CN116318880A - High-grade security method and system for video camera based on security chip - Google Patents

High-grade security method and system for video camera based on security chip Download PDF

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Publication number
CN116318880A
CN116318880A CN202310126367.7A CN202310126367A CN116318880A CN 116318880 A CN116318880 A CN 116318880A CN 202310126367 A CN202310126367 A CN 202310126367A CN 116318880 A CN116318880 A CN 116318880A
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Prior art keywords
security
security chip
execution environment
subsystem
memory
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李赟
李翔
林悦炜
张琳
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China Railway Information Technology Group Co ltd
China State Railway Group Co Ltd
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China Railway Information Technology Group Co ltd
China State Railway Group Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/18—Closed-circuit television [CCTV] systems, i.e. systems in which the video signal is not broadcast

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a high-level security method and a high-level security system for a camera based on a security chip, wherein the high-level security method and the high-level security system comprise an imaging subsystem, a DSP subsystem, a network subsystem, an encryption subsystem and a power subsystem; the encryption subsystem is used for constructing a completely trusted execution environment based on the security chip and a corresponding verification mechanism by taking a national secret heterogeneous security chip for storing a pair of private keys of the asymmetric keys as a trusted root and verifying the completely trusted execution environment; and transplanting the digital certificate and management platform based bidirectional device authentication application, the digital certificate based video data signature application and the video encryption application to a completely trusted execution environment, and using memory isolation. The invention realizes the security and credibility of software and hardware, thereby ensuring the security of public security video monitoring networking information.

Description

High-grade security method and system for video camera based on security chip
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of video monitoring, in particular to a high-grade security system of a camera based on a security chip.
Background
GB35114 public safety video monitoring networking front-end equipment information safety technology, wherein one key point is front-end equipment safety grading; the front-end equipment must have the information security protection functions of equipment identity authentication, video signature, video encryption and the like based on the digital certificate. The user terminal must have the security functions of user identity authentication, video encryption and the like based on the digital certificate; in addition, the security capability of FDWSF (front-end device with security function) is classified into three classes, from weak to strong, class a, class B, class C, respectively, as shown in table 1.
Table 1 head end equipment classification
Figure BDA0004082275210000011
The C-level security must rely on the SVAC audio-video encoder of the SVAC chip;
because the data transmission and interaction of the front-end equipment are unavoidable, illegal hackers can download and implant illegal programs by utilizing the data transmission and interaction process, analyze, crack and transmit the sensitive information of the memory and the peripheral equipment, and damage the safety of the front-end equipment.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a high-grade security system of a camera based on a security chip.
In order to achieve the aim of the invention, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a security chip based advanced security system for a camera, comprising:
the imaging subsystem is used for acquiring video images and performing ISP processing on the acquired video images;
the DSP subsystem is used for carrying out video processing, image coding and logic control on the acquired video images;
the network subsystem is used for carrying out data transmission on the collected video images;
the encryption subsystem is used for constructing a completely trusted execution environment based on the security chip and a corresponding verification mechanism by taking a national secret heterogeneous security chip for storing a pair of private keys of the asymmetric keys as a trusted root and verifying the completely trusted execution environment; transplanting the digital certificate and management platform based bidirectional device authentication application, the digital certificate based video data signature application and the video encryption application to a completely trusted execution environment, and using memory isolation;
and the power supply subsystem is used for supplying power to each subsystem.
Optionally, the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
storing the private keys of a pair of asymmetric keys in an external unreadable area of the national secret heterogeneous security chip, and verifying the execution environment by using the private keys stored by the national secret heterogeneous security chip and the public keys corresponding to the private keys to construct a complete trusted execution environment;
the fully trusted execution environment comprises a heterogeneous CPU core, a fully trusted operating system, a national secret heterogeneous security chip, a security application and a national secret algorithm module, and data transmission is carried out through an interactive interface and the non-fully trusted execution environment.
Optionally, the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
and when the system is started, carrying out self-checking on the power-on random number of the national secret heterogeneous security chip, and carrying out self-checking on the power-on of the completely trusted operating system and self-checking on the power-on of the national secret algorithm module.
Optionally, the self-checking of the power-on random number of the national secret heterogeneous security chip specifically includes:
calling a national secret heterogeneous security chip to generate 20 groups of random number samples with 106 bit length, and performing playing card detection on the random number samples; if the detection is not passed, allowing 1 repetition of random number acquisition and detection; if not, stopping service and alarming.
Optionally, the power-on self-test of the fully trusted operating system specifically includes:
key information of a completely trusted operating system and a security application is stored in a read-only memory in advance; the key information is the name and version information of a completely trusted operating system and a security application;
the current key information of the current operating system and the security application is collected again during verification, and the current key information is compared with the pre-stored key information; if the verification is consistent, the verification is passed, and if the verification is inconsistent, the verification is not passed.
Optionally, the power-on self-test of the cryptographic algorithm module specifically includes:
when initializing a national secret heterogeneous security chip, verifying SM2, SM3 and SM4 algorithms in a national secret algorithm module by using a test method of known answers; all algorithms verify that the verification is correct and pass the verification; otherwise, the verification is not passed.
Optionally, the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
the memory is divided into a safe environment special memory used by a fully trusted execution environment and a shared memory used by a non-fully trusted execution environment according to memory addresses, the memory hardware identifies the source of a memory access signal accessed through a bus, only the shared memory is allowed to be accessed if the memory is from a main CPU core, and the shared memory and the safe environment special memory are allowed to be accessed if the memory is from a heterogeneous CPU core.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
according to the invention, a GB35114 public security video monitoring networking information security technology is combined with a heterogeneous security technology, a digital certificate and management platform based bidirectional device authentication application is used, a digital certificate based video data signature application and a video encryption application are required to run in a completely trusted execution environment, the completely trusted execution environment is based on a security chip as a trusted root, and security and credibility of software and hardware are realized, so that security of public security video monitoring networking information is ensured.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a security chip-based advanced security system for a camera according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of an architecture of a encryption subsystem according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention is provided to facilitate understanding of the present invention by those skilled in the art, but it should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the scope of the embodiments, and all the inventions which make use of the inventive concept are protected by the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined and defined in the appended claims to those skilled in the art.
As shown in fig. 1, an embodiment of the present invention provides a security chip-based advanced security system for a camera, including:
the imaging subsystem is used for acquiring video images and performing ISP processing on the acquired video images;
the DSP subsystem is used for carrying out video processing, image coding and logic control on the acquired video images;
the network subsystem is used for carrying out data transmission on the collected video images;
the encryption subsystem is used for constructing a completely trusted execution environment based on the security chip and a corresponding verification mechanism by taking a national secret heterogeneous security chip for storing a pair of private keys of the asymmetric keys as a trusted root and verifying the completely trusted execution environment; transplanting the digital certificate and management platform based bidirectional device authentication application, the digital certificate based video data signature application and the video encryption application to a completely trusted execution environment, and using memory isolation;
and the power supply subsystem is used for supplying power to each subsystem.
In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
storing the private keys of a pair of asymmetric keys in an external unreadable area of the national secret heterogeneous security chip, and verifying the execution environment by using the private keys stored by the national secret heterogeneous security chip and the public keys corresponding to the private keys to construct a complete trusted execution environment;
the fully trusted execution environment comprises a heterogeneous CPU core, a fully trusted operating system, a national secret heterogeneous security chip, a security application and a national secret algorithm module, and data transmission is carried out through an interactive interface and the non-fully trusted execution environment.
Specifically, a pair of private keys of asymmetric keys are stored in the national secret heterogeneous security chip, the private keys are stored in an external unreadable area, and verification of an execution environment can be realized only if the national secret heterogeneous security chip can access the private keys and the public keys corresponding to the private keys; the safety verification information is stored in the read-only memory to ensure that the safety verification information cannot be modified; a private key of a pair of asymmetric keys is stored in the secure chip as a trusted root. The cipher operation in the encryption subsystem, the generation, storage and management of the secret key, the issuance, storage and the like of the internal authentication certificate are supported by the national cipher algorithms SM2, SM3 and SM4.
The embodiment constructs a completely trusted execution environment based on the security chip and a corresponding verification mechanism, wherein the completely trusted execution environment comprises a heterogeneous CPU core, a completely trusted operating system, a national secret heterogeneous security chip, a security application and a national secret algorithm module, and performs data transmission with the non-completely trusted execution environment through an interactive interface; the non-fully trusted execution environment comprises a main CPU core, a non-fully trusted operating system and applications; the method comprises the steps that based on a digital certificate and a management platform, a device authentication application is bidirectional, a video data signature application and video encryption based on the digital certificate are transplanted to a completely Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and memory isolation is used; the bidirectional device authentication application based on the digital certificate and the management platform can realize bottom-layer security based on the private key stored in the security chip; a non-fully trusted execution environment (REE) may use functions under a fully Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) through an interactive interface.
In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
and when the system is started, carrying out self-checking on the power-on random number of the national secret heterogeneous security chip, and carrying out self-checking on the power-on of the completely trusted operating system and self-checking on the power-on of the national secret algorithm module.
Specifically, when the front-end device is started, the embodiment firstly performs verification of the completely trusted execution environment, and the verification mode is as follows:
when the camera is started, starting a random number self-checking thread, and executing the following self-checking steps: invoking a security chip to generate 20 groups of random number samples with 106 bit length, and carrying out playing card detection on the samples according to GMT0062-2018 password product random number detection requirement; if the detection is not passed, 1 random number acquisition and detection are allowed to be repeated, and if the random number acquisition and detection are not met, the service is stopped and an alarm is given.
And then verifying and starting software of a completely trusted execution environment, wherein the software comprises a safe operating system, a national encryption algorithm and a safe application, and the verification mode is as follows:
before the safety camera leaves the factory, key information of an operating system and safety application is stored in a read-only memory; alternatively, the information a may be the name and version information of the operating system, the security application;
and re-collecting corresponding key information (information B) of the current operating system and the security application during verification, comparing the information B with the information A, if the information B is consistent with the information A, passing the verification, and if the information B is inconsistent with the information A, not passing the verification.
And then checking the cryptographic algorithm of the national cryptographic algorithm module in the following way:
when the camera initializes the security chip, the correctness of the security chip cryptographic algorithm is verified by using a test method of known answers, the verification algorithm comprises SM2, SM3 and SM4, and if the verification fails, the starting fails, so that the correctness of the security chip cryptographic algorithm is ensured.
The SM2 algorithm self-checking process is as follows:
(1) generating a 16-byte random number (preset random number 1) by using a security chip, and taking the 16-byte random number as an input source of signature data;
(2) calling a security chip interface to sign the random number, and obtaining a signature result (preset signature result);
(3) invoking a security chip interface to perform signature verification operation on the signature result to obtain a signature verification result, if the signature verification is passed, the operation is correct, otherwise, the signature verification is incorrect;
(4) generating a 16-byte random number (preset random number 2) by using a security chip, and taking the 16-byte random number as an input source of encrypted data;
(5) invoking an interface of the security chip to encrypt the random number to obtain an encryption result (preset encryption result);
(6) and (3) calling an interface of the security chip to decrypt the encryption result, obtaining a decryption result (preset decryption result), if the decryption result is consistent with the random number, verifying the algorithm, otherwise, failing encryption and decryption.
The SM3 algorithm self-checking process is as follows:
(1) the security chip is called to encrypt preset original text 1 (16 bytes) by an SM3 algorithm to obtain a hash value, whether the hash value is consistent with the preset hash value 1 or not is compared, if so, SM3 operation is correct, otherwise, the algorithm is wrong;
(2) the security chip is called to encrypt preset original text 2 (32 bytes) by an SM3 algorithm to obtain a hash value, whether the hash value is consistent with the preset hash value 2 or not is compared, if yes, SM3 operation is correct, otherwise, the algorithm is wrong;
(3) and (3) calling a security chip to encrypt preset original text 3 (64 bytes) by an SM3 algorithm to obtain a hash value, comparing whether the hash value is consistent with the preset hash value 3, and if so, indicating that the SM3 operation is correct, otherwise, the algorithm is incorrect.
Figure BDA0004082275210000081
Figure BDA0004082275210000091
The SM4 algorithm self-checking process is as follows:
(1) the security chip is called to encrypt the preset original text by using the preset secret key, whether the encryption result is consistent with the preset ciphertext or not is compared, and if so, the SM4 ECB encryption operation is correct;
(2) the security chip is called to decrypt the preset ciphertext by using the preset secret key, whether a decryption result is consistent with the preset ciphertext or not is compared, and if so, the SM4 ECB decryption operation is correct;
(3) the security chip is called to encrypt the preset plaintext by using the preset secret key and the preset vector, whether the encryption result is consistent with the preset ciphertext or not is compared, and if so, the SM4 OFB encryption operation is correct;
(4) the security chip is called to decrypt the preset ciphertext by using the preset secret key and the preset vector, whether the decryption result is consistent with the preset original text or not is compared, and if so, the SM4 OFB decryption operation is correct;
Figure BDA0004082275210000092
Figure BDA0004082275210000101
in this embodiment, when all the links pass the verification, the operating system and the security application party can start normally and start the service, and if any of the links do not pass the verification, the system stops starting.
In the embodiment, a bidirectional device authentication application based on a digital certificate and a management platform, a video data signature application based on the digital certificate and a video encryption application are transplanted to a safe operating system running environment, and memory isolation is used; the application uses the private key stored in the security chip as a trusted root, and when the application is used, the verification process is repeated according to a certain period, so that the security of the system is not destroyed in the use process.
In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
the memory is divided into a safe environment special memory used by a fully trusted execution environment and a shared memory used by a non-fully trusted execution environment according to memory addresses, the memory hardware identifies the source of a memory access signal accessed through a bus, only the shared memory is allowed to be accessed if the memory is from a main CPU core, and the shared memory and the safe environment special memory are allowed to be accessed if the memory is from a heterogeneous CPU core.
According to the embodiment, the application in the non-fully trusted execution environment can be prevented from accessing the memory data in the fully trusted execution environment through the memory isolation, and the leakage of the unencrypted video data in the fully trusted execution environment into the non-fully trusted execution environment is avoided.
In the embodiment, the GB35114 public security video monitoring networking information security technology is combined with the heterogeneous security technology, the digital certificate and management platform based bidirectional equipment authentication application is adopted, and the digital certificate based video data signature application and the video encryption application are required to run in a completely Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The completely trusted execution environment is based on the security chip as a trusted root, so that the security and the credibility of software and hardware are realized.
The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems) and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The principles and embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail with reference to specific examples, which are provided to facilitate understanding of the method and core ideas of the present invention; meanwhile, as those skilled in the art will have variations in the specific embodiments and application scope in accordance with the ideas of the present invention, the present description should not be construed as limiting the present invention in view of the above.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the embodiments described herein are for the purpose of aiding the reader in understanding the principles of the present invention and should be understood that the scope of the invention is not limited to such specific statements and embodiments. Those of ordinary skill in the art can make various other specific modifications and combinations from the teachings of the present disclosure without departing from the spirit thereof, and such modifications and combinations remain within the scope of the present disclosure.

Claims (7)

1. A security chip-based advanced security system for a camera, comprising:
the imaging subsystem is used for acquiring video images and performing ISP processing on the acquired video images;
the DSP subsystem is used for carrying out video processing, image coding and logic control on the acquired video images;
the network subsystem is used for carrying out data transmission on the collected video images;
the encryption subsystem is used for constructing a completely trusted execution environment based on the security chip and a corresponding verification mechanism by taking a national secret heterogeneous security chip for storing a pair of private keys of the asymmetric keys as a trusted root and verifying the completely trusted execution environment; transplanting the digital certificate and management platform based bidirectional device authentication application, the digital certificate based video data signature application and the video encryption application to a completely trusted execution environment, and using memory isolation;
and the power supply subsystem is used for supplying power to each subsystem.
2. The security chip-based camera advanced security system of claim 1, wherein the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
storing the private keys of a pair of asymmetric keys in an external unreadable area of the national secret heterogeneous security chip, and verifying the execution environment by using the private keys stored by the national secret heterogeneous security chip and the public keys corresponding to the private keys to construct a complete trusted execution environment;
the fully trusted execution environment comprises a heterogeneous CPU core, a fully trusted operating system, a national secret heterogeneous security chip, a security application and a national secret algorithm module, and data transmission is carried out through an interactive interface and the non-fully trusted execution environment.
3. The security chip-based camera advanced security system of claim 2, wherein the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
and when the system is started, carrying out self-checking on the power-on random number of the national secret heterogeneous security chip, and carrying out self-checking on the power-on of the completely trusted operating system and self-checking on the power-on of the national secret algorithm module.
4. A security chip-based camera advanced security system as claimed in claim 3, wherein said national secret heterogeneous security chip power-on random number self-test specifically comprises:
calling a national secret heterogeneous security chip to generate 20 groups of random number samples with 106 bit length, and performing playing card detection on the random number samples; if the detection is not passed, allowing 1 repetition of random number acquisition and detection; if not, stopping service and alarming.
5. A security chip based camera advanced security system according to claim 3, wherein said fully trusted operating system power-on self-test specifically comprises:
key information of a completely trusted operating system and a security application is stored in a read-only memory in advance; the key information is the name and version information of a completely trusted operating system and a security application;
the current key information of the current operating system and the security application is collected again during verification, and the current key information is compared with the pre-stored key information; if the verification is consistent, the verification is passed, and if the verification is inconsistent, the verification is not passed.
6. A security chip based camera advanced security system according to claim 3, wherein said national security algorithm module power-on self-test specifically comprises:
when initializing a national secret heterogeneous security chip, verifying SM2, SM3 and SM4 algorithms in a national secret algorithm module by using a test method of known answers; all algorithms verify that the verification is correct and pass the verification; otherwise, the verification is not passed.
7. The security chip-based camera advanced security system of claim 1, wherein the encryption subsystem is specifically configured to:
the memory is divided into a safe environment special memory used by a fully trusted execution environment and a shared memory used by a non-fully trusted execution environment according to memory addresses, the memory hardware identifies the source of a memory access signal accessed through a bus, only the shared memory is allowed to be accessed if the memory is from a main CPU core, and the shared memory and the safe environment special memory are allowed to be accessed if the memory is from a heterogeneous CPU core.
CN202310126367.7A 2023-02-01 2023-02-01 High-grade security method and system for video camera based on security chip Pending CN116318880A (en)

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CN202310126367.7A CN116318880A (en) 2023-02-01 2023-02-01 High-grade security method and system for video camera based on security chip

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