission to the destination server / client 16. Log data is collected and stored according to the set level, such as a detailed log, main data log, and no log. This log data is also encrypted as necessary.
[0036]
The signature verification processing unit 27 verifies the electronic data with the electronic signature. The signature verification processing unit 27 determines whether the electronic data has been tampered with, a hash value for the electronic data, and a value obtained by decrypting the electronic signature with the public key. It is verified by comparison. By this verification, it can be proved that the electronic data that has been digitally signed by the PKI key management server 10 has not been tampered with.
[0037]
The electronic certificate storage means in claims 1 and 3 of the claims is the certificate key storage table in the certificate key storage database 20 of FIG. 4, the access control means is in the access control processing section 22, and the signature processing. The means corresponds to the electronic signature processing unit 24, and the certificate registration means corresponds to the key storage processing unit 21.
[0038]
FIG. 5 is an example of the contents stored in the certificate key storage table stored in the certificate key storage database 20 of FIG. In the same figure, the certificate ID and the certificate name are unique corresponding to the certificate authority as a third party organization, and for the certificate ID = 1, the certificate name is LGPKI, for example. For ID = 2, the certificate name is GPKI, and for ID = 3, the certificate name is, for example, (authentication) service company A.
[0039]
The individual ID, the main body, and the private key correspond to individual certificates, and the main body and the private key including the public keys corresponding to the individual IDs 001 and 002 are stored as certificates issued by LGPKI. Has been.
[0040]
In addition, as a certificate issued by GPKI, a main body and a secret key for each of certificates having individual IDs 011 and 012 are stored.
Here, for example, for a certificate issued by GPKI with an individual ID of 011, it is clear that the certificate name is GPKI, and the individual ID can be set to 001.
[0041]
In this case, for each certificate having the same certificate ID and certificate name, the individual ID, the main body, and the private key are stored together in the table. For example, it is naturally possible to exchange the second and third rows in the table.
[0042]
Here, the set of PKI certificate, public key, and private key is set by the certificate key manager according to ITU (International Telecommunication Union) standard protocol X. Stored in accordance with the format 509.
[0043]
As will be described later, only the certificate key administrator is allowed to register, update, or delete the electronic certificate including the private key in the certificate key storage table, or the administrator and the owner of the electronic certificate If it is allowed only under the terms of the agreement, it is possible to prevent tampering or deletion of the private key due to impersonation of the certificate holder, registration of an illegal private key, and the like.
[0044]
FIG. 6 shows an example of the contents stored in the certificate key access management table in the certificate key storage database 20. In this embodiment, for example, a key manager is provided corresponding to each certificate ID, that is, a certificate name. For example, the ID of the certificate key manager for certificate ID = 1 is 1234, and the corresponding password Is also stored.
[0045]
The ID and password of the person who can access the electronic certificate having the individual ID stored in the certificate key storage table of FIG. 5 are stored together for each certificate ID here.
[0046]
For example, among certificates issued by LGPKI having a certificate ID of 1, a certificate having an individual ID of 001 is accessible to a certificate having an accessible person ID of 4567 and 002. It is indicated that the person's ID is 3456, and an accessible person having 3456 as an ID simultaneously accesses an electronic certificate having a certificate ID of 2, that is, 011 as an individual ID issued by GPKI. It has been shown to be possible.
[0047]
7 to 9 are explanatory diagrams of three tables constituting the system management table in the certificate key storage database 20. FIG. 7 is a system and log manager table. The ID and password of a system manager who manages the PKI key management server 10 itself of FIG. 2 as a system, and log management for managing log processing by the access log processing unit 26 of FIG. The person's ID and password are stored. In this embodiment, in order to distribute the risk, a system administrator (server administrator) and a log administrator are provided separately. Also, by limiting the number of server managers and certificate key managers, security awareness can be improved through education and training.
[0048]
FIG. 8 shows an example of the contents stored in the log level management table. In the figure, log levels are set corresponding to the types of access. First, the main data log for the server access log to the PKI key management server 10 itself authenticated by the authentication server 11, the detailed log for access to the electronic certificate itself, and the data transmission to the destination server / client No log is set.
[0049]
By acquiring logs for access and data transmission in this way, records are saved even if fraud such as data tampering, wiretapping, and impersonation has been made, and whether or not fraud has occurred and its contents, i.e. who, when, what It is possible to identify whether fraud has been performed.
[0050]
FIG. 9 is an example of the contents stored in the original management table for setting the storage level in the original storage server 17 in FIG. Here, for individual processing, for example, electronic data signature processing individually requested from the EC client 12 or client 14 in FIG. 2, the level of encryption storage + signature storage is automatic processing, that is, for example, as described later. Save the plaintext + signature in response to the automatic processing that performs the electronic signature processing again in response to a request from the application side, for example, because the electronic signature expires in the electronic data that has already been signed. The save level is set.
[0051]
FIG. 10 is a detailed flowchart (part 1) of the electronic signature processing. In this figure, processing is performed for the electronic data to be signed, the certificate name to be used and its individual ID, the signature requester (including ID and password), the destination of the data, and the input of the original management level as necessary. Is started. The original management level is given as input data when a level different from that shown in FIG. 9 is set for each piece of input electronic data.
[0052]
First, in step S11, whether or not the signature requester has access authority to the PKI key management server 10 is confirmed using the contents of the database 15 on the authentication server 11 side, an access log is taken, and specified in step S12. It is confirmed whether or not the signature requester has access authority corresponding to the received certificate, and the target certificate is selected. This access authority is confirmed using the contents of the certificate key access management table of FIG.
[0053]
As described above, the steps of confirming the access authority to the PKI key management server 10 itself and confirming the access authority to the certificate are sequentially executed, and as a result, two confirmation conditions are ANDed, and the electronic signature is obtained. Will be executed.
[0054]
As for the ID and password used in the confirmation of these two access authorities, it is possible to use the ID and password normally used by the signature requester as they are in common for the two confirmations. In the access authority confirmation, different IDs and passwords can be used so that stricter access management than before can be performed. By selecting an access management method as required, more flexible system operation management is realized.
[0055]
Subsequently, in step S13, the private key of the target certificate is taken out, an access log for the target certificate is taken, and in step S14, an electronic signature is performed on the electronic data to be signed using the private key. That is, a message digest is created using a hash function, and the message digest is encrypted with the secret key. Here, a secret key stored in the certificate key storage table of FIG. 5 is used as the secret key.
[0056]
In step S15, the signature target electronic data and the electronic signature are encrypted using the public key, and the original process is performed in step S16. In this original storage process, the electronic data and electronic signature are stored in the original storage server 17 in accordance with the original management level described with reference to FIG. 9, and the electronic data and electronic signature are sent to the destination server / client 16 in step S17. The transmission log is taken and the processing is terminated.
[0057]
As an output in the electronic signature processing by the PKI key management server 10, a signature target electronic data and electronic signature, an access log and a data transmission log are output as basic outputs, and the signature target electronic data is further output to the original storage server 17. And the electronic signature and the electronic signature are sent to the destination server / client 16.
[0058]
FIG. 11 is a flowchart (part 2) of the electronic signature process. When electronic data that has already been digitally signed is used on the application side, for example, the expiration date of the certificate used for the digital signature is FIG. 10 is a flowchart of processing performed when there is a request for resignature using, for example, an electronic certificate with an extended certification period when approaching.
[0059]
Such processing is automatically performed by the PKI key management server 10 in response to a request from an application server (not shown in FIG. 2). In this request, the application side requests the electronic signature using the server name of the PKI key management server 10 itself and the ID and password of the server administrator, for example, the system administrator described in FIG. Shall be done. Here, the server name is input when, for example, a plurality of PKI key management servers are used, and even if the server administrators are the same, electronic certificates corresponding to the same accessible persons are managed by different PKI key management servers. Necessary.
[0060]
In step S21 in FIG. 11, data of accessible persons registered in the database 15 of the authentication server 11 is searched using the server administrator name, and an access log is taken when the access authority of the server administrator is confirmed. Then, the processing after step S12 described in FIG. 10 is performed.
[0061]
However, the ID and password of the server administrator are set as the ID and password of the accessible person in the certificate key access management table described with reference to FIG. 6, thereby confirming the access authority for the target certificate.
[0062]
FIG. 12 is a flowchart of electronic certificate registration, deletion, and update processing by the key storage processing unit 21 of FIG. In this embodiment, these processes are performed by the certificate key manager corresponding to the certificate ID and certificate name described in FIG. 6 or by this manager and the certificate accessible person (certificate owner, ie, authentication). This is executed based on the agreement with the certificate issuance requester), but here the certificate key manager and the certificate owner The processing will be described as being performed based on the agreement. The same processing is performed even when corresponding to the processing activation on the certificate owner side.
[0063]
In FIG. 12, the name of the certificate to be processed by the certificate key manager, and X. A certificate in which the certificate owner is written in accordance with the provisions of 509 is input, and in step S25, the certificate key administrator and the accessible person ID are identified by the administrator ID corresponding to the certificate ID of FIG. The owner is specified, and three buttons of registration, update, and deletion are displayed for the certificate key manager.
[0064]
On the other hand, when the certificate key manager selects one of the three buttons and inputs an instruction, the approval key is in the application state in step S26 and the approval decision request should be agreed. It is issued to the other party, here the certificate owner, and an approval / approval request to the certificate owner is output.
[0065]
When the consensus, here the certificate owner, approves, a registration, update, and deletion enable flag is set in step S27, and the registration, update, and deletion buttons become valid, and the certificate key manager A valid display of these buttons is output, and the certificate key manager selects any one of these three buttons and, for example, depresses the button to register the certificate in step S28. An update or delete process is performed, and the process ends.
[0066]
In the certificate registration process, necessary items are added to each of the certificate key storage table in FIG. 5 and the certificate key access management table in FIG. 6, and in the update process, the main body of the certificate key storage table in FIG. The item of the secret key is updated, and invalid writing is performed on the item of the main body in the deletion process. That is, even in the deletion process, a process that deletes all related items is not executed in order to keep records.
[0067]
Although the details of the electronic data signature apparatus of the present invention have been described above, this apparatus can naturally be configured as a general computer system. FIG. 13 is a block diagram showing the configuration of such a computer system, that is, a hardware environment.
[0068]
In FIG. 13, the computer system includes a central processing unit (CPU) 30, a read only memory (ROM) 31, a random access memory (RAM) 32, a communication interface 33, a storage device 34, an input / output device 35, and a portable storage medium reading device. 36, and a bus 37 to which all of these are connected.
[0069]
As the storage device 34, various types of storage devices such as a hard disk and a magnetic disk can be used. Such a storage device 34 or a program shown in the flowchart of FIG. The program of claim 5 of the claims of the present invention is stored, and such a program is executed by the CPU 30 to collectively manage a plurality of types of electronic certificates and to access the signature requester in this embodiment. Electronic signatures after authority confirmation are possible.
[0070]
Such a program is stored, for example, in the storage device 34 from the program provider 38 via the network 39 and the communication interface 33, or in a portable storage medium 40 that is commercially available and distributed. It can also be set in the reading device 36 and executed by the CPU 30. As the portable storage medium 40, various types of storage media such as CD-ROM, flexible disk, optical disk, magneto-optical disk, and DVD can be used, and the program stored in such a storage medium is read by the reading device 36. By being read, the electronic signature for the electronic data in the present embodiment is possible.
[0071]
Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail above, in such embodiments, it is possible to execute signatures on electronic data in various fields. First, it is possible to execute PKI certificate management in the government office, electronic signatures for electronic documents, sending to related departments, and saving of originals.
[0072]
Secondly, PKI certificate management in electronic commerce (EC) in a private company, electronic signature on EC data, sending of data to related departments, and original storage can be performed.
[0073]
Thirdly, it is possible to execute access control based on the security policy of the bid company in the electronic bidding in the medical institution.
Fourth, management of PKI certificates in electronic medical records, electronic signatures on electronic medical records, sending to related departments, and original storage can be performed.
[0074]
【The invention's effect】
As described above in detail, according to the present invention, it is possible to dramatically improve the security of an electronic certificate including a public key and a private key by collectively managing a plurality of electronic certificates. . Strict entry / exit management to the server room where the server is installed makes it easier to detect certificate theft and restricts access even if it is copied to a medium and taken out. In addition, it is easy to perform batch management such as backing up certificates in remote locations, and it is easy to take measures against earthquakes and fires, which greatly contributes to improving the reliability of electronic data using the electronic signature method.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the principle configuration of an electronic data signature apparatus according to the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a configuration block diagram of an electronic signature method including a PKI key management server corresponding to an electronic data signature device.
FIG. 3 is a basic flowchart of electronic signature processing in the present embodiment.
FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a software configuration in a PKI key management server.
FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of the contents stored in a certificate key storage table.
FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of the contents stored in a certificate key access management table.
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an example of stored contents of a system and log manager table;
FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of the contents stored in a log level management table.
FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating an example of the contents stored in an original management table.
FIG. 10 is a detailed flowchart (part 1) of the electronic signature processing;
FIG. 11 is a detailed flowchart (part 2) of the electronic signature processing;
FIG. 12 is a flowchart of electronic certificate registration, deletion, and update processing.
FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating loading of a program into a computer according to the present embodiment.
FIG. 14 is a diagram for explaining a conventional example of an electronic signature method.
[Explanation of symbols]
1 Electronic data signature device
2 Electronic certificate storage means
3 Access control means
4 Signature processing means
10 PKI key management server
11 Authentication server
12 EC client
13 EC system
14 clients
15 Database
16 Destination server / client
17 Original storage server
20 Certificate key storage database
21 Key storage processing part
22 Access control processor
23 Certificate selection processing section
24 Electronic Signature Processing Department
25 Transmission / Reception / Original Store Processing Unit
26 Access log processor
27 Signature verification processor
30 Central processing unit (CPU)
31 Read-only memory (ROM)
32 Random access memory (RAM)
33 Communication interface
34 Storage device
35 I / O devices
36 Reader
37 passes
38 Program provider
39 Network
40 Portable storage media
51 PC
52 IC card
53 servers
54 Internet
55 Destination server / client

Claims (6)

In a device that digitally signs electronic data,
Electronic certificate storage means for storing a plurality of public key-based electronic certificates together with data indicating an administrator and an accessible person for each of the plurality of certificates;
An electronic certificate stored in the electronic certificate storage means by the signature requester in response to an electronic signature request including data of the signature requester input together with the electronic data and data specifying an electronic certificate to be used Access control means for confirming that the document is legitimately accessible,
An electronic data signature apparatus comprising: signature processing means for executing an electronic signature on the input electronic data using the designated electronic certificate after the confirmation. Corresponding to the electronic data signature apparatus, the access to the electronic data signature apparatus is authenticated based on the same or different data indicating the accessible person stored in the electronic certificate storage means. The electronic data signature apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising an authentication apparatus that performs the authentication. In the electronic data signature device,
And further comprising certificate registration means for registering, updating, and deleting a certificate in the electronic certificate storage means based on the agreement of both the administrator and the accessible person for each certificate. The electronic data signing apparatus according to claim 1. In the electronic data signature device,
An administrator of the electronic data signing apparatus is designated as the signature requester, and the access control means confirms the legitimate accessible person in response to a signature request given from an external application side. The electronic data signature apparatus according to claim 1. In a program used by a computer that performs an electronic signature on electronic data,
An electronic signature request including data of a signature requester input together with the electronic data and data specifying an electronic certificate to be used is received, and a plurality of types of electronic certificates based on a public key are assigned to each of the plurality of certificates. A procedure for confirming that the signature requester is a legitimate accessible person by referring to the stored contents of the electronic certificate storage device stored together with the data indicating each manager and accessible person;
A program for an electronic data signature device for causing a computer to execute a procedure for executing an electronic signature on input electronic data using a designated electronic certificate after the confirmation. In a storage medium used by a computer that performs an electronic signature on electronic data,
An electronic signature request including data of a signature requester input together with the electronic data and data specifying an electronic certificate to be used is received, and a plurality of types of electronic certificates based on a public key are assigned to each of the plurality of certificates. Referring to the stored contents of the electronic certificate storage device stored together with the data indicating the administrator and the accessible person for each and confirming that the signature requester is a legitimate accessible person;
A computer-readable portable storage medium storing a program for causing a computer to execute a step of executing an electronic signature on input electronic data using a designated electronic certificate after the confirmation.

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