CN116233843A - B5G/6G network slice authentication method for industrial Internet - Google Patents

B5G/6G network slice authentication method for industrial Internet Download PDF

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CN116233843A
CN116233843A CN202310211008.1A CN202310211008A CN116233843A CN 116233843 A CN116233843 A CN 116233843A CN 202310211008 A CN202310211008 A CN 202310211008A CN 116233843 A CN116233843 A CN 116233843A
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slice
user equipment
key
point
value
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马文平
任洁
杨琦
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Xidian University
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Xidian University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Abstract

The invention discloses a B5G/6G network slice authentication method oriented to the industrial Internet, which mainly solves the problems of complex network slice authentication flow and certificate management and high cost in the prior art. The implementation scheme is as follows: the third party key generation center generates a signature private key based on the user equipment identity by adopting a certificate-free mode; the user equipment selects a proper slice according to own service requirements; the user equipment initiates a connection request for the selected slice, and signs a request message based on an SM2 digital signature algorithm; selecting a slice to verify the request of the user equipment, negotiating a session key with the user equipment, encrypting a response message which is successfully verified by the session key, and sending the response message to the user equipment; the user equipment decrypts the response message to complete authentication. The invention does not need a certificate, improves the signature speed, simplifies the authentication flow of the slice and the user equipment, reduces the communication and calculation cost, and can be used for the B5G/6G network in the industrial Internet.

Description

B5G/6G network slice authentication method for industrial Internet
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer security, and particularly relates to a B5G/6G network slice authentication method which can be used for a B5G/6G network in an industrial Internet.
Technical Field
In the industrial internet collaborative manufacturing application, the requirements of different service scenes or different user equipment on the aspects of low time delay, high connection, safety and reliability and network functions are very different, if a network is independently built for each service, huge cost is generated, but if only the same network is used, different requirements are difficult to meet. Therefore, in order to provide differentiated guarantee services for different services and achieve flexibility of network deployment, the prior art proposes requirements of network slicing, different slices can share network physical resources, can be logically independent and isolated from each other, can flexibly adapt to different service scenes, and meanwhile, each network slice can independently operate due to the isolation of the slices, so that other running network slices cannot be interfered. Although network slicing brings many advantages, security issues also arise. Therefore, it is particularly important to study the slice security service model in the B5G/6G network environment. One of the slice security services is to study the authentication and authorization mechanism of the slice, prevent illegal access of the slice, and if the slice authentication and authorization mechanism is not available, operators may not be able to effectively meet the business requirements of different industries, and also face potential security risks when interacting with third party networks, so the security authentication problem for network slices is a hotspot of current study.
In network slice enhanced security research, 3GPP proposes a 5G slice secondary authentication mechanism, which performs slice-level secondary authentication using a user ID and a credential after a user and a core network complete primary authentication, where the secondary authentication architecture is based on an extensible authentication protocol EAP. When user equipment is accessed to the network, a registration request is initiated to the core network, whether slicing authentication authorization is needed or not is indicated in a request message, a main authentication process is completed based on a 5G-AKA or EAP-AKA' authentication protocol, during the main authentication, a unified data management function network element UDM judges whether a user needs special slicing authentication or not by checking a mark for additional authentication, and then an access mobile management network element AMF triggers a special slicing secondary authentication flow according to request information. However, the authentication method requires the user to deploy the public key infrastructure PKI and apply for the public key certificate, and the certificate management is complex, the certificate issue, the revocation, the verification and the preservation also need to occupy more resources, thereby limiting the application of the PKI in a real-time environment.
In patent document with application number CN201910998988, an IoT security verification framework based on 5G network slice and a service method thereof are proposed, which are used for ensuring anonymity and authenticity of a user and confidentiality of data, establishing connection between the user and a core network, selecting a proper network slice according to the type of access service, and anonymously accessing a corresponding internet of things service. However, in the method, because the user needs to re-authenticate when switching different network slices, the authentication process is complex, the calculation cost is high, and meanwhile, because the authentication process also needs to interact with a plurality of security network elements, the transmission delay is larger.
In the article published by Yinghui Zhang et al in journal Computer Communications in 2021, a flexible and anonymous network slicing method FANS is proposed, which implements mutual authentication between a user and a network slice based on the AKA protocol, protects user identity privacy by hiding a public key associated with an actual identity in a transmitted message, and implements fine-grained network slice selection based on a one-to-many matching technique used for anonymous attribute-based encryption. However, the method adopts public key blind technology to realize the privacy protection of the user identity, so that extra calculation overhead is brought to the user side.
Although the prior art provides reasonable solutions for the security authentication of the slice, the lightweight network slice authentication method still needs to be further researched aiming at the scene of accessing the industrial Internet mass user equipment.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a B5G/6G network slice authentication method oriented to the industrial Internet so as to realize fine granularity selection and lightweight authentication of user equipment and a network slice, reduce calculation and communication expenditure, reduce time delay and realize hiding of user equipment identity identification and slice characteristic information from the perspective of privacy protection.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the B5G/6G network slice authentication method facing the industrial Internet comprises the following steps:
(1) Generating user equipment identity ID based u Is a signature private key d of (a) uc ：
(1a) The third party key generating center KGC selects public parameters, designates a big prime number p, and in the finite field F p Taking a base point G with the order of n from the elliptic curve, randomly selecting 1<x<The number x in n is used for setting a system private key SK S System public key PK =x S =x×g, generating a system public-private key pair (PK S ,SK S ＝x)；
(1b) KGC random selection 1<y u <number y in n u And calculates a point Y on the elliptic curve u ＝y u * G, hash value h u ＝H(ID u ||Y u ) Signature private key d uc ＝y u +SK S *h u D is carried out through a safety channel uc ，Y u ，T 1 These three parameters are sent to the user equipment UE, where T 1 For the current timestamp, H () represents a one-way hash function;
(1c) After receiving the KGC information from the third party key generation center, the UE first checks T 1 Is effective in (3):
if valid, performing (1 d);
if not, the user equipment UE does not accept the signature private key d uc ；
(1d) Verification d uc *G＝Y u +h u *PK S Whether or not it is:
if so, the user equipment UE accepts the signature private key d uc ；
Otherwise, the user equipment UE does not accept the signature private key d uc ；
(2) The user equipment UE selects proper slice access according to own service scene requirements:
(2a) The physical network resource PNR is divided into l logically independent fine-grained network slices according to the characteristics of speed, throughput, bandwidth, time delay, expandability and security level, and each network slice is expressed as the following characteristic vector:
S i F＝{S i F 1 ,S i F 2 ,…,S i F t ,…,S i F T }
wherein i is E [1, l]，S i F t The T characteristic value of the slice i is represented, and T is the characteristic quantity of the slice;
(2b) The user equipment UE constructs a requested slice feature vector according to own business requirements, encrypts and processes the feature value of the feature vector by using a random number, and initiates a slice selection request;
(2c) The access mobile management network element AMF encrypts each slice in the list according to the slice list set which is allowed to be accessed by the user equipment UE and sends the encrypted value to the user equipment UE;
(2d) After receiving the encrypted slice list set, the user equipment UE calculates the Euclidean distance between the encrypted slice list set and the requested slice feature vector, and selects the slice with the smallest Euclidean distance in the slice list set as the most suitable slice selected by the user equipment UE according to the service requirement;
(3) The user equipment UE initiates and selects a connection authentication request of the slice, signs the request information M by using a signature algorithm, generates signature information (r, s), and sends Y u ,r,s,M,T 2 These five parameters are sent to the selected slice, where T 2 Is the current timestamp;
(4) The slice responds to the request of the user equipment UE by verifying the signature algorithm:
(4a) After the slice receives the request message sent by the user equipment UE, the prior certificate timestamp T 2 Whether or not to be effective:
if so, the slice verifies the signature information of the User Equipment (UE): if the verification is successful, executing the step (4 b), otherwise, failing the authentication;
if invalid, the authentication fails;
(4b) The slice negotiates a session key K with the user equipment UE, encrypts a response message successfully verified by the session key and sends the response message to the user equipment UE;
(5) After receiving the sliced response message, the user equipment UE decrypts the response message by using the session key K negotiated between the two:
if the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication between the user equipment UE and the selected slice is successful;
otherwise, authentication fails.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
1. the invention adopts a mode without a certificate to generate the user signature private key, does not need certificate verification, and effectively solves the problems that the certificate management is complex, and more resources are required to be occupied for certificate issuing, revocation, verification and preservation.
2. The invention encrypts the characteristic values of the slice by adopting a group of random numbers, and the original characteristic values of the slice do not participate in calculation, thereby realizing privacy protection of the characteristic information of the slice and effectively preventing a third-party attacker from illegally acquiring the slice information.
3. The invention adopts SM2 digital signature algorithm to realize the mutual authentication of the user equipment UE and the slice, has fast signature speed, small storage space, low cost and simple authentication flow, and is more suitable for the lightweight authentication of a large number of user equipment accesses in the industrial Internet.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a scene diagram of an existing industrial Internet;
fig. 2 is a flow chart of an implementation of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Referring to fig. 1, the existing B5G/6G secure network slice scenario of the industrial internet, the main participants include: user Equipment (UE) and network slicing, wherein the UE is in high-definition monitoring, a mobile robot, an unmanned aerial vehicle, a sensor, an industrial instrument and virtual reality equipment in industrial Internet collaborative manufacturing, different user equipment has respective service requirements, and the requirements on bandwidth, time delay and network functions are different; the network slice is a plurality of virtual networks which are virtualized on a physical network, are logically independent and isolated from each other, and are composed of a plurality of network functions and resources which are abstracted from the bottom layer resources, so that different service requirements of the user equipment are met.
The embodiment is based on the B5G/6G security network slice facing the industrial Internet, and adds a third party key generation center KGC and an access mobile management network element AMF, wherein the third party key generation center KGC is used for selecting public parameters, generating a system public-private key pair and generating a signature private key of user equipment; and accessing the mobile management network element AMF, wherein the AMF is used for determining the network slice which each user equipment is allowed to access according to the locally stored information or the subscription information from the user equipment.
Referring to fig. 2, the implementation steps of this example are as follows:
step one: generating user equipment identity ID based u Is a signature private key d of (a) uc 。
(1.1) third party Key Generation center KGC selects common parameters, specifies a big prime number p, and in finite field F p Taking a base point G with the order of n from the elliptic curve, randomly selecting 1<x<The number x in n is used for setting a system private key SK S System public key PK =x S =x×g, generating a system public-private key pair (PK S ,SK S ＝x)；
(1.2) random selection of the third Party Key Generation center KGC 1<y u <number y in n u And calculates a point Y on the elliptic curve u Hash value h u Signature private key d uc ：
Y u ＝y u *G
h u ＝H(ID u ||Y u )
d uc ＝y u +SK S *h u
Where H () represents a one-way hash function;
(1.3) the third party Key Generation center KGC will d through the secure channel uc ，Y u ，T 1 These three parameters are sent to the user equipment UE, where T 1 Is the current timestamp;
(1.4) after the user equipment UE receives the information of the third party key generation center KGC, it first checks T 1 Is effective in (3):
(1.4.1) adding a timestamp to the message to combat replay attacks, the user equipment UE subtracting the received timestamp T from the current time 1 Obtaining a difference delta T;
(1.4.2) setting a time threshold δ, comparing the difference Δt with the time threshold δ:
if DeltaT<Delta, then timestamp T 1 Effectively, execute (1.5);
otherwise, timestamp T 1 Invalid, user equipment UE does not accept signature private key d uc ；
(1.5) user Equipment UE authentication d uc *G＝Y u +h u *PK S Whether or not it is:
if so, the user equipment UE accepts the signature private key d uc ；
Otherwise, the user equipment UE does not accept the signature private key d uc ；
Step two: the user equipment UE selects proper slice access according to own service scene requirements.
(2.1) dividing the physical network resources PNR into l logically independent fine-grained network slices according to the characteristics of speed, throughput, bandwidth, delay, scalability, security level, each network slice being represented by the following feature vectors:
S i F＝{S i F 1 ,S i F 2 ,…,S i F t ,…,S i F T }
wherein i is E [1, l]，S i F t The T characteristic value of the slice i is represented, and T is the characteristic quantity of the slice;
(2.2) the user equipment UE constructs a requested slice feature vector Req according to its own service requirement:
(2.2.1) classifying traffic demands by features such as rate, throughput, bandwidth, latency, scalability, security level;
(2.2.2) mapping each feature of the service requirement into a slice feature value, and constructing a requested slice feature vector req= { x 1 ,x 2 ,…x t ,…x T X, where x t The T-th characteristic value of the requested slice is represented, and T represents the number of characteristic values of the slice;
(2.2.3) setting a set of random numbers c= (C) 1 ,C 2 ,…C t ,…C T ) And a randomly generated secret value f;
(2.2.4) for each eigenvalue x in the constructed request slice eigenvector Req t Using each value C in the random number C t Calculating the randomly generated secret value f to obtain an encrypted request slice feature vector Req':
Req′＝{x ′ t ＝x t +f*C t ,1≤t≤T}；
(2.3) the access mobility management element AMF parses the encrypted requested slice feature vector Req' and the random number C, checks a set of slice lists that the user equipment UE is allowed to access, the list containing m slices, each slice being represented as feature vector w j ＝(y 1 ,y 2 ,…y t ,…y T ) Wherein y is t Representing the T-th characteristic value, wherein T represents the number of characteristic values of the slice;
(2.4) the access mobility management network element AMF encrypts each slice in the slice list set, calculates an encrypted slice feature vector w' j ：
w′ j ＝(b j1 ,b j2 ,b j3 )
Wherein the method comprises the steps of
Figure SMS_1
(2.5) the feature vector w 'after encrypting each slice in the slice list set' j Combining results in an encrypted slice list set w= (W' 1 ,…w′ j ,…w′ m ) Wherein j is E [1, m]；
(2.6) the access mobility management network element AMF sends the encrypted slice list set W to the user equipment UE;
(2.7) after the user equipment UE receives the encrypted slice list set W, each slice feature vector W 'in W is calculated' j And the Euclidean distance d between the encrypted request slice feature vector Req j ：
Figure SMS_2
Wherein, the liquid crystal display device comprises a liquid crystal display device,
Figure SMS_3
E j ＝b j1 -f*b j2 ；
(2.8) user Equipment UE selecting the Euclidean distance dj in the slice List set Most preferably, the first to fourth The small slice is taken as the most suitable slice selected for the user equipment UE according to the traffic demand.
Step three: the user equipment UE signs the request information M based on the SM2 digital signature algorithm, and initiates and selects a connection request of the slice.
(3.1) user Equipment UE calculates the digest value Z Y ＝H v (Len‖ID u ‖a‖b‖G x ‖G y ‖Y x ‖Y y ) Wherein ID u Is the user equipment identity, len represents the ID u Length bit value of Y x And Y y Representing a point Y on an elliptic curve u Coordinates H of (2) v () A cryptographic hash function for generating a v-bit digest value;
(3.2) the user equipment UE computes a cryptographic hash value e=h v (Z Y ||M)；
(3.3) user Equipment UE random selection 1<a<The number a in n calculates an elliptic curve point (x 1 ,y 1 )＝aG；
(3.4) the user equipment UE calculates signature information (r, s):
r＝(e+x 1 )mod n，s＝((1+d uc ) -1 (a-r*d uc ))mod n，
wherein G is a base point on the elliptic curve, n is the order of the base point G, d uc A signature private key for the UE;
(3.5) user Equipment UE will Y u ,r,s,M,T 2 These five parameters are sent to the selected slice, where T 2 Is the current timestamp.
Step four: the slice validates the request of the user device and negotiates a session key with the user device.
(4.1) slicing received Y transmitted by user Equipment UE u ,r,s,M,T 2 After these five parameters, the time stamp T is verified a priori 2 If it is valid, the verification step is the same as (1.4), if it is invalid, it is confirmed thatFailure of the syndrome; otherwise, executing (4.2);
(4.2) the slice verifies the signature information of the user equipment UE:
(4.2.1) checking whether 1< r < n is true or not, if not, the verification fails; otherwise, executing (4.2.2);
(4.2.2) checking whether 1< s < n is true or not, if not, the verification fails; otherwise, executing (4.2.3);
(4.2.3) slice calculation of the cryptographic hash value e' =h v (Z Y ||M)；
(4.2.4) slice calculation hash value h' u ＝H(ID u ||Y u )；
(4.2.5) section calculation of elliptic Curve Point (x' 1 ,y′ 1 )＝s*G+(r+s)*(Y u +h′ u *PK S )；
(4.2.6) section examination (e '+x' 1 ) Whether mod n=r is true or not, if so, the verification is successful; otherwise, authentication fails.
(4.3) the slice negotiates a session key K with the user equipment UE:
(4.3.1) the user equipment UE exchanges data with the slice generation:
user equipment UE random selection 1<r A <number r in n A Calculating the point R on the elliptic curve A ＝r A *G＝(x A ,y A ) And let the point R A Is sent to a slice, where (x A ,y A ) Is the point R A Coordinate values of (2);
slice random selection 1<r B <number r in n B Calculating the point R on the elliptic curve B ＝r B *G＝(x B ,y B ) And let the point R B To the user equipment UE, wherein (x B ,y B ) Is the point R B Coordinate values of (2);
(4.3.2) the user equipment UE and the slice calculate respective session keys:
the slice receives R sent by user equipment UE A Thereafter, verify R A Whether an elliptic curve equation is satisfied: if not, the key negotiation fails; otherwise, slice is taken from R A Take out x A Calculating the point V on the elliptic curve and the own session key K B ：
V＝(d B +r B *x B )*(P A +x A *R A )＝(x V ,y V )，
K B ＝KDF(x V ||y V ||Z A ||Z B ,L K )，
Wherein Z is A And Z B For the abstract value, L K For a set key length, (x V ,y V ) Is the coordinate value of point V, d B Private key, P, being a slice A A public key for the user equipment UE;
r of receiving slice transmission by User Equipment (UE) B Thereafter, verify R B Whether an elliptic curve equation is satisfied or not, if not, the key negotiation fails; otherwise, the user equipment UE is from R B Take out x B Calculating a point U on an elliptic curve and a session key K of the point U A ：
U＝(d A +r A *x A )*(P B +x B *R B )＝(x U ,y U )
K A ＝KDF(x U ||y U ||Z A ||Z B ,L K )
Wherein (x) U ,y U ) Is the coordinate value of point U, d A P, which is the private key of the user equipment UE B A public key that is a slice;
(4.3.3) according to the success of calculating the session key by the slice and the user equipment UE respectively, obtaining a session key K after the negotiation of the slice and the user equipment UE is successful:
K＝K A ＝K B ；
and (4.4) the slice encrypts a response message of successful verification by using the session key K and sends the response message to the user equipment UE.
Step five: the user equipment UE decrypts the response message.
(5.1) after receiving the response message of the slice, the User Equipment (UE) uses the session key K negotiated between the user equipment and the user equipment to decrypt the response message;
(5.2) the user equipment UE judges whether authentication with the selected slice is successful:
if the user equipment UE is successfully decrypted, the authentication is successful;
otherwise, authentication fails.
The above description is only one specific example of the invention and does not constitute any limitation of the invention, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and changes in form and details may be made without departing from the principles, construction of the invention, but these modifications and changes based on the idea of the invention are still within the scope of the claims of the invention.

Claims (5)

1. An industrial Internet-oriented B5G/6G network slice authentication method comprises the following steps:
(1) Generating user equipment identity ID based u Is a signature private key d of (a) uc ：
(1a) The third party key generating center KGC selects public parameters, designates a big prime number p, and in the finite field F p Taking a base point G with the order of n from the elliptic curve, randomly selecting 1<x<The number x in n is used for setting a system private key SK S System public key PK =x S =x×g, generating a system public-private key pair (PK S ,SK S ＝x)；
(1b) KGC random selection 1<y u <number y in n u And calculates a point Y on the elliptic curve u ＝y u * G, hash value h u ＝H(ID u ||Y u ) Signature private key d uc ＝y u +SK S *h u D is carried out through a safety channel uc ，Y u ，T 1 These three parameters are sent to the user equipment UE, where T 1 For the current timestamp, H () represents a one-way hash function;
(1c) After receiving the KGC information from the third party key generation center, the UE first checks T 1 Is effective in (3):
if valid, performing (1 d);
if not, the user equipment UE does not accept the signaturePrivate key d uc ；
(1d) Verification d uc *G＝Y u +h u *PK S Whether or not it is:
if so, the user equipment UE accepts the signature private key d uc ；
Otherwise, the user equipment UE does not accept the signature private key d uc ；
(2) The user equipment UE selects proper slice access according to own service scene requirements:
(2a) The physical network resource PNR is divided into l logically independent fine-grained network slices according to the characteristics of speed, throughput, bandwidth, time delay, expandability and security level, and each network slice is expressed as the following characteristic vector:
S i F＝{S i F 1 ,S i F 2 ,…,S i Ft,…,S i F T }
wherein i is E [1, l]，S i F t The T characteristic value of the slice i is represented, and T is the characteristic quantity of the slice;
(2b) The user equipment UE constructs a requested slice feature vector according to own business requirements, encrypts and processes the feature value of the feature vector by using a random number, and initiates a slice selection request;
(2c) The access mobile management network element AMF encrypts each slice in the list according to the slice list set which is allowed to be accessed by the user equipment UE and sends the encrypted value to the user equipment UE;
(2d) After receiving the encrypted slice list set, the user equipment UE calculates the Euclidean distance between the encrypted slice list set and the requested slice feature vector, and selects the slice with the smallest Euclidean distance in the slice list set as the most suitable slice selected by the user equipment UE according to the service requirement;
(3) The user equipment UE initiates and selects a connection authentication request of the slice, signs the request information M by using a signature algorithm, generates signature information (r, s), and sends Y u ,r,s,M,T 2 These five parameters are sent to the selected slice, where T 2 Is the current timestamp;
(4) The slice responds to the request of the user equipment UE by verifying the signature algorithm:
(4a) After the slice receives the request message sent by the user equipment UE, the prior certificate timestamp T 2 Whether or not to be effective:
if so, the slice verifies the signature information of the User Equipment (UE): if the verification is successful, executing the step (4 b), otherwise, failing the authentication;
if invalid, the authentication fails;
(4b) The slice negotiates a session key K with the user equipment UE, encrypts a response message successfully verified by the session key and sends the response message to the user equipment UE;
(5) After receiving the sliced response message, the user equipment UE decrypts the response message by using the session key K negotiated between the two:
if the decryption is successful, the mutual authentication between the user equipment UE and the selected slice is successful;
otherwise, authentication fails.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein T is examined in (1 c) 1 The effectiveness of (2) is realized as follows:
setting a time threshold delta, adding a time stamp in the message to resist replay attacks, the user equipment UE subtracting the received time stamp T from the current time 1 A difference Δt is obtained, which is compared with a time threshold δ:
if DeltaT<Delta, then timestamp T 1 The effect is achieved;
otherwise, timestamp T 1 And (3) invalidating.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the user equipment UE in (2 b) constructs the requested slice feature vector according to its own service requirement, and encrypts the feature value of the feature vector with a random number, so as to implement the following steps:
(2b1) Classifying the service demands according to the characteristics of speed, throughput, bandwidth, time delay, expandability and security level;
(2b2) Mapping each feature of the service requirement into a slice feature value, and constructing a requested slice feature vector req={x 1 ,x 2 ,...x t ,...x T }，
Wherein x is t Representing the eigenvalue of the T-th requested slice, T representing the number of eigenvalues of the slice;
(2b3) Set a set of random numbers c= (C 1 ,C 2 ,…C t ,...C T ) And a randomly generated secret value f;
(2b4) For each eigenvalue x in the constructed request slice eigenvector Req t Using each value C in the random number C t And a randomly generated secret value f to obtain an encrypted request slice feature vector Req',
Req′＝{x′ t ＝x t +fC t ,1≤t≤T}。
4. the method of claim 1, wherein the signing of the request message M by the signature algorithm in (3) is performed by using an SM2 digital signature algorithm, which is implemented as follows:
(3a) Calculate the digest value Z Y ＝H v (Len‖ID u ‖a‖b‖G x ‖G y ‖Y x ‖Y y ) Wherein ID u Is the user equipment identity, len represents the ID u Length bit value of Y x And Y y Representing a point Y on an elliptic curve u Coordinates H of (2) v () A cryptographic hash function for generating a v-bit digest value;
(3b) Calculating a cryptographic hash value e=h v (Z Y ||M)；
(3c) Random selection 1<a<The number a in n calculates an elliptic curve point (x 1 ,y 1 )＝aG；
(3d) Calculating signature information (r, s):
r＝(e+x 1 )mod n，
s＝((1+d uc ) -1 (a-r*d uc ))mod n，
wherein G is a base point on the elliptic curve, n is the order of the base point G, d uc A signature private key for User Equipment (UE);
(3e) The user equipment UE sends signature information (r, s) to the slice.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the negotiating session keys with the user equipment UE by the slicing in (4 b) is performed using an SM2 key exchange protocol, which is implemented as follows:
(4b1) The user equipment UE exchanges data with the slice generation:
user equipment UE random selection 1<r A <number r in n A Calculating the point R on the elliptic curve A ＝r A *G＝(x A ,y A ) And let the point R A Is sent to a slice, where (x A ,y A ) Is the point R A Coordinate values of (2);
slice random selection 1<r B <number r in n B Calculating the point R on the elliptic curve B ＝r B *G＝(x B ,y B ) And let the point R B To the user equipment UE, wherein (x B ,y B ) Is the point R B Coordinate values of (2);
(4b2) The user equipment UE and the slice calculate the respective session keys:
the slice receives R sent by user equipment UE A Thereafter, verify R A Whether an elliptic curve equation is satisfied: if not, the key negotiation fails; otherwise, slice is taken from R A Take out x A Calculating the point V on the elliptic curve and the own session key K B ：
V＝(d B +r B *x B )*(P A +x A *R A )＝(x V ,y V )，
K B ＝KDF(x V ||y V ||Z A ||Z B ,L K )，
Wherein Z is A And Z B For the abstract value, L K For a set key length, (x V ,y V ) Is the coordinate value of point V, d B Private key, P, being a slice A A public key for the user equipment UE;
r of receiving slice transmission by User Equipment (UE) B Thereafter, verify R B Whether or not to satisfy elliptic curve squareIf not, the key negotiation fails; otherwise, the user equipment UE is from R B Take out x B Calculating a point U on an elliptic curve and a session key K of the point U A ：
U＝(d A +r A *x A )*(P B +x B *R B )＝(x U ,y U )
K A ＝KDF(x U ||y U ||Z A ||Z B ,L K )
Wherein (x) U ,y u ) Is the coordinate value of point U, d A P, which is the private key of the user equipment UE B A public key that is a slice;
(4b3) According to the success of calculating the session key by the slice and the user equipment UE, obtaining a session key K after the negotiation of the slice and the user equipment UE is successful:
K＝K A ＝K B 。
CN202310211008.1A 2023-03-07 2023-03-07 B5G/6G network slice authentication method for industrial Internet Pending CN116233843A (en)

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN117692257A (en) * 2024-02-02 2024-03-12 数盾信息科技股份有限公司 High-speed encryption method and device for service data of electric power Internet of things

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN117692257A (en) * 2024-02-02 2024-03-12 数盾信息科技股份有限公司 High-speed encryption method and device for service data of electric power Internet of things
CN117692257B (en) * 2024-02-02 2024-04-30 数盾信息科技股份有限公司 High-speed encryption method and device for service data of electric power Internet of things

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