CN117083625A

CN117083625A - Digital asset price regulation system using distributed ledger transaction processing rewards

Info

Publication number: CN117083625A
Application number: CN202080105722.7A
Authority: CN
Inventors: A·O·卡拉苏鲁; S·胡代里
Original assignee: Otedin Co
Current assignee: Otedin Co
Priority date: 2020-08-18
Filing date: 2020-08-18
Publication date: 2023-11-17
Also published as: WO2022039727A1

Abstract

A system is provided for regulating the price of digital assets through work performed by a plurality of transaction processing (and/or verification) systems that are rewarded to participate in a distributed ledger such as a blockchain network. The system increases demand for price-regulated digital assets by automating, tamper-proof, and thus forcibly converting a portion of the digital assets obtained as a result of processing a business incentive in exchange for other digital assets targeted for price control. The system, which is comprised of hardware and software, operates with or without intermediaries, wherein the rewards are ultimately distributed to owners of the transaction processing systems. The system provides means for controlling the price of digital assets to stabilize digital currency, assist regulatory authorities in performing anti-money laundering and tax evasion laws, while optionally providing reduced prices using provision of rebates to consumers and provision of rebates to manufacturers of distributed ledger transaction processing and/or verification systems.

Description

Digital asset price regulation system using distributed ledger transaction processing rewards

Technical Field

The present invention relates to the field of digital assets and their price regulation in the market by the behaviour of a plurality of digital ledger systems and intermediaries motivated by rewards to participate in transaction processing and/or validation mechanisms of digital ledger networks. In particular, the core of the present invention relates to a method of converting rewarded digital assets into demand for digital assets for which price control is sought. Optional features working in conjunction with the core of the present invention are directed to the field of rebates to mine equipment consumers and subsidies to manufacturers of mine equipment, as well as methods for performing tax laws and preventing money laundering using digital assets.

Background

Since month 1 in 2009, after the first successful cryptocurrency network (Bitcoin) was brought on line, several other cryptocurrencies, commonly referred to as "alternative currencies (altcoin"), a mix of alternatives to Bitcoin, have emerged, and several problems have arisen. Without sound monetary policies, these cryptocurrencies are extremely susceptible to gambling, exhibiting extreme volatility, and causing serious money laundering and tax evasions. These challenges have hindered the use of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to solve its otherwise most suitable common problems and have hindered innovations in the field of financial technology (FinTech).

Most DLT networks, including blockchain networks, use a proof of work (PoW) algorithm in the consensus layer. The consensus layer allows multiple distributed peer nodes to coordinate agreements on the next set of transactions to write the ledger. In the case of a blockchain ledger, the next set of transactions is organized in read-only blocks that are permanently linked to each other, similar to pages that are permanently bound to an ever-growing paper ledger. It uses the PoW algorithm involving hash computation in the consensus mechanism to achieve the unique untrusted operation of the system and the bayer fault tolerance (Byzantine Fault Tolerance). The integrity of the ledger remains unchanged as long as none of the entities on the network have more than 51% network hash capability. To promote healthy operation of the consensus layer, a number of rewards are provided to motivate a large number of distributed node populations in the network to compete with each other to generate the next transaction block. This process of competing to find the next viable transaction block to connect to the end of the blockchain and get rewards is called "mining", and competing ultra-high performance machines (and their owners) that do so are called "miners". The intense competition between miners to find the next block on the blockchain and to get rewards makes it impossible for anyone to complete the process without using high performance machines.

The rewards are provided in the form of network's own cryptocurrency coins which are cast and transferred to the miner's account as needed. This process forces new coins to become the only mechanism for inflation of the currency supply increase. The newly cast coins obtained from the mining process are in the form of tax liabilities, but the mined coins are not easily tracked and thus the revenue from the mining is not easily tax due to the identity of the person who initially receives the coins, i.e. the first owner in the chain of custody. The government loses at least billions of dollars of tax each year due to the inability to tax miners. Anonymous miners also have the ability to use these coins to facilitate illegal transactions. The use of cryptocurrency that cannot be tracked makes it possible for many illegal darknet activities, such as purchasing illegal weapons, chemicals or performing illegal activities. Many countries also use these untraceable cryptocurrencies to bypass sanctions. These real hazards to society make regulatory authorities extremely careful and hesitant to approve DLT and cryptocurrency for use in legitimate businesses, which may benefit most.

The biggest obstacle to the adoption of DLT in the field of payment and settlement remains to be price-unstable. Volatility prevents the use of cryptocurrency as a viable exchange medium. These undesirable aspects are caused by poor or simplistic currency policies incorporated into the blockchain. The bitcoin clearly exhibits a fluctuation in price greatly fluctuating. Volatility is a major obstacle to the widespread use of cryptocurrency in financial technology, but if several macro-economic principles are applied correctly to cryptocurrency, these principles can be exploited to manage price instability.

One macro-economic technique for monetary price regulation involves the concept of liquidity, i.e., the extent to which a pool of funds is immediately available for exchange. Not all currencies are equivalent in terms of fluidity in the total currency supply. This is due to the lack of mobility of large pools of funds when "bundled" in notes that must expire before they can be reused to ultimately recycle back to the immediate flow pool of money. Zero-deadline money (MZM) represents a full flow money cell in a total money supply. MZM does not take account of non-flowing currency, commonly referred to as M3 currency, which is held in the form of an expired ticket such as a bond or CD hosted by a escrow party that is penalized for withdrawal in advance. The U.S. federal Reserve committee (U.S. Federal Reserve) uses MZM data to directly measure inflation because its speed is a proven indicator of impact on expenditure and consumption.

Methods and systems for influencing the proportion of MZM to total currency supply directly regulate the price of currency. The ratio of MZM to total currency supply is a direct indicator of currency inflation or conversely currency deflation. When the MZM is reduced, meaning that the supply of mobile currency is reduced, the demand increases, resulting in a shrink in currency. When the MZM increases, meaning that the supply of mobile currency increases, the demand decreases creating a draft expansion. With these dynamic and mining processes, valuable mined coins can be converted to other coins to be extracted from their MZM cells to regulate their prices.

Unfortunately, due in part to the mining equipment manufacturer, the current state of the mining industry is severely compromised. The mining equipment manufacturer is not intended to make any sales friction in a manner that is regarded as ethical practice. There is no effort to contain criminal activity in cooperation with regulatory authorities nor is any measure taken to protect against environmental impact or to prevent dangerous imbalances on ledgers by selling products primarily to centralized mines. Selling to mines rather than individuals to achieve better decentralization is particularly dangerous as it reduces the integrity of the distributed ledger. The mine centers the hash capability (work) in the hands of a few entities that can collusion through 51% of attacks and intermediate transactions. These dynamics are a natural consequence of most individuals not having the ability to purchase expensive mining equipment, while mines that have obtained tremendous mining profits do possess the ability to purchase.

None of the prior art methods provide a solution to these problems by utilizing the mine excavation equipment and the return generated thereby. Thus, the known prior art is not suitable for solving the problems involved in the present invention in a practically acceptable manner. Thus, there remains a need for a solution to the above-mentioned problems and disadvantages.

Disclosure of Invention

In one or more embodiments of the invention, a system is disclosed for regulating the price of a digital asset through work performed by a plurality of high performance crypto-banknote mining systems that are motivated by participation in rewards of a distributed ledger such as a blockchain network. The system increases the need for price-regulated cryptocurrency (e.g., coins or tokens) by automating, tamper-proofing, and thus forcibly converting a portion of coins (e.g., bitcoin, littercoin (litexon), or ethercoin (etherer), etc.) received as a dig prize to exchange price-regulated tokens or coins. The system, which consists of hardware and software, operates with or without intermediaries, where rewards are ultimately distributed to the owners of miners. The system provides means for controlling the price of digital currency, while providing optional features including:

(a) Assisting the supervisor in executing the law of back money laundering and tax evasion; and

(b) Providing a rebate to a consumer of the cryptocurrency mining product; and

(c) Subsidies are provided to manufacturers of cryptocurrency mining products.

The proposed price administration system "pumps" mobile currency (digital asset targeted for price control) from its MZM currency pool into the M3 pool to create a draft compaction pressure. The conversion step of exchanging a portion of the mined coins for price-regulated digital assets is adjusted by a control parameter, such as an amount of money, such as a percentage of the mined coins to be converted, and applied by tamper resistant logic within the mining hardware and/or in the intermediary. In general, conversions across multiple miners and/or intermediaries that affect the price of a digital asset have created a need for a flowing form of the digital asset that targets price control. The subsequent conversion or step leaves the digital asset targeted for price control within the tool or in a state that effectively renders it out of fluidity, which requires a penalty to be able to convert back to its fully-flowable state in the MZM cell. This sub-process regulates the forward flow of digital assets targeted for price control through the MZM monetary pool into the M3 pool. Due to the nature of cryptocurrency mining, any person or group of people cannot manually perform mining operations during their life. Even if a mined coin can be produced by manual operation within thousands of years, it does not cause any significant price that affects the compaction pressure of the currency. Furthermore, the human-only process is not easily tampered with.

Converting mined cryptocurrency into digital assets targeted for price control creates sufficient forward pressure and forward flow from the MZM to the M3 pool. The forward flow due to the switching member can easily reverse to immediately flow back into the MZM cell. In this case, the price-controlled digital asset is not affected by the net price. Rewards incentive or penalty discouragions for individuals to convert their non-flowing funds to flowing funds slow such immediate reversals. Individuals think before being penalized, where one part of the population decides to wait for expiration and another part clears it prematurely. Overall, the overall action of the population causes less reflux. Thus, the key to affecting the price of a digital asset targeted for price control is to create a net flux between two currency pools. These two counteracting forces are regulated to manage forward and reverse flows, which act synergistically to regulate the price of digital currency.

In a further preferred embodiment, the frustrating penalties for premature clearing, such as liquidity premium and expiration period (with corresponding control parameters), regulate the penalty for premature use of unexpired funds and the time required for expiration: those funds in the M3 pool are bundled to limit the time of the reflux. In summary, these parameters regulate the amount of currency inflation back pressure (M3- > MZM) of expired currency, thereby counteracting the currency deflation forward pressure (MZM- > M3). As previously described, the overall throughput between flowing funds and non-flowing funds determines the price of money. Referring to FIG. 11, a non-embodiment diagram is used for information purposes describing the concept of MZM/M3 flux.

In further preferred embodiments, the implementation of the reflow pressure control means may be based on, for example, a liquidity premium containing tamper-resistant logic directly incorporated into the blockchain code of a token smart contract or coin. Such tamper-resistant logic integrated into the token-related smart contract and/or blockchain software stack will enforce expiration requirements with respect to accounts transferred to other parties.

In further preferred embodiments, the implementation of the reflow pressure control means may be based on, for example, a liquidity premium containing logic incorporated into a tamper-resistant third party hosted smart contract independent of the token contract or blockchain code. In this case, tamper-proof logic in the third party escrow contract specifies an expiration requirement, including the step of requiring the owner to extract the digital asset from the third party escrow contract to its own account address.

Conversely, in further embodiments, a liquidity premium may be awarded for expired use or withdrawal, rather than punting for unexpired use or withdrawal use. Both strategies may even be used together. The same final expected effect occurs regardless of the component used, even if the reflow is delayed.

In further preferred embodiments, penalties for premature use of funds in digital assets targeted for price control may be destroyed (burned) or transferred to accounts associated with other activities (i.e., rebates and subsidies). Burning the fine amount of the digital asset targeted for price control helps reduce the overall monetary supply that causes the draft to tighten.

In further preferred embodiments, the intermediary may mediate to aggregate the work and/or process transformations performed by the mining equipment before forwarding rewards to miners. In such a case, the mine excavation apparatus may require post-manufacture configuration, including a reconciliation process at the time of delivery to the consumer. For example, a hybrid mine pool may process both pooling and conversion in one step, and then distribute rewards with converted digital assets targeted for price control. Further, allocation may require transferring digital assets targeted for price control to third party hosted smart contract addresses or to miners' account addresses.

In a further preferred embodiment, the regulatory body publishes parameters controlling the conversion amount, as well as the liquidity premium and expiration period. These parameters may be published using any combination of techniques, including directly publishing the parameters over a blockchain with smart contracts through web services and/or through messaging techniques, so that all elements in the system may look up and/or be notified of changes to control parameters to modify their operation appropriately.

In further preferred embodiments, the ability to influence the price of digital assets is used to provide rebates for consumers of mining equipment, as well as subsidies for manufacturers of such equipment. The core price regulation capability of the present invention provides a basis for both consumer rebates and manufacturer subsidies. By adjusting all parameters to facilitate a sharp rise in the price of the digital asset being regulated during the sale of the mining apparatus, a positive difference in price between the time the user purchased the mining apparatus and received his purchase will produce considerable value. The value resulting from the price difference helps to provide a large number of rebates to the consumer and a large number of subsidies to the manufacturer. This additional functionality enables individuals lacking in mine purchasing power to purchase high performance mining equipment at lower prices, some of which may be free to acquire equipment or gain profits. Rebates rewards consumers for waiting due to the manufacture of the mining apparatus, particularly during pre-sales activities. It also helps to cushion manufacturer price fluctuations while components for manufacturing are acquired through its supply chain, which in turn helps to establish cheaper, more realistic pre-market prices. When a consumer of the mining equipment participates in the rebate program, it is motivated to participate in the conversion process that powers the core price regulation capability of the present invention. When the consumer accepts the rebate, their mining equipment is configured to enable forced conversion. Also, applying for the patch according to this process helps the mining equipment manufacturer to achieve the required integration with the system of the present invention, keeping the price low to achieve more mass consumption.

In further preferred embodiments, optional steps may be included to facilitate reporting of revenue and capital gain obtained from cryptocurrency rewards and converted mining activities of the digital asset targeted for price control. When combined with identity information from the mining equipment sales and/or through the KYC/AML program, a first owner in the chain of custody will be determined. The chain of custody derived from the cryptocurrency of the mine mining rewards may then be tracked, which in turn facilitates performance of income tax and capital benefit tax laws. Until now, the income of mining activities has not been tax-rated or traceable, as the first owner is not yet clear. Subsequent commerce by exchanges requiring KYC/AML helps to determine identity, but this is not always possible. The presence of a first owner in the chain of custody helps to detect illegal transactions using mined cryptocurrency and digital assets targeted for price control.

Other objects, features and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent from the following detailed description of the same preferred embodiments of the present invention. The invention is not limited in its application, details, or components to be set forth in the following description or description. The invention resides not only in any one of the features set forth in the specification, but also in a specific combination of one or more of the features and improvements claimed. Methods and apparatus consistent with the present invention are capable of other embodiments. In general, the order of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within the scope of the invention. Also, the phraseology and terminology employed herein is for the purpose of description and should not be regarded as limiting unless otherwise specified.

Drawings

Some embodiments of the invention are illustrated by way of example and not limited by the accompanying figures, in which like references indicate similar elements, and in which:

fig. 1-10 are process flow diagrams associated with embodiments.

FIGS. 1-6 also depict a flow through the various embodimentsA process flow diagram of the data flow of the digital asset of the actions of the process steps performed by the system entity. All figures 1-6 are consistently referred to as R for digital assets awarded for work performed by the ledger system _W (R subscript W, as in a Work incentive (forward for Work)), and C refers to the converted digital asset targeted for price control. 1-6 are subsets of diagrams dedicated to depicting different embodiments of the core price regulation capability of the system, without including the optional features of consumer rebates, manufacturer subsidies, or regulatory compliance of the present invention.

The process elements in fig. 1-6 are labeled using a 4-digit numbering scheme. The arithmetic value of the 4-bit number always increases with the progress of the process step, except at the branching point. The first digit corresponds to the figure number: i.e. entities in the 5000 range of fig. 5. The second number corresponds to the sub-process number, where there are a total of 10 sub-processes, the first of which is sub-process 0 and the last of which is sub-process 9. The last two digits are unique sub-process entity identifiers, all using even increments.

This numbering scheme is used to avoid describing the same sub-process more than twice, as many sub-processes do indeed repeat in the figure. The sub-process may later be broken down into separate graphs (in non-transitory applications), but currently deciding to view the entire core flow on a single graph and page is easier to understand. The sub-process with number assignment includes:

(0) Sub-process 0, having 6 entities, numbered [000-010] (including 000 and 010), present in fig. 1-6, represents an action of the digital ledger processing and/or verification system receiving rewards (referred to as "mining hardware" or "ledger system"); and

(1) Sub-process 1, having 4 entities, numbered [100-106] (including 100 and 106), present in FIGS. 1 and 2, represents actions taken with respect to direct DLT network interactions to disclose work performed in processing and/or validating transactions; and

(2) Sub-process 2, having 7 entities, numbered [200-212] (including 200 and 212), present in fig. 3 and 4, representing actions taken by the working aggregate mining pool for indirect DLT network interactions to disclose work performed in processing and/or validating transactions; and

(3) Sub-process 3, having 9 entities, numbered [300-316] (including 300 and 316), present in fig. 5 and 6, representing actions taken by the hybrid job aggregation and rewards conversion mining pool for indirect DLT network interactions to disclose work performed in processing and/or validating transactions; and

(4) Sub-process 4, having 5 entities, numbered [400-408] (including 400 and 408), present in FIGS. 1 and 3, representing actions taken by interfacing directly and indirectly with a DLT network through an intermediary pool that connects the DLT network to a sub-process embodiment, for incentivizing and/or penalizing the implementation of premature clearing of transitions using logic embedded in the DLT stack and/or in a smart contract associated with tokens; and

(5) Sub-process 5, having 5 entities, numbered [500-508] (including 500 and 508), present in FIGS. 2 and 4, representing actions taken by interfacing directly and indirectly with a DLT network through an intermediary pool that connects the DLT network to an alternative sub-process embodiment, for incentivizing and/or penalizing the implementation of a premature clearing of a withdrawal using logic embedded in a third party hosted intelligent contract; and

(6) Sub-process 6, having 3 entities, numbered [600-604] (including 600 and 604), present only in FIG. 5, represents actions taken to indirectly interface with the DLT network by connecting the DLT network to the hybrid work aggregation and translation pool of the sub-process embodiment for motivating and/or punishing the implementation of premature clearing of transitions using logic embedded in the DLT stack and/or in the smart contracts associated with tokens; and

(7) Sub-process 7, having 3 entities, numbered [700-704] (including 700 and 704), present only in FIG. 6, represents actions taken to indirectly interface with the DLT network by connecting the DLT network to the hybrid working aggregation and translation pool of the sub-process embodiment, for incentivizing and/or penalizing the implementation of premature clearing of withdrawals using logic embedded in a third party hosted intelligent contract; and

(8) A sub-process 8, having 9 entities, numbered [800-816] (including 800 and 816), present in fig. 1, 3 and 5, representing actions taken by a user and embodiments based on DLT and/or token codes, for implementing incentives and/or penalties for premature clearing of transfer implementations; and

(9) Sub-process 9, having 9 entities, numbered 900-916 (including 900 and 916), exists in fig. 2, 4 and 6, representing actions taken by a user and embodiments of escrow smart contracts based on third parties, for implementing incentives and/or penalties for premature clearing of the withdrawal implementation.

7-10 are subsets of the figures specifically describing different embodiments of system optional features of regulatory agency control, consumer rebate, manufacturer subsidy, regulatory compliance (tax and back money), and factory configuration and procurement reconciliation processes.

Figures 1-1 depict the process flow and digital asset flow between components of an embodiment in which mining hardware performs work directly on a distributed ledger that provides rewards, and liquidity management logic resides within a token smart contract or software stack of the same or another distributed ledger.

Figures 2-2 illustrate a modified version of the embodiment of figure 1 that uses a third party escrow-based mechanism for liquidity management, such as through a separate smart contract, rather than embedding liquidity supervision logic directly into the software stack of the smart contract or blockchain of tokens.

Figures 3-3 depict the process flow and digital asset flow between components of an embodiment in which mining hardware indirectly performs work on a distributed ledger that provides rewards through intermediaries of a mining pool, and liquidity management logic resides within a token smart contract or software stack of the same or another distributed ledger.

Figures 4-4 illustrate a modified version of the embodiment of figure 3 that uses a third party escrow-based mechanism for liquidity management, such as through a separate smart contract, rather than embedding liquidity supervision logic directly into the software stack of the smart contract or blockchain of tokens.

Figures 5-5 depict the process flow and digital asset flow between components of an embodiment in which mining hardware indirectly performs work on a distributed ledger that provides rewards through a hybrid intermediary that acts as both a mining pool and a rewards converter, and liquidity management logic resides within a software stack of a token smart contract or the same or another distributed ledger.

Figures 6-6 illustrate a modified version of the embodiment of figure 5 that uses a third party escrow-based mechanism for liquidity management, such as through a separate smart contract, rather than embedding liquidity supervision logic directly into the software stack of the smart contract or blockchain of tokens.

Fig. 7-7 illustrate a regulatory body control parameter management and publishing embodiment.

8-8 illustrate an embodiment of a factory configuration and purchase reconciliation process.

Fig. 9-9 depict embodiments of consumer rebate features in combination with embodiments of manufacturer patch assistance features.

10-10 depict embodiments of features for tracking a first owner in a chain of possession of a mined incentive, and for tax and regulatory compliance purposes, price control targeted digital assets.

11-11 are not intended to depict diagrams of any embodiment, but rather serve as an aid to the background section for conveying the MZM flux concept that affects the price of a regulated digital asset.

Detailed Description

The terminology used is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. As used herein, the term "and/or" includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising," when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical, scientific and economic terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. It will be further understood that terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should be interpreted as having a meaning that is consistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant art and the present disclosure, and will not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein.

In describing the present invention, it should be understood that numerous techniques and steps are disclosed. Each of these techniques and steps has individual benefits and each may be used in combination with one or more techniques and steps, or in some cases all other disclosed techniques may be used. Thus, for the sake of clarity, this specification will avoid each and every possible combination of separate steps being repeated in an unnecessary fashion. However, it is to be understood that such combinations are fully within the scope of the invention and claims when read from the specification and claims.

A new system and additional features thereof are discussed herein for regulating the price of digital assets on the market by utilizing the value of other digital assets rewarded for processing and/or verifying transactions over various distributed ledger networks. In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without these specific details.

The present disclosure is to be considered as illustrative of the invention and is not intended to limit the invention to the specific embodiments illustrated by the following figures or description.

The invention will now be described by reference to the accompanying drawings, which represent preferred embodiments. The repeated sub-process will be explained only once and provides an inverse reference to the paragraph containing its detailed description.

FIG. 1 is a annotated flow chart showing a digital asset flow containing sub-processes 0, 1, 4 and 8. FIG. 1 depicts an embodiment of the invention in which a plurality of miners interact directly with the PoW consensus layer of a DLT network to obtain a coin prize for the work they perform. The awarded coins are forwarded to a designated network address that swaps a portion of the awarded coins for a price-controlled digital asset. Forced conversion occurs when a consumer of the mining apparatus selects to participate in the rebate program when purchasing the mining apparatus. The digital asset may represent a token supported by a smart contract or coin whose code is embedded in the software stack of yet another DLT. The DLT being mined may be the same as the DLT associated with the digital asset targeted for price control, or may be different. Logic for applying penalties to premature transfer of digital assets targeted for price control is embedded within the respective tokens or coin codes.

All sub-process 0 present in fig. 1-6 represents the setup and permanent operation of the tamper resistant mining system. 1000 of fig. 1 (sub-process 0, entity 00) depicts a mineworker being manually initiated or reconfigured, for example, to begin mining on a different network. In 1002 of fig. 1 (sub-process 0, entity 02), miners prepare parameters to mine on a specified network. Before the mine is started in 1006 of fig. 1, it performs a lookup to find a unique account associated with itself in 1004 of fig. 1 (sub-process 0, entity 04). Other parameters such as device settings may also be looked up. Once the lookup is complete, the mineworker provides the DLT with the found account address and other information, while presenting a proof of work. Eventually, the DLT sends a mine dig reward to this address. 1004 of FIG. 1 may be invoked using a specified web service or even an intelligent contract method on a blockchain to find an address associated with itself. To this end, the mining apparatus provides a unique identifier associated with itself as a argument during the manufacturing process. An embodiment of the manufacture and reconciliation of miners creating and logging the unique identifier of this machine is known with reference to fig. 10. 1006 (sub-process 0, entity 06) and 1010 (sub-process 0, entity 10) represent the end of a cycle that is only altered by manual user settings (altering the winning rewards DLT) or interrupted by shutting down the machine (shutdown end node not shown for simplicity). 1008 (sub-process 0, entity 08) of fig. 1 represents the continuous operation of a mineworker in performing work for providing a proof of workload to a DLT network using messages. The description of this same sub-process 0 embedded within fig. 2-6 (including 2 and 6) will re-refer to this paragraph, rather than repeat this paragraph for brevity.

The sub-process 1 present in fig. 1, 2 and 6 represents the DLT that provides rewards to miners. 1100 in fig. 1 (sub-process 1, entity 00) represents the content of a message sent to a DLT network to present a proof of workload. 1102 (sub-process 1, entity 02) in FIG. 1, branching decision node, determines whether the provided workload proof is guaranteed by R _W (rewards (review) subscript Work (Work)) specified rewards. If the branch condition evaluates to FALSE (FALSE), then more work is required and the sub-process terminates at end node 1104 of FIG. 1 (sub-process 1, entity 04) further waiting for additional work messages. If the branch condition evaluates to TRUE (TRUE), the sub-process transitions to 1106 of FIG. 1 (sub-process 1, entity 06), wherein the reward is cast and delivered to the account address. The description of sub-process 1 contained in fig. 2 and 4 will re-reference this paragraph rather than duplicate this paragraph.

The sub-process 4 present in fig. 1 and 4 represents actions of a conversion intermediary for exchanging a portion of rewards for digital assets targeted for price control. Upon receiving the reward at the mineworker hardware specific designated account address (found in sub-process 0, entity 04), the intermediary finds the amount to be converted in 1400 (sub-process 4, entity 00) in fig. 1. P (P) _C The (Percent) index conversion (Converted)) parameter may be provided by a regulatory agency responsible for price regulation through potentially several components. Thus, the lookup uses one of the components to determine how much to switch rewards. In 1402 (sub-process 4, entity 02) of FIG. 1, a portion R of the prize _W ·(1-P _C ) Is split into parallel paths and sent to the mineworker's owner's wallet account for the awarded coins. Note the miner's owner's wallet account for R rewards and its address and miner's use to notifyThe account address where the DLT sends the mine dig reward is different. This parallel path terminates immediately after delivering the incentive to the mineworker's owner's wallet account C for the price-controlled digital asset. Second part of the prize R _W ·P _C Is split into a second parallel path in 1402 (sub-process 4, entity 02) of fig. 1 and is converted in 1406 (sub-process 4, entity 06) of fig. 1. The conversion means may involve the use of a third party exchange or the intermediary associated with this sub-process may itself be the exchange. The conversion quantity C is transferred to the owner's wallet account associated with the DLT network of digital asset C targeted for price control.

Both paths of sub-process 4 effectively terminate: the end node is hard terminated at 1404 (sub-process 4, entity 04) of fig. 1 and soft terminated at 1408 (sub-process 4, entity 08) of fig. 1. The termination is "soft" in that it stops, waiting indefinitely for a transmission event to continue the overall process of fig. 1. Thus, the entire process is still ongoing, with manual user operations to transfer digital asset C targeted for price control.

The sub-process 8 present in figures 1, 3 and 5 represents the act of implementing a premature transmission penalty for code in a smart contract for a token or embedded code for a coin in a DLT software stack. Sub-process 8 begins with an uncertainty delay in 1800 of fig. 1 (sub-process 8, entity 00) that represents the latency before transmitting the check code further downstream in the manual transmission event trigger process in 1802 of fig. 1 (sub-process 8, entity 02). The transfer operation code must look up the expiration time M in 1804 (sub-process 8, entity 04) of fig. 1 _P . During or prior to this step, this value may be cached locally using one of several lookup or notification means provided by the regulatory body. However, one must look up M from somewhere _P To check whether the transfer caused an expiration clearing in 1806 (sub-process 8, entity 6) of fig. 1. If the transfer occurs at M _P After day, i.e. after expiration of the C token or coin, all C converted in the previous sub-process will be transferred to the target account address to which the owner is attempting to transfer C. If the transfer occurs at M _P Before day, i.e. generation CBefore the expiration of the coin or coin, a flowable premium penalty L needs to be found _P To determine the fines transferred prematurely in 1810 of fig. 1 (sub-process 8, entity 10). And M is as follows _P The parameters are the same, L _P Parameters may also be looked up by various components provided by regulatory authorities. Once the liquidity overflow is determined, the code calculates in 1812 (sub-process 8, entity 12) of FIG. 1 the amount C (1-L of unexpired digital asset to be transferred _P ). The two parallel process paths are separated by a time period of one (1-L) that is in 1814 of FIG. 1 (sub-process 8, entity 14) for which the tokens have not expired _P ) The address sent to the target account and one at 1816 of FIG. 1 (sub-process 8, entity 16) will C.L _P Sending to another address or burning it out. Minor details relating to algorithms used in token aging and transmission are omitted: such as use period tokens C.L _P To fill in the missing amount associated with the transfer to the destination address. If C.L _P Expired tokens are not available, the transfer may be aborted because the purpose is to transfer the quantity C to the destination. However, these are small details that are sufficiently clear to an practitioner in the art and therefore need not be defined for the sake of brevity.

FIG. 2 is a annotated flow chart showing a digital asset flow containing sub-processes 0, 1, 5 and 9. Fig. 2 depicts an embodiment of the invention that uses a third party escrow smart contract to expire C tokens or coins that need to settle fines, if any, on a withdrawal operation, but not on a transfer operation to another destination. Both fig. 2 and fig. 1 contain sub-processes 0 and 1. Entities 1000-1010 of fig. 1 and entities 2000-2010 of fig. 2 map to sub-process 0 and are identical. Entities 1100-1106 of FIG. 1 and entities 2100-2106 of FIG. 2 map to sub-process 1 and are identical. For a detailed description of sub-processes 0 and 1, please see paragraphs 46 and 47, respectively.

The sub-process 5 in fig. 2 represents the behavior of the conversion intermediary that sends C not to the owner's wallet account address but to a third party escrow account, which is later extracted by the owner. Rewards R _W Smart contracts transferred to intermediaries by DLT in 2106 (sub-process 1, entity 06) of FIG. 2, the DLT is immediatelyThe percentage P to be converted is found in 2500 of FIG. 2 (sub-process 5, entity 00) _C . As before, P is looked up from the regulatory agency (or from the cached value) through one of the access means provided by the regulatory agency _C . Then at 2502, the process splits into two parallel paths. The amount R of the prize to be unconverted by one path _W (1-P _C ) To the account address of the owner in the end node 2504 (sub-process 5, entity 04) of fig. 2 and terminates. Another path is R of the awarded coins in 2506 of FIG. 2 (sub-process 5, entity 06) _W ·P _C Conversion to C, i.e. digital access targeting price control. In 2508 of fig. 2 (sub-process 5, entity 08), the converted C token or coin is "deposited" into the third party escrow account by transferring C to the address of the third party escrow account. At this point, the second path is actually ended even though explicit termination is not used on the flowchart. Instead, the sub-process waits for the owner to manually stop in the last sub-process 9.

The sub-process 9 in fig. 2 represents the operation of a third party hosted intelligent contract that requires a revocation rather than a transfer event. The sub-process starts 2900 in fig. 2 (sub-process 9, entity 00), indicating a time delay. This is the time it takes for the user to manually attempt to extract C from the third party escrow at 2902. Third party hosted smart contract code then looks up M from cache or by directly accessing values from regulatory authorities in 2904 (sub-process 9, entity 04) of fig. 2 _P I.e., the expiration period, is in days. In decision node 2906 of fig. 2 (sub-process 9, entity 06), it is determined that the third party escrow funds are due. If funds C have expired, where the number of days since deposit is greater than or equal to M _p The full amount of C will be transferred to the owner account address of C on the network where C resides. If the funds have not expired, a find liquidity premium penalty L occurs in 2910 (sub-process 9, entity 10) of FIG. 2 _P . This parameter is obtained directly or indirectly from a regulatory authority. Once L _P The sub-process may be split into two parallel paths at 2912 of fig. 2 (sub-process 9, entity 12). One path is after removal of the liquidity premium penalty at terminal node 291 of fig. 2 At 4 (sub-process 9, entity 14) will remain C (1-L _P ) A wallet account address for C delivered to a user on a network hosting tokens or coins. Another path would be c·l at terminal node 2916 (sub-process 9, entity 16) of fig. 2 _P To a certain address or burn it out.

FIG. 3 is a annotated flow chart showing a digital asset flow containing sub-processes 0, 2, 4 and 8. Fig. 3 depicts an embodiment of the present invention that uses a pooling intermediary between miners and the PoW-based consensus layer of DLT. Fig. 3 is a variation of fig. 1 in which sub-process 1 is replaced by sub-process 2 to handle pooling intermediaries. All other sub-processes are identical to entities 1000-1010 in FIG. 1 (entities 3000-3010 mapped to sub-process 0 in FIG. 3) and entities 1400-1408 in FIG. 1 (entities 3400-3408 mapped to sub-process 4 in FIG. 3) and entities 1800-1816 in FIG. 1 (entities 3800-3816 mapped to sub-process 8 in FIG. 3). See paragraphs 46, 48 and 50 for detailed information about the corresponding sub-processes 0, 4 and 8.

Sub-process 2 in fig. 3 represents the actions of both the DLT and the intermediary juxtaposed between the mineworker and the DLT for pooling purposes. The pooling agent aggregates the workload evidence of several miners to increase the frequency with which they get rewards, which are then distributed to the pool members. At 3200 (sub-process 2, entity 00) in fig. 3, sub-process 0 switches to sub-process 2. The pool configuration is part of the setup and/or is looked up based on the unique identifier of the device present in sub-process 0 (sub-process 0, entity 04) in 3004 of fig. 3. The mining machine passes the performed workload certification to the intermediary so that it can aggregate the workload certification in 3202 (sub-process 2, entity 02) of fig. 3 and present the workload certification to the PoW-based consensus layer of DLT in 3204 (sub-process 2, entity 04). The DLT then decides to reward or not reward the operation of the pool in branch node 3206 (sub-process 2, entity 06) of fig. 3. If no prize is awarded, the sub-process terminates at end node 3208 (sub-process 2, entity 08) of FIG. 3. If awarding a prize R _W LS (where LS is the number of ledger systems), then a prize is cast in 3210 (sub-process 2, entity 10) of FIG. 3 and in 3212 (sub-Process 2, entity 12) is assigned to the conversion intermediary of each mineworker member of the pool.

The sub-process 2 of fig. 3 is handed over to a sub-process 4 involving actions of the intermediary. Finally, this is followed by sub-process 8 to transfer the appropriate amount R to the owner's wallet account address and C to the third party, while applying a penalty.

FIG. 4 is a annotated flow chart showing a digital asset flow containing sub-processes 0, 2, 5 and 9. Fig. 4 depicts an embodiment of the present invention that uses a pooling intermediary like the embodiment in fig. 3, however that uses a third party escrow mechanism with withdrawal rather than transfer to enforce the liquidity premium penalty. The embodiment in fig. 3 uses sub-processes 4 and 8, while the embodiment in fig. 4 uses sub-process 5 instead of 4 and sub-process 9 instead of 8. In the previous paragraphs 46, 55, 52 and 53, all sub-processes have been introduced for the respective sub-processes 0, 2, 5 and 9. For the sake of brevity, details thereof will not be redefined.

FIG. 5 is a annotated flow chart showing a digital asset flow containing sub-processes 0, 3, 6 and 8. FIG. 5 depicts an embodiment of the present invention that uses a hybrid mine pit intermediary with integrated components to convert rewards into digital assets targeted for price control. It uses sub-process 8 to impose a liquidity premium penalty on the transfer event, rather than third party escrow for the withdrawal event in sub-process 9. Paragraphs 46 and 50 have defined sub-processes 0 and 8, respectively. Sub-processes 3 and 6 are defined in detail below.

The sub-process 3 in fig. 5 combines the action of the mine excavation with the transition member. The mineworker presents his work to the intermediary in 5300 (sub-process 3, entity 00) of fig. 5. The pool aggregates the work load evidence from multiple mining machines in 5302 of fig. 5 (sub-process 3, entity 02) and then presents this work aggregate to the PoW consensus layer of the DLT in 5304 of fig. 5 (sub-process 3, entity 04). The consensus layer decides in 5306 (sub-process 3, entity 06) of fig. 5 whether to provide a reward to the pool. If no rewards are possible, the sub-process terminates in end node 5308 of FIG. 5 (sub-process 3, entity 08), effectively rendering the DLT pool more operational. If a prize is to be awarded to the poolR _W LS, where LS is the number of ledger systems, then cast and delivered to the pool in 5310 of FIG. 5 (sub-process 3, entity 10). Upon receipt, the pool looks up P in 5312 of fig. 5 (sub-process 3, entity 12) from the cache using one of the publishing means provided by the authority or directly from the regulatory authority _C . Once P _C The values of the parameters are available and the intermediary in 5314 (sub-process 3, entity 14) of fig. 5 converts the appropriate prize amount c·ls for all members of the pool into a single transaction instead of several transactions per miner. Once converted, the remaining rewards R _W ·LS(1-P _C ) And the conversion amounts of the digital assets targeted for price control are distributed to all miners in the pit in 5316 (sub-process 3, entity 16) of fig. 5.

Sub-process 6 in fig. 5 (present only in fig. 5) represents a process pathway that splits into two short parallel process paths in 5600 of fig. 5 (sub-process 6, entity 00) during the delivery phase of assigning rewards and digital assets to each of the individual members of the mixed pool intermediary. One path in the end node 5602 of fig. 5 (sub-process 6, entity 02) would be the remaining rewards R for each pool member _W ·(1-P _C ) Delivered to the mineworker (owner) at the account address on the prize granting network and terminated. In 5604 of fig. 5 (sub-process 6, entity 04), another path delivers the converted amount C of the digital asset targeted for price control for each pool member to the account address of the mineworker (owner) on the DLT network hosting C. For all practical purposes, 5604 may be considered a soft termination, even though the process in FIG. 5 models it as an action in the process, since the roll-over process now requires a transfer action of part of the owner to continue.

In fig. 5, sub-process 6 continues with sub-process 8 waiting for an indeterminate C-transition to occur, and if the transition is too early, sub-process 8 applies a liquidity premium penalty to the transition. Paragraph 50 already provides detailed information of sub-process 8.

FIG. 6 is a annotated flow chart showing a digital asset flow containing sub-processes 0, 3, 7 and 9. Fig. 6 depicts an embodiment of the present invention that uses a hybrid pooling and conversion intermediary while using a third party escrow withdrawal component to enforce a liquidity premium penalty instead of a transfer. All sub-processes except sub-process 7 have been defined in detail. Detailed information about sub-processes 0, 3 and 9 is known with reference to paragraphs 46, 59 and 53, respectively.

Sub-process 7 in fig. 6 (present only in fig. 6) represents a process pathway that splits into two short parallel process paths in 6700 (sub-process 7, entity 00) of fig. 6 during the delivery phase of rewards and digital assets being distributed to accounts and third party hosts associated with each pool member. One path in the end node 6702 of fig. 6 (sub-process 7, entity 02) will be the remaining rewards R for each pool member _W ·(1-P _C ) Delivered to the mineworker (owner) at the account address on the prize granting network and terminated. In 6704 of fig. 6 (sub-process 7, entity 04), another path delivers the converted amount C of the digital asset targeted for price control for each pool member to the address of the third party escrow smart contract on the DLT network hosting C. For all practical purposes 6704 may be considered a soft termination, even though the process in fig. 6 models it as an action in the process, since the flipping process now requires a manual withdrawal action (which may also be automated) of part of the mineworker's owner to continue. The third party hosted intelligent contract implementation may be a single contract that is parameterized to track all depositors (all miners in the pool that receive the digital asset), or may be multiple intelligent contracts where each instance is dedicated to a unique depositor and owner (in this case, a member of the miners in the pool).

The embodiment in fig. 6 completes this process after the owner of C attempts to extract C from the third party escrow account into his own wallet account using sub-process 9. The sub-process 9 has been defined in detail by the paragraph 53 and is not redefined here for the sake of brevity.

FIG. 7 depicts an embodiment of managing and publishing process control parameters by a price regulating authority. This embodiment uses blockchain intelligence contracts and dapps to implement multiple control parameter notification and data access mechanisms. The process begins with the submission of a change in step 7001 of fig. 7, which initiates a vote in step 7002 of fig. 7. There are several open source intelligence contracts for consensus voting and can be used for voting by the directors of the regulatory authorities (i.e., the foundation or even the company). The idea is to have more than one person participate in authorizing the modification of these regulatory parameters. There will be some delay in the entity 7003 of fig. 7 and the voting may time out. If no consensus is reached within the set time, entity 7004 of FIG. 7 terminates this process in terminal node 7005 of FIG. 7. If agreement is reached to accept the changes, the changes are approved in step 7006 of FIG. 7 and published in step 7007 of FIG. 7. All parameter changes must be updated to their new values in a single transaction using a method on the smart contract to prevent inconsistent parameter configurations from being found. Change logs, votes, and overall audit history may also be maintained on the blockchain. Once published on the blockchain in step 7007 of fig. 7, this process splits at entity 7008 in fig. 7 to represent the ability of intelligence on the blockchain to locate new values of parameters approximately in the end node 7009 of fig. 7 through a method call to the supervisor's intelligence contract. The other path continues to generate events at step 7010 of FIG. 7 to notify the listening DApp on the blockchain. In entity 7011 of fig. 7, there is a time delay before detection, and then the DApp begins to react to the event. The entity 7012 in fig. 7 splits the detection into separate paths in the process to represent separate DApp detections. The detection of events may be performed by several dapps: the REST gateway DApp, which updates its cache in step 7013 of fig. 7, and the notifier DApp gateway, which converts the blockchain event into a message on MOM (message oriented middleware) topic or queue in step 7014 of fig. 7 to announce to listeners that the change is available. Step 7015 of FIG. 7 shows that other DApps may also detect events on the blockchain. After issuance in step 7007 of fig. 7, smart contracts and other entities, such as token smart contracts, can easily find parameters through the blockchain, however, bridges that enable other access mechanisms require the DApp to translate events on the blockchain into equivalent updated values of parameters through its own mechanism. The intermediary and miners may use REST services to find control parameters or update cached values of control parameters by listening for notification of message queues/topics.

Fig. 8 depicts a process of an embodiment of means for reconciling delivery of purchased mining equipment. This is a long running process that begins with the customer purchasing a device in start node 8001 of FIG. 8. Once payment is confirmed in step 8002 of fig. 8, many aspects of the purchase are recorded on the blockchain in the same transaction as in 8003 of fig. 8. Then, there is a delay in 8004 of fig. 8 until a unit destined for the customer is manufactured in 8005 of fig. 8. Once the manufacture is complete, the alphanumeric string that uniquely identifies the mining machine is looked up in step 8006 of fig. 8 and correlated with the purchase recorded on the blockchain in step 8007 of fig. 8. Additional information, such as the root public key of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the mining machine, may also be recorded to facilitate reconciliation. Once the unique identifier and/or public root key of the mining machine is associated with the customer's purchase, the unit is shipped in step 8008 of fig. 8. After the shipping delay in 8009 of fig. 8, the customer receives and disassembles the device and brings it online in step 8010 of fig. 8. The device uses a tamper-resistant mechanism to securely execute the code to check whether it has been checked out in step 8011 of fig. 8. The mining machine may perform the check in a number of ways, including invoking a manufacturer's smart contract on the blockchain, or connecting to a REST call exposed by the blockchain through the manufacturer's DApp interface. If the reconciliation has been completed, the unit continues normal operation in terminal node 8012 of FIG. 8, which terminates the reconciliation process. If not already reconciled, then code is executed to reconcile the delivery of the good in step 8013 of FIG. 8. There are several ways in which the reconciliation step of 8013 in fig. 8 can be implemented: one such way may be to digitally sign its unique identifier using the root key of the mining machine and to make REST or blockchain method calls to the manufacturer's smart contract, with the digitally signed envelope provided as a argument. The smart contract method or web service DApp may check the signature to verify the signer's public key and verify that the unique identifier of the digital signature matches the unique identifier associated with the commodity recorded on the blockchain prior to shipment to the buyer. At this point, the record is only marked as checked-out. In addition to the mechanisms used by this embodiment, several other ways of tamper-resistant reconciliation are possible.

Fig. 9 depicts a combined method of embodiments of components for providing rebates to consumers while also providing subsidies for production of the mine equipment to manufacturers. This embodiment provides the consumer with the option of: the back-off schedule is selected to be added or withdrawn. Rebate programs require the forced conversion of mined cryptocurrency to price-controlled cryptocurrency, which can cause demand and price increases. The person opting out of the rebate plan for purchase does not have the purchased mining equipment participate in the conversion process for pushing the price controlled cryptocurrency demand, and therefore it is reasonable to not require rebates due to price differences in the digital assets targeted for price control. When opted out, the value of the difference generation is turned to subsidy to the manufacturer to reduce its product price and make the mining equipment more readily available. Superficially, the example would appear to combine the two ways of providing rebate and patch mutually exclusive, and this is true when focusing on the decision of each individual customer purchase. In general, when the scope expands to group dynamics for a large number of customer purchases, some people will choose to rebate while others will not. Thus, both the rebate and patch will still coexist within the purchasing population. Other embodiments may split the value derived from price differences across rebates and subsidies, or embodiments may be completely decoupled as a separate process. Another embodiment may ignore patches altogether to reassign value to the person selecting the rebate. The decision to present this preferred embodiment to others depends on their choice given to the customer, while effectively combining both the rebate and the patch member to show how they work together.

FIG. 9 is a process diagram of a long run process from the consumer checkout of the shopping cart in start step 9001 of FIG. 9. For brevity, several steps are omitted, such as providing shipping addresses, payment options, etc. This process continues with the consumer selecting a manual action to participate in the rebate program in step 9002 of fig. 9. Once this decision is made in step 9003 of fig. 9 and all other information is collected to initiate the payment process, payment is confirmed in step 9004 of fig. 9 and a transaction receipt is recorded on the blockchain in step 9005 of fig. 9. Entity 9006 in fig. 9 depicts a subset of the parameters stored within the purchase record (i.e., item-by-item list that does not contain the item). After this, branching condition 9007 of FIG. 9 considers the consumer's decision as to whether to participate in the rebate program. If the consumer refuses the rebate plan, the subsidy amount is calculated and registered with the subsidy fund, which may be managed by a regulatory agency, in step 9008 of FIG. 9. This may be an intelligent contract on the blockchain that is tasked with collecting and managing funds in the form of digital assets targeted for price control. If the consumer chooses to participate in the rebate program, the subsidy is not delivered to the fund and bypasses 9008 in FIG. 9. The two branches from 9007 converge on the delay entity in 9009 of fig. 9. This delay represents the time it takes to manufacture the mining apparatus in 9010 of fig. 9, but instead it can be modeled as the time it takes to find a manufactured inventory mining apparatus. The pre-shipment task of looking up the serial number and unique identifier associated with the purchase after step 9012 of fig. 9 is represented by 9011 of fig. 9, where these values (some parameters not shown) in entity 9013 of fig. 9 are written to the blockchain and associated with the consumer's original purchase record in entity 9006 of fig. 9. These post-fabrication steps are considered automated, but may be manual. The product is then manually shipped to the customer in 9014 of fig. 9, and delayed in 9015 of fig. 9 until the product is received, started and brought on line in consumer manual step 9016 of fig. 9. Once the mining machine is on line, it checks whether a reconciliation is made at branch point 9017 of fig. 9, which may require a connection to REST service or issuing a method call on a blockchain contract to check status. As with most operations of the mining machine, this part of the process is tamper-proof by allowing only signature code (using, for example, a TPM with secure boot and digital signature code execution) that handles these operations to be run. There are several implementation tamper-resistant options, but at the discretion of the manufacturer. If not, reconciliation step 9018 in FIG. 9 creates entity 9019 in FIG. 9, which represents a reconciliation record connected with the particular purchase record associated with the mining equipment on the blockchain. Purchasing multiple mining machines in the same purchase transaction is omitted from the flow chart for brevity. Once the reconciliation is completed, a check in 9020 of fig. 9 is performed to see if the purchaser of the mining machine has selected a rebate plan. If it does not select rebate schedules, then delivery and receipt of the product is reported to the regulatory agency in 9021 of FIG. 9 to take some action, such as burning out a certain amount of the digital asset targeted for price control or sending it to the manufacturer as a subsidy. The item and quantity of hardware purchased may be used to determine how many subsidies to allocate to the manufacturer if the delivery of the purchase has been reconciled. If the user accepts the terms and selects to add a rebate plan in 9002 of fig. 9, the mining apparatus does not make any subsidy to converge with the two branch paths on 9022 of fig. 9, which indicates that the mining machine enters a continuous normal operation mode. There is then a delay, 9023 of fig. 9, representing the time between the reconciliation represented in manual step 9024 of fig. 9 and the consumer attempting to ask for his rebate. The rebate application may be processed by an online networking application connected to the blockchain. The application checks the blockchain contract that maintains the purchase record for purchases in 9025 of fig. 9. There may be several purchases, but for simplicity and simplicity, a single purchase is assumed: one skilled in the art can readily infer the flow of processing rebate applications for multiple purchases. Again, a check is made in branch point 9026 of fig. 9 to determine if the consumer has participated in the rebate program in this purchase. If the user does not choose to participate in the rebate program, the process flow terminates at terminal node 9027 of FIG. 9, which denies the consumer to obtain rebate by appropriate messages informing the consumer that they do not qualify for a particular purchase. If the user does choose to participate in the rebate program for a purchase, another check is made in branch point 9028 of FIG. 9 to see if the mining hardware has been reconciled. If not, the process routes back to 9027 of FIG. 9 to reject the rebate with an appropriate message indicating that a reconciliation is required. If the check-out confirmation is affirmative, the rebate amount is calculated in step 9029 of fig. 9 and delivered in end node 9030 of fig. 9.

Step 9029 of fig. 9 is determined by the implementer and its business requirements. Several equations may be used to determine the rebate amount. In practice, any and all information required should be captured and recorded on the blockchain in the recording entities 9006, 9013 and 9019 of fig. 9. Regardless of the equation used by the practitioner, the proposed rebate is commensurate with the amount purchased and proportional to the price difference in the digital asset targeted for price control between the purchase and the time the consumer attempts to require its rebate. It is disadvantageous to use any amount of money that is not related to the economics of the price controlled digital asset. In addition, the consumer should be allowed to request a rebate at any time after reconciliation, without a rebate expiration period, however this choice is at the discretion of the person responsible for the implementation. An example equation for calculating a rebate amount for price controlled digital asset pricing that is proportional to the amount of hardware purchased and the price difference of the digital asset targeted for price control may be:

it comprises the following steps:

(a) R, the rebate amount in the digital asset targeted for price control; and

(b)H _{gold alloy} Is the dollar amount of the hardware purchased; and

(c)P _purchasing Is the dollar value of the digital asset that targets price control when purchasing hardware; and

(d)P _{Back buckle} Is the dollar value of the digital asset that targets price control when a rebate is required.

The same equation may also be used to calculate the manufacturer subsidy amount. However, other requirements may need to be considered in this decision, such as price negotiations and agreements for providing reasonable price points of the mine equipment to the consumer. Essentially, the regulatory agency that decides the amount of subsidized should do so while enforcing reasonable pricing for the end consumer.

FIG. 10 depicts an embodiment of establishing a first owner of cryptocurrency cast during a mining process to establish a clean possession chain. Fig. 10 is almost identical to fig. 6, with only one entity modified, and two new entities created to demonstrate this embodiment. These modifications may be introduced in any of the embodiments of fig. 1-6. For the sake of brevity, the entire process in fig. 6 will not be redefined, which may be determined from the detailed description of fig. 6 by simply replacing the first number 6 with the 10 of the entity of fig. 10. The differences between fig. 6 and 10 will be explained herein:

(a) Step 10316 of fig. 10 is modified from 6316 of fig. 6 to include "AND RECORD" which involves creating a RECORD on the blockchain that correlates the number of mined coins dispensed by the mixing intermediary with the purchased mining apparatus. In this way, the first chain of the possession chains of the mined cryptocurrency is recorded; and is also provided with

(b) Step 10918 of fig. 10 is new and is added between nodes 6906 and 6908 of fig. 6 to depict an embodiment of a record of the first owner and due withdrawal in the possession chain for the digital asset targeted to price control; and is also provided with

(c) Step 10920 of fig. 10 is new and is added between nodes 6912 and 6914 of fig. 6 to depict an embodiment of a record of a first owner and unexpired withdrawal in the possession chain for a digital asset targeted to price control.

Fig. 10 depicts the steps required to authenticate a first owner in a chain of custody. This is necessary to implement a blockchain analyzer that can track coin and token flows between parties and determine the remainder of the chain of custody. These analyzers, not shown in fig. 10, allow for calculation of the capital benefits of tax liabilities and holding these digital assets. With regard to bypassing sanctions and other illegal activities, having a first owner in possession of the chain allows two pools of authenticated and unidentified mined coins in circulation to now be created. Those cases not illustrated by KYC/AML necessarily require the attention of the appropriate regulatory authorities.

Fig. 11 is not a representation of an embodiment, but rather a graph representing the dynamics of flux between the mobile MZM and M3 regions when using this price regulation system. It aims to help visualize the actual dynamics and the importance of demand pressure to effectively create significant compaction of the currency with the mining machine rather than human computing.

Claims

1. A system for regulating the price of a digital asset, the system comprising:

one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein code is provided on the distributed ledger that manages behavior of the one or more digital assets;

a plurality of ledger systems and/or a plurality of intermediaries, each of the plurality of ledger systems and/or the plurality of intermediaries providing the one or more digital assets, wherein the one or more digital assets are purported to be one or more rewards on a rewards distributed ledger;

converting a percentage of the one or more digital assets into the one or more rewards in exchange for the one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein the automatic conversion means is tamper resistant, and wherein the conversion means affects circulation supply and demand for the one or more digital assets targeted for price control to change prices of the one or more digital assets targeted for market price; and

means for a regulatory agency to provide means for influencing transfer of ownership of said one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein said circulation supply and demand of said one or more digital assets on said market is influenced.

2. The system of claim 1, further comprising a set of control parameters, wherein the rewards conversion means and the means for affecting transfers are controlled by the set of control parameters, the system further comprising means for communicating values of the set of control parameters by the regulatory agency, and the system further comprising means for changing the set of control parameters by the regulatory agency to regulate the price of the price control-targeted digital asset or assets, wherein the change in the control parameters affects the circulation supply and demand of the price control-targeted digital asset or assets on the market, thereby affecting the price thereof.

3. The system of claim 1, further comprising means for providing a rebate to one or more purchasers of the plurality of ledger systems that include rebate assets, means for determining a rebate amount, means for reconciling the plurality of ledger systems with purchases, and means for the one or more purchasers to request the rebate.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the one or more digital assets targeted for price control are tokens supported by the code that manages behavior of the one or more digital assets, wherein the code that manages behavior of the asset is a smart contract, wherein the smart contract resides on a blockchain ledger.

5. The system of claim 1, wherein one or more digital assets targeted for price control are coins with a private network supported by the code managing behavior of the one or more digital assets, wherein the code managing behavior of the one or more digital assets is part of a distributed ledger stack.

6. The system of claim 1, wherein the one or more digital assets targeted for price control are tokens supported by the code that manages behavior of the one or more digital assets, wherein the code that manages behavior of the one or more digital assets is a smart contract, wherein the smart contract resides on a non-blockchain ledger-based hash map.

7. The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of ledger systems are crypto-currency mining devices working with a plurality of intermediaries, wherein each of the plurality of intermediaries is a mining pool in which work is accumulated and rewards are continuously distributed, or wherein the plurality of intermediaries are exchanges in which the one or more digital assets are converted, or the plurality of intermediaries are mixed mining pools, wherein the conversion means is integrated to handle pooling and conversion functions.

8. The system of claim 1, wherein the automatic conversion component is a component within the plurality of ledger systems, wherein the plurality of ledger systems are a plurality of crypto-currency mining devices that perform a converted tamper-resistant digital signature code that is intended to process a portion of the incentive, wherein the incentive is a plurality of types of mined crypto-currency coins, wherein the mined crypto-currency coins are exchanged for the one or more digital assets targeted to price control, wherein the one or more digital assets targeted to price control are smart contract-supported tokens on one of: blockchains, hash diagrams, or coins within their own network and distributed ledger software stacks.

9. The system of claim 1, wherein the automatic conversion component is a component of an intermediary, wherein the intermediary is a mine pit provided and operated by the regulatory agency, wherein the plurality of ledger systems are a plurality of types of crypto-currency mine pit devices for executing tamper-resistant digital signature codes to use the mine pit provided by the agency.

10. The system of claim 1, wherein owners of the plurality of ledger systems are associated with mined cryptocurrency and the one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein a first owner in a chain of possession is determined to enable distributed ledger analysis to determine tax due, capital revenue tax, and to help track cryptocurrency for financing of illegal activities.

11. A method for regulating the price of a digital asset, the method comprising the steps of:

managing, by code, behavior of one or more digital assets provided on the distributed ledger;

providing the one or more digital assets through a plurality of ledger systems and/or a plurality of intermediaries, wherein the one or more digital assets are purported to be one or more rewards on a rewards distributed ledger;

automatically converting a percentage of the one or more digital assets into the one or more rewards in exchange for the one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein an automatic conversion means is tamper resistant, and wherein the conversion means affects circulation supply and demand for the one or more digital assets targeted for price control to change prices of the one or more digital assets targeted for market price; and

the transfer of ownership of the price control targeted digital asset or assets is effected by a regulatory agency, wherein the circulation supply and demand of the digital asset or assets on the market is effected, and wherein the regulatory agency is a human and/or computerized agent.

12. The method of claim 11, further comprising the step of: controlling variable aspects of the bonus switching means and means for influencing the transfer by a set of control parameters; transmitting, by the regulatory body, values of the set of control parameters; and altering, by the regulatory body, the set of parameters to affect the circulation supply and demand on the market, thereby affecting the price of the one or more digital assets targeted for price control.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein the means to affect transfer is logic within a smart contract code of a token, wherein one or more expiration checks are performed prior to the transfer, wherein upon expiration, an owner of the token obtains 100% of its value upon transfer.

14. The method of claim 12, wherein the means for effecting transfer comprises means for a third party to host the token until the token expires to permit an owner to obtain 100% of its value at the time of expiration of a withdrawal.

15. The method of claim 12, wherein the converting means is performed by the plurality of ledger systems, wherein the ledger systems are crypto-currency mining devices in which a portion of mined coins is converted, wherein the mining devices or mining pools use the control parameters to convert only a specified amount of mined coins into the one or more digital assets targeted for price control at predetermined intervals or intervals regulated by one of the control parameters.

16. The method of claim 11, further comprising the step of: record purchases, reconciliation, shipment, and delivery of the plurality of ledger systems, and request rebate assets by one or more purchasers.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the means for determining the rebate amount is based on storing and calculating information using one or more intelligent contracts on approximately a blockchain-based distributed ledger, the intelligent contracts comprising: means for irrevocably recording purchase information on the blockchain, the purchase information including a hardware purchase amount and a price of the one or more digital assets targeted for price control; and means for calculating a rebate amount and a price of the price control-targeted digital asset or assets based on the purchase information when the buyer requests its rebate, wherein the rebate amount is determined in proportion to a difference in the price of the price control-targeted digital asset and in proportion to the hardware purchase amount.

18. The method of claim 16, wherein determining a rebate is based on casting, allocating, and destroying or transferring the one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein the one or more digital assets targeted for price control are tokens on blockchains supported by smart contract codes comprising:

Means for casting the token;

means for recording sales on the blockchain;

means for assigning the cast tokens to one or more buyer accounts without the buyer being able to modify the account prior to reconciliation; and

means for destroying or transferring excess tokens allocated to the one or more purchaser accounts when the purchaser requests their rebate, wherein the remaining tokens in the purchaser accounts are related to the amount of exploitation hardware and the price variation of the tokens whose price is controlled.

19. The method of claim 11, further comprising the step of: determining a patch assistance amount; checking account of the plurality of account book systems; the subsidized amounts are required by one or more manufacturers to obtain protection against price fluctuations during sales and manufacturing of the plurality of ledger systems.

20. The method of claim 19, wherein the means for determining the subsidized assistance amount is based on storing and calculating information on a blockchain based on the distributed ledger using the smart contract, the smart contract comprising: means for irrevocably recording purchase information on the blockchain when a purchase of each of the plurality of ledger systems occurs, the purchase information including the hardware purchase amount and a price of the one or more digital assets targeted for price control; and means for calculating the subsidy amount of assistance and the price of the price control targeted digital asset or digital assets based on the purchase information when the rebate is required, wherein the amount of assistance is determined in proportion to a difference in the price of the price control targeted digital asset or digital assets, the hardware purchase amount, or a cost of the manufacturing versus purchased hardware.

21. The method of claim 20, wherein the means for determining the subsidy assistance amount is based on casting, allocating, and destroying or transferring the one or more digital assets targeted for price control, wherein the one or more digital assets targeted for price control are tokens on a blockchain supported by a smart contract code, the smart contract code comprising:

means for casting the token;

means for recording sales on the blockchain;

means for assigning the cast tokens to one or more manufacturer accounts that the one or more manufacturers cannot modify prior to reconciliation; and

means for destroying or transferring excess tokens allocated to the one or more manufacturer accounts when the one or more manufacturers require rebating thereof, wherein the remaining tokens in the one or more manufacturer accounts are related to the amount of exploitation hardware and the price variation of the tokens whose price is controlled.