CN117675235A

CN117675235A - Secret communication processing method, first terminal and storage medium

Info

Publication number: CN117675235A
Application number: CN202211009120.9A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 田野
Original assignee: China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd; China Mobile Communications Ltd Research Institute
Current assignee: China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd; China Mobile Communications Ltd Research Institute
Priority date: 2022-08-22
Filing date: 2022-08-22
Publication date: 2024-03-08
Also published as: WO2024041498A1

Abstract

The application provides a secret communication processing method, a first terminal and a computer readable storage medium, wherein a first message is sent to first equipment; the first message comprises identification information related to the first terminal and identification information related to the second terminal; receiving a second message sent by the first device; wherein the second message includes a first key for the first terminal to communicate securely with the second terminal; the first key is sent to the second terminal.

Description

Secret communication processing method, first terminal and storage medium

Technical Field

The present application relates to, but is not limited to, the field of communications, and in particular, to a secure communication processing method, a first terminal, and a computer readable storage medium.

Background

As society enters a comprehensive informatization age, information security is increasingly valued, and several parties participating in communication often transmit information based on keys; the quantum key generated by the quantum random number generator or the quantum key distribution (Quantum key distribution, QKD) network negotiation has intrinsic randomness and irreproducibility, and is safer and more difficult to crack by an attacker compared with the key generated by the traditional mode (such as a physical noise source, pseudo random and the like). Therefore, the use of a quantum key instead of a conventional key in a secure communication system can ensure the security of the key itself, thereby improving the overall security level of the system.

In the traditional secret communication system and the secret communication system based on the quantum key, the devices of the parties involved in the communication need to negotiate to acquire a consistent session key, which is used for carrying out password protection on data information transmitted between users, so as to prevent an attacker from carrying out illegal eavesdropping, tampering, replay and other attacks on the information content, and thus information leakage is caused.

It should be noted that, the key negotiation scheme based on the digital envelope mechanism adopts an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, and the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm can be cracked in polynomial time in the face of potential quantum computation security risk, so that the key negotiation scheme based on the digital envelope mechanism of the asymmetric cryptographic system has the risk of key disclosure. However, in the key negotiation scheme of the central key distribution mechanism based on the symmetric cryptosystem, both parties of the secret communication need to acquire session keys from the key management center respectively, and the processing overhead of the key management center is large. In addition, if one party does not successfully acquire the session key, the encrypted communication service fails, and bad experience is brought to the user.

Disclosure of Invention

The embodiment of the application provides a secret communication processing method, a first terminal and a computer readable storage medium, and provides a scheme for acquiring a session key based on a symmetrical cryptosystem.

In a first aspect, a secure communication processing method is provided, which is applied to a first terminal, and includes:

transmitting a first message to a first device; the first message comprises identification information related to the first terminal and identification information related to the second terminal;

receiving a second message sent by the first device; wherein the second message includes a first key for the first terminal to communicate securely with the second terminal;

and sending the first key to a second terminal.

In a second aspect, there is provided a first terminal comprising:

a sending module, configured to send a first message to a first device; the first message comprises identification information related to the first terminal and identification information related to the second terminal;

the receiving module is used for receiving a second message sent by the first device; wherein the second message includes a first key for the first terminal to communicate securely with the second terminal;

the sending module is further configured to send the first key to a second terminal.

In a third aspect, a first terminal, the first terminal comprising:

a memory for storing executable instructions;

And the processor is used for realizing the secret communication processing method when executing the executable instructions stored in the memory.

In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a chip for implementing the above-mentioned secure communication processing method; the chip comprises: and a processor for calling and running the computer program from the memory, so that the device mounted with the chip executes the above-mentioned secret communication processing method.

In a fifth aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that causes a computer to execute the above-described secure communication processing method.

In a sixth aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a computer program product comprising computer program instructions for causing a computer to perform the above-described secure communication processing method.

In a seventh aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a computer program which, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the above-described secure communication processing method.

In the method provided by the embodiment of the application, under the scene that the first terminal needs to carry out secret communication with the second terminal, the first terminal sends a first message comprising the secret communication multiparty identifier, such as a key request message, to the first device, and the first device distributes a first key, such as a session key, for the secret communication multiparty and feeds back the session key to the first terminal; obviously, the first device directly provides the session key for the secret communication multiparty terminal based on the key request message, and each terminal of the communication multiparty terminal does not need to interact with the first device to acquire the session key, so that the establishment of secret communication service in a severe network environment is ensured, the success rate of secret communication service establishment is improved, and network transmission resources are saved. The scheme for acquiring the session key based on the symmetric cryptosystem avoids the risk that an asymmetric cryptoalgorithm in the asymmetric cryptosystem is cracked by quantum computation in polynomial time, and improves the safety of the system.

Drawings

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a secure communication system according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method for secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 3 is a second flowchart of a secure communication processing method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

fig. 4 is a schematic block diagram of a first terminal provided in an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of a chip provided in an embodiment of the present application;

fig. 7 is a schematic block diagram of a secure communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application.

Detailed Description

The following description of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be made with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application, and it is apparent that the described embodiments are some embodiments of the present application, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by one of ordinary skill in the art without undue burden from the present disclosure, are within the scope of the present disclosure.

Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a secure communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application.

As shown in fig. 1, the secure communication system 100 may include a terminal device 110 and a key management device 120. The key management device 120 may communicate with the terminal device 110 over the air. Multi-service transmission is supported between the terminal device 110 and the key management device 120.

It should be understood that the embodiments of the present application are illustrated by way of example only with respect to secure communication system 100, but the embodiments of the present application are not so limited. That is, the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application may be applied to various communication systems to encrypt and transmit service data in the various communication systems; by way of example, various communication systems include, but are not limited to, long term evolution (Long Term Evolution, LTE) systems, LTE time division duplexing (Time Division Duplex, TDD), universal mobile telecommunications system (Universal Mobile Telec ommunication System, UMTS), internet of things (Internet of Things, ioT) systems, narrowband internet of things (Narrow Band Internet of Things, NB-IoT) systems, enhanced Machine-type communication (eMTC) systems, fifth generation mobile telecommunications technology (5th Generation Mobile Communication Technology,5G) communication systems, also known as New Radio, NR) communication systems, or future communication systems.

In the secure communication system 100 shown in fig. 1, the key management device 120 is a device that communicates with each terminal device 110 in the secure communication system 100, and provides a key or key management service for a service in the secure communication system 100. By way of example, key management device 120 may be a unified (quantum) secure services platform that provides unified key management services for a variety of different services; the key management platform of a specific service, for example, a key management platform of a Voice over Long Term Evolution (VoLTE) encrypted call service, and the key management platform is specially used for providing key management service for the VoLTE encrypted call service.

By way of example, key management device 120 may be implemented as a notebook, tablet, desktop, mobile device (e.g., mobile phone, portable music player, personal digital assistant, portable gaming device), a terminal where the smart robot is capable of providing key management services, or as a server. Here, the server may be a single server, or may be a server cluster including a plurality of servers, a cloud computing center, or the like.

Terminal device 110 includes, but is not limited to, any terminal device that employs a wired or wireless connection with key management device 120 or other terminal devices.

By way of example, terminal device 110 may refer to an access terminal, user Equipment (UE), subscriber unit, subscriber station, mobile station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, wireless communication device, user agent, or User Equipment. An access terminal may be a cellular telephone, a cordless telephone, a session initiation protocol (Session Initiation Protocol, SIP) phone, an IoT device, a satellite handset, a wireless local loop (Wireless Local Loop, WLL) station, a personal digital assistant (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), a handset with wireless communication capabilities, a computing device or other processing device connected to a wireless modem, an in-vehicle device, a wearable device, a terminal device in a 5G network or a terminal device in a future evolution network, etc.

The terminal Device 110 may be used for Device-to-Device (D2D) communication.

Fig. 1 exemplarily shows one key management device 120 and two terminal devices 110, and alternatively, the key communication system 100 may include a plurality of key management devices 120 and may include other numbers of terminal devices within a management range of each key management device 120, which is not particularly limited in the embodiment of the present application.

It should be noted that fig. 1 illustrates, by way of example, a system to which the present application is applicable, and of course, the method shown in the embodiment of the present application may be applicable to other systems. Furthermore, the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably herein. The term "and/or" is herein merely an association relationship describing an associated object, meaning that there may be three relationships, e.g., a and/or B, may represent: a exists alone, A and B exist together, and B exists alone. In addition, the character "/" herein generally indicates that the front and rear associated objects are an "or" relationship. It should also be understood that, in the embodiments of the present application, the "indication" may be a direct indication, an indirect indication, or an indication that there is an association relationship. For example, a indicates B, which may mean that a indicates B directly, e.g., B may be obtained by a; it may also indicate that a indicates B indirectly, e.g. a indicates C, B may be obtained by C; it may also be indicated that there is an association between a and B. It should also be understood that, in the embodiments of the present application, reference to "corresponding" may mean that there is a direct correspondence or an indirect correspondence between the two, or may mean that there is an association between the two, or may be a relationship between an instruction and an indicated, configured, or the like. It should also be understood that "predefined" or "predefined rules" mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented by pre-storing corresponding codes, tables or other manners that may be used to indicate relevant information in devices (e.g., including terminal devices and network devices), and the present application is not limited to a specific implementation thereof. Such as predefined may refer to what is defined in the protocol. It should also be understood that, in the embodiments of the present application, the "protocol" may refer to a standard protocol in the field of communications, and may include, for example, an LTE protocol, an NR protocol, and related protocols applied in future communication systems, which are not limited in this application.

In order to facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the following description is given of related technologies of the embodiments of the present application, and the following related technologies may be optionally combined with the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application as an alternative, which all belong to the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.

Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing embodiments of the present application only and is not intended to be limiting of the present application.

Prior to explaining the present application, a description is made here of a key agreement scheme in the related art:

key negotiation scheme based on digital envelope mechanism under asymmetric cryptosystem: the terminals adopt a digital envelope mode to negotiate a shared session key between the two communication parties, thereby realizing secret communication. Digital envelopes are implemented based on asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms and are widely used in secure communication systems.

Illustratively, in a secure telephone system, the calling and called terminals a and B each hold a legal digital certificate issued by a certificate authority CA. Under the architecture with a key management center, the key management center generates a shared session key for both the calling party and the called party in the call establishment process, encrypts the key by using the public key of each certificate of A, B and then sends the encrypted key to the corresponding terminal. The terminal adopts the private key corresponding to the certificate to decrypt, so as to obtain the session key, and further adopts a symmetric cryptographic algorithm to encrypt and decrypt the voice information of the user. Or under the architecture of the keyless management center, the terminals A and B can mutually carry out identity authentication based on the digital certificate, then the terminal A autonomously generates a session key and sends the session key to the terminal B in a digital envelope mode, so that two parties can obtain the same session key for encrypted communication.

However, with the development of quantum computing technology, the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (for example, the shell algorithm) designed based on the complex mathematical problem of large number decomposition and discrete logarithm can be cracked in polynomial time, so that the traditional key negotiation mechanism based on digital envelope faces security threat, and cannot ensure the security of the session key negotiation process. Therefore, the unilateral adoption of the quantum key technology cannot ensure that the quantum session key is not revealed in the negotiation process, so that the overall security of the system is damaged, so that in order to resist potential quantum computing attacks, a secret communication system, particularly a quantum secret communication system, is not suitable for adopting the method, and an asymmetric cryptographic technology is avoided as much as possible when a cryptographic scheme is designed, and the occurrence of a 'security short board' in the session key negotiation process is avoided.

Key acquisition scheme based on central key distribution mechanism under symmetric cryptosystem: secure communication systems based on symmetric cryptosystems require the distribution of session keys used for secure communication with each other to their underlying terminal devices via a key management center. In order to ensure the security of the session key distribution process, a key management center usually presets a plurality of symmetric keys in a secure medium/secure storage space of the terminal device in an off-line filling manner, so as to be used for performing encryption protection on the distributed session keys.

For example, in a secure telephone system, when a terminal establishes an encrypted call, a key management center generates a shared session key for a calling terminal a and a calling terminal B, encrypts the session key using a symmetric key pre-shared with a A, B terminal, respectively, and then transmits the encrypted session key to the corresponding terminal. The terminal decrypts using the corresponding symmetric key to obtain the shared session key, and further, encrypted communication is achieved between A, B.

For a system adopting the quantum key technology, a quantum key management center pre-charges a quantum symmetric key for a terminal, and generates a quantum session key for a calling terminal and a called terminal when a call is encrypted. Each encryption call calling and called terminal A and B respectively uses the pre-charged quantum symmetric key to communicate with the quantum key management center, and the session key is obtained through encryption.

In the above scheme, the calling and called terminals need to be respectively accessed to the key management center to acquire the session key, which requires that both the calling and called terminals and the key management center keep good network connection. If one end of the network is in poor connection, the establishment of the secret communication service is failed. Although this is not usually easy to happen, in order to increase the success rate of the service, to ensure the establishment of a secure communication service in a severe network environment, this method of establishing a dual connection should be avoided.

Fig. 2 is a flow chart of a secure communication processing method according to an embodiment of the present application, as shown in fig. 2, where the method is applied to a terminal device 110 in the secure communication system 100 shown in fig. 1, and the method includes:

step 201, a first message is sent to a first device.

The first message includes identification information related to the first terminal and identification information related to the second terminal.

In the embodiment of the application, the first terminal can perform secure communication with at least one second terminal. The second terminal can be one or a plurality of second terminals, and the second terminals can be used for multiparty secret communication when the second terminals are a plurality of second terminals.

Note that secure communications include, but are not limited to, encrypted conversations, encrypted short messages, encrypted instant messages, encrypted audio video conferences, encrypted fifth generation mobile communication technology (5th Generation Mobile Communication Technology,5G) messages (e.g., rich media service (Rich Communication Services, RCS) messages), encrypted intercom messages, encrypted mail, and the like.

In this embodiment of the present application, the identification information may be identification information of a terminal, and exemplary identification information includes, but is not limited to, mobile station international integrated services digital network number (Mobile Station international Integrated Services Digital Network number, MSISDN), international mobile subscriber identity (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI), international mobile equipment identity (International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI), service identification (e.g., domain name of the terminal, etc.), service number of a certain application of the user (e.g., user identification of software such as chat software installed on the terminal, communication software, etc.).

In the embodiment of the present application, the first device is a device that provides a key or a key management service for at least two terminals that perform secure communications in the secure communication system, that is, the first device is the key management device 120 in fig. 1. The first device includes, but is not limited to, a key management center (Key Management Center, KMC), a key management system (Key Management System, KMS), a key service center, a security service center, a key management platform/facility that provides services for a particular service, and the like.

By way of example, the KMC/KMS may be a (quantum) key management center; and can also be a (quantum) security service platform for providing unified key management services for a plurality of different services. Brackets herein indicate alternatives.

Illustratively, the key management platform for a particular service includes a key management platform for (quantum) encrypted telephony services that provides key management services for VoLTE/VoNR encrypted telephony services.

The first device may be referred to as a (quantum) cryptographic security service center, a (quantum) cryptographic service center, a (quantum) security center, or the like.

In some embodiments, the KMC/KMS can be deployed either on the carrier side or on the user side. When deployed on the operator side, the operator manages the passwords used by the users; when deployed on the user side, the method is a resident deployment mode, and at the moment, the user manages the used passwords by himself, so that the control degree of the user on the passwords can be improved.

It should be noted that, whether the first device is disposed on the operator side or the user side, the first device is independent of the mobile communication network managed by the operator, and can support independent access of the terminal. Therefore, the first device is irrelevant to the mobile communication network managed by the operator, and the KMC/KMS can access the session key corresponding to the communication application at the same time when the terminal device initiates communication, so that the processing of the operator network is not needed. This parallel approach is more efficient.

In addition, the method has no influence and change on the operator network, a special server does not need to be arranged in the operator network to manage the secret communication service, the special server does not need to be arranged to be in butt joint with the first equipment, and the complexity of system implementation and the cost of construction and operation and maintenance of the operator are simplified.

In this embodiment of the present application, the first key is sent in the manner that: in-band, out-of-band, media, signaling, data, messages, control plane, user plane, etc. The existing encrypted call service is realized through a media channel based on an in-band mode, so that the first key is preferably sent through a media surface in an in-band mode, thereby being better compatible with the existing system and reducing the cost of system reconstruction. In addition, when multiparty secret communication is carried out, the established media surface communication channel is a one-to-many multicast/broadcast communication channel, so that the other terminals can receive the first secret key only once through the established multicast/broadcast communication channel, and the sending quantity of messages is effectively reduced.

In the embodiment of the present application, the first message may be a request, a response, an indication, a reply, or the like.

In the embodiment of the application, the first message may further include a session identifier or a timestamp or a sequence number.

Here, the session identifier is used to distinguish between different secure communication service requests, and to associate related information of the same service request as an index. The session identification may be an ordered or unordered, obtained according to a certain rule, or randomly generated number. The session identification may be generated by the first terminal or by the first device.

Here, a time stamp or a sequence number may be carried in the first message for preventing the first message from being replayed.

Step 202, receiving a second message sent by the first device.

The second message includes a first key for the first terminal to perform secure communication with the second terminal.

In the embodiment of the application, after receiving the first message, the first device generates a first key and sends a second message carrying the first key to the first terminal. The first terminal receives a second message sent by the first device. The first key may be a quantum key or a normal key generated by a pseudo-random number generator/physical noise source generator. If the first key is a quantum key, the quantum key may be generated by a quantum random number generator or by negotiating with the peer through a quantum key distribution (Quantum key distribution, QKD) network, and then provided to the first device through a QKD network node or a quantum key security service center.

In the embodiment of the application, the first key may be directly generated by the first device; but may also be generated by other devices associated with the first device.

In the embodiment of the present application, the second message includes, but is not limited to, a request message, an indication message, a response message, an Acknowledgement (ACK) message, and the like.

In some embodiments, the second message may also include a session identification. If the first message carries the session identifier, the session identifier in the second message may be the same as the session identifier in the first message; if the first message does not carry the session identifier, the first device can allocate the session identifier to the service and carry the session identifier in the second message to be sent to the first terminal. Session identification may also be referred to as service identification, etc.

The second message may also include a time stamp or sequence number for preventing the second message from being replayed.

Step 203, the first key is sent to the second terminal.

In the embodiment of the application, the first terminal analyzes the second message to obtain the first key; and transmitting the first key to at least one second terminal. That is, when the secret communication method provided by the application is used for processing the secret communication service of at least two terminals, the terminal devices of both secret communication parties do not need to be accessed into the first device, and the first secret key is acquired through one of the terminal security single connection modes, so that the success rate of establishing the secret communication service can be improved.

In this embodiment of the present application, when the second terminals are multiple, the first terminal may send the first key to multiple second terminals at the same time; the first key may be sent to the plurality of second terminals sequentially.

The manner of sending the first key includes, but is not limited to, in-band, out-of-band, media, signaling, data, messages, control plane, and user plane. The encrypted call service in the related art distributes the session key in the media channel based on an in-band mode, so that the first key can be sent through the media channel in an in-band mode, and the encrypted call service is better compatible with a related system and reduces the cost of system reconstruction. In addition, when multiparty secret communication is carried out, the established media surface communication channel is a one-to-many multicast/broadcast communication channel, so that the other terminals can receive the first secret key only once through the established multicast/broadcast communication channel, and the sending quantity of messages is effectively reduced.

In the method provided by the embodiment of the invention, under the scene that the first terminal needs to carry out secret communication with the second terminal, the first terminal sends a first message comprising the secret communication multiparty identifier, such as a key request message, to the first device, and the first device distributes a first key, such as a session key, for the secret communication multiparty and feeds back the session key to the first terminal; obviously, the first device directly provides the session key for the secret communication multiparty terminal based on the key request message, and each terminal of the communication multiparty terminal does not need to interact with the first device to acquire the session key, so that the establishment of secret communication service in a severe network environment is ensured, the success rate of secret communication service establishment is improved, and network transmission resources are saved.

The scheme for acquiring the session key based on the symmetric cryptosystem avoids the risk that an asymmetric cryptoalgorithm in the asymmetric cryptosystem is cracked by quantum computation in polynomial time, and improves the safety of the system.

In some embodiments, after both the first terminal and the second terminal receive the first key, the first terminal performs secure communication with the second terminal based on the first key.

In some embodiments, the method provided by the embodiment of the invention comprises the following steps:

and A1, sending a first message to the first device through the first secure channel.

In this embodiment of the present application, the first secure channel may be a secure channel for data transmission between the first terminal and the first device. A secure channel is understood herein to be a communication channel that uses a shared key between two devices to encrypt information, integrity protect information, etc., to enable secure transmission of information between the two devices.

In some embodiments, step A1 of sending the first message to the first device through the first secure channel may be implemented by:

part or all of the first message is encrypted and/or integrity protected and sent using the second key.

Here, the second key is a symmetric key shared between the first terminal and the first device or a symmetric key derived based on the shared symmetric key. The symmetric key may be pre-placed in the first terminal by the first device in an off-line filling manner for subsequent secure communication between the first terminal and the first device. The symmetric key may be one pair or a plurality of pairs. The symmetric key may be generated using a (quantum) random number generator.

In the embodiment of the present application, in the case where the derivative key is adopted in contract, the derivative key may be obtained by the formula (1).

K’＝KDF(K，String，…) (1)

Wherein the KDF is a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function); k is the original symmetric key; k' is a symmetric key derived based on the original symmetric key; string is a String representing the purpose of the derived key, illustratively the String of the Encryption key is "Encryption" and the String of the Integrity protection key is "Integrity". It should be noted that other input parameters may be included in the key derivation function, such as identification of the terminal and/or the (quantum) key management center.

In some embodiments, encrypting and/or integrity protecting part or all of the first message with the second key comprises:

Encrypting part or all of the first message based on the second key to obtain an encrypted first message; a message authentication code is calculated for some or all of the first message based on the second key.

Obviously, the second secret key is used for encrypting part or all of the first message and/or protecting the integrity, so that the content of the first message can be prevented from being eavesdropped and tampered, and the safety of the first message is ensured.

It should be noted that, the steps of encrypting and calculating the message authentication code may be performed simultaneously, or the message authentication code may be first encrypted and then calculated, or the message authentication code may be first calculated and then encrypted, which is not limited specifically. Encrypting the first message may be: at least one of the first terminal related identification information, the second terminal related identification information, the session identification (optional), the timestamp and the sequence number in the first message is encrypted. The integrity protection of the first message may be: at least one of the identification information of the first terminal, the identification information of the second terminal, the session identification (optional), the key identification of the second key, the timestamp, and the sequence number in the first message is integrity protected.

After the first device receives the first message, the first device decrypts and/or integrity-protects the first message after partial or complete encryption and/or integrity protection by using the second key, and knows that the first message is a key request for carrying out encrypted communication between the first terminal and the second terminal. And the first device allocates a session key for the encrypted call. And carrying the session key in the second message, encrypting part or all of the second message by using the second key and/or protecting the integrity, and then transmitting the second message to the first terminal.

Step A2, the first terminal receives a second message sent by the first device through a first secure channel, wherein the second message comprises; further, the method can be as follows: the first terminal receives the second message; wherein part or all of the second message is encrypted and/or integrity protected using a second key.

The first terminal then decrypts and/or verifies the integrity of part or all of the second message using the second key to obtain the first key. And then the first key is sent to the second terminal.

Further, in order to secure the transmission of the first key between the first terminal and the second terminal. After receiving the first message and distributing the first key, the first device respectively encrypts and/or protects the integrity of the first key, and the method comprises the following steps: the first key is encrypted and/or integrity protected with the second key and/or the first key is encrypted and/or integrity protected with the third key. Wherein the second key is a shared key between the first terminal and the first device, and the third key is a shared key between the second terminal and the first device.

Further, the second message sent by the first device includes: a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a second key, and/or a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a third key. Of course, other information may also be included in the second message, for example: session identification (optional), key identification, first terminal identification, second terminal identification, timestamp, serial number, etc.

Thus, after the first terminal receives the second message, the second key can be used for decrypting and/or checking the integrity of the first key encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key, so as to obtain the first key and other information. But because the first terminal does not have the third key, which is a shared key of the first device and the second terminal, the first terminal cannot decrypt and/or verify the integrity of the first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with the third key.

Further, when the first terminal transmits the first key to the second terminal, the first terminal transmits the first key encrypted and/or integrity protected by the third key. And after the second terminal receives the first key, the first key which is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the third key is decrypted and/or integrity checked by using the pre-shared third key, so that the first key is obtained. Of course, the first terminal may send other information, such as session identifier (optional), key identifier, first terminal identifier, second terminal identifier, timestamp, serial number, etc., at the same time as the first key is sent to the second terminal. After decryption and/or integrity verification, the second terminal may obtain other information in addition to the first key.

By the method, the transmission safety of the first secret key between the first equipment and the first terminal can be skillfully protected, and meanwhile, the transmission safety of the first secret key between the first terminal and the second terminal is also protected. No additional processing overhead is introduced for the first terminal either.

It should be noted that the third key may be a symmetric key shared between the second terminal and the first device or a symmetric key derived based on the shared symmetric key. The symmetric key may be pre-placed in the second terminal by the first device in an off-line filling manner for subsequent secure communication between the second terminal and the first device. The symmetric key may be one pair or a plurality of pairs. The symmetric key may be generated using a (quantum) random number generator.

K’＝KDF(K，String，…) (1)

In addition, the shared key in the embodiment of the present invention may also be referred to as a symmetric key, a base key, a working key, a key protection key, an authentication key, or an access key.

It should be understood that, if there are a plurality of terminals that communicate with the first terminal, that is, the first terminal is to perform secure communication with the second terminal, the third terminal, the fourth terminal, … …, and the nth terminal, the second message may further include: a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a fourth key, and/or a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a fifth key, … …, and/or a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with an n+1th key.

Wherein the fourth key is a shared key of the third terminal and the first device, the fifth key is a shared key of the fourth terminal and the first device, the n+1-th key is a shared key of the N-th terminal and the first device; n is a positive integer greater than 4.

The fourth and fifth keys … …, n+1 keys are similar to the second and third keys and will not be described again here.

It should be noted that, in the scenario of multiparty secret communication, the second message includes the first key encrypted by the shared key between the corresponding terminal and the first device; when the first terminal forwards the first key to other terminals, the first key is respectively encrypted by the shared key between the corresponding terminal and the first device, so that the first key can be correctly received by the other terminals, and the safety of the first key distribution process is ensured.

When the first terminal forwards the first key for encryption and/or integrity protection to each terminal, the first key may be sent uniformly or separately. Further, each terminal decrypts and/or verifies the received encrypted and/or integrity-protected first key to obtain the first key. The secret communication processing method provided by the application can be applied to secret communication services participated by two terminal devices and secret communication services participated by a plurality of terminal devices, for example, the secret communication processing method can be applied to secret multiparty calls, multiparty secret voice/video conferences, secret group messages, secret multiparty talkbacks and other service applications.

In some embodiments, after step 203 sends the first key to the second terminal, the method further comprises:

and receiving a third message sent by the second terminal.

Wherein the third message is used for indicating that the second terminal receives the first key. The indication here may be that the third message includes a specific indication field, or that the third message itself indicates that the second terminal receives the first key, etc.

In this embodiment of the present application, part or all of the third message may be encrypted and/or integrity protected by using the first key, and then sent to the first terminal.

In the embodiment of the application, the first message, the second message, and the third message include, but are not limited to, a feedback message, an indication message, response information, a response message, and an acknowledgement message.

In some embodiments, in the scenario of secure communications by multiple parties, the third terminal, fourth terminal, … …, nth terminal may also return a message indicating successful receipt of the first key in addition to the second terminal. Of course, in the scenario of secret communication by multiple parties, the second to nth terminals may not reply to the message indicating successful receipt of the first key.

Fig. 3 is a flow chart of a method for processing secure communications provided in an embodiment of the present application in the context of encrypting voice telephony services.

Step 301, terminal a initiates an encrypted phone call request.

In the embodiment of the application, when the user dials the encrypted phone, the calling terminal A initiates an encrypted phone call request.

Step 302, encrypt the call connection procedure.

In the embodiment of the application, the calling terminal A and the called terminal B carry out incoming call connection through an application server (Application Server, AS). For encrypted telephony services for voice over internet protocol (Internet Protocol, IP) (Voice over Internet Protocol, voIP), the AS is a session initiation protocol (Session initialization Protocol, SIP) server responsible for implementing telephony services functions; for encrypted telephony services based on Long Term Evolution Voice-over-Term Evolution (VoLTE) or new air-interface carried Voice (Voice over New Radio, voNR) or landline telephony, AS is the server responsible for telephony services in the IP multimedia subsystem (IP Multimedia Subsystem, IMS).

Step 303, terminal a sends a key request (terminal a identifier, terminal B identifier, session identifier, K) to the (quantum) key management center _ID A, timestamp, HMAC ₁ )。

In this embodiment of the present application, in the process of call connection, the calling terminal a sends a key request message to the (quantum) key management center, and obtains a (quantum) session key for the encrypted phone call application, so as to encrypt and protect the voice information of the user. The request message should carry identification information of the calling terminal a and the called terminal B, which is used for indicating the two communication parties.

It should be noted that, the request message may also carry a session identifier, which is used to distinguish different secret communication service requests, and associate related information of the same service request as an index. The session identification may be an ordered or unordered, obtained according to a certain rule, or randomly generated number. In addition, the request message can also carry a time stamp or serial number information to prevent the replay of the message.

In order to prevent interception and tampering of the contents of the key request message, and to ensure the security of the message, terminal a obtains locally an unused pre-configured (quantum) symmetric key K _A Key identification K _ID A. Thereafter, K is used _A Or based on K _A Derived symmetric key K _A ' encrypt and/or integrity protect all or part of the contents of the key request message. Illustratively, the identity, session identity (optional), time stamp or serial number of the calling terminal a and/or the called terminal B is encrypted; identification of calling terminal a and/or called terminal B, session identification (optional), key identification K _ID Integrity protection is performed on a, time stamp or sequence number to obtain an integrity protected verification result, e.g., a Hash-based message authentication code (Hash-based Message Authentication Code, HMAC) function is used to calculate an integrity protected verification result HMAC ₁ . The calling terminal A identifies the key K _ID Verification of a and integrity protection results HMAC ₁ Carried in the key request message.

In step 303, the calling terminal a sends a key request to the (quantum) key management center; here, step 303 may also be that the called terminal B sends a key request to the (quantum) key management center, that is, the sending of the key request to the (quantum) key management center may be any terminal in the secret communication.

In the case where the contract employs a derivative key, the key derivation is as follows: k' =kdf (K, string, …). Wherein KDF (Key Derivation Function) is a key derivation function; k is the original key, e.g. K _A The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the K' is derived key result, e.g. K _A 'A'; string is a String representing the purpose of the derived key, e.g. "Encryption" is an Encryption key, "Integrity" is an Integrity protection key, etc.; in addition, other input parameters can be included in the KDF function, such asIdentification of the terminal and/or (quantum) key management center, etc.

Step 304, (quantum) key management center obtains preconfigured shared symmetric key K _A The key request message is authenticated and decrypted, generating a session key Ks.

In this embodiment of the present application, after the (quantum) key management center receives the key request message, the (quantum) key management center queries and obtains a (quantum) symmetric key K shared with the terminal a in a preconfigured manner according to the calling terminal identifier and the key identifier _A And use K _A Or based on K _A Derived symmetric key K _A ' integrity protection checking and decryption of the key request message. The freshness of the key request message is then verified based on the timestamp or sequence number (if any) carried in the request message.

In the embodiment of the application, after the integrity and freshness of the request message are verified, the (quantum) key management center queries and acquires a (quantum) symmetric key K shared with the terminal B in a pre-configuration mode according to the called terminal identification _B K is as follows _B The corresponding key identifier K _ID And B. Meanwhile, the (quantum) key management center generates a (quantum) session key Ks for the present call. For the case of using a quantum session key, the quantum session key Ks may be generated by a quantum random number generator, or may be generated by negotiating with the peer through a QKD network, and the specific manner should be determined according to the situation of the call.

Step 305, (quantum) key management center sends a key response (msg_a, HMAC) to calling terminal a _A ，Msg_B，HMAC _B )。

In this embodiment, for the calling terminal a, the information to be provided by the (quantum) key management center to the calling terminal a includes: (Quantum) session key Ks, session identification (received from key request message), key identification K _ID A, the identity of the calling and called terminals, and/or a timestamp or sequence number. To prevent this part of the message content from being eavesdropped and tampered, ensuring the security of the transmission process, (quantum) key management centers use K _A Or based on K _A Derived symmetric key K _A ' encryption and/or integrity protection of all or part of the information content. For example, encrypting a (quantum) session key Ks, a session identification (optional) or key identification, a calling and called terminal identification, a timestamp or serial number, etc.; for (quantum) session key Ks, session identification (optional), key identification K _ID Carrying out integrity protection on the_A, the calling terminal identifier, the called terminal identifier, the time stamp or the serial number and the like to obtain an integrity protection verification result, such as HMAC _A 。

For the called terminal B, the information to be provided by the (quantum) key management center to B includes: (Quantum) session key Ks, session identification (received from key request message), key identification K _ID B, the identity of the calling and called terminal, and/or a timestamp or sequence number. To prevent this part of the message content from being eavesdropped and tampered, ensuring the security of the transmission process, (quantum) key management centers use K _B Or based on K _B Derived symmetric key K _B ' encryption and/or integrity protection of all or part of the information content. For example, encrypting a (quantum) session key Ks, a session identification (optional), a calling and called terminal identification, a time stamp, a serial number, or the like; for (quantum) session key Ks, session identification (optional), key identification K _ID B, the identification of the calling terminal, the called terminal, the time stamp or the serial number and the like are subjected to integrity protection, and a verification result of the integrity protection, such as HMAC, is obtained _B 。

Then, the (quantum) key management center returns a key response message to the calling terminal a, wherein the response message comprises: the encrypted and/or integrity protected session key Ks, related information (which may or may not be encrypted and/or integrity protected) provided to A (Ks and related information are denoted as Msg_A), HMAC _A The encrypted and/or integrity protected session key Ks provided to B, related information (which may or may not be encrypted and/or integrity protected) (Ks and related information are denoted as Msg_B), HMAC _B Etc.

In embodiments of the present application, the (quantum) key management center will be usedK _A And K _B Destroying.

Step 306, the terminal a verifies the msg_a in the key response message and decrypts the msg_a to obtain the session key Ks.

In this embodiment of the present application, according to the session identifier or the key identifier in msg_a, the calling terminal a confirms that K is used _A Or based on K _A Derived symmetric key K _A ' integrity protection checking and decryption are performed on msg_a in the key response message. Thereafter, the freshness of the portion of the key response message msg_a is verified based on the timestamp or sequence number (if any) in msg_a.

In this embodiment of the present application, after the integrity and freshness of the msg_a portion pass verification, the calling terminal a obtains a (quantum) session key Ks allocated by the (quantum) key management center for the encrypted call.

In this embodiment, the calling terminal a locally uses K _A Destroying.

Step 307, terminal a sends session key Ks (msg_b, HMAC) to terminal B _B )。

In this embodiment, the calling terminal a sends the session key Ks to the called terminal B, and the message carries the related information provided by the (quantum) key management center to the called terminal B, including msg_ B, HMAC _B Etc. to base the called terminal B on Msg B, HMAC _B A session key Ks is obtained.

If step 303 is that the called terminal B sends a key request to the (quantum) key management center, step 307 forwards msg_ A, HMAC provided by the (quantum) key management center by the called terminal B to the calling terminal a _A Enabling it to obtain the session key Ks and related information.

Step 308, the terminal B verifies the msg_b in the message and decrypts it to obtain the session key Ks.

In the embodiment of the application, the K is identified according to the key in the Msg_B _ID B, the called terminal B obtains the corresponding preconfigured (quantum) symmetric key K by local inquiry _B And use K _B Or based on K _B Derived symmetric key K _B ' complete msg_b carried in messageAnd (5) performing sex protection verification and decryption. Thereafter, the freshness of msg_b is verified based on the timestamp or sequence number (if any) in msg_b.

In the embodiment of the application, after the integrity and freshness of the msg_b pass verification, the called terminal B obtains the information such as the (quantum) session key Ks, session identifier (optional) and the like allocated by the (quantum) key management center for the encrypted call.

In the embodiment of the application, the called terminal B locally uses the used K _B Destroying.

Step 309, terminal B sends a confirmation session key (session identification, HMAC) to terminal a ₂ )。

In the embodiment of the application, the called terminal B returns a session key confirmation message to confirm (quantum) that the session key Ks has been successfully received to the calling terminal a. The message may carry the session identification (received from msg_b) of the encrypted call and may be encrypted and/or integrity protected using Ks. In the case of integrity protection, the message should carry the corresponding integrity protection verification result HMAC ₂ 。

In some embodiments, the transmission and confirmation of the session key Ks in steps 307 and 309 may be accomplished by any information channel means. For example, it may be a signaling channel, a data channel, a media channel, etc. For example, for an encrypted phone implemented based on a system such as VoLTE/VoNR/VoIP/IMS landline phone, after a called user answers, a transmission channel of user voice information established by a network can complete sending and confirmation of a session key in an in-band manner; the sending of the session key and the confirmation information can be carried in the SIP signaling and can be completed in an in-band mode through a signaling channel; the sending and confirmation of the session key can also be completed in an out-of-band channel mode by sending short messages, instant messages, session messages (messages) and the like.

Step 310, verifying the message, and confirming that the session key of the called terminal is successfully acquired.

In the embodiment of the application, the calling terminal a confirms that the called terminal B has successfully acquired the (quantum) session key Ks. It will be appreciated that the calling terminal a uses the local Ks to decrypt and/or integrity protection check the session identification in the acknowledgment message. The calling terminal a confirms whether the called terminal B successfully acquires the (quantum) session key Ks by comparing whether the decrypted session identification is consistent with the original session identification recorded locally or checking whether the integrity-protected check result is correct.

Step 311, terminal a and terminal B perform encrypted call.

In this embodiment of the present application, after the (quantum) session key Ks of the present call is successfully obtained, the calling terminal a and the called terminal B use Ks to encrypt and protect the voice information interacted between the users, and start the encrypted call. After the call is ended, the calling and called terminals destroy the (quantum) session key Ks used at this time.

In some embodiments, a number of shared (quantum) symmetric keys, such as K, are pre-configured between the (quantum) key management center and the terminals _A ，K _B . The shared symmetric key can be generated by a (quantum) key management center by using a local (quantum) random number generator and is safely written into a secure medium/secure storage space of the terminal in an off-line filling mode for later use by the terminal. The shared symmetric key plays a role in carrying out security protection such as encryption, integrity protection, source authentication and the like on related information (such as session identification, (quantum) session key Ks and the like) interacted between the terminal and the (quantum) key management center in the secret communication service process.

An embodiment of the present application provides a first terminal, which may be used to implement a secure communication processing method provided in the embodiment corresponding to fig. 2, with reference to fig. 4, where the first terminal 40 includes:

a sending module 401, configured to send a first message to a first device; the first message comprises identification information related to the first terminal and identification information related to the second terminal;

a receiving module 402, configured to receive a second message sent by the first device; wherein the second message includes a first key for the first terminal to communicate securely with the second terminal;

the sending module 401 is further configured to send the first key to the second terminal.

In other embodiments of the present application, the first terminal 40 further includes a processing module 403;

a processing module 403, configured to perform secure communication with the second terminal based on the first key.

In other embodiments of the present application, the sending module 401 is configured to send a first message to a first device through a first secure channel; and/or the number of the groups of groups,

a receiving module 402, configured to receive, through a first secure channel, a second message sent by the first device.

In other embodiments of the present application, the processing module 403 is configured to encrypt and/or integrity protect part or all of the first message with the second key; and/or the number of the groups of groups,

A receiving module 402, configured to receive a second message sent by the first device; wherein part or all of the second message is encrypted and/or integrity protected using the second key; wherein the second key is a shared key between the first terminal and the first device.

In other embodiments of the present application, the processing module 403 is configured to decrypt and/or verify the integrity of part or all of the second message by using the second key, to obtain the first key.

In other embodiments of the present application, the second message includes: a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a second key and/or a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a third key; the second key is a shared key between the first terminal and the first device, and the third key is a shared key between the second terminal and the first device.

In other embodiments of the present application, the sending module 401 is further configured to send the first key after encryption and/or integrity protection by using the third key to the second terminal.

In other embodiments of the present application, the receiving module 402 is configured to receive a third message sent by the second terminal; wherein the third message is used for indicating that the second terminal receives the first key.

The description of the apparatus embodiments above is similar to that of the method embodiments above, with similar advantageous effects as the method embodiments. For technical details not disclosed in the apparatus embodiments of the present application, please refer to the description of the method embodiments of the present application for understanding.

In the embodiment of the present application, if the above-mentioned secure communication processing method is implemented in the form of a software functional module, and sold or used as a separate product, the secure communication processing method may also be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application may be essentially or part contributing to the related art, and the computer software product may be stored in a storage medium, and include several instructions to cause a terminal device to execute all or part of the methods of the embodiments of the present application. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: various media capable of storing program codes, such as a U disk, a removable hard disk, a ROM, a magnetic disk or an optical disk. Thus, embodiments of the present application are not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.

Fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 500 provided in an embodiment of the present application. The communication device may be a terminal device or a key management device. The communication device 500 shown in fig. 5 comprises a first processor 510, which first processor 510 may call and run a computer program from a memory to implement the method in the embodiments of the present application.

Optionally, as shown in fig. 5, the communication device 500 may further comprise a first memory 520. Wherein the first processor 510 may call and run a computer program from the first memory 520 to implement the method in the embodiments of the present application.

The first memory 520 may be a separate device independent of the first processor 510, or may be integrated into the first processor 510.

Optionally, as shown in fig. 5, the communication device 500 may further include a transceiver 530, and the first processor 510 may control the transceiver 530 to communicate with other devices, and in particular, may send information or data to other devices, or receive information or data sent by other devices.

Wherein the transceiver 530 may include a transmitter and a receiver. The transceiver 530 may further include antennas, the number of which may be one or more.

Optionally, the communication device 500 may be specifically a first terminal/second terminal in the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 500 may implement a corresponding flow implemented by the first terminal/second terminal in each method in the embodiment of the present application, which is not described herein for brevity.

Optionally, the communication device 500 may be specifically a first device in the embodiments of the present application, and the communication device 500 may implement a corresponding flow implemented by the first device in each method in the embodiments of the present application, which is not described herein for brevity.

Fig. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip of an embodiment of the present application. The chip 600 shown in fig. 6 includes a second processor 610, and the second processor 610 may call and run a computer program from a memory to implement the method in the embodiments of the present application.

Optionally, as shown in fig. 6, the chip 600 may further include a second memory 620. Wherein the second processor 610 may call and run a computer program from the second memory 620 to implement the method in the embodiments of the present application.

The second memory 620 may be a separate device from the second processor 610, or may be integrated into the second processor 610.

Optionally, the chip 600 may also include an input interface 630. The second processor 610 may control the input interface 630 to communicate with other devices or chips, and in particular, may acquire information or data sent by other devices or chips.

Optionally, the chip 600 may further include an output interface 640. The second processor 610 may control the output interface 640 to communicate with other devices or chips, and in particular, may output information or data to other devices or chips.

Optionally, the chip may be applied to the first device in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip may implement a corresponding flow implemented by the first device in each method in the embodiment of the present application, which is not described herein for brevity.

Optionally, the chip may be applied to the first terminal/second terminal in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip may implement a corresponding flow implemented by the first terminal/second terminal in each method in the embodiment of the present application, which is not described herein for brevity.

It should be understood that the chips referred to in the embodiments of the present application may also be referred to as system-on-chip chips, or the like.

Fig. 7 is a schematic block diagram of a secure communication system 70 provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in fig. 7, the secure communication system 70 includes a terminal device 110 and a key management device 120.

The terminal device 110 may be used to implement the corresponding functions implemented by the first terminal/second terminal in the above method, and the key management device 120 may be used to implement the corresponding functions implemented by the first device in the above method, which are not described herein for brevity.

It should be appreciated that the processor of an embodiment of the present application may be an integrated circuit chip having signal processing capabilities. In implementation, the steps of the above method embodiments may be implemented by integrated logic circuits of hardware in a processor or instructions in software form. The processor may be a general purpose processor, a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), an off-the-shelf programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware components. The disclosed methods, steps, and logic blocks in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented or performed. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like. The steps of a method disclosed in connection with the embodiments of the present application may be embodied directly in hardware, in a decoded processor, or in a combination of hardware and software modules in a decoded processor. The software modules may be located in a random access memory, flash memory, read only memory, programmable read only memory, or electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, etc. as well known in the art. The storage medium is located in a memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and, in combination with its hardware, performs the steps of the above method.

As one embodiment, the processor may include one or more general purpose central processing units (Central Processing Unit, CPU). Each of these processors may be a single-core (single-CPU) processor or may be a multi-core (multi-CPU) processor. A processor herein may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing cores for processing data (e.g., computer-executable instructions).

It will be appreciated that the memory in embodiments of the present application may be either volatile memory or nonvolatile memory, or may include both volatile and nonvolatile memory. The nonvolatile memory may be a ROM, a Programmable ROM (PROM), an Erasable Programmable EPROM (EPROM), an Electrically Erasable EPROM (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory may be random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM) which acts as an external cache. By way of example, and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as Static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double Data Rate SDRAM (Double Data Rate SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous DRAM (SLDRAM), and Direct RAM (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to comprise, without being limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

It should be understood that the above memory is exemplary but not limiting, and for example, the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be Static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), direct RAM (DR RAM), and the like. That is, the memory in embodiments of the present application is intended to comprise, without being limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

Embodiments of the present application also provide a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program.

Optionally, the computer readable storage medium may be applied to the first device in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program causes a computer to execute a corresponding flow implemented by the first device in each method of the embodiments of the present application, which is not described herein for brevity.

Optionally, the computer readable storage medium may be applied to the first terminal/second terminal in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program causes a computer to execute a corresponding procedure implemented by the first terminal/second terminal in each method of the embodiments of the present application, which is not described herein for brevity.

In the above embodiments, it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.

The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions in accordance with embodiments of the present application are produced in whole or in part. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable apparatus. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center by a wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital Subscriber Line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). Computer readable storage media can be any available media that can be stored by a computer or data storage devices such as servers, data centers, etc. that contain an integration of one or more available media. Usable media may be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., DVDs), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid State Disks (SSDs)), among others.

The method, the first terminal, the device and the storage medium for secure communication provided by the embodiment of the present application are described in detail, and specific examples are applied to the description of the principles and the implementation modes of the present application, and the description of the above embodiments is only used for helping to understand the method and the core idea of the present application; meanwhile, as those skilled in the art will have modifications in the specific embodiments and application scope in accordance with the ideas of the present application, the present description should not be construed as limiting the present application in view of the above.

It should be appreciated that reference throughout this specification to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment of the present application" or "the foregoing embodiments" or "some implementations" or "some embodiments" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Thus, the appearances of the phrases "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" or "an embodiment of the present application" or "the foregoing embodiments" or "some implementations" or "some embodiments" in various places throughout this specification are not necessarily referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments. It should be understood that, in various embodiments of the present application, the sequence numbers of the foregoing processes do not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of the processes should be determined by the functions and internal logic thereof, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application. The foregoing embodiment numbers of the present application are merely for describing, and do not represent advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

Without specific explanation, the first terminal/second terminal/first device may perform any step in the embodiments of the present application, and the processor of the first terminal/second terminal/first device may perform the step. The embodiments of the present application do not limit the order in which the following steps are performed by the first terminal/second terminal/first device unless specifically described. In addition, the manner in which the data is processed in different embodiments may be the same method or different methods.

In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method may be implemented in other ways. The above described device embodiments are only illustrative, e.g. the division of the units is only one logical function division, and there may be other divisions in practice, such as: multiple units or components may be combined or may be integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not performed. In addition, the various components shown or discussed may be coupled or directly coupled or communicatively coupled to each other via some interface, whether indirectly coupled or communicatively coupled to devices or units, whether electrically, mechanically, or otherwise.

The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units; can be located in one place or distributed to a plurality of network units; some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit may be separately used as one unit, or two or more units may be integrated in one unit; the integrated units may be implemented in hardware or in hardware plus software functional units.

The methods disclosed in the several method embodiments provided in the present application may be arbitrarily combined without collision to obtain a new method embodiment.

The features disclosed in the several product embodiments provided in the present application may be combined arbitrarily without conflict to obtain new product embodiments.

The features disclosed in the several method or apparatus embodiments provided in the present application may be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new method embodiments or apparatus embodiments.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: all or part of the steps for implementing the above method embodiments may be implemented by hardware related to program instructions, and the foregoing program may be stored in a computer storage medium, where the program, when executed, performs steps including the above method embodiments; and the aforementioned storage medium includes: various media capable of storing program codes, such as a removable storage device, a ROM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

Alternatively, the integrated units described above may be stored in a computer storage medium if implemented in the form of software functional modules and sold or used as a stand-alone product. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application may be essentially or partially contributing to the related art, and the computer software product may be stored in a storage medium, and include several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the methods described in the embodiments of the present application. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: various media capable of storing program codes, such as a removable storage device, a ROM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

As used in this application and the appended claims, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

In the embodiments of the present application, all or part of the steps may be performed, so long as a complete technical solution can be formed.

The foregoing is merely an embodiment of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art can easily think about changes or substitutions within the technical scope of the present application, and the changes and substitutions are intended to be covered in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A secure communication processing method applied to a first terminal, the method comprising:

And sending the first key to a second terminal.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

and carrying out secret communication with the second terminal based on the first key.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of determining the position of the substrate comprises,

the sending the first message to the first device includes:

transmitting a first message to a first device over a first secure channel;

and/or the number of the groups of groups,

the receiving the second message sent by the first device includes:

and receiving a second message sent by the first device through a first secure channel.

4. A method according to claim 3, wherein said sending a first message to a first device over a first secure channel comprises:

encrypting and/or protecting the integrity of part or all of the first message by using the second key and sending the encrypted and/or protected integrity;

and/or the number of the groups of groups,

the receiving, by the first secure channel, a second message sent by the first device, including;

receiving a second message sent by the first device; wherein part or all of the second message is encrypted and/or integrity protected using a second key;

wherein the second key is a shared key between the first terminal and the first device.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

and decrypting part or all of the second message and/or verifying the integrity by using the second key to obtain the first key.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the second message comprises: a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a second key and/or a first key encrypted and/or integrity protected with a third key;

the second key is a shared key between the first terminal and the first device, and the third key is a shared key between the second terminal and the first device.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the sending the first key to the second terminal comprises:

and sending the first key which is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the third key to the second terminal.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

and receiving a third message sent by the second terminal, wherein the third message is used for indicating the second terminal to receive the first key.

9. A first terminal, the first terminal comprising:

10. A first terminal, the first terminal comprising:

a memory for storing executable instructions;

a processor for implementing the secure communication processing method of any one of claims 1 to 8 when executing executable instructions stored in the memory.

11. A computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs executable by one or more processors to implement the secure communication processing method of any of claims 1-8.