EA027759B1 - Method for voting by secret ballot - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for voting by secret ballot using a bulletin for secret ballot, comprising the information concerning a bulletin encrypted serial number, represented in the bulletin in the form of a bar-code, and protected by opaque coating zone with the bulletin serial number. The proposed method for voting by secret ballot provides the high level of secrecy of the ballot, control of the authenticity of bulletins used in the voting, provides an access for voters to control the course and result of voting, to carry out the control of voting process, after loading the bulletin serial number on the public website to check the correctness of the record voice in the poll, while fulfilling the principle of secret ballot. The use of said method in holding different elections, polls, referendums substantially limits options of introduced intentional and casual violation in counting of votes, and, consequently, considerably increases the authenticity (objectivity) of the poll.

Description

The invention relates to methods of secret ballot and ballots for secret ballot and can be used in various elections, polls, referenda using automated vote counting systems.

Since 2004, in the territory of the Russian Federation, ballot processing systems (COIB) have begun to be used to automate the counting of votes in elections (see, for example, 1Sp: // \ y \ y \ u.Tsk5i.gi / pobs / 203). KOIB is an optical ballot scanner located above the ballot box (ballot drive) and integrated with a computer.

Voting with the use of KOIB practically does not differ from the traditional one. The voter puts any sign in the square to the right of the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to cast his vote, and then puts the ballot paper on the KOIB scanner tray. The ballot is captured, read by the scanner and gets into the ballot box. The ballots are identified by the imprint of the seal of the precinct election commission recognized by the scanner. The signatures of the two members of the election commission are put after stamping, but they should not prevent the scanner from recognizing the seal of the commission and should not be superimposed on other fields and numbers.

At the end of the voting procedure, KOIB automatically summarizes: how many ballots were received, how many of them are valid, invalid (and for what reason); summarizes the votes of voters who have voted and issues a protocol that can be received within a few minutes after the completion of voting. The protocol signed by the members of the precinct election commission, together with the data on the voting results recorded on a diskette, is transferred to a higher election commission for entry into the state automated system of Elections (GAS Elections). Paper ballots are retrieved from KOIB, packed without sorting, and transferred to a higher election commission for storage in the archive in the manner prescribed by law.

When the power is turned off, KOIB automatically remembers the data received before the accident. In this case, voting at the polling station continues according to the traditional scheme, which is why the KOIB has a compartment for manual voting. The compartments are divided by a partition, and it is impossible to mix up automatically processed ballots and ordinary ones. When the power supply is restored, voting will continue as before through the scanner. After the polling station is closed, ballots are withdrawn from the ballot box and passed through the scanner in a regular way. If force majeure occurs and the power supply is not restored, the vote count will be carried out manually by the election commission.

In accordance with the technical requirements for the KOIB-2010 Ballot Processing Complex set by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (1Shr: // \ y \ y \ u.S1kgG.gi / acTs.1a1 / rgs51bsp1 / o5p / 8_ko1b.1pt1). The KOIB must receive and process ballots that are lowered by voters into the receiving tray of the device one at a time, face down.

KOIB should automatically process and accumulate the processed ballots in the drive, returning the ballots to the voter if it is impossible to correctly process them, namely the simultaneous omission of more than one ballot; lowering the ballot with a bias greater than permissible; lowering the ballot folded in half; omitting documents that do not meet the requirements for machine-readable ballots.

KOIB should provide automated reception of ballots; bulletin processing; counting of votes of voters, referendum participants at a polling station, referendum precinct while holding elections and referenda at all levels; reception of initial data for voting prepared by the State Electoral Commission and containing ballot description data, protocol descriptions, sequence of switching modes (entering ballots when voting in the polling station, entering ballots from portable boxes, drawing up a protocol on the voting results), date of voting, voting start and end time, polling station number; receiving raw data from an external storage medium (non-volatile memory card); recording protocols on voting results in an agreed format on an external storage medium (non-volatile memory card).

In the voting process, COIBB must count the processed ballots. The number of accepted ballots should be displayed on the COIB indicator.

When summarizing the results of the voting, KOIB should provide a data synchronization mode between 2 devices installed at the polling station in order to form a single protocol with the distribution of votes among candidates.

If it is impossible to correctly process the bulletin, KOIB must return it no later than 2 seconds after the start of its processing. In the event of the return of the ballot, it must be possible to process it upon repeated lowering.

Regarding the requirements for recognizing ballots, KOIB should provide recognition of ballots in the established form, omitted one at a time, face down. During recognition, the type of ballot must be determined, and distinct marks made by the voter in squares opposite the positions registered in the election of candidates (parties) must be recognized.

KOIB should provide the calculation of clearly affixed marks of any contrasting color,

- 1,027,759 applied inside the square.

The recognition of ballots should be carried out with a reliability of 99.9%, i.e. no more than one error in recognizing a mark for a thousand processed marks, provided that the ballots are correctly typographed, that the election commission issues them correctly, and that the voter puts a distinct mark in the box.

In addition, KOIB must ensure the exchange of data with a higher election commission, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information in accordance with the requirements of current legislation. The KOIB interface should ensure the timely start of voting and the readiness of the complex to receive ballots.

Thus, the use of KOIB helps to automate the process of holding secret ballots, significantly reducing the time and effort usually required to count votes manually. In addition, according to official figures, the use of the complexes has reduced the number of errors in the calculation of votes.

However, a significant drawback of using this system is the complete inability of the voter to make sure that his voting options were correctly entered into the GAS Elections and taken into account in the final vote count. This is due both to the voting method used, in which the counting of votes at each polling station is carried out by means of the COIB and the form of the ballot used. Neither the known method, nor the form of the ballot used does not imply any possibility of control over the voting process and the counting of votes, while members of the precinct election commission receive this control to a certain extent. Control by technical means, if carried out, does not exclude the possibility of influence on the voting results by third parties, for example, members of the precinct election commission (PEC).

From the patent of the Russian Federation No. 2178586 (published on January 20, 2002; IPC С07С 13/00), a secret ballot method is known with the publication of its results using a two-part ballot. Each part of the ballot has a specially defined place for entering an individual anonymous code, and the second part is intended to control the correctness of the will of the voter. An individual anonymous code is independently obtained from the lottery drum or in a sealed form from the election commission and the ballot is filled out with the introduction of the same individual anonymous code at a specific place on each part of the ballot. The publication of the voting results shall be carried out indicating the number of votes cast regarding a particular candidate or the issue put to the vote, and indicating the individual anonymous codes of the ballots that voted for him, in order to ensure that the voter can verify the correctness of his will. An individual anonymous code may be a combination of strokes. Thus, it is possible for each voter to control the correctness of his vote when counting votes in a polling station, constituency, and the whole country without violating the principle of anonymity.

RF patent No. 2153192 (published July 20, 2000; IPC С07С 13/00) discloses a similar secret ballot method, in which the voter is invited to use a stamp with a sticky back side on which an individual identification number is made to ensure control of the voting results. In addition, it is indicated that in combination with existing optical recognition systems for images (text), the proposed method of secret voting makes it easy to automate the process of counting the number of votes and authentication of ballots using standard computer technologies.

However, filling out a ballot paper with receiving an additional anonymous code or identification number from the election commission and putting it on the ballot complicates and slows down the voting process, requires additional actions on the part of the election commission members, as well as additional production of an anonymous code or identification number carrier.

In RF patent application No. 2006112064 (published on November 20, 2007; IPC С07С 13/00), a secret ballot method is proposed with the publication of its results in the form of lists of anonymous individual ballot codes submitted for each of the polling stations. The method includes receiving a voter of a two-part ballot; filling out and separation of the part of the ballot intended for voting; putting her in the ballot box. The second part of the ballot remains with the voter to control the correctness of the accounting of his vote. An anonymous individual code is applied to each part of the ballot in advance, for example, in the process of producing ballots. It may include the number of the region and the polling station and be presented in sequential numbering.

Using a ballot consisting of two fillable parts takes time to fill them out and does not exclude errors when marking the same candidate (party) on both parts. In addition, such a bulletin increases the costs of its manufacture and transportation.

Speeding up the voting process, its automation and verification of the reliability of the results is facilitated by the presentation of information on the ballot in the form of machine-readable codes, for example, barcode 2.027759 codes. So, US patent No. 7621449 (published November 24, 2009; IPC C06K 17/00, C07C 13/00) describes a ballot for voting, consisting of two mirror parts. Each part is marked with a barcode to confirm the validity of the newsletter. Disclosed in Japanese Patent Application No. 2004118829 (published April 15, 2004; IPC C06K 7/00, C.06O 50/00, C07C 13/00) the barcodes on the ballot contain information about the candidates. Japanese Patent Application No. 2005056344 (published 03.03.2005; IPC C06O 50/00, C07C 13/00) proposes to affix (paste) a barcode on the ballot issued to the voter and exactly the same in the voting journal for that voter . The data read from the barcodes, after preliminary checking of the ballots for the correctness of filling out the ballot, is transmitted to a higher center where they are compared.

In the described options, the use of a barcode does not provide sufficient protection against falsification of ballots and does not allow full control to identify fake ballots.

The ballot paper disclosed in RF patent application No. 2006105732 (published September 27, 2007; IPC С07С 13/00) contains a code assigned only to this ballot, and the code may be coated with a protective coating making it impossible to read. The voter informs the information processing center of the code of his ballot and his voting option, and the code of each ballot and the corresponding voting option can be placed in the public domain, in particular on a computer network.

However, the notification by the voter of the ballot code and voting option to the information processing center does not provide unconditional preservation of the secrecy of the vote.

The voting bulletin described in the patent application of the Russian Federation No. 99104040 (published on March 20, 2001; IPC Β42Ό 15/00) may be the closest analogue of the invention under consideration. The voting ballot according to this application is equipped with personified indices that make up an ordered number series corresponding to the number of voters, and they can be covered by a removable opaque coating.

The disadvantage of the analogue is the low level of secrecy of voting and control of violations during the voting.

The present invention addresses the disadvantages of known secret ballot methods and the ballots used for this. It provides a high level of secrecy of voting, automated control of the authenticity of ballots used in voting and the identification of facts of illegal duplication of ballot forms, excludes the possibility of ballots being received in voting boxes before and after the voting time at the polling station, and provides voters with the opportunity to control the voting process and checking the correctness of accounting for your vote in the vote count, and without violating the secrecy goal osovaniya.

To solve this problem, it is proposed to use a ballot for secret ballot, made essentially on paper and containing general textual information, information on voting options, voting option numbers, voting option field, means of protecting the ballot from counterfeiting, as well as ordinal information number of the ballot, moreover, to preserve the secrecy of the vote, information about the serial number of the ballot includes an encrypted serial number of the ballot and is presented on the ballot in the form of a bar code, does not contain numbers, letters and other symbols, by which members of the election commission or other persons may establish a link between the elector and issued his bulletin. In addition, an area containing the serial number of the ballot and covered by a removable opaque coating is placed on the ballot.

The bulletin number is unique, i.e. non-repetitive, which makes it possible to keep records of ballots during voting and subsequent tabulation with the identification of invalid ballots, including the facts of illegal duplication of ballot forms.

At the current level of technological development, in particular mobile phones with a built-in camera, reading barcodes compiled using standard coding algorithms does not require the use of a specialized reader. For this reason, simply encoding the ballot number with a barcode cannot ensure the secrecy of the vote, since the ballot number can be read by an observer or a member of the election commission or by another person, and then the ballot, i.e. the choice of the voter (voter) may be identified with a particular voter. Presentation of the ballot number in encrypted form using a unique encryption algorithm specially developed for each voting process, which is transmitted and used only in technical equipment installed in the central election commission, makes it impossible to determine the ballot number in the polling stations by observers, members of the election commission or other individuals, since modern encryption algorithms are highly resistant to hacking. In short, the voter's right to secret ballot is ensured by the absence on the ballot of information that will allow a member of the election commission, observer or other person to establish a connection between the voter and the ballot issued to him.

- 3 027759

The presence of an area covered by an opaque coating with the serial number of the ballot allows the voter to find the serial number of his ballot, which means that he can verify the correctness of his vote counting in the vote counting table, published in the public domain on the Internet site and containing the voting results for each ballot . After entering the ballot number on the website, the voter can familiarize himself with the results of voting on his ballot, taken into account when counting the votes.

Thus, the technical features that distinguish the claimed ballot from those known from the prior art provide a high degree of protection of the ballot from illegal duplication and the ability of voters to control the voting process, which ultimately can significantly reduce the number of violations during the voting.

To ensure the convenience of accounting for ballots, the ability to track the results of voting by voting participants and to control the number of votes cast, it is preferable if the ballot number is changed in the acceptable range of ballot numbers. For example, a valid range of ballot serial numbers may be a range from 1 to a value equal to the number of ballots determined by the central election commission, taking into account the number of registered voters.

As a removable opaque coating, it is advisable to use an opaque layer of paint that can be mechanically removed, or a detachable adhesive opaque tape. In the latter case, it is possible to provide for such a placement of the ballot serial number, when, when disconnecting an adhesive opaque tape, the serial number remains on it, but not on the ballot, i.e. when the serial number is actually located on the back of the adhesive opaque tape.

Thus, by removing the opaque coating, the voter can find out the serial number of his ballot and in the future it is easy to verify the correctness of the accounting of his choice provided that he has access to the relevant data presented, for example, in the form of a summary voting table posted on the Internet for general viewing.

In addition to the ballot number, the indicated area may contain the date of the voting.

Another variant of the ballot according to the invention is a ballot for secret ballot, made essentially on paper and consisting of a main part and a tear-off part. The main part provides general textual information, information on voting options, fields for selecting voting options and means of protecting the ballot from counterfeiting. On the main part and on the tear-off part information on the serial number of the ballot is additionally placed, which includes the encrypted serial number of the ballot and is presented in the form of a bar code. In addition, the tear-off part contains an area with removable opaque coating, under which the serial number of the ballot is indicated.

As in the above embodiment of the ballot without the tear-off part, presenting the serial number of the ballot in encrypted form makes it possible to determine the number only when the unique decryption algorithm is known, which ensures unconditional voting secrecy. The presence of the tear-off part with the serial number of the ballot placed on it, covered by an opaque coating, provides the voter with the opportunity to find out and keep the serial number of the ballot. Further, the voter will be able to control the result of his choice, which is entered into a single voting base and placed in the public domain in the form of a summary voting table. At the same time, only the encrypted serial number remains in the ballot box, which is presented in the form of a bar code without numbers, letters and other symbols, and the serial number itself is not accessible for reading and memorization by the members of the election commission or other third party.

Similarly to the above option, the bulletin number is unique, i.e. non-repetitive, which makes it possible to keep records of ballots during voting and subsequent tabulation with the identification of invalid ballots.

To ensure the convenience of accounting for ballots, the ability to track the results of voting by voting participants and to control the number of votes cast, it is preferable if the ballot number is changed in the acceptable range of ballot numbers. For example, a valid range of ballot serial numbers may be a range from 1 to a value equal to the number of ballots determined by the central election commission, taking into account the number of registered voters.

As a removable opaque coating, it is advisable to use an opaque layer of paint that can be mechanically removed, or a detachable adhesive opaque tape. In the latter case, it is possible to provide such a placement of the serial number of the ballot that when you disconnect the adhesive opaque tape, it remains on it, but not on the ballot. In addition to the ballot number, the indicated area may contain the date of the voting.

Placing an area with an opaque coating on the tear-off part of the ballot allows the voter to find out the number of his ballot and save it without resorting to any additional means 4,027,759. At the same time, the secrecy of the vote is not violated.

In addition, the placement on the tear-off part of both the ballot serial number and the bar code with the encrypted serial number can be used to challenge the correctness of the vote count for this ballot when calculating the results of voting or proving its validity.

Another aspect of the present invention is a secret ballot method using any of the above secret ballot options containing encrypted ballot number information and an area with removable opaque coating under which the ballot number is indicated. The secret ballot method provides for the use of an automated vote counting system and includes the following stages:

receiving and filling out the ballot by the voting participant, or by the voter, at the local voting station, placing the ballot by the voting participant in the receiving unit of the automated data reader (AUSD) installed above the voting box, reading through the AUSD receiving unit of the encrypted serial number of the ballot and the selected voting options with the subsequent receipt of the ballot in the ballot box, verification by means of the processing unit of the automated dispatch control system of the correctness of filling out the ballot in accordance Articles with the voting code and assignment of the ballot status valid if it is filled in correctly or invalid because of incorrect filling if it is filled in incorrectly, the ballot data will be transferred to the Unified Vote Counting System (UCPG) through the AUSD processing unit, and the ballot data includes number of the local voting area, time and date of reading the ballot, encrypted serial number of the ballot, as well as all selected options for a ballot with the status of days valid or ballot status with a status different from the valid status, decryption of the encrypted ballot number using the ESPG technical means using a unique algorithm developed for this vote, inclusion of the ballot number and ballot data transferred to the unified ballot data base of the YSPG transmitted via the automatic data processing unit such as the time and date of reading the newsletter, all the options selected for the newsletter with valid status or the status of the newsletter compared with it ny with a status different from the valid one, the formation on the basis of the data received in the unified voting base of the UJSG of the data of the summary table of the vote count, indicating the sequence numbers of all currently voting ballots, as well as the corresponding voting options for ballots with valid status or status for ballots with a status different from the valid one, with the calculation of the total number of votes for each voting option for all ballots with the valid status, size The tabulation of the summary table of the vote count on a publicly accessible website with the possibility of the voter to view the results of the vote and verify the correctness of his vote in the vote count.

Unlike well-known voting systems, in particular, based on the use of COIB, the method according to this invention involves a partial transfer of the functions of checking ballots from AUSD to the UCPG. In particular, the decoding of the bulletin’s serial number takes place precisely in the UCPG, which means that the vote counting is carried out in the UDRP, and not through the COIB, as in the method known from the prior art. Therefore, according to the present invention, it is assumed that there is an AUSD connection at local voting stations with the UCPG, and this connection may be two-way, i.e. not only the AUSD transmits information to the UASP, but the UASP can transmit information to the AUSU, in particular to the AUSD processing unit, which, in turn, is connected to the AUPS receiving unit.

In addition, similarly, KOIB AUSD is supplied with appropriate software that determines the operation of the receiving unit and the AUSD processing unit, which, however, should not allow members of the local commission to influence the voting results. In particular, the software can be downloaded to the AUSD processing unit before voting and include data for identifying ballots, i.e. contain a description of the ballots, a description of the protocol for transmitting and receiving data when interacting with the ESPG, etc. At the same time, the software of the AUSD processing unit does not contain a unique algorithm necessary for decoding the serial number of the bulletin.

Such an organization of communication between the components of the AUSD and the UDRP provides ample technical capabilities for the full and comprehensive control of the voting process in order to exclude accidental or intentional influence on the voting results by third parties.

In a preferred embodiment of the method, an encrypted newsletter number is read in the form of a bar code and varies in the permissible range of sequence numbers

- 5,027,759 ballots. In particular, the encrypted number of the ballot may vary from 1 to a value equal to the number of ballots determined taking into account the number of registered voters.

When reading the ballot, a check may be provided for the availability and authenticity of the means of protecting the ballot from counterfeiting, such as a stamp with a hologram of a standard form, a seal of the local election commission, signatures of members of the local election commission, etc.

The data on the ballot transmitted through the AUSD processing unit to the UCPG may additionally include a voting code, with which it is identified, for example, the date of voting, its type (elections to local authorities, elections to federal authorities, referendum, etc. ), the permissible number of selected options, depending on the type of voting, and more.

In addition, a unique algorithm for decrypting the encrypted ballot number can be correlated with the voting code, on the basis of which the encrypted number is transformed into the decrypted number in the UCPG.

The use of the voting code seems convenient, since it is possible to correlate a sufficiently large number of parameters that should be taken into account during the voting. The data itself can be part of the AUSD and ESPG software (be embedded in it), and the activation of the necessary parameters during this particular voting is carried out in accordance with the transmitted voting code. For example, during the elections, voters can receive sets of two ballots: one for the election of the mayor of the city, and the other for the election of deputies to local authorities. When choosing a mayor, only one option should be marked on the corresponding ballot, and several options are marked on the ballot for elections of deputies to local authorities. The AUSD receiving unit must distinguish between ballots, for example, if they have a different format and / or arrangement of elements on them, and in addition, report information about the received ballot to the AUSD processing unit. In turn, the AUSD processing unit, based on the information received from the receiving unit, determines whether they are correctly filled. Using the voting code tells the voting system which ballots will be used, and information about the ballots themselves, the location of the elements on them, the permissible number of elections, etc. contained in the software of AUSD and UPRG.

Also, the number of AUSD for the subsequent determination of the device by which the ballot was recognized as invalid should be included in the number of data transmitted by the AUSD processing unit to the ESPG;

When entering the ballot number into the unified ballot paper of the UTG, it is advisable to check its uniqueness, and if the bulletin with the same serial number has been received earlier in the UTG, assign a corresponding status to the later ballot, for example, invalid due to the serial number. In this case, the status is invalid due to the serial number should replace the status of the current or be added to the status, different from the status of the valid.

Invalid status due to a serial number can also be assigned to a previously processed ballot, which coincides with a serial number when processing a later bulletin that received invalid status due to a serial number.

The inventive method for holding secret ballots additionally provides for the possibility of assigning invalid status due to the serial number to a ballot with a serial number that falls outside the acceptable range of ballot numbers, and invalid status due to the serial number replaces the valid status or is added to the status other than the valid status.

It is preferable if the ballot placed in the AUSD reception block before or after the official time and date of voting at the given election (local) polling station is assigned the corresponding status, for example, invalid due to the time of voting.

For convenience of monitoring the voting process and violations that occurred during the voting, the AUSD serial numbers and the numbers of local voting stations are additionally added to the unified voting base of the UCPG, for which ballots with the status invalid due to the serial number or status invalid due to the time of voting have been identified.

In the summary table of the counting of votes for the serial numbers of ballots with the status invalid due to the serial number or with the status invalid due to the voting time, additionally indicate the time and date of reading the ballots, the corresponding serial numbers of the AUSD and the numbers of the local voting stations where such ballots were identified.

The summary table of the vote count is posted on the public website either at the end of the vote or from the moment the ballot officially begins.

The inventive method can be applied both separately and in addition to the manual procedure for counting votes by members of precinct election commissions.

It should be noted that the specific names of the statuses assigned to ballots are given only to explain the proposed voting method and should not be taken as the only permissible ones. So, the valid status can be called status 1, the status is invalid due to the time of voting - status 2, etc.

The invention is further explained in more detail with reference to the accompanying figures, in which embodiments of the ballot for secret ballot according to the invention are presented.

In FIG. 1 presents a variant of the ballot without a tear-off part with the serial number of the ballot covered by an opaque layer of paint.

In FIG. Figure 2 shows the version of the ballot without a tear-off part with the serial number of the ballot closed by an opaque adhesive tape.

In FIG. Figure 3 shows the version of the ballot without a tear-off part with the serial number of the ballot closed with an opaque adhesive tape and applied to its back side.

In FIG. 4 is a ballot for secret ballot with a tear-off part.

At a local voting station equipped with an automated data reader (AUSD) consisting of an AUSD receiving unit and an AUSD processing unit, the voter receives a secret ballot from the local commission, the form of which is shown in FIG. 1-4.

Bulletin (1) is made essentially on paper and contains general textual information, for example, the heading of the ballot, the rules for filling it out, voting options, voting option numbers, and also a barcode (2).

The barcode (2) can be linear, matrix, multi-row or any other known from the prior art, and preferably does not contain numbers and / or letters and / or other characters that can be recorded by third parties when issuing a ballot to the voter. In it, by any known method, information on the bulletin serial number is encoded (1), and to ensure that it is impossible to determine the bulletin serial number by simply reading the barcode (2) by any barcode reader (decoding) known in the art and using a standard decoding algorithm, ordinal ballot number (1) is presented in encrypted form (2a) using a unique encryption algorithm developed for each vote. This fact allows us to completely exclude the possibility of violation of the secrecy of the vote, for example, by members of the local election commission or by third parties.

The barcode (2) is applied to the ballot (1) during the printing process of ballots.

The encrypted bulletin number (2a) may vary within a predetermined allowable range of bulletin numbers. The most preferred option is when the serial number of the ballot (1) varies from 1 to a value equal to the number of ballots, determined taking into account the number of registered voters. In the latter case, it is quite simple to control the production of the required number of ballots, detect facts of illegal duplication of ballot forms, take into account the voting ballots and monitor the voting results.

The voter fills out the ballot (1) in accordance with the rules of filling and places it in the receiving unit of the automated dispatch control system for the subsequent automated reading of the ballot (1). The receiving unit is a scanning device mounted above the ballot box and, in fact, performs the same functions as the COIB reader.

The AUSD receiving unit reads the ballot (1) and places it in the ballot box. The data to be read includes the encrypted serial number (2a) of the ballot and the selected voting options, which are then transmitted from the AUSD receiving unit to the AUSD processing unit, similar in purpose to the KOIB computer.

The AUSD processing unit checks the correctness of filling out the ballot (1) in accordance with the voting code previously loaded into it. As in the case of a computer in the KOIB, information about the upcoming vote is downloaded to the AUSD in advance, and this information may contain data on the date of voting, type of voting (elections to local authorities, elections to federal authorities, referendum, etc. .) and the corresponding allowable number of selected options. In addition, the decryption algorithm for the encrypted number (2a) of the ballot can be correlated with the voting code in the UCPG, on the basis of which the encrypted number is subsequently converted to the decrypted number in the UBC, i.e. in the digital bulletin number.

If the bulletin (1) is filled out correctly, at this stage it is recognized as valid and it is assigned the corresponding status, for example, the status is valid. If the ballot (1) is filled out incorrectly, for example, the wrong number of candidates was noted, then at this stage it is recognized as invalid and it is assigned the corresponding status, for example, the status is invalid due to incorrect filling.

When reading the ballot (1) by the AUSD receiving unit and its subsequent verification by the AUSD processing unit, an option may be provided to check the bulletin (1) for the presence and authenticity of counterfeit protection means, such as a stamp with a hologram of an established pattern, a local commission seal, signatures of local commission members and etc.

- 7 027759

In addition, the AUSD processing unit can check the time the bulletin (1) is placed in the AUSD receiving unit. If ballot paper (1) has been placed in the AUSD reception block before or after the official time and date of voting at this local voting station, it is assigned the appropriate status, for example, invalid due to the time of voting.

The AUSD processing unit transmits data on the ballot (1) to the unified system of vote counting (UCPG). The data transmitted includes at least the number of the local voting precinct, the time and date of reading the ballot, the encrypted serial number (2a) of the ballot, as well as all selected options for a ballot with a valid status or the status for a ballot with a status other than the status valid. Also, the number of transmitted data may include a unique AUSD serial number for the subsequent operational determination of the device by which ballot paper (1), which was recognized as invalid, was read and placed in the voting box.

The receiving unit and the AUSD processing unit can be equipped with an autonomous power supply, which ensures the functioning, safety and data transfer to the ESPG in the event of an external power supply disconnection. As an option, AUSD can be implemented on the basis of KOIB.

After receiving the ESPG data through the technical means included in it, such as computers, it decrypts the encrypted serial number (2a) of the ballot in accordance with the established unique algorithm.

As mentioned above, the decryption algorithm can be correlated with the voting code. In this case, the voting code is one of the data transmitted from the AUSD to the UDRP.

The UTGP enters data on the ballot (1) into the unified voting base of the UTG, namely the decrypted serial number of the bulletin, the time and date of reading the bulletin (1) by the AUSD receiving unit and all selected options if the bulletin (1) has valid status or its status if the bulletin (1) has a status different from the valid one.

The bulletin number (1) is unique, i.e. non-repetitive, therefore, it is advisable to check its uniqueness when entering data on the ballot (1) into the unified voting base of the UDRP. If a ballot with the same serial number has previously been received by the ESPG, a later ballot (1) shall be assigned the corresponding status, for example, invalid due to the serial number. In this case, the status is invalid due to the serial number should replace the status of the current or be added to the status, different from the status of the valid.

Invalid status due to a serial number can also be assigned to a previously processed ballot, which coincides with a serial number when processing a later bulletin (1), which received invalid status due to a serial number. Further, when checking the ballots upon request or in accordance with the voting procedure, the status is invalid due to the serial number of one of the ballots can be withdrawn if the authenticity of this ballot is confirmed.

In addition, in order to reduce the number of votes taken into account using illegally duplicated (false) ballot forms, the ESPG may optionally check that the ballot number (1) falls within the acceptable range of ballot numbers with the status being invalid because of the ballot number (1 ) with a serial number that does not fall into the specified range. In this case, the status is invalid due to the serial number should replace the status of the current or be added to the status, different from the status of the valid.

For convenience of monitoring the voting process and violations that occurred during the voting, the AUSD serial numbers and the numbers of local voting stations are additionally added to the unified voting base of the UCPG, for which ballots were identified (1) with invalid status due to serial number or invalid status due to voting time. Additional statistics can be kept for such polling stations, for example, with the aim of strengthening control over the voting process or taking other appropriate measures.

On the basis of the data received in the unified voting base of the ECHR, a summary table of vote counting is formed. The summary table indicates the serial numbers of all currently voting ballots (1), as well as the corresponding voting options for ballots (1) with valid status or the status for ballots (1) with a different status from valid. In addition, they calculate the total number of votes for each voting option for all ballots (1) with valid status.

In the summary table of the vote count for serial numbers of ballots (1) with the status invalid due to the serial number or with the status invalid due to the voting time, additionally indicate the time and date of reading the ballots (1), the corresponding serial numbers of AUSD and the numbers of local voting stations, on which such ballots were identified (1).

For ease of viewing, the data in the summary table of the vote count can be sorted by

- 8,027,759 ordinal numbers of ballots (1), ballot statuses (1), number of votes cast by candidates, etc.

The automatic generation of a consolidated vote counting table with the sequence numbers of ballots (1) during the voting process at the UJSG determines the following tasks:

excludes the registration of ballots (1) received in sealed ballot boxes before and after the end of the voting time in the local precinct, since the receipt of the first and last ballots (1) in sealed ballot boxes in a particular precinct is automatically recorded in the UCPG;

excludes the possibility of illegal falsification and duplication of ballots (1), since the presence on the ballots (1) of an encrypted serial number (2a) in the form of a bar code (2) allows the UCPG to detect the receipt of ballots (1) with identical numbers in ballot boxes (1) whose barcode (2) is not read by the AUSD or the encrypted serial number (2a) of which is not decrypted by the ESPG, or the decrypted serial number of which is outside the allowable range of serial numbers, for example, a number series between 1 and the value, equal to the number of ballots (1), determined taking into account the number of registered voters;

minimizes or completely eliminates the possibility of accidental or intentional misrepresentation of voting results by members of precinct commissions, since after the end of voting, the YSPG automatically generates a database for each local voting precinct, necessary to draw up a protocol on the voting results at the precinct and containing information on the number of ballots (1) received in the ballot boxes on the number of votes for each option, as well as on the number of invalid ballots (1) indicating reasons for invalidating the ballot (1).

A summary table of vote counting is posted on a publicly accessible website to provide voters with access to voting results and to control the correctness of their votes. The summary table is posted on the website either at the end of the vote or from the moment the ballot officially begins.

The application of the proposed method does not violate the voter's right to secret ballot, since the bulletin (1) does not visually contain information that allows a member of the local commission, observer or other person to establish a connection between the voter and the ballot issued to him (1). This is possible due to the fact that the barcode (2) without numbers, letters, or other symbols on the ballots (1) contains encrypted information about the bulletin number (1), which is decrypted in the YSPG using a unique decryption algorithm developed for of this vote, but those located at local sections of the AUSD do not allow to decrypt the encrypted information about the serial number of the ballot (1) contained in the barcode (2).

Access to the summary table of vote counting, formed during the voting process in the ESPG, is granted to observers and members of precinct commissions without the possibility of making changes and additions to the table. An exception may be made only to ballots (1), whose status is different from the status of the valid.

Since the information on ballots (1) with their statuses is communicated to the UTG, it can be available to all officials conducting the voting and authorized to access the unified voting base, for its accounting and subsequent actions determined by the voting rules and relevant job descriptions regarding ballots (1) with a status other than valid status. Based on the measures taken in respect of ballots (1) with a status different from the valid one, a conclusion is drawn up (if necessary), and the relevant information is also reflected in the protocol of the local voting site on the voting results.

For example, if ballots (1) with the same serial numbers are detected by the UCPG, the relevant information with the serial numbers of the AUSD, to which the ballots (1) with the same serial numbers are received, is automatically sent to the central election commission, as well as to observers and commission members of the corresponding local polling station. After the completion of voting, the commission members carry out an additional check of the ballots (1) in the ballot boxes on which the automatic control and control systems with the corresponding serial numbers were installed for signs of the authenticity of the ballots (1), such as the stamp of the local commission, signatures of members of the precinct commission, etc. . Upon detection of a fake ballot (1), the serial number of which coincides with the number of another ballot, the first of them is left status invalid due to the serial number, and this status can be removed from the second ballot as a result of an additional check. The results of such verification are reflected in the final protocol of the local voting precinct on the voting results.

The same applies to ballots (1) with invalid status due to the time of voting. Information on such ballots (1) is automatically sent to the central election commission, observers and members of the commission of the corresponding local polling station and is reflected in the protocol of the local polling station on the voting results.

After the completion of the vote, the ESCG may automatically form a database for each

- 9 027759 to the local voting station, necessary for drawing up a protocol on the voting results. This database contains information on the number of ballots (1) received in voting boxes, the number of votes cast for each option, as well as the number of invalid ballots (1) indicating the reason for invalidating them.

Members of the precinct commission sign a protocol on the results of voting at the local polling station, taking into account the data recorded in the ESPG, and the protocol on the results of voting at the local precinct is sent to the central election commission, and the ballots themselves (1) are archived.

To provide voters with the opportunity to control the correctness of the registration of their votes on the ballot (1), an area with the serial number (4) of the ballot is provided, covered by an opaque coating (3) (Fig. 1-4). Opaque coating (3) ensures that serial number (4) is viewed only by the voter and only if the voter decides to remove the opaque coating (3) before placing the ballot (1) in the AUSD receiving unit.

The serial number (4) of the ballot and opaque coating (3) are applied in the process of making the ballot (1) on the front or back of the ballot (1), depending on the reading capabilities of the ADCS receiving unit. It seems advisable to put a serial number (4) and an opaque coating (3) on the ballot (1) at the same time as a barcode (2) on the ballot (1).

The opaque coating (3) may be a layer of opaque paint (Fig. 1) or a detachable adhesive opaque tape (Fig. 2).

If a detachable opaque adhesive tape is used as an opaque coating (3), the serial number (4) can be placed in such a way that when the adhesive opaque tape (3) is detached, it remains only on it (Fig. 3). In other words, the serial number (4) is actually applied to the back of the detachable opaque adhesive tape (3) and, therefore, the need for storing or additional recording of the serial number (4) is eliminated by the voter.

Under the opaque coating (3), both the serial number (4) of the ballot and the date of voting can be placed.

Thus, the voter, having removed the opaque coating (3), can easily find out the serial number (4) of his ballot and then independently verify the correctness of his votes when calculating the votes and publishing them in the form of a summary table of the vote count on a public website.

Similarly, a ballot (1) with a tear-off portion shown in FIG. 4. The procedure for its use fully coincides with that applied to the ballot without a tear-off part (Figs. 1-3). However, in this case, the voter can not only immediately find out the serial number (4) of his ballot (1), hidden under an opaque coating (3), but also save it for himself without the use of improvised means, for example, without writing the number on a piece of paper .

A ballot paper (1) with a tear-off part according to this embodiment of the invention is made essentially on paper and consists of a main part (1a) and a tear-off part (1b), separated by a tear line (5) and easily separated from each other.

The main part (1a) of the ballot is similar to the variant of the ballot shown in FIG. 1-3. It contains general textual information, rules for filling out a ballot, voting options, numbers of voting options, as well as a barcode (2). The barcode (2) may be linear, matrix, multi-row, or any other known in the art, and preferably does not contain a digit or letter. In it, by any known method, the information on the serial number of the ballot is encoded (1), and to ensure that it is impossible to determine the serial number of the ballot by simply reading the barcode (2) by any barcode reader (decoding) known in the art, the serial number of the ballot (1) ) is presented in encrypted form (2a). This fact allows us to completely eliminate the violation of the secrecy of the vote, for example, by members of the local commission or by third parties.

The barcode (2) is applied to the main part (1a) of the ballot in the process of printing bulletins.

The ballot serial number (1) may vary within a predetermined allowable range of ballot serial numbers. The most preferred option is when the serial number of the ballot (1) varies from 1 to a value equal to the number of ballots, determined taking into account the number of registered voters. In this case, it is easy to control the production of the required number of ballots, to take into account the voting ballots and the actual voting results.

On the tear-off part (1b) of the ballot paper the exact same barcode (2) is placed as on the main part (1a). In addition, on the tear-off part (1b) is placed the serial number (4) of the ballot, closed by an opaque coating (3). The serial number (4) of the ballot is unique, and the opaque coating (3) ensures that only voters can see it if it decides to remove the opaque coating (3).

The serial number (4) of the ballot and opaque coating (3) are applied in the process of manufacturing the ballot (1). Preferably, the application of the barcode (2) and the serial number (4) with an opaque coating (3) on the tear-off part (1b) of the ballot is carried out simultaneously with the application of the barcode on the main part (1a) of the ballot (2).

The opaque coating (3) may be a layer of opaque paint, as shown in FIG. 4, or a detachable opaque adhesive tape, similar to that shown in FIG. 2 for the bulletin option (1) without a tear-off part. The voter, knowing the serial number (4) of his ballot, has the opportunity to check the result of his vote by contacting the summary table of the vote counting via the Internet.

If a detachable opaque adhesive tape is used as an opaque coating (3), the serial number (4) can be placed in such a way that when the adhesive opaque tape (3) is disconnected, the serial number (4) remains only on it (similar to the bulletin option (1) without the tear-off part shown in Fig. 3). This can be accomplished, for example, by placing the serial number (4) directly on the back of the adhesive opaque tape (3).

Under the opaque coating (3), not only the serial number (4) of the ballot can be placed, but also the date of the voting.

The proposed method of holding secret ballots and ballot options for secret balloting provide a high level of secrecy of the ballot, multi-level automated control of the authenticity of ballots used in voting and the identification of facts of illegal duplication of ballot forms, exclude the possibility of ballots being received in ballot boxes before and after the voting time polling station, provide the voter (voter) the opportunity to exercise control over the voting process and verify the correctness of accounting for their votes in the vote count, and in compliance with the principle of secret ballot. This helps prevent deliberate and accidental violations in the vote count. Moreover, the claimed method and ballots allow their use in voting with the manual procedure for counting votes by members of precinct commissions in order to control and improve the accuracy of the voting results.

Claims (13)

CLAIM 1. The method of operation of the automated system for recording and counting votes using a ballot for secret ballot, which includes paper media containing information on voting options, numbers of voting options, a barcode printed on paper, which encodes the bulletin number encoded in encrypted form, and an area with removable opaque coating, under which is indicated the serial number of the ballot, including the following stages: placing the filled-in ballot by the voter in the receiving unit of the automated data reader (AUSD) installed above the ballot box, reading through the AUSD receiving unit a bar code with the encrypted serial number of the ballot and the selected voting options with the subsequent receipt of the ballot in the voting box, checking by block processing of automated ballot paper for the correctness of filling out the ballot in accordance with the voting code and assigning the ballot status valid in case of about the correct filling or the status is invalid due to incorrect filling in the case of its incorrect filling, transfer of the data on the ballot to the Unified Vote Counting System (UCPG) through the automatic data processing unit, and the data on the ballot includes the number of the local voting area, the time and date of reading the ballot, encrypted serial number of the bulletin, as well as all selected options for a bulletin with a valid status or status for a bulletin with a status other than the valid status, and with the help of the technical means of the UGSS, the encrypted serial number of the ballot in accordance with the unique algorithm established in the technical means of the UDRG, entering into the unified voting base of the UDRG the ordinal number of the bulletin and data about the ballot transmitted through the AUSD processing unit, the formation of a consolidated counting table on the basis of the unified voting base of the UDRG votes indicating the sequence numbers of all currently voting ballots, as well as the corresponding voting options for ballots items with valid status or status for ballots with a status other than valid status, with the total number of votes counting for each voting option for all ballots with valid status, placing a summary table of the vote counting on a publicly accessible website with the possibility for the voter to view information, related to the vote of the voter and - 11 027759 by vote counting, from the summary table and checking the correctness of accounting for one’s vote when counting votes after the ballot number is entered on the website. 2. The method of operation of the automated accounting and counting system according to claim 1, characterized in that the serial number of the ballot is set to vary in the allowable range of serial numbers of ballots. 3. The method of operation of the automated accounting and counting system according to claim 2, characterized in that the allowable range of ballot numbers is set to a range from 1 to a value equal to the number of ballots determined taking into account the number of registered voters. 4. The method of operation of the automated accounting and counting system according to claim 1, characterized in that when reading the ballot, it is checked for the presence and validity of the means of protecting the ballot from counterfeiting. 5. The method of operation of the automated accounting and vote counting system according to claim 1, characterized in that the data on the ballot transmitted by the AUSD processing unit to the ESPG further includes a voting code. 6. The method of operation of the automated accounting and vote counting system according to claim 5, characterized in that the decryption algorithm of the encrypted ballot number is set in accordance with the voting code transmitted to the ECHR. 7. The method of operation of the automated accounting and vote counting system according to claim 1, characterized in that the data on the ballot transmitted by the AUSD processing unit to the ESPG additionally includes the AUSD serial number and the local voting area number. 8. The method of operation of the automated accounting and vote counting system according to claim 1, characterized in that when the ballot number is entered into the unified voting base of the UCPG, it is checked for its uniqueness, and if the bulletin with the same serial number has been received earlier in the UCPG, it is assigned to a later one the status of the ballot is invalid due to the serial number, and this status replaces the status of the current or is added to the status, different from the status of the valid. 9. The method of operation of the automated accounting and vote counting system according to claim 8, characterized in that the status is invalid due to the serial number and is also assigned to the ballot previously entered into the single voting base, the match with the serial number of which was revealed when checking the uniqueness of the serial number of the later ballot, received status invalid due to serial number. 10. The method of operation of the automated system for recording and counting votes according to claim 2, characterized in that when a ballot number is entered into the unified voting base of the ESCG, a ballot with a serial number that falls outside the acceptable range of ballot numbers is assigned an invalid status due to the serial number, moreover, this status replaces the valid status or is added to the status other than the valid status. 11. The method of operation of the automated system for recording and counting votes according to claim 1, characterized in that the ballot placed in the reception unit of the AUSD before or after the official time and date of voting at this local voting site is assigned invalid status due to the time of voting . 12. The method of operation of the automated system for recording and counting votes according to any one of paragraphs 8-11, characterized in that the serial numbers of the AUSD and the numbers of local voting precincts, for which ballots with an invalid status were identified, are additionally added to the unified voting base of the UCPG numbers or status invalid due to time of voting. 13. The method of operation of the automated accounting and counting system according to claim 12, characterized in that in the summary table of the counting of votes for serial numbers of ballots with the status invalid due to the serial number or with the status invalid due to the time of voting, the time and date of reading the ballots are additionally indicated , corresponding AUSD serial numbers and local voting precinct numbers.