DE202018101136U1 - Token-translated hardware security modules - Google Patents

Abstract

One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more computing devices, cause the one or more computer devices to perform operations that include: receiving at a hardware security module (HSM) (200) Requesting (250) a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key (120) and at least one authorization token (220); determining, by the HSM (200), whether an access control list (ACL) (214) associated with the cryptographic key (120 ) associated with the request (250) for a cryptographic operation, is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120); and validating by the HSM (200) the at least one authorization token (220); and if the at least one authorization token (220) is valid and the ACL (214) is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, processing the request (250) cryptographic operation by the HSM (200).

Description

TECHNICAL AREA

This disclosure relates to hardware security modules.

BACKGROUND

Data may be encrypted for secure storage in a computer readable / writable medium and then decrypted when accessed for use. For relatively quick use, the actual encryption and decryption may be performed by a cryptographic computer program stored in a general-purpose computer. The cryptographic computer program must access one or more cryptographic keys to encrypt and decrypt the data. The storage of the cryptographic keys in a file in a file system or in the memory of the general-purpose computer can be relatively uncertain. Instead, a hardware security module (HSM), which may be a hardware device within the general-purpose computer or may be a hardware device connected to the general purpose computer, may generate and / or store the cryptographic keys. The hardware security module can operate at the same speed as the computer and protect its contents and never reveal the content in an unencrypted form to the host computer. Moreover, the host computer can not access the memory of the hardware security module or address any of the memory of the hardware security module.

SUMMARY

In accordance with the requirements of the Utility Model Law, only devices as defined in the appended claims are to be protected by the utility model and are not the subject of the utility model. If reference is made in the description to methods, these references are merely illustrative of the device or devices sought for protection with the appended claims. One aspect of the disclosure provides a method for processing a request for a cryptographic operation. The method includes receiving at a hardware security module (HSM) a request for a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key and at least one authorization token, determining by the HSM whether an access control list (ACL) corresponds to the cryptographic key of the request associated with a cryptographic operation, is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key, and validated by the HSM of the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation, the method includes processing the request for a cryptographic operation by the HSM.

The implementations of the disclosure may include one or more of the following optional features. In some implementations, the at least one authorization token is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token is signed by an authorizer key; the HSM has received the at least one authorization token within an authorization period defined by the at least one authorization token; or the HSM has received the at least one authorization token less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token. If the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key of the ACL, the method may include determining by the HSM whether a cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL. If the cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL, the method may include processing the request for a cryptographic operation.

In some examples, the method includes receiving a challenge request from an owner of the cryptographic key at the HSM and issuing a corresponding authorization token from the HSM to the owner of the cryptographic key. The corresponding authorization token may include data identifying the HSM and a cryptographic signature of the HSM. The corresponding authorization token may also define an authorization period and / or a limit number that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token. The cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation may be wrapped.

Another aspect of the disclosure provides an HSM that includes data processing hardware and memory hardware associated with the computing hardware. The memory Hardware stores instructions that, when executed in the computing hardware, cause the computing hardware to perform operations. The operations include receiving a request for a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key and at least one authorization token, determining whether an access control list (ACL) associated with the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation is authorized access to control the cryptographic key, and to validate the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation, the operations include processing the request for a cryptographic operation.

This aspect may include one or more of the following optional features. In some implementations, the at least one authorization token is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token is signed by an authorizer key; the data processing hardware has received the at least one authorization token within an authorization period defined by the at least one authorization token; or the data processing hardware has received the at least one authorization token less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token. If the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key of the ACL, the operations may include determining whether a cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL. If the cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL, the operations may include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The operations may further include receiving a challenge request from an owner of the cryptographic key and issuing a corresponding authorization token to the owner of the cryptographic key.

In some examples, the corresponding authorization token includes data identifying the HSM and a cryptographic signature of the HSM. The corresponding authorization token may define an authorization period and / or a limit number that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token. The cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation may be wrapped.

Yet another aspect of the disclosure provides a second method of processing a request for a cryptographic operation. The method includes receiving at a distributed system a request for a cryptographic operation from a user. The request for a cryptographic operation includes a cryptographic key and at least one authorization token. The method also includes sending by the distributed system the operation request to an HSM configured to perform operations. The operations include determining whether an access control list (ACL) associated with the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key, and validating the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation, the operations include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The method further includes receiving a response from the HSM to the distributed system, wherein if the HSM processes the request for a cryptographic operation, the response includes a result of the cryptographic operation. The method also includes sending the response from the distributed system to the user.

This aspect may include one or more of the following optional features. In some implementations, the at least one authorization token is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token is signed by an authorizer key; the HSM has received the at least one authorization token within an authorization period defined by the at least one authorization token; or the HSM has received the at least one authorization token less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token. If the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key of the ACL, the operations may include determining whether a cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL. If the cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL, the operations may include processing the request for a cryptographic operation.

In some examples, the method includes receiving a challenge request from an owner of the cryptographic key at the distributed system and sending the challenge request to the HSM, wherein the HSM is configured to issue a corresponding authorization token to the owner of the cryptographic key. The corresponding authorization token may include data identifying the HSM and a cryptographic signature of the HSM. The corresponding authorization token may also define an authorization period and / or a limit number that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token. The cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation may be wrapped.

Yet another aspect of the disclosure provides a system that includes data processing hardware and storage hardware associated with the computing hardware. The storage hardware stores instructions that, when executed in the computing hardware, cause the computing hardware to perform operations. The operations include receiving a request for a cryptographic operation from a user, the request for a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key and at least one authorization token, and sending the operation request to an HSM configured to perform operations. The operations include determining whether an access control list (ACL) associated with the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key, and validating the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation, the operations include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The operations further include receiving a response from the HSM, wherein when the HSM processes the request for a cryptographic operation, the response includes a result of the cryptographic operation, and sending the response from the distributed system to the user.

This aspect may include one or more of the following optional features. In some implementations, the at least one authorization token is valid if the at least one authorization token is signed by an authorizer key. The at least one authorization token may be valid if the HSM has received the at least one authorization token within an authorization period defined by the at least one authorization token. The at least one authorization token may also be valid if the HSM has received the at least one authorization token less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token.

In some examples, the operations include determining whether a cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL if the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key of the ACL. If the cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL, the operations may include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The operations may further include receiving a challenge request from an owner of the cryptographic key and sending the challenge request to the HSM. The HSM may be configured to issue a corresponding authorization token to the owner of the cryptographic key. The corresponding authorization token may include data identifying the HSM and a cryptographic signature of the HSM. The corresponding authorization token may define an authorization period and / or a limit number that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token. The cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation may be wrapped.

Yet another aspect of the disclosure provides a third method of processing a request for a cryptographic operation. The method includes receiving at a distributed system a request for a cryptographic operation from a user. The request for a cryptographic operation contains a cryptographic key. The method also includes obtaining, by the distributed system of at least one authorization token, and sending by the distributed system the operation request and the at least one authorization token to an HSM configured to perform operations. The operations include determining whether an access control list (ACL) associated with the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key, and validating the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to access the cryptographic key of the request To control the cryptographic operation, the operations include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The method also includes receiving a response from the HSM to the distributed system, wherein if the HSM processes the request for a cryptographic operation, the response includes a result of the cryptographic operation, and sending the response from the distributed system to the user.

The implementations of the disclosure may include one or more of the following optional features. In some implementations, the at least one authorization token is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token is signed by an authorizer key; the HSM has received the at least one authorization token within an authorization period defined by the at least one authorization token; or the HSM has received the at least one authorization token less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token. If the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key of the ACL, the operations may include determining whether a cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL. In addition, when the cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL, the operations may include processing the request for a cryptographic operation.

In some examples, the method includes receiving a challenge request from an owner of the cryptographic key at the distributed system and sending the challenge request to the HSM, wherein the HSM is configured to issue a corresponding authorization token to the owner of the cryptographic key. The corresponding authorization token may include data identifying the HSM and a cryptographic signature of the HSM. The corresponding authorization token may also define an authorization period and / or a limit number that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token. The cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation may be wrapped.

Yet another aspect of the disclosure provides a system that includes data processing hardware and storage hardware associated with the computing hardware. The storage hardware stores instructions that, when executed in the computing hardware, cause the computing hardware to perform operations. The operations include receiving a request from a user for a cryptographic operation, the request for a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key, obtaining at least one authorization token, and sending the operation request and the at least one authorization token to an HSM that configures is to perform operations. The operations include determining whether an access control list (ACL) associated with the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key, and validating the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation, the operations include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The operations also include receiving a response from the HSM, wherein when the HSM processes the request for a cryptographic operation, the response comprises a result of the cryptographic operation, and sending the response to the user.

This aspect may include one or more of the following optional features. In some implementations, the at least one authorization token is valid if the at least one authorization token is signed by an authorizer key. The at least one authorization token may be valid if the request for a cryptographic operation is received by the HSM within an authorization period defined by the at least one authorization token. The at least one authorization token may also be valid if the HSM has received the request for a cryptographic operation less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token.

In some examples, the operations include determining whether a cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL if the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key of the ACL. If the cryptographic operation requested by the request for a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL, the operations may include processing the request for a cryptographic operation. The operations may also include receiving a challenge request from an owner of the cryptographic key and sending the challenge request to the HSM, wherein the HSM is configured to issue a corresponding authorization token to the owner of the cryptographic key. The corresponding authorization token may include data identifying the HSM and a cryptographic signature of the HSM. The corresponding authorization token may define an authorization period and / or a limit number that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token. The cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation may be wrapped.

The details of one or more implementations of the disclosure are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other aspects, features, and advantages will be apparent from the description and drawings, and from the claims.

list of figures

• 1 FIG. 12 is a schematic view of an exemplary cryptographic system for processing a cryptographic operation request that includes at least one capability token.
• 2 Figure 13 is a schematic view of an exemplary hardware security module issuing an authorization token from a cryptographic key owner in response to receiving a challenge request.
• 3 FIG. 12 is a schematic view of exemplary operations performed by a user device and a hardware security module to generate a cryptographic key. FIG.
• 4 FIG. 12 is a schematic view of the exemplary operations performed by a hardware security module to perform a cryptographic operation request from a user.
• 5 FIG. 12 is a schematic view of the exemplary operations performed by a hardware security module to process a request for a cryptographic operation from an authorized authorizer authorized by a cryptographic key owner. FIG.
• 6 12 shows a schematic view of the exemplary operations performed by a hardware security module to log an entry in a verification log for the cryptographic operations processed by the hardware security module.
• 7 FIG. 10 is a block diagram of an example implementation of the components of an example authorization system for authorizing requests for a cryptographic operation. FIG.
• 8th FIG. 10 is a flowchart of an example method for processing a request for a cryptographic operation.
• 9 FIG. 12 is a schematic view of an example computing device that detects the hardware security module manager 1 performs.

Like reference numerals in the various drawings indicate like elements.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Hardware security modules enable users to encapsulate cryptographic secrets and authorize which users are allowed to perform cryptographic operations on the cryptographic secrets. When hardware security modules are integrated within a cloud environment (such as a distributed system) and users store their cryptographic keys in the cloud environment, the cloud environment provider inadmissibly grants full privileges over all on behalf of the users stored cryptographic keys, thus undermining the purpose of using hardware security modules in controlling and limiting access to the cryptographic keys. The implementations herein are directed to requiring that a user requesting a hardware security module integrated in the cloud environment to process a cryptographic operation in addition to at least one authorization token generated by the hardware security module and digitally signed by an authorization key to provide a wrapped cryptographic key. The hardware security module can verify that the hardware security module has created and signed the authorization token. The hardware security module further validates the authorization token to determine whether the user requesting the cryptographic operation is authorized to access a corresponding cryptographic key associated with an access control list to perform the cryptographic operation.

In the 1 and 2 contains a cryptographic system in some implementations 100 a user device 110 . 110a-n that a user 10 is assigned, over a network 130 with a remote system 140 can communicate. The remote system 140 may be a distributed system (eg, a cloud environment), the scalable / resilient resource 142 having. The resources 142 contain computing resources 144 and / or memory resources 146 , The system 100 also includes a hardware security module (HSM) 200 that with the resources 142 of the distributed system 140 communicates. Specific is the HSM 200 a piece of hardware associated with software / firmware associated with the circuitry of the resources (ie, the computing resources 144 ) to provide one or more cryptographic functions. Other names for a hardware security module include a personal computer security module (PCSM), a secure application module (SAM), a cryptographic hardware device, or a cryptographic hardware module. In some implementations, the distributed system performs 140 an HSM manager 150 off, the communication between one or more user devices 110 and the HSM 200 promotes.

In some implementations, the HSM contains 200 a secure encryption processor 210 (ie, a computing hardware 210 ) and secure encryption memory 212 (ie, a storage hardware 212 ) using the encryption processor 210 communicates. The encryption processor 210 can (a) an integrated secure generation; (b) integrated secure storage; (c) the use of cryptographic and sensitive data; and / or (d) provide relieving of the application servers for full asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. In some examples, the HSM handles 200 asymmetric key pairs (and certificates) used in public-key cryptography and / or symmetric keys and other arbitrary data. The HSM 200 can through the encryption processor 210 a wrapped cryptographic key 120 generate one being the cryptographic key 120 associated access control list (ACL) 214 A list of users may include access rights to those through the HSM 200 have managed cryptographic and sensitive data. The cryptographic key 120 associated ACL 214 can have one or more authorization tokens 220 specify who an authorized user 10 the cryptographic key 120 must provide for the HSM 200 an operation on the cryptographic key 120 performs. The ACL 214 may also specify which cryptographic operations (eg, signing, encrypting, and / or decrypting) the HSM 200 may process. In some examples, this is the cryptographic key 120 associated ACL 214 as an intrinsic property of the cryptographic key 120 contain. In other examples, this is the cryptographic key 120 associated ACL 214 no intrinsic property of the cryptographic key 210 , passing through the authorization token 220 can be provided. The ACL 214 can z. In the authorization token 220 be coded. In these examples, the user can 10 the HSM 200 the authorization token 220 provide, with the HSM 200 authorized that the ACL 214 access to the cryptographic key 120 controls. The through the authorization token 220 provided ACL 214 can specify which authorization signatures through the HSM 200 to use the cryptographic key 120 to process the request 250 may be needed. The HSM 200 also has an internal clock 210 contain. The encryption store 212 stores instructions that, when passed through the encryption processor 210 are executed, the encryption processor 210 cause to perform cryptographic operations. The through the encryption processor 210 executable cryptographic operations can z. Encryption, decryption, cryptographic key generation, authorization token generation, hash coding, signing, and / or verification, but are not limited thereto. The encryption store 212 can also have one or more counters 213 . 213a-n each incremented each time a corresponding authorization token 220 is used to pass through the HSM 200 to be executed to perform a cryptographic operation.

The user 10 can be an owner of a wrapped cryptographic key 120 be assigned, the user 10 may have complete control over it, such as the cryptographic key 120 for processing the corresponding cryptographic operations in the HSM 200 used and managed. The wrapped cryptographic key 120 can through the HSM 200 can be encrypted and signed and can be both through the HSM 200 generated material of the secret key as well as public parts of an authorizer key (the authorization key) 118 (FIG. 3 ), the (the) the user 10 and any authorized authorizers 234 (the 5 and 6 ) is assigned. In some examples, the user corresponds 10 a person authorized by the owner of the cryptographic key 120 to the cryptographic key 120 access. In some implementations, the owner of the cryptographic key generates / generates 120 one by the authorization key 118 signed authorization token 220 within the corresponding cryptographic key 120 that the HSM 200 before processing a corresponding request 250 a cryptographic operation by the user 10 must validate. The HSM 200 can z. For example, the authorization token 220 validate if the HSM 200 the request 250 within one through the authorization token 220 defined authorization period receives and / or if the HSM 200 the request 250 less often than a limit number defined by the at least one authorization token. The authorization token 220 as used herein, may define a set of "restrictions" that include the use of the authorization token 220 to authorize a request 250 restrict a cryptographic operation. The authorization token 220 is through the authorization key 118 of the user 10 Signed in the wrapped cryptographic key 120 is included. In some examples, the cryptographic key 120 and the authorization token 220 simultaneously generated / generated and bound together. The authorization token 220 can also specify which signatures (e.g., which authorization keys 118 ) for the use of the cryptographic key 120 for processing the request 250 a cryptographic operation are required.

In some implementations, the HSM receives 200 a cryptographic operation request 250, which is a cryptographic key 120 , at least one authorization token 220 and an ACL 214 that the cryptographic key 120 or the at least one authorization token 220 it then determines whether the ACL 214 is authorized to access the cryptographic key 120 and at least one authorization token 220 validated. Consequently, the ACL 214 that the cryptographic key 120 (or the at least one authorization token 220 ) of the request received 250 associated with a cryptographic operation, one or more authorization tokens 220 specify for validation by the HSM 200 are required before the HSM 200 the cryptographic key 120 decrypted / unwrapped and the corresponding requirement 250 a cryptographic operation processed. If the HSM 200 the ACL 214 authorized access to the cryptographic key 120 the request 250 controls, and the at least one authorization token 220 validates, processes the HSM 200 the request 250 a cryptographic operation, where there is a result 260 the cryptographic operation back to the user device 110 provides. In some examples, the HSM determines 200 furthermore, whether by the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation requested by the ACL 214 allowed is. If, in these examples, the cryptographic operation is by the ACL 214 allowed, processes the HSM 200 the request 250 a cryptographic operation, with the corresponding result 260 back to the user device 110 provides. If the ACL 214 one by one request 250 does not allow a cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation, decrypts the HSM 200 hence the cryptographic key 120 not / wraps the HSM 200 hence the cryptographic key 120 therefore does not process the request 250 of a cryptographic operation. The cryptographic operation may include an encryption operation, a decryption operation, or a signing operation.

In 2 In some implementations, generates the user device 110 that belongs to the owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 associated with an authorization token 220 by sending a challenge request to the HSM 200 and gives the HSM 200 a corresponding authorization token 220 to the owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 out. The user device 110 can be a user interface 112 to complete the challenge request 270 to the HSM 200 transferred to. In some examples, the HSM manager receives 150 that in the distributed system 140 is executed, the challenge request 270 from the user device 110, receiving the challenge request 270 to the HSM 200 sends. In some configurations, the user device may 102 the authorization token 220 locally simply by signing the authorization token 220 with an authorization key 118 within the cryptographic key 120 generate without the cryptographic key 120 over the net 100 the HSM 200 uncover. In these configurations, the user device 110 a local HSM for storing the cryptographic key 120 and for locally generating the authorization token 220 contain.

The owner 10 can in the challenge request 270 at least one of an authorization period 226 to validate the authorization token 220 , a limit number 228 to limit the number of uses of the authorization token 220 a guy 232 the cryptographic operation of the authorization token 220 is assigned, or one by the owner 10 authorized additional authorized authoriser 234 specify the authorization token 220 to use. The authorized authorizers 234 may be authorized in the form of one or more additional authorization tokens that these authorizers assign to the HSM 200 in the requirement 250 need to provide a cryptographic operation. The authorized authorizers 234 can any authorization token 220 using their own authorization keys 118 sign.

In response to receiving the challenge request 270 gives the HSM 200 the corresponding authorization token 220 to the owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 out. In the example shown, the authorization token contains 220 an HSM identifier 222 that is associated with the data that the HSM 200 identify the authorization token 220 and a cryptographic signature 224 of the HSM 200 , The authorization token 220 may also include capability restrictions associated with the authorization token 220 assigned. The authorization token 220 can z. B. the authorization period 226 during which the corresponding authorization token 220 is valid, and / or the limit number 228 indicating the number of uses of the corresponding authorization token 220 limited, define. The authorization token 220 can also be the type 232 the cryptographic operation for the corresponding authorization token 220 and / or any by the owner 10 the cryptographic key 10 empowered authorized authorizers 234 (ie, authorized users / entities) to define the token 220 before sending a request 250 to the HSM 200 continue to validate. An authorized authoriser 234 can refer to an authorization authority such. An entity, a person, or any cloud service (eg, a customer's virtual machine) operating in the distributed system 140 is executed, relate. In the example shown, the authorization token contains 220 also a digital signature 230 through the authorization key 118 of the owner 10 , If the authorization token 220 an authorized authoriser 234 defined, it is required that the authorized author 234 the authorization token 220 using an appropriate authorizer key 118 , the authorized author 234 is assigned, signed.

3 represents a graphical representation 300 ready to illustrate the exemplary operations performed by the user device 110 and the HSM 200 be executed to the cryptographic key 120 to create. The user device 110 can be a user 10 associated with a customer of a service operating in the distributed system 140 is performed. The graphic representation 300 with respect to the cryptographic system 100 according to the 1 and 2 to be discribed. The vertical y-axis indicates the time increasing from top to bottom. At the time 1 generates the user device 110 a pair of authorizer keys 118 , such as Asymmetric or symmetric key pairs for use in performing cryptographic operations in the HSM 200 , If the pair of authorization keys 118 contains asymmetric keys, the asymmetric keys can 118 a non-public authorization key 118a (eg a decryption key or a signing key) and a public authorization key 118b (eg an encryption key or a verification key). Here belongs the non-public authorization key 118a the customer 10 and will be in front of the HSM 200 in the distributed system 140 kept secret while the public authorizer key 118b the public parts of the non-public authorizer key 118a contains. At the time 2 sends the user device 110 a create key operation (CreateKey (AK)) 320 by sending the public authorizer key 118a to the HSM 200 in the distributed system 140 , The user interface 112 that in the user device 110 is executed, it may be the user device 110 allow the pair of authorization keys 118 to generate and send the CreateKey (AK) 320. The user interface 112 it can be the customer 10 z. For example, to allow access to a client library or command line tool, the pair of authorizer keys 118 to manually generate and use a call application programming interface (call application API) to obtain the public authorization key 118b to the HSM 200 to send, or simply provide an API to the HSM manager 150 or another service running in the distributed system allows the authorization keys 118 to create. Between the times 2 and 3 The CreateKey (AK) corresponds to a vendor-neutral CreateKey (AK) 320 of the HSM.

At the time 3 can the HSM manager 150 the create key operation 320 that the public authorizer key 118 contains, received and sent to the HSM 200 send. The CreateKey (AK) 320 may be a vendor-specific CreateKey (AK) 320 of the HSM 200 correspond. At the time 4 HSM 200 records the public authorization key in response to receiving CreateKey (AK) 320 118 (ie, the public parts of the non-public authorizer key 118 ) while the HSM 200 at the time 5 the cryptographic key 120 generated and wrapped. Here is the wrapped cryptographic key 120 through the HSM 200 encrypted and signed, taking the public parts of the authorization keys 118 and the associated ACL 214 may contain. As used herein, the HSM signs 200 the wrapped cryptographic key 120 with a signed statement showing the attributes of the corresponding public Parts of the authorizer key 118 contains. As it becomes obvious, only the HSM can 200 Operations on the wrapped cryptographic key 120 perform when authorized users 10 the wrapped cryptographic key 120 and the at least one through the wrapped cryptographic key 120 associated ACL 214 specified authorization tokens 220 submit. In some scenarios, the authorization token represents 220 the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation the ACL 214 the HSM 200 ready. At the time 6 sends the HSM 200 the wrapped cryptographic key 120 to the HSM manager 150 , at the time 7 the HSM manager 150 the wrapped cryptographic key 120 receives and to the user device 110 sends. Between the times 6 and 7 Can the wrapped cryptographic key 120 contain a vendor-specific format of the HSM, whereas the wrapped cryptographic key 120 at the time 7 may include a vendor-neutral format if the HSM manager 150 the key 120 to the user device 110 sends.

4 represents a graphical representation 400 which illustrates the exemplary operations performed by the HSM 200 to be a request 250 a cryptographic operation from the user device 110 who owns the cryptographic key 120 is assigned to process. The graphic representation 400 can with respect to the cryptographic system 100 after the 1 and 2 to be discribed. The vertical y-axis indicates the time increasing from top to bottom. At the time 1 generates the user device 110 an authorization token 220 that access to the cryptographic key 120 for use in performing a corresponding cryptographic operation on the HSM 200 authorized. The user device 110 can the authorization token 220 by sending the challenge request 270 generate to the HSM 220 to initiate the appropriate authorization token 220 to the owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 as above regarding 2 has been described. In some implementations, the user device generates 110 the authorization token 220 at the time of generation of the cryptographic key 120.

At the time 2 sends the user device 110 the request 250 a cryptographic operation containing the wrapped cryptographic key 120 and the authorization token 220 contains, to the HSM 200 , The wrapped cryptographic key 120 can through the HSM 200 using the authorizer key 118 of the user 10 as described above 3 has been described. In some examples, this is included by the requirement 250 cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation, an encryption operation. Here, the request 250 of a cryptographic operation requests the HSM 200 on, the encryption operation using the wrapped cryptographic key 120 and the authorization token 220 to process in plain text. Consequently, the requirement may be 250 A plain-text cryptographic operation included by the user 10 over the cryptographic key 120 wants to encrypt. If the cryptographic operation contains a decryption operation, the request may 250 a cryptographic operation containing encrypted text that the user 10 over the cryptographic key 120 wants to decode. On the other hand, if the cryptographic operation contains a signing operation, the request may 250 a cryptographic operation a digital signature on the cryptographic key 120 by the user 10 contain. The user interface 112 that in the user device 110 is executed, it may be the user device 110 allow the authorization token 220 to generate and the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation containing the cryptographic key 120 and the authorization token 220 contains, to the HSM 200 to send. The user interface 112 it can be the user 10 z. For example, you can access a client library or command-line tool to obtain the authorization token 220 to generate an API to give it to the user 10 to allow the authorization token 220 manually generate and / or use a call API to request 250 a cryptographic operation to the HSM 200 to send. At the time 3 can the HSM manager 150 the request 250 a cryptographic operation containing the cryptographic key 120 and the authorization token 220 contains, received and sent to the HSM 200 send.

At the time 4 authenticates and authorizes the HSM 200 that of the user device 110 received request 250 a cryptographic operation. Here is the HSM 200 determine if the ACL 214 that the cryptographic key 120 (eg the encryption key) associated with request 250 of a cryptographic operation is authorized to access the wrapped cryptographic key 120 to control. By authorizing the assignment of the ACL 214 to the wrapped cryptographic key 120 prevents the HSM 200 Unauthorized ACLs try the HSM 200 confuse and thereby unauthorized access to the HSM 200 to get. The ACL 214 that the cryptographic key 120 associated with request 250 may be through the authorization token 220 be provided (the authorization token 220 works z. As the ACL 214 ). In some examples, the HSM determines 200 furthermore, whether by the requirement 250 cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation (e.g., the encryption operation) by the ACL 214 allowed is. The HSM 200 also validates the authorization token 220 the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation. In general, the HSM validates 200 the at least one in the requirement 250 included authorization tokens 220 by ensuring that each authorization token 220 the ACL 214 for by the requirement 250 corresponds to a corresponding cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation. In other words, the user 10 must have the correct authorization tokens specified by the ACL 214 for the corresponding cryptographic operation 220 provide. The authorization token 220 can z. B. valid if the authorization token 220 through the authorization key 118 is signed, ie, the authorization token 220 the digital signature signed by the authorization key 118 230 ( 2 ) contains. The authorization token 220 can also be valid if the HSM 200 the authorization token 220 within the authorization period 226 ( 2 ) received by the authorization token 220 is defined. The HSM 200 can z. B. on the internal clock 211 Referring to determine the time at which the authorization token 220 of the request 250 a cryptographic operation was received.

The authorization token 220 may additionally or alternatively be valid if the HSM 200 the authorization token less often than the authorization token 220 defined limit number 228 ( 2 ) receives. The HSM 200 can z. B. on the counter 213 Refer to to determine how many times the authorization token 220 through the HSM 200 has been received. When the value of the counter 213 is smaller than the limit number 228 is, the HSM can 200 the counter 213 increment. Because the HSM 200 can perform many different cryptographic operations, the HSM 200 a corresponding counter 213 which is associated with each of the various cryptographic operations performed by the HSM at any given time 200 can be executed.

If the authorization token 220 is valid and the assignment of the ACL 214 to the wrapped cryptographic key 120 that in the request 250 a cryptographic operation is authorized, processes the HSM 200 at the time 5 the request 250 a cryptographic operation. The authorization token 220 the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation, the ACL 214 contain. Because the HSM 200 determines that these two conditions are met, the HSM 200 proceed to the cryptographic key 120 unwrap by the requirement 250 perform a cryptographic operation requested operation. If by the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation e.g. B. contains the encryption operation, performs the HSM 200 the encryption operation using the cryptographic key 120 in plain text. Here contains the request 250 In addition, the plaintext for encryption. At the time 6 sends the HSM 200 an answer that the result 260 contains the cryptographic operation. The result 260 the cryptographic operation can z. For example, the encrypted text contained by the HSM 200 at the in the request 250 a plaintext provided by a cryptographic operation. In the scenarios where the cryptographic operation corresponds to a signing operation, the signing operation may include a digital signature to verify an origin of an electronic document and / or to provide a status of the electronic document. The HSM manager 150 can at the time 7 the wrapped key 120 and receive the signed statement and to the user device 110 send.

In some configurations, the user device may 110 the authorization token 220 generate and the HSM manager 150 prompt for the authorization token 220 in the distributed system 140 (eg within the memory resources 146 ) save. Here is the authorization token 220 be durable. In some examples, the distributed system includes 140 an archive that stores the authorization tokens. The user device 110 can then make a request 250 a cryptographic operation containing only the cryptographic operation (eg, an encryption operation) and the cryptographic key 120 to the HSM manager 150 send, with the HSM manager 150 the authorization token 220 for inclusion in the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation for the HSM 200 can regain.

5 represents a graphical representation 500 which illustrates the exemplary operations performed by the HSM 200 to be a request 250 a cryptographic operation of one by the owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 Authorized Authorized Authoriser 234 to process. The graphic representation 500 can with respect to the cryptographic system 100 after the 1 and 2 to be discribed. The vertical y-axis indicates the time increasing from top to bottom. At the time 1 creates the owner 10 assigned user device 110 a first authorization token (T ₁ ) 220a for use in performing a corresponding cryptographic operation in the HSM 200 , In the example shown, the first authorization token defines 220a one or more by the owner 10 empowered authorized authorizers 234 to the first authorization token 220a to validate before the request 250 a cryptographic operation to the HSM 200 is sent.

At the time 2 sends the user device 110 an authorization request 450 that's the first authorization token 220a to any authorized authoriser 234 who have each authorized author 234 prompts before sending the request 250 a cryptographic operation to the HSM 200 the first authorization token 220a to validate and sign. In some examples, the first authorization token is 220a durable and in the distributed system 140 (ie, within the memory resources 146 ) saved. The authorization request 450 can connect to multiple through the first authorization token 220a defined authorized authorizers 234 be sent. By validating and signing the first authorization token 220a may be the authorized author 234 carry out additional validation procedures and an authorized authoriser 234 associated internal authorization structure (eg, a cloud service) into one through the HSM 200 translate understandable authorization structure. Generated accordingly at the time 3 the authorized authoriser 234 a second authorization token (T ₂ ) 220b, one by an authorization key 118 of the authorized authorizer 234 contains corresponding digital signature. The HSM manager 150 can be a public interface for a cluster of HSMs 200 in the distributed system 140 be assigned.

At the time 4 sends the authorized authorizer 234 the request 250 a cryptographic operation containing the cryptographic key 120, the first authorization token T ₁ 220a and the second authorization token T ₂ 220b to the HSM 200 , In the example shown, the first and second authorization tokens are 220a . 220b within the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation linked together. The cryptographic key 120 of the authorized authorizer 234 is wrapped up so that he has the public parts of the authorization key 118 of the Authorized Authorizer 234 to sign both authorization tokens 220a . 220b contains. In other examples, the authorized authorizer embeds 234 the first authorization token 220a in the second authorization token 220b where it contains the embedded authorization tokens 220 along with the cryptographic key 120 in the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation bundles.

In some examples, this is included by the requirement 250 cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation, an encryption operation. Here demands the request 250 a cryptographic operation the HSM 200 on, the encryption operation using the non-public cryptographic key 120 , the first authorization token T ₁ 220a and the second authorization token T ₂ 220b to be processed on the plaintext. Consequently, the requirement may be 250 a plaintext cryptographic operation containing encryption over the cryptographic key 120 requires. If the cryptographic operation contains a decryption operation, the request may 250 a cryptographic operation containing encrypted text that decrypted the cryptographic key 120 requires. In other examples, the cryptographic operation may include a signing operation that signifies the contents of the cryptographic key 120 requires.

At the time 5 authenticates and authorizes the HSM 200 that of the authorized author 234 received request 250 a cryptographic operation. In some examples, the HSM 200 further determine whether by the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation (e.g., the encryption operation) by the cryptographic key 120 associated ACL 214 allowed is. At least one of the authorization tokens 220 can the ACL 214 deploy, giving an access strategy to the HSM 200 can be refined without relying on one in the HSM 200 to store stored master ACL. The ACL 214 can specify which and how many authorization tokens 220 . 220a-b needed to meet the requirement 250 to process a cryptographic operation. The HSM 200 also validates the authorization tokens 220a . 220b the request 250 of a cryptographic operation. The authorization token 220 can z. For example, if both authorization tokens 220a . 220b through the authorization keys 118 of the user 10 and the Authorized Authorizer 234 are signed, that is, the authorization tokens 220a . 220b the digital signature signed by the authorization keys 118 230 ( 2 ) contain. In some examples, the first authorization token is 220a durable and the second authorization token 220b is valid if the HSM 200 the second authorization token 220b within one by the second authorization token 220b defined authorization period 226 ( 2 ) receives. The HSM 200 can z. B. on the internal clock 211 Reference to determine the time at which the second authorization token 220b the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation was received. Additionally or alternatively, the authorization token 220 be valid if the HSM 200 the authorization tokens 220a . 220b less often than one through the authorization tokens 220a . 220b defined limit number 228 ( 2 ) receives. The HSM 200 can z. B. on the counter 213 Make reference to determine how often the authorization tokens 220a . 220b through the HSM 200 have been received. If the value of the counter 213 less than the limit number 228 is, the HSM can 200 the counter 213 increment. One or both of the authorization tokens 220a . 220b can have a corresponding limit number 228 define. If both authorization tokens 220a . 220b the marginal numbers 228 can define one of the tokens 220a . 220b corresponding limit number 228 the same as the limit number 228 his or her limit number 228 be different to the other of the tokens 220a . 220b equivalent.

If the authorization tokens 220a . 220b are valid and the cryptographic key 120 the requirement 250 Authenticated to a cryptographic operation, the HSM processes 200 at the time 6 the request 250 a cryptographic operation. If by the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation requested by a cryptographic operation e.g. B. contains the encryption operation, performs the HSM 200 the encryption operation using the cryptographic key 120 on the plaintext. Here contains the request 250 In addition, the plaintext for encryption. At time 7, it sends a response indicating the result 260 the cryptographic operation to the authorized author (s) 234 , The result 260 an encryption operation can e.g. As by the HSM 200 at the in the request 250 a cryptographic operation provided plaintext computed encrypted text.

6 represents a graphical representation 600 ready to illustrate the exemplary operations performed by the HSM 200 be executed to an entry 662 in a test report 660 for each through the HSM 200 to process processed cryptographic operation. The graphic representation 600 can with respect to the cryptographic system 100 after the 1 and 2 and the graphic representation 500 to 5 to be discribed. The vertical y-axis indicates the time increasing from top to bottom. At the time 1 creates the one owner of a cryptographic key 120 assigned user device 110 an authorization token 220 At the time 2 an authorization request 450 that the authorization token 220 to at least one through the authorization token 220 defined authorized authoriser 234 sends. In some examples, the authorization token 220 further defines a limit count 228 indicating the number of uses of the corresponding authorization token 220 limited. The authorization token 220 can z. B. only for two by the HSM 200 processed cryptographic operations to be valid. The authorized authorizer 234 For example, the authorization token 220 may be using a non-public cryptographic key 120 of the Authorized Authorizer 234 validate and sign. The authorized authorizer 234 can also have a second authorization token 220 generated by the authorized author 234 (ie, using an authorized authoriser 234 corresponding corresponding authorizer key 118 ) is digitally signed, and then by the owner / customer 10 generated first authorization token by the authorized authorizer 234 generated second authorization tokens 220 bind or the two authorization tokens 220 embed together as above with respect to the graph 500 to 5 has been discussed.

At the time 3 sends the authorized authorizer 234 a first requirement 250 . 250a a cryptographic operation that uses the authorization token 220 contains, to the HSM 200 , For clarity, the cryptographic key 120 and any additional authorization tokens 220 who is the authorized author 234 may have produced, not shown. At time 4, the HSM processes 200 the first requirement 250a a cryptographic operation after authenticating and authorizing the authorization of the authorized author 234 received first request 250a a cryptographic operation. In the example shown, the HSM determines 200 that the cryptographic key 200 and the associated ACL 214 the requirement 250a authentic, being the authorization token 220 validated. The authorization token 220 may be valid if the HSM 200 the authorization token less often than the authorization token 220 defined limit number 228 ( 2 ) receives. If the limit number 228 z. B. is two ("2"), the HSM 200 on the counter 213 Refer to to determine how many times the authorization token 220 through the HSM 200 has been received. If the value of the counter 213 less than the limit number 228 (eg 2), the HSM 200 the counter 213 increment and the request 250 a cryptographic operation. In the example shown, the HSM increments the counter 213 so that it does after processing the first request 250a a cryptographic operation has a value equal to one "1". The the cryptographic key 120 associated ACL 214 can specify the authorization token 220 that must be validated to meet the requirement 250 to process a cryptographic operation.

In some implementations, the HSM generates 200 a corresponding test log entry 662 in the test report 660 for each through the HSM 200 processed requirement 250 a cryptographic operation. The HSM 200 can any audit log entry 662 using the authorizer key 118 of the Authorized Authorizer 234 sign in the corresponding wrapped cryptographic key 120 is included. Each test log entry 662 can also use any authorization token 220 included the HSM 200 validated to the requirement 250 to process a cryptographic operation. At the time 5 sends the HSM 200 an answer that the result 260 by the HSM 200 processed first request 250a a cryptographic operation, back to the authorized authorizer 234 , For an encryption operation, the result may be 260 contain encrypted text. In addition, the HSM provides 200 the test report 660 , the first test log entry 662 . 662a for those through the HSM 200 processed first request 250a includes a cryptographic operation, the HSM manager 150 ready. In some examples, the HSM 200 simply the first test log entry 662a the HSM manager 150 ready, being the HSM manager 150 the entry 662a in the test report 660 records that within the storage resources 146 of the distributed system 140 is stored.

At the time 6 sends the authorized authorizer 234 a second request 250 . 250b a cryptographic operation that uses the authorization token 220 contains, to the HSM 200 , where the HSM 200 at the time 7 that of the authorized author 234 received second request 250 a cryptographic operation is authenticated and authorized, as discussed above at time 4. Here the HSM validates 200 the authorization token 220 the second request 250b a cryptographic operation by reference to the counter 213 and determining that the value (eg, 1) of the counter 213 less than the value (eg, 2) of the authorization token 220 defined limit number 228 is. Then the HSM increments 200 the counter 213 to a value of two ("2"), so all subsequent requirements 250 a cryptographic operation using the authorization token 220 be rejected because of the authorization key 220 is considered invalid.

At the time 8th sends the HSM 200 an answer that the result 260 by the HSM 200 processed second request 250b a cryptographic operation, back to the authorized authorizer 234 , For an encryption operation, the result may be 260 contain encrypted text. In addition, the HSM provides 200 the test report 660 containing the second audit log entry 662 . 662b for those through the HSM 200 processed second request 250b a cryptographic operation, the HSM manager 150 ready. In some examples, the HSM 200 the second test log entry 662b just the HSM manager 150 ready, being the HSM manager 150 entry 662b in the audit log 660 within the memory resources 146 of the distributed system 140 is stored.

At the time 9 Receives the owner 10 associated client device the audit trail 660 including the first and second test log entries 662a, 662b. At the time 10 can the owner 10 the test report 660 validate to account for all authorized cryptographic operations. In some examples, the owner may 10 the test report 660 validate when the number of audit log entries 662 with the number (ie, the limit number 228 ) by the owner 10 authorized cryptographic operations. The owner 10 can z. B. be able to quickly determine that the authorization token 220 has been abused when the number of log entries 662 through the authorization token 220 defined limit number 228 exceeds. The client device 110 can anytime the HSM manager 150 prompt the test report 660 to send.

7 FIG. 10 is a block diagram of an example implementation of the components of an example authorization system. FIG 700 to authorize requests 250 a cryptographic operation containing at least one authorization token 220 included and by a customer / authoriser 10 to an HSM 200 of the distributed system 140 be sent. A customer device 710 serving the customer / authorizer 10 can be assigned over the network 130 to 1 with the distributed system 140 communicate. The distributed system 140 Contains a virtual machine (VM) 720 of the customer, one or more authorized authorizers 234 and the HSM 200 , Each Authorized Authorizer 234 can be an independent entity, by the customer / author 10 is empowered to the requirements 250 make an authorization decision associated with a cryptographic operation.

In the example shown, the authorized authorizers included 234 one Security policy service, a key management service, and an application service running in the distributed system. The security policy service creates one by the customer / authorizer 10 established security strategy for managing the authorizations of the client / author 10 belonging resources. The key management service can do it to the customer / authorizer 10 allow to manage the cryptographic operations for the services running in the distributed system. The key management service can, for. B. with the security strategy service to the grants of specific cryptographic keys 120 to manage the client / authorizer 10 belong and before the distributed system 140 be kept secret. The application service may correspond to a document service, an e-mail service, a calendar service, or another service running in the distributed system.

The customer / authoriser 10 can be a requirement 250 a cryptographic operation involving the HSM 200 requests an appropriate cryptographic operations 250 (eg, an encryption operation). In the example shown, the client VM receives 720 Distributed system 140 the request 250 a cryptographic operation that is a cryptographic key 120 who is the customer / authorizer 10 and a first authorization token 220a contains. The first authorization token 220a can define capability constraints, such as B. the authorization period 226 during which the token 220a is valid, and / or the limit number 228 indicating the number of uses of the corresponding token 220a limited. The first authorization token 220a may also include one or more by the authorisers / customers 10 empowered authorized authorizers 234 define the token 220 before sending the request 250 to the HSM 200 continue to validate. In the example shown, the first authorization token 220a each of the security strategy service, the key management service and the application service as the authorized authorizers 234 define.

In some implementations, one or more of the authorized authorizers 234 a corresponding authorization token 220b generate the first authorization token 220a is bound if certain conditions are met. The security strategy service can, for. B. a corresponding authorization token 220 generate if the authorizer / owner 10 based on the permissions set forth in the security policy, on the cryptographic key 120 access. The application service can provide a corresponding authorization token 220b generate if the customer / owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 used to encrypt / decrypt all data associated with the application service. The application service can, for. For example, the authorization token 220a that of the customer / owner 10 received request a cryptographic operation using a non-public key that is associated with the application service sign. Thereafter, the key management service may request the capability request 250, which is the first authorization token 220a contains, by the authorizer key 118 that is bundled in the wrapped cryptographic key 120 associated with the owner / customer and the second authorization token signed by an authorizer key associated with the application service 220b contains, send. The second authorization token 220b can an authorization period 226 which is different than the authorization period defined by the first authorization token 226 is. The HSM 200 can the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation when each of the authorization tokens 220a . 220b is valid and the HSM 200 the assignment of the ACL 214 to the cryptographic key 120 the requirement 250 authorized a cryptographic operation. The HSM 200 can be an authentication / authorization module 730 contain the internal clock 211 , the counter (s) 213 and the ACL 214 to 1 contains.

By the customer / author 10 allowed to the distributed system 140 associated with the authorized author 234 in the authorization token 220, the authorized authorizers 234 perform additional validation procedures and an authorized authorizer 234 assigned internal authorization structure in one by the HSM 200 translate understandable authorization structure. Accordingly, the customer / authorizer must 10 no corresponding public key for each authorized authoriser 234 that in the distributed system 140 is carried out. In addition, the customer / authorizer does not have to contact the HSM 200 or have no direct control channel to the HSM 200 build up.

8th illustrates a method 800 to process a request 250 a cryptographic operation. In the block 802 method 800 includes receiving at a hardware security module (HSM) 200 the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation that is a cryptographic key 120 and at least one authorization token 220 contains. The HSM 200 can z. For example, the requirement 250 from a user device 110 received, the one owner 10 the cryptographic key 120 assigned. Alternatively, the HSM 200 the request 250 from one by the owner 10 of cryptographic key 120 Authorized Authorized Authoriser 234 receive the at least one authorization token 220 to use. The cryptographic key 120 can be wrapped. In the block 804 contains the procedure 800 determining by the HSM 200 Whether an Access Control List (ACL) 214 that the cryptographic key 120 the request 250 is associated with a cryptographic operation authorized access to cryptographic keys 120 to control.

In the block 806 contains the procedure 800 validation by the HSM 200 of the at least one authorization token 220 , The authorization token 220 can z. B. valid if at least one of the tokens 220a by the authorizer key 118 of the owner 10 is signed, the HSM 200 the token 200 within one through the token 220 defined authorization period 226 has received or the HSM the token 220 less often than one through the token 220 defined limit number 228 has received.

In the block 808 the method includes processing by the HSM 200 the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation, if the at least one authorization token 220 is valid and the cryptographic key 120 the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation is authentic. In some examples, the HSM processes 200 the request 250 only if by the requirement 250 a cryptographic operation requested by the ACL 214 allowed is. After processing the request 250, the HSM 200 a response containing a result of the cryptographic operation back to the user device 110 send to the owner of the cryptographic key 120 assigned. Here is the result 260 contain an encrypted text if the cryptographic operation is an encryption operation.

A software application (i.e., a software resource) may refer to computer software that causes a computing device to perform a task. In some examples, a software application may be referred to as an "application," "app," or "program." Exemplary applications include, but are not limited to, system diagnostic applications, system management applications, system maintenance applications, word processing applications, spreadsheet applications, messaging applications, media streaming applications, social networking applications, and gaming applications.

The non-transitory memory may consist of physical devices used to store programs (e.g., sequences of instructions) or data (e.g., program state information) on a temporary or permanent basis for use by a computing device. The non-transitory memory may be a volatile and / or nonvolatile semiconductor addressable memory. Nonvolatile memory examples include, but are not limited to, flash memory and read only memory (ROM) / programmable read only memory (PROM) / erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM) / electronically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM) (typically used, for example, for firmware, such as bootstrap programs). Examples of volatile memory include, but are not limited to, both random access memory (RAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), phase change memory (PCM), and disks ,

9 FIG. 10 is a schematic view of an exemplary computing device. FIG 900 , which can be used to implement the systems and methods described in this document. The computer device 900 is provided, various forms of digital computers, such. Laptops, desktops, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframes or other suitable computers. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships and their functions are intended to be illustrative only and not intended to limit the implementations of the inventions described and / or claimed in this document.

The computer device 900 contains a processor 910 a memory 920, a memory device 930 , a high speed interface / high speed controller 940 that with the memory 920 and the high-speed expansion ports 950 connected, and an interface / a controller 960 at low speed, the one with a bus 970 at low speed and a storage device 930 connected is. All components 910 . 920 . 930 . 940 . 950 and 960 are interconnected using different buses and may be mounted on a common motherboard or in other ways, if desired. The processor 910 (eg, the computing hardware) may have instructions for execution within the computing device 900 including in the store 920 (eg, the storage hardware) or in the storage device 930 stored instructions, graphic information for a graphical user interface (GUI) on an external input / output device, such. B. a display 980 that on the high-speed interface 940 is coupled to display. In other implementations, multiple processors and / or multiple buses may optionally be used along with multiple memories and types of memory. In addition, multiple computing devices 900 may be connected, with each device providing portions of the necessary operations (eg, as a server bank, a group of blade servers, or a multiprocessor system).

The memory 920 (eg, the storage hardware) stores information non-transitorily in the computing device 900 , The memory 920 may be a computer readable medium, a volatile storage device (s) or a nonvolatile storage device (s). The non-transitory memory 920 may consist of physical devices used to program (e.g., follow instructions) or data (e.g., program state information) on a temporary or permanent basis for use by the computing device 900 save. Examples of nonvolatile memory include, but are not limited to, flash memory and read only memory (ROM) / programmable read only memory (PROM) / erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM) / electronically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM) (typically used, for example, for firmware, such as bootstrap programs). Examples of volatile memory include, but are not limited to, both random access memory (RAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), phase change memory (PCM), and disks ,

The storage device 930 can be a mass storage device for the computing device 900 provide. In some implementations, the storage device is a computer readable medium. In various different implementations, the memory device 930 a floppy disk device, hard disk device, optical disk device or tape device, flash memory or other similar semiconductor memory device, or an array of devices, including devices in a storage area network or other configurations. In additional implementations, a computer program product is tangibly embodied in an information carrier. The computer program product contains instructions that, when executed, may include one or more methods, such as the following: For example, those described above. The information carrier is a computer- or machine-readable medium, such. B. the memory 920 , the storage device 930 or a memory in the processor 910 ,

The high-speed controller 940 manages the bandwidth-intensive operations for the computing device 900 while the controller 960 at low speed manages the less bandwidth intensive operations. Such assignment of duties is merely exemplary. In some implementations, the high-speed controller is 940 to the store 920 , the ad 980 (eg, by a graphics processor or graphics accelerator) and to the high-speed expansion ports 950 that can accept various expansion cards (not shown). In some implementations, the controller is 960 at low speed to the storage device 930 and an expansion port 990 coupled with low speed. The expansion port 990 At low speed, which may include various communication ports (eg, USB, Bluetooth, Ethernet, wireless Ethernet) may be connected to one or more input / output devices, such as a wireless device. As a keyboard, a display device, a scanner or a networking device, such. As a switch or a router, z. B. be coupled by a network adapter.

The computer device 900 can be implemented in a number of different forms, as shown in the figure. You can z. As a standard server 900a or several times in a group of such servers 900a as a laptop computer 900b or as part of a rack server system 900c be implemented.

Various implementations of the systems and techniques described herein may be implemented in digital electronic and / or optical circuitry, integrated circuitry, specifically designed ASICs (application specific integrated circuits), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various implementations may include implementation in one or more computer programs included in a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, special or universal, for receiving data and instructions from a memory system, at least one input device, and at least one output device and send, execute, and / or interpret data and instructions to a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device.

These computer programs (also known as programs, software, software applications or code) contain machine instructions for a programmable processor and can be used in a higher procedural and / or or object-oriented programming language and / or an assembler / machine language. As used herein, the terms "machine-readable medium" and "computer-readable medium" refer to any computer program product, non-transitory computer-readable medium, apparatus, and / or apparatus (eg, magnetic disks, optical disks, memory, programmable logic devices (PLDs)) used to provide machine instructions and / or data to a programmable processor, including a machine-readable medium that receives the machine instructions as a machine-readable signal. The term "machine-readable signal" refers to any signal used to provide machine instructions and / or data to a programmable processor.

The processes and logic operations described in this specification may be performed by one or more programmable processors executing one or more computer programs to perform the functions by manipulating the input data and generating an output. The processes and logic operations may also be implemented by special logic circuitry, e.g. An FPGA (a field programmable gate array) or an ASIC (an application specific integrated circuit). The processors suitable for executing a computer program include, by way of example, both general purpose and special purpose microprocessors and any one or more processors of any type of digital computer. In general, a processor receives instructions and data from a read-only memory or a random access memory or both. The essential elements of a computer are a processor for executing instructions and one or more memory devices for storing instructions and data. In general, a computer also includes one or more mass storage devices for storing data, e.g. Magnetic, magneto-optical or optical disks, or is a computer also operatively connected to one or more mass storage devices for storing data, e.g. As magnetic, magneto-optical or optical disks, coupled to receive data from these or transmit data to these or both. However, a computer need not have such devices. The computer readable media suitable for storing computer program instructions and data include all forms of nonvolatile memory, media and memory devices, including, by way of example, semiconductor memory devices, e.g. EPROM, EEPROM and flash memory devices; Magnetic disks, z. Internal hard disks or removable disks; magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM discs. The processor and memory may be supplemented by special logic circuitry or included in special purpose logic circuitry.

To create an interaction with a user, one or more aspects of the disclosure may be implemented in a computer having a display device, e.g. A CRT (cathode ray tube), LCD (liquid crystal) monitor or touch screen for displaying information to the user, and optionally a keyboard and pointing device, e.g. As a mouse or a trackball through which the user can provide input to the computer has. Other types of devices may also be used to interact with a user; a user-provided feedback can, for. For example, some form of sensory feedback, e.g. A visual feedback, an acoustic feedback, or a tactile feedback; and an input from the user may be received in any form, including auditory, voice or tactile input. In addition, a computer may interact with a user by sending documents to and receiving documents from a device used by the user; z. By sending web pages to a web browser in a client device of the user in response to requests received from the web browser.

A number of implementations have been described. Nevertheless, it will be appreciated that various modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure. Accordingly, other implementations are within the scope of the following claims.

A method for processing a request ( 250 ) of a cryptographic operation involves receiving at a hardware security module (HSM) ( 200 ) the request for a cryptographic operation that contains a cryptographic key ( 120 ) and at least one authorization token ( 220 ), determining by the HSM whether an access control list (ACL) ( 214 ) associated with the cryptographic key requesting a cryptographic operation, is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key, and validating by the HSM of the at least one authorization token. If the at least one authorization token is valid and the ACL is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key of the request for a cryptographic operation, the method includes processing the request for a cryptographic operation by the HSM.

Claims (28)

One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more computing devices, cause the one or more computing devices to perform operations that include: Receiving at a hardware security module (HSM) (200) a request (250) of a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key (120) and at least one authorization token (220); Determining, by the HSM (200), whether an access control list (ACL) (214) associated with the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) ; and Validating by the HSM (200) the at least one authorization token (220); and, if the at least one authorization token (220) is valid and the ACL (214) is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation through the HSM (200). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 1 wherein the at least one authorization token (220) is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token (220) is signed by an authorization key (118); the request (250) of a cryptographic operation has been received by the HSM (200) within an authorization period (226) defined by the at least one authorization token (220); or the HSM (200) has received the request (250) of a cryptographic operation less often than a limit number (228) defined by the at least one authorization token (220). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 1 or 2 further comprising: if the ACL (214) is authorized to control the access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, determining by the HSM (200) whether the requests made by the request (250) a cryptographic operation (260) requested by the ACL (214); and if the cryptographic operation (260) requested by the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL (214), processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation. One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media according to any one of Claims 1 - 3 further comprising: receiving at the HSM (200) a challenge request (270) from an owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120); and issuing from the HSM (220) a corresponding authorization token (220) to the owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 4 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) comprises data identifying the HSM (200) and a cryptographic signature (224) of the HSM (200). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 4 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) defines an authorization period (226) and / or a limit number (228) that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token (220). One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media according to any one of Claims 1 - 6 , where the cryptographic key (120) the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is wrapped. Hardware security module (HSM) (200), comprising: Data processing hardware (210); and Storage hardware (212) in communication with the computing hardware (210), the storage hardware (212) storing instructions that, when executed in the computing hardware (210), comprise the computing hardware (210) to perform operations that include: Receiving a request (250) of a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key (120) and at least one authorization token (220); Determining whether an access control list (ACL) (214) associated with the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120); Validating the at least one authorization token (220); and if the at least one authorization token (220) is valid and the ACL (214) is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation , HSM (200) after Claim 8 wherein the at least one authorization token (220) is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token (220) is signed by an authorization key (118); the request (250) of a cryptographic operation has been received by the HSM (200) within an authorization period (226) defined by the at least one authorization token (220); or the HSM (200) has received the request (250) of a cryptographic operation less often than a limit number (228) defined by the at least one authorization token (220). HSM (200) after Claim 8 or 9 wherein the operations further comprise: if the ACL (214) is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, determining whether requested by the request (250) of a cryptographic operation cryptographic operation (260) is allowed by the ACL (214); and if the cryptographic operation (260) requested by the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL (214), processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation. HSM (200) after one of the Claims 8 - 10 wherein the operations further comprise: receiving a challenge request (270) from an owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120); and issuing a corresponding authorization token (220) to the owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120). HSM (200) after Claim 11 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) comprises data identifying the HSM (200) and a cryptographic signature (224) of the HSM (200). HSM (200) after Claim 11 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) defines an authorization period (226) and / or a limit number (228) that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token (220). HSM (200) after one of the Claims 8 - 13 wherein the cryptographic key (120) is wrapped in the request (250) of a cryptographic operation. One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more computing devices, cause the one or more computing devices to perform operations that include: Receiving at a distributed system (100) a request (250) of a cryptographic operation from a user (10), the request (250) of a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key (120) and at least one authorization token (220); Sending, by the distributed system (100), the request (250) of a cryptographic operation to a hardware security module (HSM) (200) configured to perform operations including: Determining whether an access control list (ACL) (214) associated with the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120); Validating the at least one authorization token (220); and if the at least one authorization token (220) is valid and the ACL (214) is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request for a cryptographic operation (250), processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation ; Receiving a response from the HSM (200) at the distributed system (100), wherein when the HSM (200) processes the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, the response comprises a result (260) of the cryptographic operation; and Sending the response from the distributed system (100) to the user (10). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 15 wherein the at least one authorization token (220) is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token (220) is signed by an authorization key (118); the request (250) of a cryptographic operation has been received by the HSM (200) within an authorization period (226) defined by the at least one authorization token (220); or the HSM (200) has received the request (250) of a cryptographic operation less often than a limit number (228) defined by the at least one authorization token (220). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 15 or 16 wherein the operations of the HSM (200) further comprise: if the ACL (214) is authorized, access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) controlling a cryptographic operation, determining whether the cryptographic operation (260) requested by the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL (214); and if the cryptographic operation (260) requested by the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL (214), processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation. One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media according to any one of Claims 15 - 17 method further comprising: receiving at the distributed system (100) a challenge request (270) from an owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120); and sending the challenge request (270) to the HSM (200), wherein the HSM (200) is configured to issue a corresponding authorization token (220) to the owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 18 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) comprises data identifying the HSM (200) and a cryptographic signature (224) of the HSM (200). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 18 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) defines an authorization period (226) and / or a limit number (228) that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token (220). One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media according to any one of Claims 15 - 20 wherein the cryptographic key (120) is wrapped in the request (250) of a cryptographic operation. One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more computing devices, cause the one or more computing devices to perform operations that include: Receiving at a distributed system (100) a request (250) of a cryptographic operation from a user (10), the request (250) of a cryptographic operation comprising a cryptographic key (120); Obtained by the distributed system (100) of at least one authorization token (220); Sending, by the distributed system (100), the operation request and the at least one authorization token (220) to a hardware security module (HSM) (200) configured to perform operations including: Determining whether an access control list (ACL) (214) associated with the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120); Validating the at least one authorization token (220); and if the at least one authorization token (220) is valid and the ACL (214) is authorized to control access to the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation ; Receiving a response from the HSM (200) at the distributed system (100), wherein when the HSM (200) processes the request (250) of a cryptographic operation, the response comprises a result (260) of the cryptographic operation; and Sending the response from the distributed system (100) to the user (10). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 22 wherein the at least one authorization token (220) is valid if at least one of the following applies: the at least one authorization token (220) is signed by an authorization key (118); the request (250) of a cryptographic operation has been received by the HSM (200) within an authorization period (226) defined by the at least one authorization token (220); or the HSM (200) has received the request (250) of a cryptographic operation less often than a limit number (228) defined by the at least one authorization token (220). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 22 or 23 wherein the operations of the HSM (200) further comprise: if the cryptographic key (120) of the request (250) of a cryptographic operation matches the corresponding cryptographic key (120) of the ACL (214), determining whether a request by ( 250) a cryptographic operation (260) requested by a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL (214); and if the cryptographic operation (260) requested by the request (250) of a cryptographic operation is allowed by the ACL (214), processing the request (250) of a cryptographic operation. One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media according to any one of Claims 22 - 24 which further comprise: Receiving at the distributed system (100) a challenge request (270) from an owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120); and sending the challenge request (270) to the HSM (200), wherein the HSM (200) is configured to issue a corresponding authorization token (220) to the owner (10) of the cryptographic key (120). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 25 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) comprises data identifying the HSM (200) and a cryptographic signature (224) of the HSM (200). One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media Claim 25 wherein the corresponding authorization token (220) defines an authorization period (226) and / or a limit number (228) that limits a number of uses of the corresponding authorization token (220). One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media according to any one of Claims 22 - 27 wherein the cryptographic key (120) is wrapped in the request (250) of a cryptographic operation.

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