DE19754936A1 - Sealing and guiding device for highly dynamically accelerated, distance-effective protective elements - Google Patents

Abstract

Protection is given by enclosed units such that the mass of defensive elements (14) is 1 - 2 times that of the threat (16c) against which action is taken. The defensive elements are accelerated to a speed of 100 to 500 m/s. Elements may be accelerated chemically, mechanically, pneumatically or by a hybrid combination and two or more elements can be accelerated in different directions (15).

Description

The invention relates to a sealing and guiding device for highly dynamic Accelerate distance-effective, weight-optimized protective elements against impact (KE) projectiles, shaped charge ammunition (HL) and explosive-shaped Projectiles (EFP) according to the preamble of claim 1.

Over the past few decades, the breakthrough performance of both Hollow charge (HL) and balancing (KE) projectiles raised in such a way that with inert protective structures, even with heavy armored driving testify a hardly realizable measure of basis weights is necessary. Since this trend will continue to increase in the future, there have been He investigated special armor that had the same mass compared to steel have increased protection.

In addition to the use of special protective materials, it has been particularly since In the early 1970s, so-called reactive armor (ERA) was tested decisive improvements in the especially against HL projectiles Protection performance and thus a reduction in the basis weight. The Principle is that in a sandwich structure made of z. B. steel sheet / explosive fabric / sheet steel due to the impact or penetration of the explosive material is initiated and by the correspondingly accelerated steel sheets (plates) lateral effects on the penetrating projectile (HL beam or KE- Penetrator) can be achieved. Because of the very short available This acceleration process must not only be initiated very quickly but also correspondingly high plate speeds can be achieved. For end ballistic reasons z. B. for KE projectiles Such flat configurations, depending on the angle of inclination, the slab speed is 15% to 30% of the projectile speed to get one out to achieve sufficient protection. This limits the ones to be realized Sheet thicknesses, which are usually for shaped charges in the mm range, against (KE) projectiles in special cases with a plate thickness of a few centimeters gene.

Both required conditions, both ignition without significant time delays tion, as well as a very high disk speed, can be used in flat and simple structures can only be reached with explosives.

Since, in particular due to the fact that the point of impact of the projectile on the reactive protective element is not known precisely enough and the reactive elements must act on the penetrating threat for a certain time, their area cannot be reduced arbitrarily. The lateral dimensions of the protective modules, which are already in use in a wide variety of combat tanks around the world, are in the order of 0.1 to 0.3 m ² . Due to the above-mentioned conditions, explosive thicknesses of 4 mm to 8 mm result and therefore relatively high explosive masses. This means that in addition to the shock load, very substantial energies or pulses are also transmitted to the supporting structure. In the case of massive reactive defense systems, these can certainly be compared with those of the threat that is encountered. (Reference value: For a plate energy of approximately 1 MJ, approximately 1 kg of explosives are required for acceleration).

The so-called specifi is of particular importance in this context surface mass or the factor "equivalent" steel mass / actually be required steel mass per surface element (Em factor). It is a measure of the ef efficiency (mass) of armor.

The mentioned reactive armor with a larger surface area are although with favorable end ballistic dimensioning over the with inert special material achievable values, however, it should be for a realistic estimate at least some of those specifically required for the use of reactive elements Masses (fasteners, webs, etc.) are taken into account. This um depending on the point of view, the Em factor is reduced for large-area ele ment or unfavorable interpretations such that a mass-efficient and therefore meaningful use is questioned.

When using relatively small but highly effective defense elements (AR), how they are proposed with this invention, however, result relatively favorable mass coefficients. Because on the one hand only masses are accelerated that come into effect immediately, the other are the so-called dead or Loss masses due to the small modules and the low structural loads comparatively low when shot.

Another problem that is technically very difficult to solve is reactive Orders to detonate a particular flat element limit without further damage or even a sympathetic detonation of the order to give protective elements. This fact, connected with the Demand for the longest possible exposure to the floor, this be is the size of the defense plates, and the very large energy of the Defensive elements has the consequence that such systems primarily as so-called called modular reactive protection elements to protect the outer surface of the applied to the vehicles.

A number of disadvantages and limitations when using uncontrolled reactive armouring can be caused by the transition to spark ignition reactive protective elements can be avoided. However, this must be sufficient precise information regarding the time and location of the persons to be defended Known threat. These are controlled by sensors and downstream Calculator determined. If this is guaranteed, significantly smaller areas for the defense units are realized. Such sensor-based systems are commonly referred to as active.  

Another important aspect for the use of such systems is in their sensitivity to interference or targeted countermeasures. These can be attacked by small threats (machines cannon) with the aim of a flat release or in the fire with Tandem - shot.

The relatively small areas of the solution proposed in this invention are us counter these conceivable countermeasures. Furthermore, with always comparably low structural loads two or more defense elements be accelerated (e.g. for redundancy or multiple control). Furthermore the areal "small" acceleration systems are relatively well protected, e.g. B. by means of protective elements or protective covers made by splinters or small ones bullets are not penetrated.

But even the penetration of a fragment or projectile into a certain one Depth does not reduce the effectiveness of the defense elements. Because just theirs Spark ignition makes them opposite to an accidental or smaller one Insensitive to the desired trigger.

In any case, only relatively small defense effective areas are used, even with one This failure is out of function, an essential argument for use smallest possible defense elements and in particular for the possibility of on set of redundant systems.

Because of the ever increasing threat of more powerful penetrato ren with regard to impact geometry and kinetic or chemical energy and especially the values to be expected in the foreseeable future, e.g. B. is at KE- Ammunition an increase from approximately 8 MJ to 15 MJ and more were conceivable Developed concepts that match the threat with defense elements allow to take place outside of the objects to be protected. This is achieved with so-called "distance-effective" protective elements. Such Systems are used by basic research in particular by the German French research institute (ISL) proposed since the mid-80s. Corresponding experiments with KE ammunition against HL ammunition are also already in progress known. Since the distance-effective protective elements a certain time before If the threat must be activated, it requires a corresponding appropriate sensors in connection with a control and a triggering device.

Coming as acceleration media for active or distance-effective systems primarily explosives. Likewise, for a number of years ren also electromagnetic acceleration devices in the basic form researched. On the other hand, sensor-controlled systems open up the Possibility to use acceleration systems that take longer to initiate than with pure explosives. Here are deflagrating systems and certain propellant powder structures of importance. Are the ignition delay times with explosives in the order of a few microseconds (µs), see above for deflagrating systems they are currently in the order of 100 500 µs. As deflagrating components come e.g. B. porous hexogen wax Mixtures or classic LOVA powder in question. Deflagrating systems will has also been fundamentally examined in the ISL for a long time.  

When using propellant powder (TLP) is with a minimal amount of time for calculate the ignition process in the order of 1000 µs. The efficiency of deflagrating systems as well as superstructures with TLP as attachment So the fuel depends crucially on a precise ignition and one uniform ignition. That this is possible and that with such systems, speeds of several 100 m / s can also be reached, was demonstrated years ago in the ISL.

A combination of electromagnetic accelerations is also a hybrid drive supply and additional chemical energy conceivable, e.g. B. by using substances sensitive to pressure such as perchlorates (e.g. potassium perchlorate). Here is due to the mechanical launch load of the defense element to Be perchlorate powder on the ground (in Pot) of the protective element or between the two coils initiated spontaneously: This generates a large amount of gas, which the defense element in the ejector cup too additionally accelerated. Future-oriented hybrid drives are also conceivable where, for example, a plasma as a drive medium by electrical energy gie is generated.

Regarding a technical application in armored structures, Be acceleration systems based on detonating explosives outgoing disadvantage. They always cause a shock load. With that the dynamic flow limits of the immediately surrounding plant are inevitable substances exceeded, so that there are permanent deformations. Farther are very large loads on the surrounding, but also in such systems of the supporting structure cannot be avoided. This requires compensation in the As a rule, considerable additional masses, which correspond to the gain in protection Reduce. At the same time, this makes it technically sensible to accelerate Mass limited or determined.

The shock load can be mitigated when using explosives by adding "thinning" components (inert powder, PU foam Etc.). This means that the plastic deformation in the near area can be particularly effective higher speeds of the defense elements can hardly be prevented, however is this with optimal design and coordination of speeds and Limit masses clearly. With such measures, however, the Zün the explosive mixture difficult.

A number of proposals are known for reducing the protective measures to use "active armor" for vehicles and ships. Basically Such protection systems are characterized in that the incoming loading Defense mass is threatened. A focus of this over Laying lies on the triggering of shaped charges (e.g. DE 9 77 984) or Cutting charges (US 3,895,368) perpendicular to the direction of the threat. Other Protection systems directly provide explosive charges for defense (e.g. DE 9 78 036).

However, the basic principle here is that relatively solid bodies, such as balancing projectiles, by shaped charges, cutting charges or by the explosion of explosives can hardly be adversely affected and can in no way be significantly destroyed.  

A second type of such proposals can be summarized by who that also to ward off KE threats in relation to the penetrator diameter of relatively large areas (armor plates) laterally against penetrating Projectiles are accelerated. As examples, the patents DE 29 06 378 C1 and DE 27 19 150 C1. The same applies to all such solutions common that the moving plates also with respect to the protective dimensions constitute an integral part of the armor. In addition to the fact that the Be acceleration of such large masses is associated with the greatest problems the protective balance (efficiency) even against the simplest inert protective structures in any case worse if they are required for such constructions Dead masses are taken into account. Also is an acceleration with Explosives do not avoid the impacted edges of the moving Plates are significantly plastically deformed. It is also easy to estimate that the protective plates given energy or the impulse given at least in the order of the projectile energy or the projectile impulse ses lie. If anything, such concepts can only be used once in action occur, especially after an interaction in which only a relatively small mass fraction the flying heavy armor plates usually come into effect also have to be caught again. All of these points allow such con scepters seem unrealistic.

Another protective device against an approaching projectile is from DE 195 05 629 A1 known, in the sling plate modules no longer directly from the structure of the vehicle to be protected, but rather in a stem attached to the forehead of a main battle tank the. When the protection module is triggered, the two become heavy protection plates flung in the opposite direction, only one of the two Protection plates come into interaction. This does make the reaction forces largely reduced to the armored vehicle structure, but the mass balance is due to the high dead masses (stem, second sling plate) very bad.

Other known proposals deal with controlled, reactive tanks gene, as shown for example in the patent DE 44 40 120 A1. The We Here too, as in the case of simple reactive arrangements, which occurs be initiated by the threat itself, by a flat against the side Threat accelerated disk. This principle basically requires a size armor angle of attack, combined with larger air gaps as freedom of movement for the reactive components.

The solution specified in DE 44 40 120 A1 is also for reactive Systems unfavorable, because here the blasted off plates are considerable counter would need masses. Also, the reactive elements should only be against one already disassembled floor, which significantly reduces the overall efficiency is reduced. So there is no positive relationship between effort and benefit nis.

Basically, disruptive elements should be positioned as far as possible from the space or object to be protected, since the subsequent flight path (deflection path) of the disturbed penetrator is of great importance for efficiency due to the continued lateral movement. With large distances between the defense element / feature threat in front of the structure in the order of a few penetrator lengths, e.g. B. 2 to 5 m based on the 120 mm DM 33 (L _{pe nefrator} = 505 mm), is to be expected with such large projectile _impairments that the subsequent armor structure can be carried out much easier. With smaller distances between the defense element / threat and follow structure in the order of magnitude of a penetrator length or less, the interaction between the defense element and the downstream armor plays an increasing role as the distance decreases, since both components are practically simultaneously engaged with the penetrator.

In known active protective arrangements, the interference elements or their facilities mostly behind relatively massive pre-armor or behind upstream multi-plate armor, such as in DE 44 40 120 A1 shown. However, this makes the overall effectiveness and only this is decisive dend, basically reduced, since the upstream armor only classic achieve protective performance values. First use the penetrator distance or the HL beam dissipating, distance effective and smallest possible Chen protective elements in connection with an adapted, passive follow-up vehicle tion enhances the effective protection performance of overall armor the dead masses for the distance-effective component.

There is little impact on threats that are already broken or that have already been created difficult to control efficiently and in terms of time and location. It is also to be considered realize that different threats from different directions each penetrate through armor completely differently according to speed.

This basically means that a protective element effective from a distance to one protective structure or should be arranged in front of a main armor. Just then it is ensured that the defense element is still largely unzero disrupted threat and thus can have an optimal effect. At approve Neter shape of the armored vehicle or angle of attack in the Seitenbe rich (flank angle) can ensure a polyvalent mode of action the total armor the distance-effective protective element behind one be positioned thin buckling device. This ensures a high level of protection against heavy hollow loads or tandem HL.

Another crucial characteristic for the quality of a protective arrangement be stands in its range of use. So the solutions known so far are mostly up very specific positions, e.g. B. tied to armored vehicles, which the like z. T. extremely heavy or large impulses active or right can wear active protection systems at all. With that, they're usually up limited the vehicle bow area. But this is especially the case with armored vehicles Vehicles of all weight classes not only the smaller area proportion of one Armor, but is also special due to the spatial possibilities well with conventional technologies, e.g. B. to protect purely passively.

It is therefore the subject of this invention, a practicable and simple loading Acceleration device for distance-effective protective elements to sheep fen that with relatively little effort a very effective defense against the threat can be achieved by KE, HL, and EFP projectiles. The characteristics, details  The advantages and advantages result from the patent claims, the wording of which Reference is made to the content of the description, and based on the Drawings. Here show:

Fig. 1 shows a schematic view of a vehicle with the use of areas for active protection elements against KE and HL;

Fig. 1. 1 schematic view of a vehicle with the area of use for distance-effective protective elements against EFP;

Fig. 2 arrangement and paths of the defense elements against HL and KE;

Fig. 2.1 arrangement and paths of the defense elements against EFP;

Fig. 3 is schematic representation of the interaction between defense element and a KE-projectile;

Fig. 4 vector diagrams for rotating and counter-rotating protection elements;

Fig. 5 geometric shapes of possible AWE;

FIG. 5.1A numerical 3D simulation of a cylindrical defensive element and a KE penetrator to the beginning of the interaction;

Fig. 5.1B numerical 3D simulation of the cylindrical defensive element and KE penetrator by the interaction of AR and penetrator;

FIG. 5.2A diagram for pressure-speed characteristic at the embodiment of a disc-shaped defensive element during variation of the disks diameter,

Fig. 5.2B diagram for pressure-speed characteristic at the embodiment of a disc-shaped defensive element for variation of the material from the Defense element (density)

Fig. 6 outline structure of various acceleration units;

Fig. 7 basic guidance of defense elements during acceleration;

Fig. 8 is a basic representation of the volume increase in the movement of a AWE;

Fig. 9 accelerator unit with a sealing zone and Abdeckbeispielen;

Fig. 10 basic representation of sealing concepts for flat defense elements;

Fig. 11 sealing concepts for rotation body;

FIG. 12 is a basic representation of modular drive elements;

FIG. 13 is a basic representation of single or multiple ejection systems;

Fig. 14 views of multiple ejection systems;

FIG. 15 is schematic diagram of a defensive element with integrated elements;

Fig. 16 Schematic diagram of an optionally switchable defense system.

Fig. 17 3D numerical simulation of interaction of a beam-shaped defensive element and a KE penetrator at a short distance of the AWE front of a solid steel armor plate.

Figs. 1A, 1B, and 1G in Fig. 1 show schematic side views of a ge armored vehicle 1 with the different areas of application distance more slowly more protection elements inside and outside the structure.

In Fig. 1A, the inner work area of distance effective devices, e.g. B. within the vehicle bow area 2 , shown. It is triggered by a bow sensor 5 a for the inner area or by contact.

Fig. 1B identifies the immediate detection close range 3 of armor with distance-effective elements and the sensors 5 b (roof sensor for the close range) and 5 c (bow sensor for the close range).

Fig. 1C shows the subsequent vehicle distant region 4, which is sampled d here of a suitable roof sensor 5. Of course, this task can also be performed by several sensors.

In Fig. 1.1 the possible threat area of a vehicle in the roof area is indicated by EFP or shaped charge missiles. Triggering takes place here via appropriately arranged sensors 5 e.

Figs. 2A, 2B and 2C in FIG. 2 show the respective paths of the stand from effective protection elements (AWE).

The bow area 6 is determined by the upper front surface 7 a and lower front surface 7 b. The end of the combat area in which the team is located is formed by an oblique or vertical passive (inert) basic protection 13 . The possible paths 12 of the inner defense elements 11 are determined by the geometry of the front surfaces 7 a, 7 b and the base protection 13 and can run obliquely according to the respective contour or vertically. The arrangement in the bow area can thus be made very variable and thus optimally adapted to the needs of the respective passive armor.

At the bow side area 9 or tower front area 8 or tower side area 10 , the basic arrangement of distance-effective protective elements 14 with their possible tracks 15 to ward off a threat in the near-contour vehicle area 3 or area 4 remote from the vehicle is shown. The threat from Ge bullets, missiles or warheads can be directly from the front 16 a, from the side 16 b or from above 16 c.

In Fig. 2.1 the possible defense against an explosively shaped projectile (arrow 16 c in the sketch) is sketched by a distance-effective defense element 14 or the external defense trajectory 15 . Such a distance-effective protection system can also be used to combat missiles that attack in the so-called top attack (the object from above) very well.

In the following considerations according to FIG. 3, a vertical interaction between the defense element 20 and a KE penetrator 18 (threat) is assumed. Actually occurring angles (inclination or inclination of the armor) are to be dealt with in a first approximation by transmission using the Gosinus law. There are shown in FIG. 3A two times three options regarding. The interaction angle.

The defense element 20 moves in the direction of the threat 18 with a component in the direction of flight 21 of the threat ( 17 ac from above, 17 bc from below) or with a component against the direction of flight 21 of the threat ( 17 aa from above, 17 ba from below ). The third possibility is vertical impact ( 17 from above, 17 bb from below).

In Fig. 3B, the case is shown (17 bb) for a vertical interaction, wherein the speed with which the defensive element 20 runs into the penetrator 18 side is set to be large (greater than 0.2 to 0.3 V _penetrator) . It is therefore only a certain penetrator length 18 b punched out. Due to the inertia of the residual penetrator, the remaining pieces of the projectile 18 a / 18 c remain in their original flight axis. The end ballistic performance is only reduced approximately according to the punched-out penetrator length 18 b.

Fig. 3G shows the case in which the transverse speed of the Abwehrele element 20 is too small (less than 0.1 to 0.15 V _penetrator ). There is only a slight deflection ( 19 , α. Depending on the direction of movement of the defense element 20 , the penetrator 18 can even be set in the direction of the target normal of a downstream inclined armor, so that the slight gain in protection performance due to the slight inclination of the penetrator improves somewhat penetration could still be compensated.

In these considerations, however, both directions are always towards the threat take into account, as in connection with the following (usually employed armor) there are different effective angles of impact.

The vector diagrams in FIG. 4 show this relationship for a running protection element and an opposing protection element for a system "stationary defense element" and a system "stationary floor".

In the inner Defense tracks 12 shown in FIG. 2A are still in principle all 6 Be wegungsrichtungen defense elements 11 conceivable, while the outer webs 15 of the defensive elements 14 only a single direction of movement is useful for the close to the vehicle or vehicle region remote from the threat.

When it comes to the ballistic effect of the AWE against penetrating or penetrating penetrators, a distinction must be made between two cases:

• a.) the threat (projectile, penetrator) penetrates the reactive / distance effective same protective device,
• b.) the defense element acts laterally on a specific threat Position.

Case a.) Requires a relatively high lateral velocity of the AR, since the penetrating head penetrates a significantly larger crater knife than its diameter itself (e.g. 2D penetrator). So that since AWE with its crater rim is a very quickly penetrating projectile can still interfere effectively at all, whereby it is as far as possible in front of the pro attack jectile, it must be correspondingly fast. Simple kinematic Considerations show that at floor speeds of 1500 m / s to 2000 m / s lateral speeds of the defense elements of several 100 m / s are required become.

In case b.), The defense element acts immediately after contact with the penetrator. It must be taken into account here that there is a sufficient deflection force (transverse force) is fathered. It is particularly important to ensure that a penetrator to be disturbed as quickly as possible, d. H. in the front area, is disturbed or distracted, so its greatest possible transient deformation or deflection and thus reduction the breakthrough performance is achieved.

Kinematic considerations show that certain Late speeds are required. At the current and expected in the future The threats must be at least 150 m / s, better still 200 m / s go.

In addition to the lateral force, the lateral force causing a deflection is rapid the area and density of the defense element is crucial. In addition, the The length of the AR can be limited to avoid dead mass. To achieve one good ratio of effort to effect (efficiency) or a large em- Only masses that are intended for direct distraction or acceleration may be accelerated Damage to the penetrator may be required.

According to the previous considerations and simulation calculations carried out in the ISL Defense elements in the speed range between 150 m / s and 500 m / s then reliably a high deflection effect or deformation be aimed if their mass with a favorable geometry in size is of the order of 1 to 2 penetrator masses, d. H. to ward off large caliber KE threats require masses of the AR between 4 and 10 kg.

The geometrical bodies shown in FIG. 5, which fundamentally meet these conditions, are preferably to be used as active elements (AWE).

In Fig. 5A an AWE as a flat cuboid 30 with width B _Qua 30 a, height H _Qua 30 b and length L _Qua 30 C.

In Fig. 5B a bar 31 as AWE with width B _Ba 31 a, height H _Ba 31 b and length L _Ba 32 G.

A cylinder 32 according to FIG. 5G as AWE has the diameter D _Zyl 32 a and the 5 length L _Zyl 32 b.

The following apply to the geometric dimensions of a disk 33 according to FIG. 5D as AWE: height H _Sch 33 a and diameter D _Sch 33 b.

The main geometric features for sufficient interaction with the penetrator and thus high efficiency are:

With cuboid 30 :
H _Qua ≈ 1.5-2. D _penetrator H _Qua <L _Qua B _Qua z. B. H _Qua ≈ L / 2, B / 2 to L / 4, B / 4 L _Qua , B _Qua 3-8. D _penetrator
With bar 31 :
L _Ba ≈ 5-10. D _penetrator B _Ba , H _Ba ≈ 2. D _penetrator
For cylinder 32 :
D _cyl ≈ 1.5-2. D _penetrator L _cyl ≈ 4-6. D _penetrator
For disc 33 :
D _Sch ≈ 4-6. D _penetrator H _Sch ≈ 1.5-2. D _penetrator

These geometric specifications are sufficient to generate a sufficiently large one Shear force necessary, with the cross-section laterally loading the penetrator must have at least the same basis weight (per longitudinal unit) as the Penetrator itself, so that a sufficient shear force is available in the the period of time can be exercised.

If the penetrator position is the decisive defense criterion, ei ne sufficiently large lateral deflection distance after exposure to the defense element are available. Under the diversion line is the Understand distance that the deflecting element perpendicular after the start of contact towards the direction of movement of the threat as it passes travels. If a sufficient cross-sectional load is observed, this is Entity point for the performance of a protective or defense element outgoing.

Ensuring a given collision point depends equally of a sufficiently precise detection as well as of a precise and sufficient appropriate acceleration of the active body. The detection should be sufficient are precisely presupposed and is not the subject of this invention. Very however, it is important to achieve a certain speed of defense elements at the collision point.  

Through calculations carried out in the meantime in the ISL using the numeri It was possible to demonstrate that the proposed 3D simulation distance-effective protective elements with appropriately set interaction speed to a decisive deformation or breakage and thus Significant performance degradation from those striking at high speed or penetrating penetrators are suitable.

In Fig. 5.1A, the case for a certain, optimally set transverse speed, in this case 200 m / s, and a cylinder 32 as a defense element at the moment of interaction is shown as the starting point for the 3D simulation calculation that was carried out in the ISL . The pentrator speed is 1800 m / s. The mass of the cylindrical AWE corresponds to the mass of the projectile.

Fig. 5.1B demonstrates in an impressive manner the result of the calculation of the deformation of the penetrator 18 , the load limits of the penetrator material, which was given here as high-strength tungsten heavy metal (1800 N / mm ² ), being clearly exceeded in the middle region. This leads to a subsequent disassembly of the penetrator into several fragments, which due to the dynamic deflection of the pentrator also have different target positions in a downstream inert base armor.

In order to achieve the desired end ballistic effect, the appropriate ones Materials for the distance-effective protective elements (AR) can be selected. Here are due to the fixed drive parameters such as pressure and drive area or acceleration path the density of the materials with the achievable Ab gearing speed closely linked.

For a given geometry of the drive and the acceleration energy read Defense elements made of light weight with the same geometric dimensions Accelerate material such as GRP, aluminum or titanium faster and to the ge bring the desired speed of interaction. However, it must then be checked whether z. B. in the case of massive balancing projectiles, the mass or density of the AR to Er generation of a sufficient shear force and thus deformation of the penetrator is sufficient. Such materials are preferably laterally more sensitive for defense Deploy threats.

Endballistically very effective materials such as tungsten heavy metal (WS) enriched uranium (DU) or armored steel, on the other hand, reach langsa mere speeds, but achieve high due to their mass or density Shear forces and are therefore used to ward off massive threats such as KE bullets of high performance are particularly suitable.

Under the postulate of a required AWE mass of about 1 to 2 penetrator masses and the necessary speed range for the interaction of 100 to 500 m / s, the conditions for the drive unit of the AWE and the required material are narrowly limited. For the case of 120 mm DM 33 ammunition with a pentrator diameter of about 25 mm and a penetrator mass of 4.3 kg, the volume required for a defense element (e.g. cuboid, bar, cylinder, disc) is calculated according to the above statements from about 300 to 600 cm ³ . From the required mass of 1 to 2 penetrator masses (4.3 to 8.6 kg) there is a lower limit of 7 to 14 g / cm ³ for the required material density of the AWE material. The low-density materials are therefore ruled out if you want to give preference to the smallest possible defense elements. Hard tempered steel is probably the most suitable material for the defense elements (price).

In FIGS. 5.2A and 5.2B of this basic relationship is shown for one of chosen example a little closer.

The first diagram 5.2A shows the exit speed v of a defense element as a function of a constant working pressure p in the drive system. The example of a defense element in disk-shaped form for the interception process of the 120 mm DM 33 ( _penetrator ≈ 25 mm) was calculated. Simplified, a uniformly accelerated movement over the entire drive path (corresponding to H _Sch ) was _assumed . According to the above geometric features for high efficiency, 3 possible diameters of 4, 5 and 6 penetrator diameters (D _Sch = 100, 125 and 150 mm) and the average height of 1.75 penetrator diameters (H _Sch = 43.75 mm) given. From these geometric variables, the course of the AWE speed v shown in diagram 5.2 A is obtained as a function of the constant drive pressure p and as a function of the disk diameter D _Sch . The respective acceleration times are in the order of 0.4 to 0.5 ms with the necessary minimum speed of 100 m / s and 0.1 to 0.2 ms in the high speed range. The required minimum densities ρ for the end-ballistic material of the disk-shaped defense elements are between 5.6 and 12.5 g / cm ³ , depending on the disk diameter.

The second diagram 5.2B shows the values for different AWE materials with different densities. A disk-shaped defense element with 5 penetrator diameters (D _Sch = 125 mm) was used as a basis. From the speed required for effective vertical interaction in this case from 150 to 300 m / s and the required AWE mass of approx. 4.3 kg, it follows that only steel and tungsten heavy metal (WS) or end ballistic materials are used a density between these two materials would be suitable for defense against the 120 mm DM 33 (hatched area). This only applies to this selected case of a disk-shaped defense element.

Larger defense elements that would allow the use of light materials due to the above geometric conditions for the AR larger drive area. This could cause ignition problems or it is a proper, reproducible departure position of the AWE schwie guarantee (tilting etc.).

The required precision of the trajectory of a defense element for compliance the specified collision point also requires smaller protective elements a very precise starting position and, above all, a reprodu Accelerated acceleration to achieve the same flight times.

This results in an imperative for the optimal design and the structure of the acceleration units and is the subject of this invention.  

From the known circumstances for the very fast acceleration of Shot in cannons can be deduced that especially in the case of a pyro technical drive a good sealing of the drive room is absolutely necessary will be. Furthermore, the optimal guidance of the defense elements during the highly dynamic acceleration phase of great importance.

In FIG. 6, the basic structure of various acceleration units is shown with the various drive media.

Fig. 6A shows an ARC 20 in the defense unit 34. Explosives serve as the drive medium, in this case a thin explosive film 35 . There is a transmission or damping layer 36 between the AR and this film. The ignition device 37 receives the ignition signal via the transmission line 38 .

In Fig. 6B, a technological solution for the future is outlined, for example, a working fluid is generated as a plasma 39 by a corresponding power suppliers 44 in the.

Fig. 6G shows the case of electromagnetic acceleration to a primary coil 40 and the secondary coil 41. A pressure-sensitive chemical drive medium 45 could possibly also be arranged between the two coils 40 , 41 (hybrid drive).

In Fig. 6D a structure is outlined, in which chemical energy suppliers 42 with egg ner implementation speed below the detonation speed of explosives (deflagrating explosives, very fast powder mixtures) are arranged in the drive room. The rapid energy conversion takes place after the ignition with the aid of a transfer or booster charge 43 .

The basic management of acceleration units is shown in FIG. 7. The case of a step-shaped or piston-shaped defense element 51 is outlined in FIG. 7A. The piston part 52 is located in the base plate 49 a, the drive space 53 below it. The entire AWE 51 is seated in a sensor 50 on the outer surface of the defense unit.

In contrast, in FIG. 7B a disk-shaped defense element 54 is sketched in the corresponding base plate 49 b and pick-up device 50 .

Both concepts differ in the different volume increases after ignition and thus the working pressure or the drive power.

FIG. 8A outlines the volume increase 56 after a small movement of the AWE in the work area according to FIG. 7A. However, the upper volume is still without gas pressure and therefore does not contribute to the drive. Only after passing the lower edge of the piston part 52 on the transducer 50 does the actual spontaneous increase in volume occur with the corresponding effects on gas pressure and drive power. Such a stepped piston concept is very variable in terms of working pressure and drive power over the length of the piston part 52 and the diameter ratio of the defense element 51 to the piston 52 .

Accordingly, the volume increase 57 runs linearly with the movement of the disk-shaped defense element 54 with its movement, as shown in FIG. 8B.

In Fig. 9 an acceleration unit according to the invention with a sealing zone and coverage examples is shown. The AWE 20 is located in the defense module 60 and is surrounded by a sealing and guiding element 61 . The drive room 53 is located below the AWE 20 . The AWE 20 can be provided with a lid / cover 62 which is fastened to the housing of the defense module 60 by means of screw fastening 63 and is centered in the AWE 20 via two bores 64 . Of course, other cover options are also conceivable, for example a flat cover 65 , which simultaneously acts as a seal and is glued or vulcanized on.

In Fig. 10 examples according to the invention for sealing concepts of the AR are given to.

Here, in Fig. 10A, a defense module 70 with a sealing strip 69 at AWE, in Fig. 10B, a module 71 with sealing rings 76, 77 shown at the AWE. According to FIG. 10G, other solutions consist in a defense module 72 in which the AR has a lateral sealing surface 78 or, as shown in FIG. 10D, a defense module 73 with an AR and sealing lip 79 . Further sealing concepts include a bottom seal 80 at the AR in accordance with Fig. 10E in the defense module 74 or a combined side floor seal according to FIG. 10F and defense module 75.

Other examples of sealing concepts and rotationally symmetrical defense elements, for example cylinders, are outlined in FIG. 11.

In the example according to FIG. 11A, the sealing is carried out, for example, by a sealing strip 86 in the case of a cylindrical defense element or by a sealing ring in the case of a rotationally shaped AWE (ball). In Fig. 11 B, the seal is made via a contour of the defense element adapted, flat bottom seal 87th In contrast to the sealing strip according to FIG. 11A, a lateral flat seal 88 is sketched in FIG. 11G. Fig. 11D shows the case of a circumferential seal 89, through which any position of the cylindrical defensive element is made possible.

According to FIG. 12, there are various drive options which, depending on the drive concept and the resulting structural load, lead to different designs.

In Fig. 12A is once a defense member 91 with a planar integral Antriebsein 97 shown and, for comparison, a cup-shaped AWE 92 3 Antriebseinhei th 95th

The defense element 92 is sketched in FIG. 12B in a multiple arrangement, in which it was indicated that the respective left or right neighboring region 93 of the AWE 92 could be designed to be shock-proof by means of webs or buffer elements 94 .

Analogous to FIG. 12B, a multiple arrangement is sketched in FIG. 12G, in which a defense element 98 is accelerated by 6 cup-shaped drive units.

Fig. 13 shows an example of possibilities for the design of direct uptake of Defense modules in an armor or structure.

The simplest way is to accommodate a defense element 20 or the corresponding defense module in a sack lock, a hole or milling 100 in part of the armor structure 99 according to FIG. 13A. The arrangement in a shock-absorbing material, for example GRP or rubber, is particularly advantageous.

An inexpensive arrangement is shown in FIG. 13B, in which the defense modules 102 are accommodated in a perforated plate 101 . This perforated plate 101 is arranged, for example, in front of or on a base armor 103 .

Another design option is shown in Fig. 13G, in which the weir element 20 is laterally supported or buffered by a sleeve 104 . Even with such measures, the reactions in the highly dynamic acceleration process can be greatly limited locally with a suitable choice of material.

Analogously to FIG. 13, views of planar defense units are shown in FIG. 14. In Fig. 14A, the round receptacles 102 are each lined by the round sleeve 104 , in Fig. 14B this is sketched for a quadrangular receptacle 108 with a quadrangular sealing and guide sleeve 107 . The mounting plate for the accelerator unit and the AWE can also be formed by a perforated plate 106 with quadrangular holes or, for example, from webs and strips.

A bar with integrated defense elements is shown in FIG. 15 as a defense element 31 . In the left-hand arrangement, an active body 20 a is inserted which should differ as much as possible from the material of the support beam 31 with regard to its properties. In the middle arrangement, two active bodies 20 b are integrated in the support beam 31 , so that the overflowing penetrator 18 is practically hit simultaneously by the two inserted bodies 20 b at different locations. In the example on the right, the bar contains two defense elements 20 c arranged one behind the other.

The last two options in particular result from those specified in the ISL 3D simulation calculations showed a significant improvement in the effect of defensive defense elements.

Another very interesting defense option is the arrangement shown in Fig. 16 of two or more mutually inclined drive units, which can be ignited individually or together, so that the defense elements 20 are accelerated individually or together in different directions. With such an arrangement, the most diverse threats, e.g. B. Tandem projectiles, combat effectively. A single penetrator can also be acted upon with defense elements several times with a suitably coordinated firing order and angular position.

Since a variety of possible uses are conceivable, in which the distance effective protective element at a relatively short distance from the next pan is moved, this case is of particular end ballistic interest. Because it is to be expected that an optimally disturbed penetrator, which with a certain lateral component penetrates into the successor structure (armor) is destroyed by this structure in a particularly small space. Here, for. B. the space required for reactive armor to deflect the pen trators virtually replaced by a high density deflection medium.

The 3D simulation calculations shown in FIGS. 17A to 17G, also carried out in the ISL, confirm the high efficiency of such a protective combination, even with a vertical structure. With an inclined protection arrangement, this effect will be intensified.

The deflection of a cylindrical penetrator made of tungsten Heavy metal through interaction with a bar-shaped defense element, which at 200 m / s at a distance corresponding to the beam width in front of a homogeneous one armor is moved at three different times. The targets speed of the WS penetrator is 1800 m / s. The values for height, width and length of the AWE made of high-hard steel is 2 or 8 Ge lap diameter. The RHA armor is 5 penetrator thick.

At the time of the simulation result shown in FIG. 17A, a lateral disturbance of the penetrator as a result of the interaction with the AR is already known, the projectile having been subjected to the beam-shaped defense element approximately vertically since it hit the armor plate.

In Fig. 17B, the penetrator is just passing the defense element. The dynamics of the lateral disruption caused by the AWE were significantly enhanced in the armor, so that the penetrator broke and the fragments were tilted.

In Fig. 17G to detect the comparatively very large crater (corresponding to a high proportion of deprived projectile energy) in the armor steel plate, as well as the complete destruction of the penetrator on the relatively short flight distance.

The position of the AWE is of particular importance. Because it follows from the time sequences and representations according to FIGS . 17A to 17G that the defense element in this calculation example has given all of its energy to the penetrator and has practically come to rest. In view of the structural load caused by the AWE, this is an optimal condition that can never be achieved with large, moving protective elements.

Through the technology presented with this invention in connection with the Proposed technical solutions are protective elements with effective distance elements with end ballistic optimized masses with sufficient precision table cheap and thus with the least possible structural load to be accelerated nigen.

Claims (36)

1. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements to ward off threats from KE-HL or EFP ammunition in the front, side, or roof area of armored and unarmored objects, in defense elements (AR) from a container / housing highly dynamic accelerated who, characterized in that the devices each form a closed unit and the mass of the defense elements is of the order of magnitude (one to two times) the mass of the threat to be warded off and the speed of the defense elements is approximately 100 to 500 m / s. 2. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements Claim 1 characterized, that the defense elements by chemical, mechanical or pneumatic drives are accelerated. 3. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements Claim 1 characterized, that the defense elements are accelerated by hybrid drives. 4. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that two or more defense elements by at least two against one another Drive angle enclosing drive systems in different directions be inclined. 5. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the triggering of the drives one or more depending on the Bedro Contact or detector controlled (cascade connection). 6. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements before or on the main structure to be protected (main armor).   7. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements within a protective, structured overall armor. 8. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements directly into the protective structure (armor) are integrated. 9. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements as an insert for the structure (armor) to be protected is implemented. 10. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements with the fol structure (main armor) a coordinated and effect-optimized unit bil the. 11. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements turn, swivel, or are tiltable. 12. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are properly arranged are net and controlled by detectors. 13. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the defense elements cuboid, beam, cylinder, or disc-shaped body are. 14. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements Claim 13, characterized, that the height of a cuboid defense element prefers the 0.5 to Double the value and the length and width of the cuboid in each case approximately the 4 to 6 times the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P-charge).   15. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements Claim 13, characterized, that the length of a bar-shaped defense element prefers the 5 to 10 times the value and the width and height of the bar each about 2 times Value of the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P charge). 16. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements Claim 13, characterized, that the length of a cylindrical defense element prefers the 4 to 6 times the value and the diameter of the cylinder approximately 0.5 to 2 times Value of the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P charge). 17. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements Claim 13, characterized, that the height of a disk-shaped defense element preferably 0.5 to 2 times the value and the diameter of the disc approximately 4 to 6 times the value of the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P charge). 18. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the interaction mass of a defense element in the Magnitude of the basis mass of the threat is. 19. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the material of the defense element has a high end ballistic lei stung owns. 20. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element wholly or partly from a light metal or its Alloy. 21. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element be made entirely or partially of titanium or its alloy stands. 22. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element be made entirely or partially of fiber-reinforced plastics stands.   23. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element wholly or partially from a sintered or pure There is high density metal. 24. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element wholly or partly from a brittle metal or brittle metal compound of high density. 25. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element consists entirely or partially of a steel of high hardness. 26. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element from a mixture of materials according to the claims 20 to 25 exists. 27. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element consists of a laminated or fibrous structure. 28. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element is constructed in one or more parts. 29. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the defense element is fragmented. 30. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective defense elements according to one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element wholly or partially from individual elements or fragments is constructed. 31. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that a defense element consists of a structure into which one or more are separated protective elements with material that diverges strongly from the structure properties (e.g. density, strength) are integrated.   32. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the defense elements in several stages or with changing diameters (col ben-shaped). 33. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the sealing of the defense elements by means of a sealing strip, sealing ring, sealing surfaces or sealing lips. 34. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the sealing and guiding device is provided with a cover. 35. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that the seal and guide on the drive side, in the middle, on the cover side or combined he follows. 36. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements one or more of the preceding claims, characterized, that there is a transfer between the working medium (explosives) and the defense element tion or damping layer.