EP2374091A2 - Encrypted marking and method for securing and certifying the authenticity of a product - Google Patents
Encrypted marking and method for securing and certifying the authenticity of a productInfo
- Publication number
- EP2374091A2 EP2374091A2 EP09762149A EP09762149A EP2374091A2 EP 2374091 A2 EP2374091 A2 EP 2374091A2 EP 09762149 A EP09762149 A EP 09762149A EP 09762149 A EP09762149 A EP 09762149A EP 2374091 A2 EP2374091 A2 EP 2374091A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- marking
- encrypted
- elements
- dots
- information
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V30/00—Character recognition; Recognising digital ink; Document-oriented image-based pattern recognition
- G06V30/10—Character recognition
- G06V30/22—Character recognition characterised by the type of writing
- G06V30/224—Character recognition characterised by the type of writing of printed characters having additional code marks or containing code marks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
- G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
- G07D7/004—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip
- G07D7/0047—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency using digital security elements, e.g. information coded on a magnetic thread or strip using checkcodes, e.g. coded numbers derived from serial number and denomination
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0806—Details of the card
- G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/12—Card verification
Definitions
- This invention refers to encrypted marking and a method for protection, verification, and certification of products' authenticity by means of unique encrypted marking based on extensive encrypted information embedded [located] in each very small element (dot) of the marking, which is protected and which may be recovered [reconstituted] in case of wear, contamination, or deletion.
- WO 0129790 shows a one-level or multilevel encrypted marking for securing and controlling a product's authenticity, which offers the opportunity of integrating one or several encrypted, invisible, and personalized numbers in the same marking, which is to be placed on the secured product. This is done by means of rearranging signs of the visible number of the marking, increasing or reducing the size of the letters and elements of the marking, or their rotation. Such marking offers a very good protection against forgery due to the uniquely encrypted personalized numbers on each securitized product provided by separate and independent sources.
- BG 61241 Bl describes a method for writing and reading such multimedia and multilevel markings (codes), which are generated by parallel and independently operating systems.
- WO 0239397 contains a description of a device for embedding such multimedia and multilevel encrypted markings.
- all they have considerable disadvantages, namely that such markings contain information limited to some personalized numbers. This is due to the way of reading the information, i.e. there is a change of certain elements, whose dimensions are relatively big in comparison to the dimensions of the marking or its parts.
- Such elements are signs (letters or digits) or other parts of the marking, which are limited in terms of quantity and features.
- the aim of this invention is to solve the above-mentioned problems and to overcome the previously mentioned disadvantages by means of encrypted marking and a method for securing and certifying the authenticity of a product through a multilevel encrypted marking with one-level and multilevel generated, independent, encrypted information, unique for each marking and which is secured by recording and reading the code of the material, obtained from different sources by means of a controllable marking element. Without altering the initial appearance and form of the marking, it is possible to record a very large quantity of encrypted information, written in each small element (dot) of the marking by means of stochastic modulation and alteration of these very small elements (dots) of the marking.
- the marking by using very small elements (dots) of the marking one can obtain a big multitude, i.e. bigger resolution and density of elements, which on their part may be modulated and altered in a large variety of forms, spatial orientation, and location.
- the large multitude of very small elements (dots) multiplied by the big variety of modulations result in the opportunity of integrating a large volume of information.
- the very marking preserves its integrity in terms of initial appearance and form. The alteration of these very small elements, which do not constitute a significant part of the whole marking, does not result in a change in the form and image of the marking.
- the number of elements, the quantity and variety of impacts on them lead not only to the possibility of integrating more information, but also to more options available to the user such as a bigger choice of elements and impacts on them, with the objective of achieving uniqueness for each of the users and each of their products with the immediate result of more security and reliability against any attempted forgery.
- the marking itself can be applied by means of a laser marking system, an electronic beam, a controllable nano-brush - matrix, an inkjet element, a mechanical marking head, or any other technology of marking and printing.
- the print, modulation, form, and location of certain encrypted elements (dots) of the marking are stored in a database.
- These small elements (dots) are selected in such a way as to ensure the availability of a few such elements (dots) from various and specific fields of the very marking and/or bigger elements of the marking such as its parts, signs, letters, and digits, which need to be defined.
- a protective ultraviolet varnish is applied on the area around the marking. As the varnish dries, it forms a protective layer on, in, and around the elements of the marking.
- the marking is put on an inlay, which is to be integrated into the product, the marking is placed in such a way as to be positioned between the inlay and the secured product. Such a location prevents it from aging and wearing out.
- the encrypted marking is made by means of a laser beam, which penetrates through the layer.
- Figure 1 shows a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements of the marking
- Figure 2 shows a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements of the marking applied on metal by means of laser engraving
- Figure 3 shows a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements (dots) of the marking by means of micro-perforation of paper where (1) is the regular marking; (2) is a multilevel encrypted marking; (3) is a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements of the marking; (4) is a group of encrypted small elements (dots); (5) is a magnified image of a group of encrypted small elements (dots);
- Figure 4 shows the resistance and recovery of a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements (dots) of the marking in case of contamination, wear and tear, and obliteration;
- Figure 5 shows the application of a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements (dots) of the marking for securing products which are subject to production, control, and verification by several independent authorities;
- Figure 6 shows the implementation of a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements (dots) of the marking at a nano-level;
- Figure 7 shows a product secured by means of integration of its information into a unique multilevel encrypted marking with encryption in very small elements (dots) of the marking.
- Figure 8 shows secured personal ID documents with a unique multilevel encrypted marking secured by a material code; the marking contains also the biometric data of the holder of the ID document;
- Figure 9 shows secured personal ID documents with an integrated contact chip
- Figure 10 shows secured passport with an integrated contactless chip
- Figure 11 shows a marking of a motor vehicle against theft
- Figure 12 shows a unique multilevel encrypted marking secured with a code of the material
- Figure 1 is an illustration of a unique marking with encrypted information, which is integrated into very small elements (dots).
- (1) shows multilevel encrypted marking which is a laser micro-perforation of holes in paper. An eight-digit number is integrated by means of shuffling eight holes along the 'X' & 'Y' axes;
- (2) shows a multilevel encrypted marking with another five eight-digit numbers integrated in the same way. It becomes evident from (1) and (2) that the amount of integrated information is extremely limited. Even a small increase in the volume of information leads to a drastic change in the form and appearance of the marking. With the second example, it is even impossible to visually recognize the last digit '3'.
- the marking (3) is the same visible marking '153' with integrated encrypted information in very small elements (dots) of the marking.
- the marking preserves its form and appearance and it is easily recognizable and machine-readable even though the volume of integrated information is several times higher than the information in (1) and (2).
- the magnified image (5) of the fragment (4) of the marking (3) shows a number of small elements (dots) (6) having various alterations (modulations) obtained by means of different geometric forms of each very small element (dot). In this case, twenty-seven different geometric forms are used. Even in this simplified example, fragment (4) with its eleven elements results in I I 27 combinations. In theory and practice, the number of possible geometric forms and combinations is unlimited.
- Figure 2 shows another example of marking made by means of laser engraving on metal.
- (1) shows a laser engraved serial number without integrated encrypted information
- (2) is a multilevel encrypted marking with one personalized twelve-digit number derived by means of displacing the signs (letters and digits) of the serial number horizontally along the 'X' & 'Y' axes
- (3) represents a multilevel encrypted marking with three personalized twelve-digit numbers integrated by means of displacement of signs, rotation of signs, and increase/decrease of signs.
- (2) and (3) clearly show the limited volume of the integrated encrypted information. Its triple increase in (3) compared to (2) results in a drastic change of the appearance of the marking, impeded recognition, machine reading, and OCR (optical character recognition) unlike marking (4).
- Marking (4) is a marking of the same serial number with encryption in very small elements (dots) of the marking.
- the appearance of marking (4) resembles the one of (1).
- the magnified fragment (5) of marking (4) shows on the magnified image (6) the encrypted very small elements (dots) (7) of marking (4) made by means of engraving much smaller figures with different shapes on the signs of the marking. It makes it possible to integrate several dozens of different personalized numbers by using the encryption table (8) in fragment (5) alone, where a particular twelve-digit number corresponds to each element (dot).
- Figure 4 is an illustration of the resistance of a marking with encryption in very small elements (dots) to contamination, wear, tear, and obliteration.
- Certain very small elements (dots) (2) of each sign of the marking (1) are modulated in a certain way for that particular sign.
- these elements (dots) have the shape of the digit one for digit ' 1 ', for the digit '5' they have the shape of a pentagon, for digit '3' they have another specific shape.
- the elements (dots) (2) of each particular sign are selected in such a way as to be located on different places in the relevant sign of the marking (1).
- Modulations on these very small elements are unique for each very small element (dot) of the marking (1). Their type, modulation, and location are stored in a database tagged by indices, i.e. both by the visible number of the marking (in this case ' 153') and by individual signs.
- the digit ' 1 ' is represented by a modulation whose element (dot) has the shape of the digit one; digit '5' has a shape of a pentagon, etc.
- Marking (1) acquires the appearance (3) as a result of contamination or wear and tear. The marking is destroyed and its type cannot be determined. A further detailed study of the marking (3) reveals the type and location of its encrypted very small elements (dots) (2). A check in the database makes it possible to restore the marking, the element which is to represent the digit '1 ', then the pentagon restores the digit '5', and so one until the marking ' 153' is completely restored.
- Figure 5 shows another example of the possibility offered by this invention for protecting a product (2), which is subject to protection, verification, and certification by several independent authorities (1).
- Product (2) bears a marking (3) with encryption in very small elements (dots).
- Each of the authorities Oi , O 2 ... O N determines the modulations of certain elements (dots) (4), (5) ... (6) independently from each other.
- the location, type of modulation, the image, and the structure of the product around the relevant elements (dots) of each of the authorities Oi , O 2 ... O N is stored in the relevant database DBi, DB 2 ...
- DB N The database of a particular authority stores information only related to the elements (dots) of the marking determined by this authority (3), respectively (4) for Oi , (5) for O 2 and (6) for O N -
- each authority has its own unique and independent personalization, unknown to the other authorities, by which the authenticity of a product can be verified and certified.
- Oi the elements of the authorities
- O 2 the unique personalization of the affected authority has been compromised
- such an event cannot affect the security features of the marking as a whole (3), because the unique personalization provided by the rest of the authorities, shall remain valid, thus the validation of the authenticity of the product shall not be affected.
- the secured product can be a EURO banknote with a certain nominal value and the relevant authorities can be the European Central Bank and the central banks of the Members States, which issue and use this currency.
- Figure 6 illustrates the implementation of this invention at a nano-level. i.e. where the dimensions of the information encrypted in very small elements (dots) of the unique multilevel encrypted marking (1) are of the nano-level, and where certain very small elements (dots) of the marking (2) are images (3), formed at a nano-level of elements with dimensions less than 1 ⁇ m and where these images serve to encrypt the information and to secure the marking.
- certain elements (dots) or certain locations are formed as a marking at a nano-level (3) of the same marking carrying the same information stored in them (4).
- the encryption at a nano-level is carried out by a controllable nano-brush-matrix. Such encryption can be read by means of AFM (Atomic Force Microscopy).
- This unique encrypted marking (1) may be applied as a thin layer, on or under security elements such as kinegrams, holograms, etc., where it is placed in the inner side of such security elements.
- security elements such as kinegrams, holograms, etc.
- the unique encrypted marking will be between the product and the security element and in such way it will be protected from aging and wearing out while at the same time it can be verified and certified.
- Figure 12 illustrates another embodiment of the invention where the code of a material can secure the encrypted marking in very small elements (dots) of being exactly copied - cloning.
- the structure of product's material is scanned in and around certain elements (dots) or a group of elements (dots) (2) of the marking. These elements (dots) are located at different places of the marking.
- the scanned structures which are unique identifiers of the protected product, are stored in a database and serve for the unquestionable identification of the authenticity of a marking. In case the marking gets contaminated, worn out or partly destroyed, some elements are saved (3), thus permitting the express and unquestionable identification and verification the whole marking after comparing of that preserved element of the marking to the one which that has been stored in the database.
- Each product bears specific information relevant only for this particular product.
- Such information can be a serial number, a product number, a brand and model, a document number, as well as identificators with information about the product's designated purpose of use such as nominal value of payment documents, etc.
- this information is placed on the products to be protected in a way, which makes it easy to find it, read it, and identify it because it is important for the product, subject to protection, or for its functions.
- the payment title (1) on Figure 7 contains a nominal value (2) and a serial number (3), which are visible to every user; such information is different for each particular title of this kind.
- the same title is also protected by a unique multilevel encrypted marking (4) and it is also secured by the code of the material.
- the nominal value and the serial number of the payment title are integrated into the unique multilevel encrypted marking by means of alteration of certain elements.
- the nominal value is integrated into the unique multilevel encrypted marking through the very small elements (dots) of group (5) while the serial number of the payment title is encrypted through the very small elements (dots) of group (6).
- the unique marking is applied as perforation on the document.
- the next example illustrates the security protection of personal ID documents by means of a unique multilevel encrypted marking protected by the code of the material where the personal biometric data of the document's holder are integrated in such a marking.
- the personal document (1) on Figure 8 is an ID card made of plastic material such as Teslin, PVC, PET, Polycarbonate, or any other material used in the plastic card industry.
- a unique multilevel encrypted marking (2) is placed on it.
- the passport (3) is treated in the same way.
- the encrypted marking (2) may take the form of a logo or another sign (4) of the authority issuing the relevant ID document or it may be the marked image of the document's holder (5).
- Images (6) and (7) of (4) and (5) show the implementation of biometric information by means of modulation of the elements of a marking, (8) and (9) respectively.
- the distribution by areas of the marking and/or the sequence of these elements determines the type of recorded biometric data.
- Biometric data include features of the document's holder such as eyes colour, hair colour, nose shape, lips shape, ears shape, identifying marks, height, weight, etc., as well as fingerprints and other prints which are integrated into the encrypted marking by means of modulation of elements as described above.
- the elements of group (10) refer to the eye colour
- those of group (11) refer to the shape of the nose
- the ones of group (12) refer to the hair colour, etc.
- the very encrypted marking can be placed on personal ID documents by different printing techniques, laser engraving as with (1), laser or other types of perforation as with (3).
- Electronic documents such as ePassports, eID cards, etc. are the most recent trends in the field of personal ID documents. Such documents bear an electronic device, which is integrated into them and which contains data of both their holder and the document itself. These data are readable, checkable and serve for verification of the authenticity of the document.
- the most commonly used contactless and contact integrated circuits in personal ID documents are RFID chips. They can store very important personal information of the holder of an ID document such as fingerprints, a digital photograph, etc.; such data are used for holder's authentication and are subject to very successful forgery, manipulation, and falsification.
- the data in question can be secured in the following way:
- the personal ID card (1) on Figure 9 has an integrated contact chip (2).
- the hash value of information stored on the contact chip is calculated under the mathematical hash function.
- a distinctive feature of the hash function is that a change of even one bit of input information results in a different calculated value.
- the calculated hash function is then integrated into the encrypted marking (3) via alteration of some elements of the marking.
- the encrypted marking (3) may comprise either the contact surface of the chip, or both the chip and the card.
- the marking is placed by means of laser micro-engraving.
- Passport (1) on Figure 10 has a contactless chip (2) integrated into its cover and a unique identificationor (4).
- the unique multilevel encrypted marking (3) is applied by means of printing. It bears the unique identificator of the chip, which is used later for verification of the authenticity of the chip and the of data stored on it.
- Passport (1) has a chip (2) with an identificator (4).
- the hash value of data stored in that chip is calculated and integrated into the unique multilevel encrypted marking (5), which is in the form of a perforation of an image on the document.
- the verification process includes thereafter reading of an encrypted marking and the data integrated into it.
- the hash value of data stored on the chip is calculated and the value of the marking is then compared to the calculated hash value. If both values match, the data from the chip are authentic. If they do not match, that is a sure sign that the data have been manipulated and altered.
- the same principle refers to any product containing a RFID tag, a NFC (Near Field Communication) device, or another type of chip, processor, memory, or electronic device, which carry data about the product, its purpose of use and mode of operation, as well as any other important information concerning the product.
- a bankcard with an integrated chip which is marked with a unique multilevel encrypted marking with an integrated unique chip identificationor.
- the card can only be used after the chip has been validated through the marking of the bankcard. This is to prevent forging it and especially making a duplicate of it known as cloning and using for unauthorized money drawing.
- Another field of implementation of this invention is the protection of motor vehicles against theft. Every vehicle has a chassis number, which serves as vehicle's identification. When a motor vehicle is stolen, this number is usually changed, manipulated, and forged. The motor vehicle is repainted and then easily reregistered and sold. This is why it became necessary to place a marking on many additional interior and exterior parts. Often such marking contain another number, the vehicle's registration number, chassis' number, or part of it. Such markings are not secured and can easily be replaced, falsified, and forged which makes them useless.
- the problem can be solved in the following way: a number of interior and exterior parts of a motor vehicle (1) on Figure 11 are marked with a unique multilevel encrypted marking (2) and secured with a code of the material.
- the marking contains integrated information about the vehicle and/or its owner, and/or the name of the authorized company, which marked it.
- the marking is placed by means of mechanical, laser, chemical abrasive, sandblast, or another type of marking. Such an encrypted marking cannot be forged, imitated, and manipulated. A motor vehicle marked in such way can be easily traced and identified if stolen.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE09762149.4T DE09762149T1 (en) | 2008-06-12 | ENCRYPTED MARKING AND METHOD FOR ASSURING AND CERTIFYING THE AUTHENTICITY OF A PRODUCT |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
BG10110162A BG66377B1 (en) | 2008-06-12 | 2008-06-12 | Encoded marking and a method for protection and certification the authenticity of products |
PCT/IB2009/052476 WO2009150622A2 (en) | 2008-06-12 | 2009-06-10 | Encrypted marking and method for securing and certifying the authenticity of a product |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2374091A2 true EP2374091A2 (en) | 2011-10-12 |
Family
ID=41217692
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09762149A Ceased EP2374091A2 (en) | 2008-06-12 | 2009-06-10 | Encrypted marking and method for securing and certifying the authenticity of a product |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2374091A2 (en) |
BG (1) | BG66377B1 (en) |
DE (1) | DE09762149T1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2728513T1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2009150622A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN103415857A (en) * | 2011-02-08 | 2013-11-27 | 录象射流技术公司 | Method of printing a product code |
ES2727101T3 (en) | 2013-04-11 | 2019-10-14 | European Central Bank | Security feature and object with security feature |
DE15816640T1 (en) * | 2014-10-23 | 2019-11-28 | Keit Ltd. | Method of protecting bound documents against forgery by means of perforation |
CN105150711A (en) * | 2015-08-25 | 2015-12-16 | 郑国义 | Random colorful three-dimensional entity false proof mark and manufacturing device and method |
JPWO2022044876A1 (en) * | 2020-08-24 | 2022-03-03 |
Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3628353A1 (en) * | 1986-08-21 | 1988-02-25 | Guenther Louda | Method for the inconspicuous marking of documents and method of testing such documents |
EP0469868A2 (en) * | 1990-07-31 | 1992-02-05 | Xerox Corporation | Binary image processing for decoding self-clocking glyph shape codes |
WO1999056241A1 (en) * | 1998-04-23 | 1999-11-04 | The Royal College Of Art | Method and apparatus for producing a signal from an image |
JP2002200872A (en) * | 2000-12-28 | 2002-07-16 | Printing Bureau Ministry Of Finance Japan | Authenticity discriminating former with fine perfortion and authenticity discriminating device |
FR2843072A1 (en) * | 2002-08-02 | 2004-02-06 | Banque De France | Document secured with micro-perforations, uses micro-perforations of various shapes and orientations to form encoded marking of bank note |
DE202005011521U1 (en) * | 2005-07-19 | 2005-10-06 | Bundesdruckerei Gmbh | Security system for book type document especially a passport has security markings applied to each page |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2565383B1 (en) * | 1984-05-29 | 1986-08-14 | Imaje Sa | METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING A PRODUCT FOR PREVENTING FRAUD AND DEVICE CARRYING OUT THIS METHOD |
EP1402485A1 (en) * | 2000-11-07 | 2004-03-31 | Zhivko Georgiev Zhelev | A device for recording multi-dimensional coded markings upon products for protection and verification purposes |
US20040061326A1 (en) * | 2001-02-09 | 2004-04-01 | David Hilton | Document printed with graphical symbols which encode information |
GB2397681B (en) * | 2001-10-01 | 2005-12-07 | Fryco Ltd | Optical encoding |
BG65111B1 (en) * | 2001-10-04 | 2007-02-28 | "Кеит" Оод | Method and device for code recording and reading of material on products for the protection and control of their originality |
-
0
- DE DE09762149.4T patent/DE09762149T1/en active Pending
-
2008
- 2008-06-12 BG BG10110162A patent/BG66377B1/en unknown
-
2009
- 2009-06-10 ES ES09762149T patent/ES2728513T1/en active Pending
- 2009-06-10 WO PCT/IB2009/052476 patent/WO2009150622A2/en active Application Filing
- 2009-06-10 EP EP09762149A patent/EP2374091A2/en not_active Ceased
Patent Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3628353A1 (en) * | 1986-08-21 | 1988-02-25 | Guenther Louda | Method for the inconspicuous marking of documents and method of testing such documents |
EP0469868A2 (en) * | 1990-07-31 | 1992-02-05 | Xerox Corporation | Binary image processing for decoding self-clocking glyph shape codes |
WO1999056241A1 (en) * | 1998-04-23 | 1999-11-04 | The Royal College Of Art | Method and apparatus for producing a signal from an image |
JP2002200872A (en) * | 2000-12-28 | 2002-07-16 | Printing Bureau Ministry Of Finance Japan | Authenticity discriminating former with fine perfortion and authenticity discriminating device |
FR2843072A1 (en) * | 2002-08-02 | 2004-02-06 | Banque De France | Document secured with micro-perforations, uses micro-perforations of various shapes and orientations to form encoded marking of bank note |
DE202005011521U1 (en) * | 2005-07-19 | 2005-10-06 | Bundesdruckerei Gmbh | Security system for book type document especially a passport has security markings applied to each page |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
ES2728513T1 (en) | 2019-10-25 |
DE09762149T1 (en) | 2019-12-05 |
WO2009150622A3 (en) | 2010-02-04 |
BG110162A (en) | 2009-12-31 |
BG66377B1 (en) | 2013-10-31 |
WO2009150622A2 (en) | 2009-12-17 |
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