JP2001147984A - System and method for electronic voting - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To enable high-reliability electronic tendering, with which illegality can be surely verified. SOLUTION: Each of tendering terminals 11a, 11b and 11c generates the hash value of a tender document, enciphers the document with its own secret key and transmits the enciphered hash document to a TTP 15. The TTP prepares an SHV certificate concerning each of enciphered hash documents and calculates an SHV every second. The TTP discloses the SHV of every second of each of enciphered hash documents and each of enciphered hash documents, to which the SHV certificate is attached, on the Internet 27. Before tendering to a procurement institution 13, each of tendering terminals downloads the enciphered hash document with SHV certificate. The procurement institution discloses a tender document 107 of a successful bidder company. Each of tendering terminal downloads the tender document of the successful bidder company, takes the hash thereof, deciphers the hash value after successful bid and the enciphered hash document of the successful bidder company, compares the deciphered value with the hash value before the successful bid and when these values are not coincident, it is judged the tender document of the successful bid is illegally revised.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an electronic voting method using a computer.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Electronic bidding is known as a typical example of electronic voting using a computer. As a method of electronic bidding, TTP (Trusted Third Party, a trusted third party (third party) Time key method using a third party authentication institution)) is known. In this method, generally, operations shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 are performed between a TTP, a bid participant, and a procurement organization.

First, as shown in FIG. 1, the TTP 5 creates a pair of a public key and a secret key (step S1), and transmits only the public key to the procurement institution 3 (S2). Thereafter, when the procurement institution 3 receives a bid participation application from the bid participants 1a, 1b, and 1c (S3, 4, 5), the TTP
5 and the public key received from bidder 1a, 1b, 1c
(S6, 7, 8).

[0004] After receiving the public key from the procurement institution 3, each bidder 1a, 1b, 1c uses the public key to submit a bidding document (hereinafter referred to as a bid document) as shown in FIG. ) Are encrypted (steps S9, S10, S11) and transmitted to the procurement institution 3 for bidding (S12, S13, S13).
14). The TTP 5 transmits the secret key to the procurement institution 3 when the bidding time has come (S15). Procurement institution 3
The bidding document encrypted with the public key is decrypted using the secret key from TP5, and the bid is opened (S16).

[0005]

In bidding, prevention of fraud is of paramount importance. However, in the above-mentioned electronic bidding, even if the following fraud is performed, it cannot be electronically detected and prevented.

(1) The procurement institution 3 falsifies the received bid document after opening the bid, whereby the procurement institution 3 illegally signs a contract with a certain bidder 1a, and
It becomes possible to falsify the document into a bidding document that a can make a successful bid for.

[0007] (2) The procurement institution 3 accepts the bid document despite the submission deadline, whereby
After one bidder 1a explores the trend of the other bidders 1b, 1c in some way and the other bidders 1b, 1c submit bid documents to the procurement institution 3,
It would be possible to create documents that are convenient for them and bid on them.

(3) The bidding participants 1a, 1b, and 1c illegally falsify the contents of the bidding document at hand after bidding or opening a bid, whereby the bidding participants 1a, 1b,
1c indicates that “the current procurement institution 3
Is a falsified document that has been tampered with by the procurement institution 3 and is different from the one that he / she bid for. "

Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to provide a highly reliable electronic bidding which can reliably verify the above-mentioned fraud.

[0010]

In an electronic voting method according to a first aspect of the present invention, one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses for generating voting document data recording the contents of voting documents, and a trusted third party An institution and an institution from which the voting document data is procured, a third party comprising means for releasing the encrypted voting document data, wherein the procurement institution is based on the procured voting document data. A means for publishing the data indicating the voting result, wherein one or a plurality of information processing devices encrypts the voting document data and sends it to a third party; Means for sending, means for obtaining the published encrypted voting document data, means for obtaining the published voting result data, and encrypted voting document data for detecting the presence or absence of fraud. Voting with And means for comparing the data.

[0011] For example, when one or a plurality of information processing devices send voting document data to a trusted third party, the voting data encrypted with the public key of the third party, its own common key or secret key is used. The document data is recorded on a recording medium such as a floppy disk or MO, and the recording medium is sent by mail or the like, or transmitted via a computer network (typically, the Internet). When sending the voting document data to the procurement institution, the one or more information processing devices may record the voting document data on a recording medium such as a floppy disk and send the recording medium by mail or the like. Encrypt with a public key of a three-party organization, or encrypt with a common key or secret key of your own (you may also encrypt with a public key of a third-party organization) and then send it over a computer network. I do. The third party can transfer the encrypted voting document data recorded on each recording medium sent thereto or sent via a computer network to a computer network, a specific magazine, or
The information is recorded on a recording medium such as a D-ROM or MO, sent to each bidder by mail or the like, and is directly disclosed by any one of the methods. The procurement institution records data indicating the results of counting votes based on each of the voting document data recorded on each recording medium sent by mail or the like or sent via a computer network (for example, at the procurement institution). All of the procured voting document data or only the voting document data selected in the counting of votes) is recorded on a computer network, on a specific magazine, or on a recording medium such as a CD-ROM or MO to participate in each bid. Send it to the company by mail, etc., and make it public either directly. One or a plurality of information processing devices obtain the vote counting result data and the encrypted voting document data of the voting participant by the above disclosure performed by the third party organization and the procurement organization, and detect whether there is any fraud. Next, the vote counting result data and the encrypted voting document data are compared. For comparison, for example, each of the encrypted voting document data is decrypted with the common key or the public key of each voting participant, and then the above comparison is performed. As a result, if data that does not substantially match is included, it can be detected that the voting document data has been tampered with.

[0012] In a preferred embodiment, a means for generating a certificate certifying the existence of the voting document data with a date and time for each of the encrypted voting document data in a third party is further provided. Means for publishing each of the generated certificates attached to their corresponding encrypted voting document data. In this case, in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the first obtaining means obtains the certificate together with the encrypted encrypted voting document data, and the comparing means determines whether or not there is fraud. The date and time are further compared with the date and time attached to the obtained certificate. As a result, if the date and time attached to the certificate includes a date and time that is later than the date and time of counting the votes, it is detected that there is voting document data that was illegally accepted despite the passing of the date and time of counting the votes. can do.

In a preferred embodiment, one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses further include means for generating characteristic data of the voting document data, and the first sending means converts the encrypted characteristic data to a third one. To an institution. At a third party, the means for publishing causes each of the encrypted feature data to be made public. In this case, in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the first obtaining means obtains the published encrypted characteristic data, and the comparing means obtains the characteristic data of the slip result data in order to detect the presence or absence of fraud. Is generated, and the characteristic data of the counting result data is compared with the obtained encrypted characteristic data.

In a preferred embodiment, means for generating another feature data of the encrypted feature data at any time after the date and time attached to the certificate by a third party, and another feature generated at any time thereafter Means for publishing the data is further provided, and the means for generating a certificate includes, for each of the encrypted feature data, a date and time when another feature data of the encrypted feature data is generated, and another feature generated at the date and time. Generating a certificate (for example, an SHV certificate) that records a method for generating data using the encrypted feature data. In this case, in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the comparing unit may detect the presence or absence of a fraud from the publicly-available different feature data and generate the information recorded in the certificate corresponding to the feature data to be compared. Get another feature data at the time and date,
In addition, another feature data of the feature data to be compared is generated based on the feature data to be compared and the generation method recorded in the certificate thereof, and the generated different feature data and the obtained different feature data are combined. Compare. The means for generating different characteristic data may generate the different characteristic data periodically (for example, every one second).

[0015] In a preferred embodiment, the characteristic data or the other characteristic data is a hash value.

In a preferred embodiment, in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the second sending means attaches a certificate corresponding to the generated voting document data to the voting document data among the obtained certificates. And send it to the procurement agency.

In a preferred embodiment, after the counting of votes, when a voting participant informs (raises) that the voting participant has committed fraud (for example, that the voting document data has been falsified by the procurement institution), 1 or In a plurality of information processing devices, the first or second
Means for obtaining the voting document data held by the voting participant who has made the above-mentioned notification (request) (for example, receiving the voting document data via a computer network), and comparing means for obtaining the content of the notification. Voting document data of the voting participant who made the above notification, and data obtained from the encrypted voting document data or encrypted characteristic data corresponding to the voting participant who made the notification in order to detect whether Compare with

In a preferred embodiment, in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the second sending means encrypts the voting document data or its characteristic data and sends it to the procurement institution.

In a preferred embodiment, the means for publishing at a third party publishes each of the encrypted voting document data or the encrypted feature data over a computer network. Further, in the procurement institution, means for disclosing publishes the counting result data on a computer network.

In a preferred embodiment, the encrypted voting document data or the encrypted feature data is encrypted with the public key of the third party, and the third party can use the third party's public key at the time of counting votes. Issue a secret key (to a procurement institution or one or more information processing devices).

In a preferred embodiment, in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the first sending means transmits the voting document data or its characteristic data to a secret (of the information processing apparatus for sending the voting document data). A second sending means encrypts the voting document data or its characteristic data encrypted with its own private key or common key, and sends it to the third party. It is further encrypted with a key and sent to the procurement organization. In this case, the procurement institution receives the private key of the third party at the time of counting the votes (more preferably, the date and time of counting the votes), and further encrypts the private key with the public key of the third party. Means for decrypting each of the voting document data or the encrypted feature data, and each of the decrypted encrypted voting document data or the encrypted feature data is stored in one or more information processing devices corresponding to the public key or Means for decrypting with a common key.

In a preferred embodiment, one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, a third party organization, and a procurement organization are communicably connected via a computer network. First sending means encrypts the voting document data or its characteristic data and sends it to a third party over a computer network;
The second sending means encrypts the voting document data, its characteristic data, the encrypted voting document data, or the encrypted characteristic data and transmits it to the procurement institution via the computer network.

In a preferred embodiment, the vote result data includes the voting document data selected at the time of counting the votes, and in one or a plurality of information processing apparatuses, the means for comparing includes the selected voting documents. The data is compared with the data corresponding to the selected voting document data among the obtained encrypted voting document data or encrypted characteristic data.

In a preferred embodiment, the voting document data is:
This is data indicating the contents of the submitted documents at the time of bidding.

In the electronic voting method according to the present invention, a step of publishing each of the encrypted voting document data recording the contents of the voting document, and a voting document procured by an organization from which the voting document data is procured. A step of publishing data indicating a result of the counting based on each of the data, and a step of comparing the published encrypted voting document data with the published counting result data to detect the presence or absence of fraud. Have.

In a preferred implementation method, the method further comprises, for each of the encrypted voting document data, generating a certificate certifying the existence of the voting document data with a date and time, and the step of publishing includes: Each of the generated certificates is attached to their corresponding encrypted voting document data so as to be published, and the step of comparing includes attaching the published encrypted voting document data to detect whether there is fraud. The date and time attached to the issued certificate is compared with the date and time of counting.

[0027]

FIG. 3 shows an overall system configuration in an electronic bidding system according to one embodiment of the present invention.

The terminal device 11a used by each bidder,
11b, 11c, ..., TTP (Trusted Third Party,
A third-party certification organization 15 and a procurement organization 13 are communicably connected by a communication network (typically, the Internet) 27.

The terminal devices 11a, 11b, 11c,.
Typically, a general-purpose computer (for example, a personal computer) installed in almost any company,
For example, a hash value of document data (“document” referred to in the present specification is not limited to character data but also includes image data and the like) indicating the contents of a document to be submitted in a bid (for example, a variety of operations described below) ( Hereafter, the hash document is encrypted with the secret key of the bid participant (hereinafter, referred to as an encrypted hash document).
And the like. In the following description, for the sake of simplicity, bid participants are referred to as "Company A"
“Company B” and “Company C”, and the terminal devices 11a, 1
1b and 11c are called "bid terminals" of companies A, B and C, respectively.

The TTP 15 is provided with a computer network (for example, a LAN) 25, and a bid support server 19, a time stamp server 21, and a database 23 are connected to the network 25.

The bidding support server 19 mainly includes the procurement institution 1
It contributes to eliminating the possibility of fraud in 3. That is, the bidding support server 19 creates a public key / private key, and first transmits a public key for encrypting the above-mentioned encrypted hash document of each bidder to the procurement institution 13,
When the bidding time has come, a private key for decrypting the encrypted hash document encrypted with the public key is obtained by the procurement institution 13.
Send to Further, the bid support server 19 converts the encrypted hash documents from each of the bid terminals 11a, 11b, 11c into
Attach an SHV certificate, which will be described later, to the Internet 27
Publish on top.

The time stamp server 21 mainly certifies the existence and the time of the bid document from each of the bid terminal submissions 11a, 11b, 11c, and that the contents of the bid document are not falsified. Here, the time stamp server 21 has a Digital No. developed by Surety of the United States.
tary Service (Electronic Document Certification Service, hereinafter DNS)
The technology described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-508121 has been introduced. That is, the time stamp server 21
Upon receiving the encrypted hash document from each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c, the SHV (Super Hash Valu
e, super hash value), and further creates an SHV certificate for the encrypted hash document. Note that S
HV is a hash value generated in the time stamp technique in DNS.

FIG. 4 shows an example of the configuration of the SHV certificate.

The time stamp server 21 includes, for example, SHV calculation information 31 for calculating the SHV of the encrypted hash document, the date and time when the SHV was calculated (that is, the date and time certifying the existence of the SHV) 33, The user ID 35 and the like are posted on the SHV certificate 37. SHV
As the calculation information 31, a plurality of hash values serving as factors of the SHV calculation and a calculation path (calculation procedure) of the SHV calculation using each hash value are shown. The SHV calculation information 31 and the date / time 33 included in the SHV certificate are:
For example, when an encrypted hash document is received,
Is the SHV calculation information, and the date / time one second after the calculation is performed.

With respect to the method of calculating the SHV based on the SHV certificate 37, the method described in the above-cited Japanese Patent Publication No. 10-508121 is used. FIG. 5 schematically shows an example.

The calculation of the SHV of the encrypted hash document 200 to which the SHV certificate 37 shown in FIG. 4 is attached based on the certificate 37 is performed, for example, as follows.

First, the first factor hash value specified in the SHV calculation information 31 of the certificate 37 (for example, "abcdef ...")
203 is extracted, and the hash value 203 and the hash value (for example, “ABCDE...”) 201 of the encrypted hash document are concatenated to obtain a hash, and the concatenated hash value (for example, “AbCdEf...”) 205 is generated. I do.

Next, the second factor hash value (for example, “aZbYcX...”) 207 specified in the SHV calculation information 31,
The generated hash value 205 is linked to obtain a hash, and the hash value of the linked hash value (for example, “abbdcf
.. ") 209 are generated. Such connection and generation of hash values are performed according to the calculation path specified in the SHV calculation information 31.

Finally, the finally generated hash value (for example, the hash value 209) is connected to the SHV 211 one second before the date / time (hereinafter referred to as the time) described in the certificate 37. Then, a hash is obtained, and the SHV 213 at the time is generated. It should be noted that the SHV 211 one second before the time is, as will be understood later,
In the SHV generated every second (that is, every second) between the time stamp server 21 receiving the encrypted hash document and the completion of the bid examination, the SHV corresponds to one second before the time.

Referring again to FIG. 3, the time stamp server 21 applies the SHV as shown in FIG. 4 to each of the encrypted hash documents from the bidding terminals 11a, 11b and 11c.
After the certificate is created, it is passed to the bid support server 19. Accordingly, thereafter, the bid support server 19 attaches each SHV certificate passed from the time stamp server 21 to the encrypted hash documents from the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c, as described above, and A pair of the encrypted hash document and the SHV certificate is disclosed on the Internet 27.

The time stamp server 21 generates the SHV of the encrypted hash document every second (that is, 1 second) from the reception of the encrypted hash document to the end of the bid examination for each encrypted hash document. Every time) and save it in the database 23. Then, the time stamp server 21 publishes, on the Internet 27, the SHV for each second of the encrypted hash document that needs to be verified whether it has been tampered with.

The TTP 15 is provided by the above-described functions of the input support server 19 and the time stamp server 21.
Even if fraud is performed in this electronic bidding, it can be surely verified. For example, even if the procurement institution 13 has received a bid document fraudulently even after the submission deadline has passed, each bidding participant will make a request for each bid document (encrypted hash document) published on the Internet 27. By confirming the date and time on the SHV certificate that proves the existence of the document, the fraud can be verified.

The procurement institution 13 has a procurement server 17. The procurement server 17 receives the public key from the TTP 15, distributes it to each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c, and receives an encrypted hash document encrypted with the public key from each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c. . When the billing time comes, the procurement server 17 receives the secret key from the TTP 15, and decrypts the encrypted encrypted hash document with the secret key. And the procurement server 17
Decrypts each encrypted hash document encrypted with the private key of the bidding participant with the public key of the bidding participant so that examination of each bid can be performed. When the screening is completed and the winning bidder is determined, the procurement server 17
Publishes on the Internet 27 the results of the bid examination (for example, the determined company name of the winning bidder, the bid document of the winning bidder, etc.).

Hereinafter, the procedure of the electronic bidding performed in the above-described system configuration will be specifically described with reference to FIGS.

First, as shown in FIG. 6, the bid support server 19 of the TTP 15 creates a public key and a secret key (step S21), and sends only the public key to the procurement institution 13 (S22). The procurement server 17 of the procurement institution 13
The public key from TP15 is transmitted to each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b,
11c (S24, 25, 26).

Thereafter, each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11
c, as shown in FIG. 7, takes the hash of the document to be bid and generates a hash value thereof (steps S27, S27).
8, 29) and encrypt it with its own private key (S3
0, 31, 32). And each bidding terminal 11a, 11
b and 11c transmit the encrypted hash document encrypted with the company's private key to the TTP 15 via the Internet 27.
(S33, S34, S35).

In the TTP 15, as shown in FIG. 8, the time stamp server 21 transmits the information to each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b,
11c, an SHV certificate as shown in FIG. 4 is created for each of the encrypted hash documents from step 11c.
36), and pass it to the bid support server 19 (S37).
The bid support server 19 attaches the SHV certificate passed from the time stamp server 21 to each encrypted hash document, and publishes the pair of the encrypted hash document and the SHV certificate on the Internet 27 (S38). . As a method of this disclosure, for example, as shown in this figure, the bid support server 19 publishes a pair 103a, 103b, 103c of the encrypted hash document and the SHV certificate of each participating company on the homepage 101 of TTP15. I do. Each participating company uses the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c to
Data 103 of all participating companies published by P15
a, 103b, and 103c are downloaded (S39,
40, 41).

On the other hand, the time stamp server 21 of the TTP 15 transmits the encrypted hash document from each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c, for example, to the above-mentioned Japanese Patent Application Publication No.
The SHV is calculated every second (that is, every second) using the method described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 08121 (S42). The time stamp server 21 saves the SHV per second of each encrypted hash document calculated by the method in the database 23 (S43) and makes the SHV public on the Internet 27 (S44). As a method of this disclosure, for example, as shown in this figure, a home page 110 of TTP 15 is prepared, and a user ID of a desired SHV certificate is input on the home page 110, and public SHV data 111 of a desired participating company is input. Is displayed. The public SHV data 111 is T
This is the SHV of the encrypted hash document every second from when the TP 15 receives the bid document until the bid examination is completed. The public SHV data 111 may be recorded on a recording medium such as a CD-ROM, and the recording medium may be distributed to all participating companies.

When bidding to the procurement institution 13, each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c digitally signs the encrypted hash document as shown in FIG. 9 (steps S45, S46, S45).
47), it is encrypted using a public key issued by TTP15 distributed from the procurement organization (S48, 49, 5).
0). And each bid terminal 11a, 11b, 11c,
A bid is made by transmitting the encrypted hash document to the procurement institution 13 (S51, 52, 53). In this figure, each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c transmits the SHV certificate corresponding to its own encrypted hash document to the TTP.
15 and send its cryptographic hash document to the procurement institution 13 along with its SHV certificate. Thereby, the procurement institution 13 can determine each bidding terminal 11a,
Since the encrypted hash documents with the SHV certificate are received from 11b and 11c, the SHV of each encrypted hash document is obtained by the above-described method based on the SHV certificates, and the obtained SHV and the public SHV data 111 are obtained. By comparing the SHV of the date and time recorded in the SHV certificate with the one obtained from each of the bidding terminals 11a and 11b.
It is possible to confirm whether or not the bid document sent from b, 11c has been tampered with. In addition, the procurement institution 13 sets the S
Since the HV certificate can also be disclosed, the transparency for each participating company can be further improved.

When the bidding time has come, as shown in FIG. 10, the bid support server 19 of the TTP 15 sends the secret key to the procurement institution 13 (step S54). Procurement organization 13
The procurement server 17 uses the secret key from the TTP 15 to decrypt the encrypted hash document from each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c that has been encrypted with the public key of the TTP 15 (S55). As a result, each decrypted encrypted hash document becomes a hash document encrypted with the private key of each participant. Therefore, the procurement server 17 decrypts the encrypted hash document with the public key of the participating bidder (S56), and makes it possible to examine each bid. The procurement server 17 publishes the result of the examination to each bid participant when the company which has won the examination and the winning bidder is determined (S57). As a method of this disclosure, as shown in this figure, for example, as shown in FIG. , Order amount, etc.) 107 are posted. Of course, the procurement server 17 sends the bidding documents of all the participating companies to the
5 may be posted. In this case, in the verification of fraud described below, each bidder participates in the bidding terminal 11
a, 11b, and 11c, and downloads the results of the bid examination. As a result of the examination (that is, after the bid is opened), the bidding documents of all the bid participants and the bid documents of all the participating firms that are already held before the bid is opened. It can be compared with a bid document (encrypted hash document) to verify the presence or absence of fraud.

Each bidding participant has a bidding terminal 11a, 11
The bidding document 107 of the successful bidder is downloaded using b and 11c so that it is possible to verify whether or not fraud has been performed in this electronic bidding (S58, 59 and 60).

In the electronic bidding in this embodiment, the following fraud, which could not be verified conventionally, can be verified.
The verification of the fraud will be described.

(1) The procurement institution 3 falsifies the accepted bid document after opening the bid.

This can be verified by each bid participant using the bid terminals 11a, 11b and 11c. This will be described with reference to FIG.

The bidding terminals 11a, 11b and 11c are shown in FIG.
In steps S58, 59, and 60 of 0, the bid document 107 of the successful bidder was downloaded. Therefore, the bidding terminal 11a,
11b and 11c take the hash of the bidding document 107 of the successful bidder and generate a hash value of the bidding document of the successful bidder after bid opening (step S61).

The bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c
In steps S39, S40 and S41 in FIG. 8, a pair 103 of the encrypted hash documents of all the participating companies and their SHV certificates
a, 103b, and 103c were downloaded. Each encrypted hash document is a document encrypted with the private key of the participating company. Therefore, the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c
Decrypts the encrypted hash document of the successful bidder among the downloaded encrypted hash documents with the public key of the successful bidder, and obtains the hash value of the successful bidder's bid document before the bid opening.

The bidding terminals 11a, 11b and 11c compare the hash value of the bidding document of the successful bidder after the bid opening with the hash value before the bidding, and if they do not match, the bidding document of the successful bidder is opened after the bidding. It is determined that the data has been tampered with (S63).

In this way, each bid participant can verify the fraud in the electronic bidding.

(2) The procurement institution 3 accepts a bid document even though the submission deadline has passed.

This can be verified by each bid participant using the bidding terminals 11a, 11b and 11c. The bidding terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c prove the validity of the date and time recorded in the SHV certificate of the winning bidder and confirm with the participating companies whether the time is before or after the bidding time. We will be able to verify this fraud by asking them to do so. This will be described with reference to FIG.

The bidding terminals 11a, 11b and 11c are shown in FIG.
After the operation of step S63 shown in FIG. 1 is completed, this fraudulent verification can be performed. Bidding terminals 11a, 11
b and 11c, after step S63 in FIG.
Homepage 110 on which V data 111 is posted
(See FIG. 8), and using the user ID recorded in the SHV certificate of the successful bidder as a key, the public SHV of the successful bidder
Data 111 is obtained, and the SHV of the winning bidder is obtained from the data.
S required to prove the validity of the date and time of the certificate
HV is obtained (step S64). The required SHV is
The SHV at the time (that is, the date and time of the certificate) and the SHV one second before the time. Bidding terminals 11a, 11
Reference numerals b and 11c denote, for example, FIG. 5 using the encrypted hash document of the successful bidder, SHV calculation information (see FIG. 4) in the SHV certificate attached thereto, and the SHV one second before the time. And the SHV at the time
Is calculated (S65).

Thereafter, the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c
Is the calculated SHV at the time, and the
Is compared with the SHV at the time acquired from the public data 111, and if they match, it is proved that the date and time in the SHV certificate of the successful bidder are valid (S
66-a). Then, the certified time is compared with the bidding time, and if the certified time is after the bidding time, the bidding document of the winning bidder is illegal at the procurement institution 13 even though the submission deadline has passed. Is determined to have been received (S66-b).

(3) After a bidder or bidder opens a participating company,
Unauthorized falsification of the contents of a tender document at hand.

For example, suppose that the company B illegally falsifies the bid document at hand after deciding the winning bidder and claims that the bid document is genuine. Other participating companies A, C
The company can verify whether the claim is legitimate using its own bidding terminals 11a and 11c. This will be described with reference to FIG.

First, Company B uses Company's own bidding terminal 11b to publish a B Company claimed bidding document 3
00 is made public on the Internet 27 (step S67).

The other participating companies, company A and company C, use their own bidding terminals 11a and 11c to make a bid document 3
00 is downloaded (S68, S72), and a hash value of the B company claimed bidding document 300 is generated (S69, S7).
3). Thereafter, the encrypted hash document of Company B previously downloaded is decrypted with the public key of Company B to obtain the hash value of the original bid document of Company B (S70, S74). Then, the hash value of the initial bidding document of the company B is compared with the hash value of the bidding document claimed by the company B generated in steps S69 and S73, and if they do not match, the assertion of the company B is invalid. Is determined (S71, S75).

As described above, even if a participant company falsifies the contents of a bid document at hand after bidding or opening a bid, another participant company can verify the fraud. In this case, in order for Company B to justify the above claim, all of the cryptographic hash documents of Company B held by the other participating companies A and C must be replaced with bid documents claimed by Company B. Must. Since it is practically impossible to do this, it is possible to prevent the above unjustified assertion from being made.

According to the above-described embodiment, since each of the participating companies can verify the various frauds that could not be verified conventionally, the reliability of the electronic bidding can be improved, and
It is possible to prevent the above various kinds of wrongdoing from occurring.

According to the above-described embodiment, the TTP
15 publishes the data (bid document data (encrypted hash document), SHV certificate, public SHV data 111) of each participant required for verification of fraud. For this reason,
The disclosure of highly reliable data increases transparency in bidding, and the possibility of using that data as evidence in court is high, enabling secure and reliable electronic bidding.

Although some preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described above, these are merely examples for describing the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention only to these examples. . The present invention can be implemented in other various forms. That is, as can be seen from the description of one embodiment when the present invention is applied to bidding, the present invention
It can verify substantially all fraud that can be done in electronic voting. Therefore, the present invention can be applied to all types of voting, and the present invention is of value only when there is no injustice such as an election. If it is applied to elections, it will not only ensure highly reliable and secure elections, but also allow voters to vote from anywhere as long as they have a communication terminal device,
This eliminates the need to visit the election hall, which can improve turnout.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram of an operation in a conventional electronic bidding.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an operation in a conventional electronic bidding.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing an overall system configuration in an electronic bidding method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of an SHV certificate.

FIG. 5 is a view for explaining a method of calculating the SHV based on the SHV certificate.

FIG. 6 shows that each bidding terminal 11a, 11b, 11c has a TTP1
FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an operation when the public key of No. 5 is distributed.

FIG. 7 shows that each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b and 11c has TTP1.
FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an operation when transmitting an encrypted hash document to the fifth embodiment;

FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an operation when the TTP 15 discloses an encrypted hash document of each participating company and its SHV.

FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an operation when a bid is placed by each of the bid terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c.

FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an operation when a result of a bid examination is disclosed.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an operation when each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, and 11c verifies that the bidding document received by the procurement institution 3 is falsified after the bid is opened.

FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing an operation when each of the bidding terminals 11a, 11b, 11c verifies that the procurement institution 3 accepts a bid document even though the submission deadline has passed.

FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing an operation when verifying that a participant illegally falsifies the contents of a bid document at hand after a bid or bid opening.

[Explanation of symbols]

 11a, 11b, 11c Tender terminal 13 Procurement institution 15 TTP 17 Procurement server 19 Bid support server 21 Time stamp server 27 Internet 37 SHV certificate

Claims (23)

[Claims] An information processing apparatus for generating voting document data in which the contents of voting documents are recorded; a trusted third party; and an organization from which the voting document data is procured. A third party includes means for publishing each of the encrypted voting document data, and the procurement agency publishes data indicating a result of counting votes based on each of the procured voting document data. First sending means for encrypting the voting document data and sending the voting document data to the third party, and the voting document data provided by the procurement institution. A second sending means for sending to the public, a first obtaining means for obtaining the disclosed encrypted voting document data, and a second obtaining means for obtaining the disclosed vote counting result data. , Fraud To detect an electronic voting system and means for comparing said vote counting result data and the encrypted voting document data. 2. The third-party institution further comprises: means for, for each of the encrypted voting document data, generating a certificate certifying the existence of the voting document data with date and time, and publishing the certificate. Means for publishing each of the generated certificates attached to the corresponding encrypted voting document data, and in the one or more information processing apparatuses, Obtaining the certificate together with the disclosed encrypted voting document data, wherein the comparing means detects the date and time of the vote and the date and time attached to the obtained certificate in order to detect the presence or absence of fraud. 2. The electronic voting method according to claim 1, further comprising: 3. The one or more information processing apparatuses, further comprising: means for generating feature data of the voting document data, wherein the first sending means encrypts the feature data by encrypting the feature data. The third party organization, the means for publishing publishes each of the encrypted characteristic data, the one or more information processing apparatuses, The obtaining means obtains the disclosed encrypted characteristic data, and the comparing means generates the characteristic data of the slip counting result data in order to detect the presence or absence of fraud, and the characteristic data of the counting result data and 2. The electronic voting method according to claim 1, wherein the obtained encrypted feature data is compared with the obtained encrypted feature data. 4. A means for generating another feature data of the encrypted feature data at any time after the date and time attached to the certificate, wherein the third feature generates the different feature data generated at the arbitrary time. Means for publishing, wherein the means for generating the certificate includes, for each of the encrypted characteristic data, a date and time when another characteristic data of the encrypted characteristic data is generated; Generating a certificate that records a method for generating feature data using the encrypted feature data; and in the one or more information processing apparatuses, the comparing unit detects whether there is fraud. Obtaining, from the published different feature data, different feature data at the time of generation date and time recorded in the certificate corresponding to the feature data to be compared, and comparing the feature data to be compared with the feature data to be compared. Generate another feature data of the feature data of the comparison object on the basis of said generation method recorded in the record of the certificate,
4. The electronic voting method according to claim 2, wherein the generated different characteristic data is compared with the obtained different characteristic data. 5. The electronic voting method according to claim 3, wherein the characteristic data or the different characteristic data is a hash value. 6. In the one or more information processing apparatuses, the second sending means attaches a certificate corresponding to the generated voting document data to the voting document data among the obtained certificates. The electronic voting method according to any one of claims 2 to 5, wherein the electronic voting method is transmitted to the procurement institution. 7. When the voting participant is notified that there has been fraud after the counting of the votes, the one or more information processing devices may be configured so that: In order to obtain voting document data held by the voting participant who has made the notification, the comparing means determines whether or not the content of the notification is true. 7. The document data according to claim 1, wherein the obtained encrypted voting document data or encrypted feature data is compared with data corresponding to the information of the notified voting participant. Electronic voting method. 8. The information processing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the second sending means encrypts the voting document data or its characteristic data and sends the encrypted voting document data to the procurement institution. 8. The electronic voting method according to any one of 7 above. 9. The method according to claim 1, wherein, in the third party, the means for publishing publishes each of the encrypted voting document data and the encrypted characteristic data on a computer network. Electronic voting method according to any one of the above. 10. The electronic voting method according to claim 1, wherein in the procurement institution, the means for publishing publishes the ballot result data on a computer network. 11. The encrypted voting document data or the encrypted characteristic data is encrypted with a public key of the third party, and the third party instructs the third party at the time of counting the votes. The electronic voting method according to claim 1, wherein a private key of the institution is issued. 12. The one or more information processing devices, wherein the first sending means encrypts the voting document data or its characteristic data with its own secret key or common key and sends it to the third party. The second sending means sends the voting document data or its characteristic data encrypted with the secret key or the common key to the procurement institution, further encrypted with the public key of the third party, The procurement institution receives the secret key of the third party at the time of counting the votes, and uses the secret key to encrypt the encrypted voting document data or the encrypted feature data, each of which is further encrypted with the public key. Means for decrypting, and means for decrypting each of the decrypted encrypted voting document data or the encrypted characteristic data with a public key or a common key of the one or more information processing devices corresponding thereto. Is updated Any electronic voting method of one claim of claims 1 to 11 is provided. 13. The one or more information processing apparatuses, the third party organization, and the procurement institution are communicably connected via a computer network. The first sending means encrypts the voting document data or its characteristic data and sends it to the third party through the computer network; the second sending means sends the voting document data 13. The method according to claim 1, further comprising encrypting the characteristic data, the encrypted voting document data, or the encrypted characteristic data, and transmitting the encrypted characteristic data to the procurement institution via the computer network. Electronic voting method described in section. 14. The voting result data includes voting document data selected at the time of voting, and in the one or more information processing apparatuses, the comparing means includes: 14. The document data according to claim 1, wherein the document data is compared with data corresponding to the selected voting document data among the obtained encrypted voting document data or encrypted feature data. Electronic voting method. 15. The electronic voting method according to claim 1, wherein the voting document data is data indicating the content of a document to be submitted at the time of bidding. 16. A method for publishing each of encrypted voting document data recording the contents of voting documents, based on each of the voting document data procured at the institution from which the voting document data is procured. An electronic voting method comprising the steps of: publishing data indicating a result of counting votes; and comparing the disclosed encrypted voting document data with the published counting result data to detect whether there is any fraud. Method. 17. The method according to claim 17, further comprising: generating a certificate certifying the existence of the voting document data with a date and time for each of the encrypted voting document data; Each of the issued certificates is attached to the corresponding encrypted voting document data so as to be disclosed, and the comparing step includes detecting the presence or absence of fraud in the disclosed encrypted voting documents. 17. The electronic voting method according to claim 16, further comprising comparing the date and time of the certificate attached to data with the date and time of the counting of votes. 18. A means for generating voting document data recording the contents of a voting document; means for encrypting the voting document data; and each of the encrypted voting document data of a plurality of voting participants is disclosed. A first obtaining means for obtaining encrypted voting document data from the voting document data; and a second obtaining means for obtaining published data indicating a result of counting votes based on the procurement of each of the voting document data. An information processing apparatus comprising: an obtaining unit; and a unit configured to compare the obtained voting result data with the encrypted voting document data in order to detect the presence or absence of fraud. 19. A first obtaining means for obtaining encrypted document data to which a certificate proving the existence of voting document data is attached, and wherein said comparing means detects whether there is fraud or not. 19. The information processing apparatus according to claim 18, further comprising comparing the date and time of the counting and the date and time attached to the obtained certificate. 20. The apparatus further comprising: means for generating feature data of the voting document data; wherein the encrypting means encrypts the feature data; and wherein the first obtaining means encrypts a plurality of voting participants. Wherein the comparing means for obtaining the encrypted characteristic data from the released data of each of the generated characteristic data generates the characteristic data of the ticket counting result data in order to detect the presence or absence of fraud, and 19. The information processing apparatus according to claim 18, wherein the characteristic data of the result data is compared with the obtained encrypted characteristic data. 21. A date and time when another characteristic data of the encrypted characteristic data is generated in the certificate, and a method for generating the different characteristic data generated on the date and time using the encrypted characteristic data. In order to detect the presence or absence of fraud, the comparing means detects the characteristic data of the object to be compared from another characteristic data generated at any time after the existence date and time. And obtaining another characteristic data at the time of the generation date and time recorded in the certificate corresponding to the certificate, and based on the characteristic data of the comparison target and the generation method recorded in the certificate thereof, the characteristic of the comparison target. 21. The information processing apparatus according to claim 19, wherein another characteristic data of the data is generated, and the generated different characteristic data is compared with the obtained different characteristic data. 22. After the counting of votes, when a participant of the voting notifies that the institution where each of the voting document data has been procured is fraudulent, the first or second obtaining means includes: The voting document data held by the voting participant who made the notification is obtained, and the comparing means detects the voting participant who made the notification in order to detect whether or not the content of the notification is true. 22. The voting document data is compared with data obtained from the obtained encrypted voting document data or encrypted feature data corresponding to the notified voting participant.
The information processing apparatus according to claim 1. 23. A system comprising a trusted third-party organization, one or more information processing apparatuses for generating voting document data recording the contents of voting documents, and an organization from which the voting document data is procured. A computer-readable recording medium that records a program for causing a computer to function as the information processing apparatus; a means for generating voting document data in which voting document content is recorded; and encrypting the voting document data. Means for obtaining encrypted voting document data from each of the encrypted voting document data of a plurality of voting participants, each of which has been made public; and that the voting document data has been procured. A second obtaining means for obtaining published data indicating a result of the counting based on the result of counting the votes, and a method for detecting the presence or absence of fraud. Computer-readable recording medium containing the program code for executing the means for comparing the over data with the open cryptographic voting document data to the computer.