GB2474296A - A machine-readable tag having a timer to lock memory - Google Patents
A machine-readable tag having a timer to lock memory Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- GB2474296A GB2474296A GB0917770A GB0917770A GB2474296A GB 2474296 A GB2474296 A GB 2474296A GB 0917770 A GB0917770 A GB 0917770A GB 0917770 A GB0917770 A GB 0917770A GB 2474296 A GB2474296 A GB 2474296A
- Authority
- GB
- United Kingdom
- Prior art keywords
- machine
- timer
- tag according
- readable tag
- data
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
- G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
- G06K19/07318—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by hindering electromagnetic reading or writing
- G06K19/07327—Passive means, e.g. Faraday cages
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01V—GEOPHYSICS; GRAVITATIONAL MEASUREMENTS; DETECTING MASSES OR OBJECTS; TAGS
- G01V15/00—Tags attached to, or associated with, an object, in order to enable detection of the object
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
- G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
- G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
- G06K19/07345—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by activating or deactivating at least a part of the circuit on the record carrier, e.g. ON/OFF switches
Abstract
The tag 10 can be used for authenticating an article or document. It comprises an electronic microcircuit having at least one block of memory 12a that can be read from and written to, and a timer 13 which is set to begin when the memory is read. The timer is used to lock at least some of the memory against further access for a predetermined time period. The tag could comprise an RFID chip. The memory might include limited access memory (LAM). The timer could be protected against external influence by a metallic cage 14. The device would make cloning a prohibitively long process and thus deter counterfeiters.
Description
Security Labelling This invention relates to security labelling, e.g. for products or documents, to authenticate the product or document and differentiate it from counterfeits.
Essentially, anything that can be made can be copied, including conventional security labelling. Security labelling can take many forms, from complex and difficult to reproduce printing, as is found on banknotes, through the use of special substrates, such as watermarks and/or metallic inserts in paper, such, also, as in banknotes, chemical markers and DNA markers, to holograms, and more. All have the problem that they can be copied, albeit with varying degrees of difficulty, but since the counterfeiter aims to capture a significant slice of the market, often a bigger share than the genuine manufacturer has, and since copying a product does not involve research and product development costs and advertising and promotion costs, the counterfeiter is well able to afford even a substantial cost in copying the labelling.
Another problem with conventional security labelling is that it requires sometimes a high level of expertise to decide if a label is genuine or copied.
W02005088523 discloses methods for labelling that accept the fact that the label may be copied, but ensure that a copied label can be detected. The methods involve machine-readable tags such as RFID tags. There are various levels of security attainable with these methods, the basic level being the assignment of a unique code, which might be an alphanumeric code, but which, in electronic format, will become a binary number, to each item, this code being placed in a register of an RFID tag. The number is generated according to a secret algorithm, so that it would be impossible to generate a genuine' number except by chance, and impossible, therefore, to generate hundreds or thousands of genuine numbers.
lit would, of course, be possible to clone one genuine label, obtained by the simple expedient of buying a genuine product, and reproduce it thousands of times to create labels that would pass the identity test. But hand held reading machines would be programmed to detect if they had discovered a repeated label. A shelf full of products all with the same code would immediately be detected as fakes.
More than one genuine code might be copied to avoid this, so that it could be ensured that no two codes the same appeared in the same shop, or even the same city. Card readers, however, report back to a central database, which would soon detect duplicates wherever they turned up, and prompt an investigation into the provenance of the goods in question.
As anyone in the supply chain can be prosecuted for handling counterfeit goods, this would quickly lead to those in the supply chain taking a great deal more care to establish the credentials of goods they handle, and they can be assisted in this by collaboration with he genuine manufacturer, who can install code reading equipment against which goods inward can be authenticated.
This basic approach is developed to cover goods or items -such as banknotes -that may be presented more than once for authentication. In order to prevent a repeated presentation being mistaken for a counterfeit, the code is altered, as, for example, by advancing an incremental counter in the RFID tag, at each authentication. It is possible that a tag could be cloned with such an incremental counter, but the database would quickly detect that two otherwise identical tags had different numbers in their counters.
Adding, again at each authentication, details of time, place and perhaps account numbers, could lead to rapid detection of counterfeits and counterfeiters.
These higher-level detection features rely, however, on each authentication being carried out in conjunction with, or at least swiftly reported to, a database. While, with today's communications facilities, including, particularly, the Internet, this is quite easy to do in most parts of the world, there are occasionally circumstances in which a database cannot be accessed, but in which it is important to authenticate a product or a document using only an off-line reader.
The present invention provides a machine-readable tag that cannot be easily cloned, and a method for authenticating an article or document by affixing such a tag.
The invention comprises a machine-readable tag for authenticating an article or document, the tag comprising an electronic microcircuit comprising at least one block of memory that can be read and written to and a timer which is set to begin when the memory is read, and to lock at least some of the memory against further access for a predetermined time period.
The tag may comprise at least one block of limited access memory (LAM) which cannot be read but which may be addressed by a central processing unit (CPU) of the microcircuit to carry out an operation on data in the LAM and return a result, and the timer locks said data against being so addressed for said predetermined time period. The LAM contents may be modified as a result of such addressing.
The timer may comprise a digital timer or may comprise a component a property of which changes over time, such, for example, as a leaky capacitor.
The timer's function may be protected against external influence. The timer may be shielded against electrostatic and/or electromagnetic fields, or a fail-safe mechanism may be incorporated to operate, when any such field, or any other attack such as by heat or cold, is detected, permanently to lock the data. A thermal fuse may be incorporated that permanently opens a circuit when the temperature is outside a prescribed operating range.
The machine-readable tag may comprise an REID tag, and may be a component of a system such as is described in W02005088523 involving a database and tag readers.
Data held in the tag may be encrypted, if desired with public and private key encryption, to protect against information, such as algorithms used in the system and the meaning of data, being gathered from a reading of the memory contents. Data held on the tag may be held also in the database, and the database updated with changes in the information on the tag either by being connected to the tag during data reading and data changing operations, or by tag data being downloaded on a batch basis to the database via the internet or otherwise.
Said time period might, for example, be one hour, but might be shorter or longer, even up to a week or more, depending on circumstances.
In order to clone a tag, its contents must be read. If the tag is to be replicated in substantial numbers, and the replication requires the tag to be read for each replica, a delay of an hour or more between replications would be highly inefficient, considering the capital cost of the equipment required to produce such replications. If, moreover, reading one sub-block of data on the tag barred reading any other block of data on the tag for, say, as little as an hour, it could take in excess of a hundred days to copy all the information from a single 2.5-kilobyte block of data.
The timer may be set to begin as soon as the reading starts, so that, by the time the timer data is read, assuming sequential data reading, a copy of the tag would begin life with a preset time running, and could itself not be copied for the predetermined time.
To test for authenticity, an on-line or off-line reader will read and confirm data stored in one or more data addresses, which may be selected randomly, especially for on-line reading under database control, or according to control algorithms, more particularly when reading takes place off line, and write new data, particularly if a read counter is incorporated or if reading time and place information is to be recorded.
To permit frequent reading early in the manufacturing and supply chain, when tagged goods may be passing through manufacturing and packing operations, the timer may be disabled, and it may then be arranged that the timer becomes operative after a prescribed number of reading operations, or that it can be, or perhaps will automatically be, rendered operative by a signal sent e.g. from the database during on-line reading. It may further be arranged that, once operational, the timer cannot be disabled, except, as referred to above, with permanent lockout of data.
Methods for configuring machine readable tags according to the invention and methods for labelling and assuring authenticity of products and documents thereby will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which: Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of a first embodiment of an RFID tag; Figure 2 is a diagrammatic representation of a second embodiment of an RFID tag; and Figure 3 is a diagram of a fuse arrangement for use with the embodiment of Figure 1 or Figure 2, The drawings illustrate a machine-readable tag 10 and a method for configuring the tag for authenticating an article or document, the tag 10 comprising an electronic microcircuit comprising at least one block of memory 12a that can be read and written to and a timer 13 which is set to begin when the memory 12a is read, and to lock at least some of the memory against further access for a predetermined time period.
The tag comprises at least one block of limited access memory (LAM) 1 2a which cannot be read but which may be addressed by a central processing unit (CPU) 11 of the microcircuit to carry out an operation on data in the LAM 12a and return a result, and the timer 13 locks said data against being so addressed for said predetermined time period.
The LAM contents may be modified as a result of such addressing.
The timer may comprise a digital timer or may comprise a component a property of which changes over time, such, for example, as a leaky capacitor. A digital timer might be appropriate in an active RFID tag, i.e. one that has a battery power supply. Such tags are more expensive than passive tags, which derive power by induction through an aerial from an interrogation signal, but for the protection of high-value or highly sensitive goods, would be commercially viable. In either event, a capacitor might maintain a potential sufficient maintain a transistor gate at a potential that renders the transistor non-conductive.
The timer's function may be protected against external influence. The timer may be shielded against electrostatic and/or electromagnetic fields, or a fail-safe mechanism may be incorporated to operate, when any such field, or any other attack such as by heat or cold, is detected, permanently to lock the data. A thermal fuse may be incorporated that permanently opens a circuit when the temperature is outside a prescribed operating range.
The timer may 13 comprises a digital timer or a component a property of which changes over time, such, for example, as a leaky capacitor.
The timer's function is, in the embodiments of Figures 1 and 2, protected against external influence by being shielded in a metallic cage 14 against electrostatic and/or electromagnetic fields. Figure 3 illustrates protection against attack by heat or cold comprising a heat fuse 15 and a cold fuse 16 in series with the timer 13. Such fuses can comprise a thermotropic liquid crystal device adapted to undergo a phase change at a selected temperature and an electronic means for testing for the phase change and, if it occurs, to latch the circuit open.
The timer 13 may be set for any desired time period, say one hour. During that time, the protected data blocks may not be read. Figure 1 illustrates an arrangement in which the CPU 11 is connected through the timer to all registers 12a -12f of the RFID chip 10.
Figure 2 illustrates an arrangement in which only some, 1 2a -1 2c, are so protected.
One reason for having only some registers protected, especially if thermal fuse protection is used, as illustrated in Figure 3, is that a genuine tag could still be read as genuine from the remaining registers, but, as some registers could not be accessed, would indicate that it had been tampered with.
Claims (19)
- Claims: 1 A machine-readable tag for authenticating an article or document, the tag comprising an electronic microcircuit comprising at least one block of memory that can be read and written to and a timer which is set to begin when the memory is read, and to lock at least some of the memory against further access for a predetermined time period.
- 2 A machine-readable tag according to claim 1, comprising an FRID chip.
- 3 A machine-readable tag according to claim 1 or claim 2, comprising at least one block of limited access memory (LAM) which cannot be read but which may be addressed by a central processing unit (CPU) of the microcircuit to carry out an operation on data in the LAM and return a result, and the timer locks said data against being so addressed for said predetermined time period.
- 4 A machine-readable tag according to claim 3, in which the LAM contents are modified as a result of such addressing.
- A machine-readable tag according to any one of claim 1 to 4, in which the timer comprises a digital timer.
- 6 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims ito 5, in which the timer comprises a component a property of which changes over time.
- 7 A machine-readable tag according to claim 6, in which the component comprises a leaky capacitor.
- 8 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 7, in which the timer's function is protected against external influence.
- 9 A machine-readable tag according to claim 8, in which the timer is shielded against electrostatic and/or electromagnetic fields.
- A machine-readable tag according to claim 9, in which a fail-safe mechanism is incorporated to operate, when any such field is detected, permanently to lock the data.
- 11 A machine-readable tag according to claim 8, for an attack by heat or cold, a thermal fuse is incorporated that permanently opens a circuit when the temperature is outside a prescribed operating range.
- 12 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 11, being a component of a system such as is described in W02005088523 involving a database and tag readers.
- 13 A machine-readable tag according to claim 12, in which data held in the tag is encrypted.
- 14 A machine-readable tag according to claim 13, in which the data is encrypted if desired with public and private key encryption.
- 15 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims ito 14, in which the predetermined time period is one hour or more.
- 16 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 15, in which the timer is set to begin as soon as the reading starts, so that, by the time the timer data is read, assuming sequential data reading, a copy of the tag would begin life with a preset time running, and could itself not be copied for the predetermined time.
- 17 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claim 1 to 16, in which the timer s initially disabled, and it becomes operative only after a prescribed number of reading operations.
- 18 A machine-readable tag according any one of claims 1 to 16, in which the timer is initially disabled but rendered operative by a signal sent e.g. from the database during on-line reading.
- 19 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims ito 18, in which, once operational, the timer cannot be disabled, except with permanent lockout of data.Amendments to the claims have been filed as follows Claims: 1 A machine-readable RFID tag for authenticating an article or document, the tag comprising an electronic microcircuit comprising at least one block of memory that can be read and written to and a timer which is set to begin when the memory is read, and to lock at least some of the memory against further access for a time period.2 A machine-readable tag according to claim 1, comprising at least one block of limited access memory (LAM) which cannot be read but which may be addressed by a central processing unit (CPU) of the microcircuit to carry out an operation on data in the LAM and return a result, and the timer locks said data against being so addressed for said predetermined time period.3 A machine-readable tag according to claim2, in which the LAM contents are modified as a result of such addressing.4 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claim 1 to 3, in which the timer comprises a digital timer.5 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 4, in which the timer comprises a component, a property of which changes over time.6 A machine-readable tag according to claim 5, in which the component comprises a leaky capacitor.7 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 6, in which the timer's function is protected against external influence.8 A machine-readable tag according to claim 7, in which the timer is shielded against electrostatic andlor electromagnetic fields.9 A machine-readable tag according to claim 8, in which a fail-safe mechanism is * *** incorporated to operate, when any such field is detected, permanently to lock the data. ****: 35 10 A machine-readable tag according to claim 7, in which, for an attack by heat or * cold, a thermal fuse is incorporated that permanently opens a circuit when the * :* temperature is outside a prescribed operating range.11 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 10, being a component of a system involving a database and tag readers.* :: :* 12 A machine-readable tag according to claim 11, in which data held in the tag is encrypted.13 A machine-readable tag according to claim 12, in which the data is encrypted if desired with public and private key encryption.14 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 13, in which the predetermined time period is one hour or more.15 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims 1 to 14, in which the timer is set to begin as soon as the reading starts, so that, by the time the timer data is read, assuming sequential data reading, a copy of the tag would begin life with a time running, and could itself not be copied for the predetermined time.16 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claim 1 to i, in which the timer is initially disabled, and it becomes operative only after a number of reading operations.17 A machine-readable tag according any one of claims 1 to 16, in which the timer is initially disabled but rendered operative by a signal sent e.g. from the database during on-line reading.18 A machine-readable tag according to any one of claims I to 17, in which, once operational, the timer cannot be disabled, except with permanent lockout of data. * * ***. ******* * * ** ** * . S * * * * SI * I. *I * I...*..II* * I
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB0917770A GB2474296A (en) | 2009-10-12 | 2009-10-12 | A machine-readable tag having a timer to lock memory |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB0917770A GB2474296A (en) | 2009-10-12 | 2009-10-12 | A machine-readable tag having a timer to lock memory |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| GB0917770D0 GB0917770D0 (en) | 2009-11-25 |
| GB2474296A true GB2474296A (en) | 2011-04-13 |
Family
ID=41402837
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB0917770A Withdrawn GB2474296A (en) | 2009-10-12 | 2009-10-12 | A machine-readable tag having a timer to lock memory |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| GB (1) | GB2474296A (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2013079335A1 (en) | 2011-11-28 | 2013-06-06 | Smartrac Ip B.V. | Tag forgery protection |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US5784704A (en) * | 1993-12-28 | 1998-07-21 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Memory card with timer controlled protection of stored data |
| WO2006134563A2 (en) * | 2005-06-14 | 2006-12-21 | Nxp B.V. | Transponder system for transmitting key-encrypted information and associated keys |
| EP1862952A1 (en) * | 2006-05-30 | 2007-12-05 | Axalto SA | Secure electronic device |
-
2009
- 2009-10-12 GB GB0917770A patent/GB2474296A/en not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US5784704A (en) * | 1993-12-28 | 1998-07-21 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Memory card with timer controlled protection of stored data |
| WO2006134563A2 (en) * | 2005-06-14 | 2006-12-21 | Nxp B.V. | Transponder system for transmitting key-encrypted information and associated keys |
| EP1862952A1 (en) * | 2006-05-30 | 2007-12-05 | Axalto SA | Secure electronic device |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2013079335A1 (en) | 2011-11-28 | 2013-06-06 | Smartrac Ip B.V. | Tag forgery protection |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| GB0917770D0 (en) | 2009-11-25 |
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Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAP | Application withdrawn, taken to be withdrawn or refused ** after publication under section 16(1) |