CN1997147A - A method for content protection of the handset TV service - Google Patents
A method for content protection of the handset TV service Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN1997147A CN1997147A CNA2006101654130A CN200610165413A CN1997147A CN 1997147 A CN1997147 A CN 1997147A CN A2006101654130 A CNA2006101654130 A CN A2006101654130A CN 200610165413 A CN200610165413 A CN 200610165413A CN 1997147 A CN1997147 A CN 1997147A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- bak
- mobile
- content
- key
- rand
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Images
Landscapes
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
This invention relates to one cell phone television business content protection method, which comprises the following steps: a, the multi-media broadcast content provider codes the content by control words by system; b, sending the words to cell phone platform; c, the platform codes the words; d, sending the control words and terminal decodes to the provider; e, the said provider sends the content to the said terminal; f, decoding the content coded by the control words.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the communications field, relate in particular to a kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method.
Background technology
Along with development of Communication Technique, mobile communication carrier can provide based on the multimedia service of authorizing (subscription) to the user.The user who subscribes to can use this business, and does not have the user who subscribes to can not use this business.BroadCast MultiCast Service (BCMCS) is exactly to authorizing (subscription) user that a kind of business of broadcast/group broadcast is provided.
The network configuration of BCMCS as shown in Figure 1, content source (CS) provides content by a cellular system to BCMCS user.Content can be IP Multimedia Messages such as audio-visual data, or broadcast multimedia message.CS can be the part of service network, also can be an independent community.If the visit of BCMCS is based on subscription, so, content has only authorized users just can browse/handle this content after encrypting.CS can provide more than one BCMCS to one or several operators.The user can pass through its operator's subscribing service, or directly from the CS subscribing service.The entity of supporting the user to subscribe to is subscription manager (SM).The user can subscribe to more than one business by one or several SM.SM provides service authorization, and is an inherent part of BCMCS key management.
The security architecture of BCMCS as shown in Figure 2.
At first be the generation that broadcasting inserts key (BAK): (finishing before the Business Stream transmission of encrypting) BAK is by BCMCS_FLOW_ID and BAK_ID combination sign.
Login key RK of each self-configuring of 201 subscriber identification modules (UIM) and SM.This key RK will be the basis of BCMCS authentication and cipher key change.
202 BAK makers (BAKG) generate BAK, and this value and BAK_ID identifies and the out-of-service time (BAK_Expire) connects; BAK and corresponding BAK_ID and BAK_Expire are transferred into business cipher key (SK) manager (SKM) and BAK distributor (BAKD) together.BAK_ID is one and is used for discerning present which BAK to a specific effective sequence number of BCMCS multicast IP flows; BAK is by BCMCS_FLOW_ID and BAK_ID combination sign, and to a specific BAK, corresponding BAK_ID value is all the same to all users; BAK_Expire is used to represent when BAK expires.This can use the overdue time representation of BAK, or by the distance BAK remaining time representation that expires.Therefore, it is corresponding with a BAK to have a plurality of BAK_Expire values.Before the BAK_Expire time expired, terminal can be asked a new BAK value.Terminal comprises mobile device (ME) and UIM.
When BAK compares when not changing execution in step 203-step 207 with the previous decryption oprerations in the terminal; When inconsistent, new BAK of terminal to apply.
203 SKM produce SK by the random value of current BAK and SK_RAND.SKM reaches content-encrypt device (CE) to SK, SK_RAND, BAK_ID and BAK_Expire.
204 CS are sent to CE to multicast IP flows.
205 CE encrypt multicast IP flows with SK, and the multicast IP flows of encrypting is sent to terminal through service system.CE also is included in SK_RAND and BAK_ID in the multicast IP flows of encryption.
206 ME receive the multicast IP flows of encryption, and do following operation:
Do not change if BAK_ID and SK_RAND compare with SK_RAND with BAK_ID in the multicast IP flows of receiving at last, ME to the multicast IP flows deciphering, and reaches user's application to the result with the SK value of distributing to this multicast IP flows at present;
If BAK_ID or SK_RAND change, SK changes so, and at this moment ME asks a new SK from UIM, comprises BCMCS_FLOW_ID, BAK_ID and SK_RAND.
207 UIM produce SK by BAK and SK_RAND, and SK is sent back to mobile device (ME).ME deciphers multicast IP flows, and the result is reached user's application.
If during the new BAK of one of terminal to apply, a, b, c, d step in the execution graph:
A.ME sends out a BAK request to BAKD.This BAK request may comprise the authentication information based on RK.SM can use this information to determine that this request is from a legal users.
B. for BAK is delivered to UIM, BAK must be encrypted, in case it is received by non-target recipient.BAKD request SM produces temporary key (TK).BAKD is new TK of each BAK request.
C.SM produces TK by TK_RAND random value and RK.TK_RAND can be produced by BAKD or SM.SM delivers to BAKD to TK and TK_RAND.Then, SM abandons TK and TK_RAND.
D.BAKD encrypts BAK with TK, and the BAK that encrypts is delivered to UIM with TK_RAND, BAK_ID and BAK_Expire through ME.BAKD abandons TK and TK_RAND.UIM at first forms TK by TK_RAND and RK, with the BAK deciphering of TK to encrypting, draws BAK.UIM abandons TK and TK_RAND.BAK and relevant BAK_Expire value thereof are stored among the UIM.UIM should can store two BAK at least, so that obtained and store a new BAK before BAK expires.
Along with the development of digital communication technology, mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider begins to provide digital television service.Because the definition of Digital Television is more high than traditional simulated television, and can derive the business of many interactive classes, be subjected to affirming of consumer.
Fig. 3 has described the broadcasted content safety protection structure that adopts the CA system.Expressly programme content is through the control of CA condition receiving system, generate by the programme content of scrambling by encryption, scrambling and modulated process, the programme content of scrambling, Entitlement Control Message ECM and Entitlement Management Message EMM are issued to terminal receiving equipment agency by Web broadcast then, terminal receiving equipment agency and SIM or SMD cartoon are crossed the process of descrambling and are obtained control word, thereby solve programme content.
Relevant with the program stream condition receiving system have two data flow: Entitlement Control Message ECM (EntitleControl Message) and Entitlement Management Message EMM (Entitle Manage Message).Transmit in ECM by the control word (CW) after business cipher key SK (Service Key) encryption, also comprise program information such as program source, time, classifying content and program price among the ECM.The SK that CW is encrypted transmits in EMM, and SK will also comprise address, authorized user message through the encryption of individual subscriber distributing key PDK (PersonalDistribute Key) among the EMM before transmission.
A condition receiving system comprises two encryption subsystems, and one is the program encryption system, and the programme content that broadcasts is encrypted, and is called scrambling traditionally, and its effect is to upset programme signal, makes that unwarranted user can not the watching encrypted program.Another encryption system is the hierarchical encryption encryption system, its objective is to use closely linked level to encrypt the safety of protection CW.Scrambling to program, adopt DVB common scrambling algorithm, the algorithm that is based on key that this scrambling algorithm uses, control key is CW, in order to guarantee the safe and reliable of scrambling, CW changed once in common 5～10 seconds, and guarantee sufficient randomness, resist hacker's attack effectively,, thereby strengthened the versatility of receiving equipment because front end has adopted the common scrambling algorithm of standard, as long as receiving equipment has been equipped with same Descrambling Algorithms, and finished the CA system integration, promptly possessed the condition of watching scrambled program, if there is mandate can watch scrambled program.
And for the layered encryption technology, in cryptography, it has become a generally acknowledged mature technique.Wherein control word (CW) is used for the scrambled program content, this key is encrypted the back through SK and is sent user side to by ECM, and SK, PDK, IK (program issuer key) wait and use PDK, IK and PPK (individualized secret key) encryption then to send to user side by EMM according to this.At user's receiving terminal, receive in the control smart card and untie IK, PDK, SK, CW according to this according to opposite order, if the user has the mandate of watching program, will solve CW expressly, and send receiving equipment to, finish final descrambling work by receiving equipment.
Because the mobile communication equipment volume is little, can carry, and mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider and mobile communication carrier all will carry out new business, find new commercial opportunity, so mobile phone TV services are carried out in mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider and mobile communication carrier's enthusiastic cooperation.
Existing BCMCS security architecture only is applicable to the needs that the user subscribes to and program current cipher key is distributed when providing MBMS service in CDMA BCMCS system.BCMCS issues program by the CDMA broadcast channel, limited CDMA interface-free resources and IP transfer resource have greatly been taken, in order to guarantee the service quality of the basic voice conversation of CDMA, note and master data value-added service, the bandwidth of BCMCS broadcast channel and channel number are inevitable limited, and this will greatly influence the experience of user by the BCMCS mobile phone television viewing.
At present, generally the mobile TV implementation of being had an optimistic view of by industry is mobile radio communication and digital broadcast networks combination: mobile radio communication provides data uplink, realizes that the user subscribes to and the interactive VOD function; Digital broadcast networks provides the downlink broadcast of multimedia programming, does not take the mobile radio communication limited resources, and possesses the innate advantage of broadcasting, is not subjected to the number of users restriction, watches the effect clear and smooth.
When the mobile TV service was provided, existing C DMABCMCS security architecture can not satisfy the demands at cdma communication net and digital broadcast networks.In China, in general digital broadcast network can be responsible for building and operation by mobile TV/mobile multimedia broadcast system, mobile TV/mobile multimedia broadcast system can be cooperated with the mobile network of the multiple standard of how tame mobile operator, and the mobile TV service is provided.But, the encryption key of the TV programme of same channel can only have a cover (impossible a plurality of encryption keys, otherwise generate the redundant data of many covers after encrypting same program), the ciphered program stream that mobile TV/mobile multimedia broadcast system offers all mobile operator has only a cover.The condition that this key is generally built by mobile TV/mobile multimedia broadcast system receives the CA system and generates, i.e. CW.
In the G net, mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider and mobile communication carrier adopt the safe framework of multimedia broadcast multi-broadcasting business (MBMS) that television content is encrypted.In MBMS safety framework, directly use CW as business cipher key.And in cdma network BCMCS security architecture,, generating SK by BAK and SK_RAND, this process is irreversible; The CW of mobile TV/Mobile Multimedia Broadcasting CA can not directly use as SK.Therefore, the BCMCS security architecture of standard is not suitable in these cases, and cdma network and digital broadcast network are in conjunction with the needs that the mobile TV service is provided.
Fig. 4 has shown BCMCS and the network configuration that mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider cooperates.Mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider provides program current cipher key, operator encrypts program current cipher key with the Business Stream key of oneself, return to mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider, the radio channel data by mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider issues the encrypted program stream keys data then.
As can be seen, in BCMCS, broadcasting what be handed down to the user with encrypted content is SK_RAND from the BCMCS System security architecture, and never transmission aloft of SK, the SK value is to be generated with SK_RAND by BAK.If therefore utilize the CW of CA system generation as business cipher key SK by mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider, issue mobile operator, by BAK business cipher key SK is encrypted again, require this moment BAK and SK to generate SK_RAND and return to content supplier.
The generative process of SK_RAND is as follows in the BCMCS standard:
The algorithmic function f0 that calls 3GPP2 S.S0055 " Enhanced Cryptographic Algorithms " 2.2.2.2 joint regulation produces SK_RAND.
The input parameter of f0 should be made as:
Parameter K is made as a selected at random seed.
Parameter f i is made as 0x41.
Parameter F mk is made as 0x4243474B.
SK_RAND is made as minimum 32 significant bits of the 64 bits output of the f0 that calculates.
Generate SK by the SK_RAND that generates:
The algorithmic function f3 that calls S.S0055 2.2.2.6 joint regulation produces SK.
The input parameter of f3 should be made as:
Parameter K is made as BAK.
Parameter f i should be made as 0x45.
Parameters R AND is made as SK_RAND|SK_RAND|SK_RAND|SK_RAND.
Parameter F mk is made as 0x4243474B.
SK is made as the 128 bits output of the f3 that calculates
Algorithmic function f3 among the S.S0055 is irreversible function, promptly can not be according to the anti-SK_RAND that releases of SK.Therefore, this scheme generates SK_RAND by BAK and SK, returns to mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider, and this is infeasible.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve above-mentioned technical problem, a kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method is provided, its purpose is, solves CDMA user watches the digital broadcast networks TV programme on the CDMA terminal based on the BCMCS security architecture problem.
The invention provides a kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method, may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, the mobile broadcast content is encrypted with the control word that condition receiving system produces by mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider;
Step 2 sends to described control word on the mobile phone TV services platform of mobile communication carrier;
Step 3, the controlled entity in the described mobile phone TV services platform is encrypted described control word;
Step 4, the parameter that the described control word after described control word after the encryption and the described encryption of terminal deciphering is needed sends to described mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider;
Step 5, described control word and described parameter after the mobile broadcast content that described mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider encrypts described control word by described content supplier network, the encryption send to described terminal;
Step 6, the mobile broadcast content that described terminal is encrypted described control word is decrypted.
In the described step 3, the BroadCast MultiCast Service controlled entity is encrypted described control word.
Described step 3 may further comprise the steps:
Step 301, login key RK of each self-configuring of subscriber identification module and subscription manager;
Step 302, broadcasting inserts key generator and generates broadcasting access key, and described broadcasting is inserted key connect with BAK_ID sign and out-of-service time, described broadcasting inserts key and described BAK_ID and described out-of-service time and is transferred into the business cipher key manager together and broadcasts the access cipher key distributor; Described broadcasting inserts key by BCMCS_FLOW_ID and described BAK_ID combination sign;
Step 303 is compared with the previous decryption oprerations in the described terminal when not changing when described broadcasting inserts key, and execution in step 304 is to step 306; Otherwise apply for that a new broadcasting inserts key;
Step 304, described business cipher key manager produces business cipher key by the random value that described broadcasting inserts key and SK_RAND, and described business cipher key manager reaches the content-encrypt device to described business cipher key, described SK_RAND, described BAK_ID and described out-of-service time;
Step 305, content source is sent to described content-encrypt device to described control word;
Step 306, described content-encrypt device is encrypted described control word with described business cipher key.
Described parameter comprises BAK_ID and SK_RAND.
Described step 6 may further comprise the steps:
Step 51 if described BAK_ID and described SK_RAND do not change, obtains described business cipher key with described broadcasting access key and described SK_RAND; If described BAK_ID and described SK_RAND change, described terminal generates a new business key;
Step 52 is deciphered described control word with described business cipher key;
Step 53 is deciphered the mobile broadcast content that described control word is encrypted with described control word.
In the described step 51, if described BAK_ID and described SK_RAND change, the mobile device of described terminal is asked a new business key from subscriber identification module, comprise BCMCS_FLOW_ID, BAK_ID and SK_RAND; Subscriber identification module inserts key by broadcasting and SK_RAND produces new new business key, and this new business key is sent back to the mobile device of described terminal.
Described mobile communication carrier is the cdma mobile communication Virtual network operator.
The present invention realizes providing the mobile phone TV services protection by mobile communications network; the program current cipher key that the distribution mobile TV of safety/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider produces is for mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider has created precondition with mobile communication carrier's cooperation operation mobile TV and other relevant value-added service.Adopt method of the present invention, the characteristic that has not only kept the BCMCS security architecture, and mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider still can adopt CA system generation content key that content is encrypted, system's change to both sides is minimum, also helps carrying out BroadCast MultiCast Service after mobile communication carrier sets up the BCMCS network later on.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the network configuration of BCMCS;
Fig. 2 is the security architecture of BCMCS;
Fig. 3 is for adopting the broadcasted content safety protection structure of CA system;
The network configuration that Fig. 4 is BCMCS with mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider cooperates;
Fig. 5 is a method flow diagram of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the present invention is described in further detail.
Method flow of the present invention as shown in Figure 5, mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider adopts the CA system to produce control word (CW), CW encrypts content as content key, then CW is handed down to mobile operator, operator is according to the BCMCS security architecture, generate SK by BAK, SK_RAND and be used for encrypting CW, the CW that has encrypted returns to mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider together with index BAK_ID, the SK_RAND of BAK.Mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider together is broadcast to terminal to the content, BAK_ID and the SK_RAND that have encrypted.In terminal one side, according to the key distribution process of BCMCS, UIM produces SK by BAK and SK_RAND, and SK is sent back to ME, and ME deciphers CW with SK, again by CW to contents decryption, and the result reached the user use.Detailed process is as follows:
Step 502 sends to mobile communication carrier with CW as data;
Step 505 together sends to terminal by content, BAK_ID and SK_RAND after mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider network will be encrypted;
Step 503 comprises following concrete steps:
At first be the generation of BAK: (finishing before the Business Stream transmission of encrypting) BAK is by BCMCS_FLOW_ID and BAK_ID combination sign.
Login key RK of each self-configuring of UIM and SM, this key RK will be the bases of BCMCS authentication and cipher key change;
BAKG generates BAK, and this value and BAK_ID sign and out-of-service time (BAK_Expire) are connected, BAK and BAK_ID and BAK_Expire are transferred into SKM and BAKD together accordingly;
When BAK compares when changing new BAK of terminal to apply with the previous decryption oprerations in the terminal: when BAK compares with the previous decryption oprerations in the terminal when not changing, carry out following steps:
SKM produces SK by the random value of current BAK and SK_RAND, and SKM reaches CE to SK, SK_RAND, BAK_ID and BAK_Expire;
CS is sent to CE to CW;
CE encrypts CW with SK.
In the described step 505:
Do not change if BAK_ID and SK_RAND and the BAK_ID that receives at last compare with SK_RAND, ME deciphers with the CW of the SK value of distributing to the CW after this encryptions at present after to this encryptions, uses the CW that obtains to decipher the mobile broadcast content.
If BAK_ID or SK_RAND change, SK changes so, and at this moment ME asks a new SK from UIM, comprises BCMCS_FLOW_ID, BAK_ID and SK_RAND;
UIM produces SK by BAK and SK_RAND, and SK is sent back to ME, and ME is to the CW deciphering after encrypting, then with CW deciphering mobile broadcast content.
BAK is identical in the above-mentioned step.If during the new BAK of one of terminal to apply, carry out following steps:
A.ME sends out a BAK request to BAKD.This BAK request may comprise the authentication information based on RK.SM can use this information to determine that this request is from a legal users.
B. for BAK is delivered to UIM, BAK must be encrypted, in case it is received by non-target recipient.BAKD request SM produces temporary key (TK).BAKD is new TK of each BAK request.
C.SM produces TK by TK_RAND random value and RK.TK_RAND can be produced by BAKD or SM.SM delivers to BAKD to TK and TK_RAND.Then, SM abandons TK and TK_RAND.
D.BAKD encrypts BAK with TK, and the BAK and the TK_RAND that encrypt, BAK_ID and BAK_Expire deliver to UIM through ME together.BAKD abandons TK and TK_RAND.UIM at first forms TK by TK_RAND and RK, with the BAK deciphering of TK to encrypting, draws BAK.UIM abandons TK and TK_RAND.BAK and relevant BAK_Expire value thereof are stored among the UIM.UIM should can store two BAK at least, so that obtained and store a new BAK before BAK expires.
Terminal is identical with the mobile phone implication among the present invention.
Those skilled in the art can also carry out various modifications to above content under the condition that does not break away from the definite the spirit and scope of the present invention of claims.Therefore scope of the present invention is not limited in above explanation, but determine by the scope of claims.
Claims (7)
1, a kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method is characterized in that, may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, the mobile broadcast content is encrypted with the control word that condition receiving system produces by mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider;
Step 2 sends to described control word on the mobile phone TV services platform of mobile communication carrier;
Step 3, the controlled entity in the described mobile phone TV services platform is encrypted described control word;
Step 4, the parameter that the described control word after described control word after the encryption and the described encryption of terminal deciphering is needed sends to described mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider;
Step 5, described control word and described parameter after the mobile broadcast content that described mobile TV/content of mobile multimedia broadcast provider encrypts described control word by described content supplier network, the encryption send to described terminal;
Step 6, the mobile broadcast content that described terminal is encrypted described control word is decrypted.
2, mobile phone TV services content protecting method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that, in the described step 3, the BroadCast MultiCast Service controlled entity is encrypted described control word.
3, mobile phone TV services content protecting method as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that, described step 3 may further comprise the steps:
Step 301, login key RK of each self-configuring of subscriber identification module and subscription manager;
Step 302, broadcasting inserts key generator and generates broadcasting access key, and described broadcasting is inserted key connect with BAK_ID sign and out-of-service time, described broadcasting inserts key and described BAK_ID and described out-of-service time and is transferred into the business cipher key manager together and broadcasts the access cipher key distributor; Described broadcasting inserts key by BCMCS_FLOW_ID and described BAK_ID combination sign;
Step 303 is compared with the previous decryption oprerations in the described terminal when not changing when described broadcasting inserts key, and execution in step 304 is to step 306; Otherwise apply for that a new broadcasting inserts key;
Step 304, described business cipher key manager produces business cipher key by the random value that described broadcasting inserts key and SK_RAND, and described business cipher key manager reaches the content-encrypt device to described business cipher key, described SK_RAND, described BAK_ID and described out-of-service time;
Step 305, content source is sent to described content-encrypt device to described control word;
Step 306, described content-encrypt device is encrypted described control word with described business cipher key.
4, mobile phone TV services content protecting method as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that, described parameter comprises BAK_ID and SK_RAND.
5, mobile phone TV services content protecting method as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that, described step 6 may further comprise the steps:
Step 51 if described BAK_ID and described SK_RAND do not change, obtains described business cipher key with described broadcasting access key and described SK_RAND; If described BAK_ID and described SK_RAND change, described terminal generates a new business key;
Step 52 is deciphered described control word with described business cipher key;
Step 53 is deciphered the mobile broadcast content that described control word is encrypted with described control word.
6, mobile phone TV services content protecting method as claimed in claim 5, it is characterized in that, in the described step 51, if described BAK_ID and described SK_RAND change, the mobile device of described terminal is asked a new business key from subscriber identification module, comprise BCMCS_FLOW_ID, BAK_ID and SK_RAND; Subscriber identification module inserts key by broadcasting and SK_RAND produces new new business key, and this new business key is sent back to the mobile device of described terminal.
7, mobile phone TV services content protecting method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that, described mobile communication carrier is the cdma mobile communication Virtual network operator.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006101654130A CN100544429C (en) | 2006-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | A kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006101654130A CN100544429C (en) | 2006-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | A kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN1997147A true CN1997147A (en) | 2007-07-11 |
| CN100544429C CN100544429C (en) | 2009-09-23 |
Family
ID=38252043
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006101654130A Active CN100544429C (en) | 2006-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | A kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN100544429C (en) |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2009039691A1 (en) * | 2007-09-28 | 2009-04-02 | Zte Corporation | A method and system for encrypting the content key in a mobile multimedia broadcast service |
| CN101420656B (en) * | 2007-10-23 | 2011-01-05 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method for expanding reception range of mobile phone television service and mobile terminal system |
| CN101146209B (en) * | 2007-09-26 | 2011-05-25 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A method and system for program stream secret key encryption in mobile multi-media broadcasting service |
| CN101145932B (en) * | 2007-10-15 | 2011-08-24 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A realization method and system for program stream secret key in mobile multi-media broadcast service |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KR20040111670A (en) * | 2002-05-21 | 2004-12-31 | 코닌클리케 필립스 일렉트로닉스 엔.브이. | Conditional access system |
| US7724907B2 (en) * | 2002-11-05 | 2010-05-25 | Sony Corporation | Mechanism for protecting the transfer of digital content |
-
2006
- 2006-12-19 CN CNB2006101654130A patent/CN100544429C/en active Active
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101146209B (en) * | 2007-09-26 | 2011-05-25 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A method and system for program stream secret key encryption in mobile multi-media broadcasting service |
| WO2009039691A1 (en) * | 2007-09-28 | 2009-04-02 | Zte Corporation | A method and system for encrypting the content key in a mobile multimedia broadcast service |
| CN101145932B (en) * | 2007-10-15 | 2011-08-24 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A realization method and system for program stream secret key in mobile multi-media broadcast service |
| CN101420656B (en) * | 2007-10-23 | 2011-01-05 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method for expanding reception range of mobile phone television service and mobile terminal system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN100544429C (en) | 2009-09-23 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN101076109B (en) | Two-way CA system of digital TV-set and method for ordering and cancelling programm based on it | |
| CN101061666B (en) | Method for managing digital rights in broadcast/multicast service | |
| CN101166259B (en) | Mobile phone TV service protection method, system, mobile phone TV server and terminal | |
| CN100493181C (en) | System, protection method and server for realizing the virtual channel service | |
| RU2433471C2 (en) | Method and device for authorising access | |
| RU2547446C2 (en) | Method of access to services provided by subscriber module | |
| US7149308B1 (en) | Cryptographic communications using in situ generated cryptographic keys for conditional access | |
| CN101009553A (en) | Secret key safety method and system for realizing multi-network integration mobile multi-media broadcasting system | |
| CN101141246A (en) | Service key obtaining method and subscription management server | |
| CN100442839C (en) | Information transmitting method and apparatus for interactive digital broadcast television system | |
| KR20090128863A (en) | Method for security key distribution in broadcast service system and system therefor | |
| CN100364332C (en) | Method for protecting broadband video-audio broadcasting content | |
| CN101119200A (en) | Method, network unit, terminal and system for providing broadcast/multicast service | |
| CN101562520B (en) | Method and system for distributing service secret keys | |
| CN100544429C (en) | A kind of mobile phone TV services content protecting method | |
| CN102714593A (en) | Methods for decrypting, transmitting and receiving control words, storage medium for executing said methods | |
| US20050105732A1 (en) | Systems and methods for delivering pre-encrypted content to a subscriber terminal | |
| CN100551034C (en) | A kind of mobile multi-media service implementation method and condition receiving system | |
| CN101656583B (en) | Key management system and key management method | |
| CN101321261B (en) | Front-end system, user terminal and authorization management information distribution method | |
| CN102917252A (en) | IPTV (internet protocol television) program stream content protection system and method | |
| CN101217358A (en) | An activation method of digital broadcast service system and digital broadcast service | |
| CN101505462A (en) | Authentication method and system for mobile multimedia broadcast conditional reception | |
| CN103546767A (en) | Content protection method and system of multimedia service | |
| CN101145932A (en) | A realization method and system for program stream secret key in mobile multi-media broadcast service |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| C41 | Transfer of patent application or patent right or utility model | ||
| TA01 | Transfer of patent application right |
Effective date of registration: 20081219 Address after: Number 31, Finance Street, Beijing, Xicheng District: 100032 Applicant after: China Telecom Co., Ltd. Address before: Number 133, North Main Street, Beijing, Xicheng District, China: 100032.: Applicant before: China United Communication Co., Ltd. |
|
| ASS | Succession or assignment of patent right |
Owner name: CHINA TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP CO.,LTD. Free format text: FORMER OWNER: CHINA UNITED COMMUNICATION CO., LTD. Effective date: 20081219 |
|
| C14 | Grant of patent or utility model | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| ASS | Succession or assignment of patent right |
Owner name: CHINA TELECOMMUNICATION CO., LTD. Free format text: FORMER OWNER: CHINA TELECOMMUNICATION GROUP CORP. Effective date: 20130319 |
|
| C41 | Transfer of patent application or patent right or utility model | ||
| COR | Change of bibliographic data |
Free format text: CORRECT: ADDRESS; FROM: 100032 XICHENG, BEIJING TO: 100033 XICHENG, BEIJING |
|
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20130319 Address after: 100033 Beijing Finance Street, No. 31, Xicheng District Patentee after: China Telecommunication Co., Ltd. Address before: 100032 Beijing Finance Street, No. 31, Xicheng District Patentee before: China Telecom Co., Ltd. |