CN1805337A - Secret shared key mechanism based user management method - Google Patents
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- CN1805337A CN1805337A CN 200510032855 CN200510032855A CN1805337A CN 1805337 A CN1805337 A CN 1805337A CN 200510032855 CN200510032855 CN 200510032855 CN 200510032855 A CN200510032855 A CN 200510032855A CN 1805337 A CN1805337 A CN 1805337A
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- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000012217 deletion Methods 0.000 description 2
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Abstract
The invention relates to a user manage method based on secret share code mechanism, which comprises following steps: 2, calculating the identification information of supper user via the hash algorism to attain the hash valve which is stored in the device safe memory section; 2, generating symmetry codes inside the device; 3, using said codes to encrypt the identification information of super user, while the secret context is stored in the device safe memory section; 4, deleting the identification information; 5, dividing the symmetry codes via threshold method of the secret share code mechanism (m, n) into n sections, while the m and n are positive integer, and the n is not less than 2m-1 and the m is more than n/2; 6, sending said n sections to the identification character storage mediums of n preset manage users; 7, deleting said n sections.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of user management method, relate in particular to the encryption of cryptography and information security field and obtain the method for power user's identity information based on secret shared key mechanism.
Background technology
Messaging device is meant the equipment that the information processing related service can be provided to its user.Messaging device particularly provides the information safety devices of security service to the equipment user, the fail safe of himself is paid close attention to very much.When messaging device self have potential safety hazard the time, its service that provides can not allow users to trust and satisfaction.The inherently safe of messaging device comprises a lot of aspects, and wherein the access control to equipment is a very important aspect.Equipment user's safety management is the means of control that effectively conduct interviews.
The access control of equipment mainly is the discriminating at the equipment user, is divided into based on role's discriminating with based on identity differentiating dual mode.The user that the discriminating of equipment by role and identity is embodied as different role or different identity provides the service of different stage.
The user role of messaging device has been represented the user right rank.The user of identical Permission Levels has identical role.Discriminating based on the role is meant that equipment is differentiated the operator, determines whether it is authorized to can be used as desired security role.For example, according to Permission Levels from low to high, the user role of messaging device can be divided into general user, leading subscriber and power user.Common operation is carried out in the service that the general user can acquisition equipment provides; Leading subscriber can be carried out a series of device initializes and equipment maintenance and management work, also has management general user's authority simultaneously, and comprising increases general user, deletion general user or the like; The power user has the highest weight limit of equipment, can manage leading subscriber and general user.Because power user's authority is the highest, so will carry out level of security the highest management and control to the power user.
Discriminating based on identity is meant that equipment differentiates to user's individual identity whether the user of this identity of simultaneous verification is authorized to as desired security role.Everyone will identify the equipment user separately, and should sign must process differentiate.Equipment provides different service content to the user of different identity.Based on the discriminating of identity require the user have can indicate identification feature, such as a user password, or a physical medium (electron key of IC-card, USB interface etc.) that comprises user key, or personal biology characteristics (fingerprint, iris etc.).
The fairly perfect messaging device of management at present all adopts the combination of differentiating and differentiate based on identity dual mode based on the role for user management.On the one hand the user is divided into different roles by Permission Levels, on the other hand, when user access device, requires to provide the feature of indicate identification.For power user's management, the mode that adopts usually has at present: power user's identity characteristic is known or had to (1) any one leading subscriber, can obtain power user's identity; (2) some successful logging devices of leading subscribers while are obtained power user's identity, and its necessary condition is that the leading subscriber number of logining simultaneously arrives more than a certain threshold value of all leading subscriber numbers of equipment.
First kind of way is very unsafe, and any one leading subscriber all may be obtained power user's authority, and may the data of other leading subscriber be made amendment after obtaining superuser right, perhaps increases more leading subscriber.Key to the issue is that the leading subscriber of obtaining superuser right lacks necessary supervision, and when and where he has obtained superuser right under which kind of situation, utilize superuser right to do which kind of operation again.
Second kind of way improved at first kind of way.Require some leading subscribers successful logging devices simultaneously, the leading subscriber number of logining when success simultaneously reaches a threshold value (as half of all leading subscriber sums), and needn't participate in by all leading subscribers, then obtains power user's identity.So just the management to the power user has increased supervision mechanism, has improved fail safe.But this way is only just judged a numerical value, thereby has certain security risk.Such as, if certain leading subscriber by some any special measures, dynamic tracking, detection are also revised successful number of persons logging in the Device memory, then can obtain power user's identity with the number of persons logging that is less than threshold value; Perhaps direct detection, revise power user's identity information and other data.
Summary of the invention
The present invention is directed to the relatively poor shortcoming of prior art fail safe, propose the higher equipment user's management method of a kind of fail safe.
A kind of user management method based on secret shared key mechanism may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, equipment power user's identity information is calculated hashed value with hashing algorithm, hashed value is stored in the device security memory block;
Step 2, produce a symmetrical key at device interior;
Step 3, usefulness symmetric key encryption equipment power user identity information, ciphertext is stored in the device security memory block;
Step 4, identity information is deleted;
Step 5, with symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part, wherein, m and n are positive integer, n is more than or equal to 2n-1, and m is greater than n/2;
Step 6, n part symmetric key fragment is sent on n the identity characteristic storage medium of specifying leading subscriber;
Step 7, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted;
Obtain power user's identity information after the encryption as need, then continue to carry out following steps:
Step 8, obtain n the leading subscriber of the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the equipment;
Step 9, (m, the n) threshold schemes in calculate and to recover symmetric key to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
Power user's identity information ciphertext in the symmetric key decryption device that step 10, utilization recover out obtains power user's identity information;
Step 11, calculate the hashed value of power user's identity information, this hashed value is compared with the hashed value in the device storage district with hashing algorithm, if unanimity then represent success, otherwise fail.
Profitable fruit of the present invention is: this user management method has the advantage that many people supervise the use of power user's identity jointly in the prior art on the one hand, overcome again simultaneously and only pass through the leading subscriber number successfully logined in the prior art, improved fail safe by secret shared key mechanism whether greater than the shortcoming of appointed threshold value; And power user's identity information encrypts storage in the secure storage areas of equipment, prevents from illegally to survey and revise, and further improved fail safe.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart that adopts secret shared key mechanism (2,3) threshold schemes encryption power user's identity information and key is cut apart storage.
Fig. 2 adopts secret shared key mechanism (2,3) threshold schemes to obtain the flow chart of power user's identity.
Embodiment
Core concept of the present invention is:
Secret in the cryptography is shared (secret sharing) mechanism and exactly the secret s of system is decomposed into n the secret s1 of part, s2 ..., sn.This n part secret had by n member of system respectively, make and to be no less than m arbitrarily (the individual member of m≤n) can recover the secret s of system jointly from the part secret that they grasp, be less than the secret s that the individual member of m then can't recover system arbitrarily, Here it is (m, n) threshold schemes (threshold scheme).(referring to " applied cryptography " of Bruce Schneier work).
Among the present invention based on the threshold schemes in the secret shared key mechanism, (m, n) threshold schemes (wherein n 〉=2m-1 and m＞(n/2), m and n are positive integers), be stored in the anti-detection of equipment, anti-tamper, nonvolatile storage after equipment power user's identity information encrypted with symmetric key algorithm, symmetric key is divided into n part, is stored in respectively on the identity characteristic physical medium of n leading subscriber.When needs were obtained power user's identity, wherein m leading subscriber logined simultaneously at least, at first recovers symmetric key, and deciphering obtains power user's identity information then, thereby obtains power user's identity.
It can adopt following concrete steps to realize, at first is the encryption handling method:
The first step calculates its hashed value with equipment power user identity information with hashing algorithm, this hashed value is stored in the secure storage areas of equipment;
In second step, produce a symmetric key at device interior;
In the 3rd step, with this symmetric key encryption of equipment power user identity information, ciphertext is stored in the secure storage areas of equipment;
The 4th step is with the plaintext deletion of identity information;
The 5th the step, with this symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part;
In the 6th step, n part symmetric key fragment safety is sent on the identity characteristic storage medium of n appointment leading subscriber;
In the 7th step, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted.
When needs are obtained power user's identity, carry out following steps:
The first step is chosen n the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the equipment successively;
In second step, (m, the n) threshold schemes in recover symmetric key with the calculating of m part key fragment to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
In the 3rd step,, obtain power user's identity information expressly with the power user's identity information ciphertext in the symmetric key decryption device that recovers out;
The 4th step, calculate power user's identity information hashed value expressly with hashing algorithm, this hashed value is compared with the hashed value in the device storage district, if unanimity then represent success, otherwise fail.
Certainly, can equipment power user identity information not calculated hashed value with hashing algorithm yet, and will be from the stored in clear of part information in the secure storage areas of equipment.When needs are obtained equipment power user identity, straight expressly expressly compare with the power user's identity information that is stored in secure storage areas with the power user's identity information that obtains, if unanimity then represent success, otherwise fail.
The specific implementation step is:
The first step produces a symmetrical key at device interior;
Second step,, with symmetric key encryption equipment power user identity information, ciphertext and power user's identity information are stored in the device security memory block respectively;
The 3rd step,, with symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part, wherein, m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
The 4th the step,, with n part symmetric key fragment be sent to n the appointment leading subscriber the identity characteristic storage medium on;
The 5th the step,, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted;
Obtain power user's identity information after the encryption as need, then continue to carry out following steps:
The 6th the step,, obtain n the leading subscriber of the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the equipment;
The 7th step,, (m, the n) threshold schemes in calculate and to recover symmetric key to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
The 8th step,, utilize the symmetric key recover out to solve power user's identity information ciphertext in the close equipment, obtain power user's identity information;
The 9th step,, the power user's identity information that obtains is compared, if consistent, then success, if inconsistent, then failure.
Be described in further detail below in conjunction with the enforcement of accompanying drawing technical scheme of the present invention:
The embodiment here gets (m, n) m=2 in the threshold schemes, the situation of n=3.
With reference to Fig. 1, in messaging device, after being provided with, the process initialization had the expressly power user's of form identity data.At first, calculate the hashed value of power user's identity data with hashing algorithm.Hashing algorithm can adopt MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPE-MD, SHA, SHA-1, Snefru, N-Hash, HAVAL scheduling algorithm, or other one-way Hash algorithm.In the present embodiment, adopt the most frequently used SHA SHA-1 of present information security field (Secure Hash Algorithm), be characterized in that these algorithm input data are any byte length, output hashed value result is 160 fixing (bits) length.(method that the SHA-1 algorithm all provides software to realize in the cryptographic algorithm software kit of a lot of openly source codes such as the OpenSSL software kit, can be downloaded on http://www.openssl.org).Power user's identity data is gone out hashed value with the SHA-1 algorithm computation.For safety, hashed value is stored in the anti-detection of equipment, anti-tamper, nonvolatile safe memory block.Then, in equipment, produce the key that function produces a symmetric key algorithm by the key in the cryptographic algorithm module.Symmetric key algorithm can adopt AES, DES, multiple DES, IDEA, RC2, RC5, Lucifer, Madryga, FEAL, REDOC, LOKI, Khufu, Khafre, MMB, CA-1.1, Skipjack, GOST, CAST, Blowfish, SAFER, 3-WAY, Crab, SXAL8/MBAL scheduling algorithm, or other symmetric key algorithms.In the present embodiment, symmetric key algorithm is selected superencipherment algorithm AES (Advanced EncryptionStandard) for use.This algorithm secret key length is selected 128 (bits) for use, and the input clear data is grouped into 128 (bits), and the grouping of output encrypt data also is 128 (bits).(method that aes algorithm all provides software to realize in the cryptographic algorithm software kit of a lot of openly source codes such as the OpenSSL software kit, can be downloaded on http://www.openssl.org).By the cryptographic algorithm module in the equipment, encrypt power user's identity data with 128 the aes algorithm key that produces by aes algorithm, be about to the input data of power user's identity data as aes algorithm, produce its corresponding ciphertext data through computing.This encrypt data is stored in the anti-detection of equipment, anti-tamper, nonvolatile storage.Clear data is deleted.Utilize (2, the 3) threshold schemes in the secret shared key mechanism (the secret shared key mechanism principle is referring to " applied cryptography " of Bruce Schneier work) to be divided into 3 parts 128 aes algorithm key encrypting usefulness, each part can be described as a key fragment.According to the secret shared key mechanism principle, any independent portion all can not use as original symmetric key in these 3 parts of key fragments, and any 2 parts of key fragments can recover original symmetric key through calculating.3 parts of symmetric key fragment safety are sent to the identity characteristic storage medium of the leading subscriber of 3 appointments, can be disk file, physical medium (electron key of IC-card, USB interface etc.).In the present embodiment, with the key fragment store on the higher physical medium of fail safe.Symmetric key in the sweep equipment and 3 parts of key fragments.Safe storage and many people managed together of power user's identity data have so just been finished.
When needs are obtained power user's Identity Management equipment, only need any 2 participations in 3 leading subscribers, and needn't all participate in by 3 leading subscribers.With reference to Fig. 2, suppose that leading subscriber 1 and leading subscriber 2 participations obtain the process of power user's identity, leading subscriber 3 does not participate in.Leading subscriber 1 and leading subscriber 2 insert the identity characteristic physical medium of oneself respectively successively on equipment, key fragment 1 on it and key fragment 2 safety are sent in the equipment, utilize (2 in the secret shared key mechanism, 3) threshold schemes, recover the aes algorithm key (the secret shared key mechanism principle is referring to " applied cryptography " of Bruce Schneier work) of original 128 (bits) with these 2 key fragments, by the power user's identity data ciphertext in the aes algorithm decryption device of cryptographic algorithm module in the equipment, obtain power user's identity data expressly with this key.Calculate the hashed value of power user's identity data 160 (bits) expressly with the SHA-1 hashing algorithm, with hashed value in the device storage district relatively, if consistent, then expression obtains the success of power user's identity, otherwise expression obtains the failure of power user's identity.
Claims (7)
1. user management method based on secret shared key mechanism may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, equipment power user's identity information is calculated hashed value with hashing algorithm, hashed value is stored in the device security memory block;
Step 2, produce a symmetrical key at device interior;
Step 3, usefulness symmetric key encryption equipment power user identity information, ciphertext is stored in the device security memory block;
Step 4, identity information is deleted;
Step 5, with symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part, wherein, m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 6, n part symmetric key fragment is sent on n the identity characteristic storage medium of specifying leading subscriber;
Step 7, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted;
Obtain power user's identity information after the encryption as need, then continue to carry out following steps:
Step 8, obtain n the leading subscriber of the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the encryption device, wherein m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 9, (m, the n) threshold schemes in calculate and to recover symmetric key to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
Power user's identity information ciphertext in the symmetric key decryption device that step 10, utilization recover out obtains power user's identity information;
Step 11, calculate the hashed value of power user's identity information, this hashed value is compared with the hashed value in the device storage district with hashing algorithm, if unanimity then represent success, otherwise fail.
2. the encryption handling method of an equipment power user identity information may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, equipment power user's identity information is calculated hashed value with hashing algorithm, hashed value is stored in the device security memory block;
Step 2, produce a symmetrical key at device interior;
Step 3, usefulness symmetric key encryption equipment power user identity information, ciphertext is stored in the device security memory block;
Step 4, identity information is deleted;
Step 5, with symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part, wherein, m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 6, n part symmetric key fragment is sent on n the identity characteristic storage medium of specifying leading subscriber;
Step 7, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted.
3. the encryption handling method of equipment power user identity information as claimed in claim 2, wherein the identity characteristic storage medium can be the electron key of IC-card or USB interface.
4. the power user's identity acquisition methods after encrypting according to the described method of claim 2 may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, obtain n the leading subscriber of the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the encryption device, wherein m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 2, (m, the n) threshold schemes in calculate and to recover symmetric key to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
Power user's identity information ciphertext in the symmetric key decryption device that step 3, utilization recover out obtains power user's identity information;
Step 4, calculate the hashed value of power user's identity information, this hashed value is compared with the hashed value in the device storage district with hashing algorithm, if unanimity then represent success, otherwise fail.
5. the encryption handling method of an equipment power user identity information may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, produce a symmetrical key at device interior;
Step 2, usefulness symmetric key encryption equipment power user identity information, ciphertext and power user's identity information are stored in the device security memory block respectively;
Step 3, with symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part, wherein, m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 4, n part symmetric key fragment is sent on n the identity characteristic storage medium of specifying leading subscriber;
Step 5, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted.
6. the power user's identity acquisition methods after encrypting according to the described method of claim 5 may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, obtain n the leading subscriber of the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the equipment, wherein m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 2, (m, the n) threshold schemes in calculate and to recover symmetric key to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
The symmetric key that step 3, utilization recover out solves the power user's identity information ciphertext in the close equipment, obtains power user's identity information;
Step 4, the power user's identity information that obtains is compared, if consistent, then success, if inconsistent, then failure.
7. user management method based on secret shared key mechanism may further comprise the steps:
Step 1, produce a symmetrical key at device interior;
Step 2, usefulness symmetric key encryption equipment power user identity information, ciphertext and power user's identity information are stored in the device security memory block respectively;
Step 3, with symmetric key utilize secret shared key mechanism (m, n) threshold schemes in are divided into n part, wherein, m and n are positive integer, n more than or equal to 2m-1 and m greater than n/2;
Step 4, n part symmetric key fragment is sent on n the identity characteristic storage medium of specifying leading subscriber;
Step 5, the n part symmetric key fragment in the equipment is deleted;
Obtain power user's identity information after the encryption as need, then continue to carry out following steps:
Step 6, obtain n the leading subscriber of the m in the leading subscriber arbitrarily, after the login symmetric key fragment safety on its identity characteristic storage medium is sent on the equipment;
Step 7, (m, the n) threshold schemes in calculate and to recover symmetric key to utilize secret shared key mechanism;
The symmetric key that step 8, utilization recover out solves the power user's identity information ciphertext in the close equipment, obtains power user's identity information;
Step 9, the power user's identity information that obtains is compared, if consistent, then success, if inconsistent, then failure.
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| CN101447870B (en) * | 2008-12-25 | 2010-11-17 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Safe storage method of private key based on technology of distributed password |
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| CN101261608B (en) * | 2007-03-08 | 2011-09-14 | 国际商业机器公司 | Method and system for keeping key |
| CN101311942B (en) * | 2007-05-23 | 2011-08-24 | 西门子（中国）有限公司 | Software encryption and decryption method and encryption and decryption device |
| CN101447870B (en) * | 2008-12-25 | 2010-11-17 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Safe storage method of private key based on technology of distributed password |
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| CN105356999B (en) * | 2015-12-08 | 2018-03-09 | 成都信息工程大学 | A kind of portion size minishing method of (2,2) threshold secret sharing |
| CN105721560A (en) * | 2016-01-27 | 2016-06-29 | 四川长虹电器股份有限公司 | Security storage system and method for unified member center user login password |
| CN105721560B (en) * | 2016-01-27 | 2018-12-25 | 四川长虹电器股份有限公司 | Unified member's central user login password safe storage system and method |
| CN106452754A (en) * | 2016-11-03 | 2017-02-22 | 大唐融合通信股份有限公司 | Multiplayer online dynamic encryption method and apparatus |
| CN107359990A (en) * | 2017-08-03 | 2017-11-17 | 北京奇艺世纪科技有限公司 | A kind of secret information processing method, apparatus and system |
| CN107786330A (en) * | 2017-09-26 | 2018-03-09 | 陈彦丰 | For the method, apparatus of privacy sharing, computer-readable storage medium and electronic equipment |
| CN107979461A (en) * | 2017-10-27 | 2018-05-01 | 财付通支付科技有限公司 | Secret key method for retrieving, device, terminal, key escrow server and computer-readable recording medium |
| CN108921553A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-11-30 | 中钞信用卡产业发展有限公司杭州区块链技术研究院 | A kind of thresholding private key generation method, method of commerce and relevant apparatus |
| CN113890731A (en) * | 2021-09-29 | 2022-01-04 | 北京天融信网络安全技术有限公司 | Key management method, key management device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN113890731B (en) * | 2021-09-29 | 2024-04-19 | 北京天融信网络安全技术有限公司 | Key management method, device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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