CN116192409A - Digital asset issuing method and system - Google Patents

Digital asset issuing method and system Download PDF

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Publication number
CN116192409A
CN116192409A CN202310262386.2A CN202310262386A CN116192409A CN 116192409 A CN116192409 A CN 116192409A CN 202310262386 A CN202310262386 A CN 202310262386A CN 116192409 A CN116192409 A CN 116192409A
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China
Prior art keywords
digital asset
center
applicant
certificate
issuing
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CN202310262386.2A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
谢婷
张超
朱梦雅
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Matrix Time Digital Technology Co Ltd
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Matrix Time Digital Technology Co Ltd
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Priority to CN202310262386.2A priority Critical patent/CN116192409A/en
Publication of CN116192409A publication Critical patent/CN116192409A/en
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852Quantum cryptography
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds

Abstract

The invention discloses a method and a system for issuing digital assets, wherein the system comprises the following steps: digital asset issuing centers, applicant, and CA certification centers. The method comprises the following steps: the applicant is taken as a signature party, and the digital asset issuing center and the CA authentication center are taken as signature verification parties to verify the identity of the applicant by adopting digital signatures; the digital asset issuing center generates a digital asset digest M' including the digital asset M and transmits it to the applicant to complete the issuance of the digital asset M. By the method, the digital asset owners can issue the digital assets owned by the owners in a quantum security mode, so that the security threat caused by computational effort and algorithm progress to the issuing process is solved, the issuing process is improved to the quantum security level, and the rights and interests of the digital asset owners are ensured.

Description

Digital asset issuing method and system
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of quantum information security, in particular to a method and a system for issuing digital assets.
Background
In the current market environment, users often have something of value, one of which is digital assets. Digital assets (Digital assets) refer to non-monetary assets that are owned or controlled by an enterprise or individual, exist in electronic data form, and are held in daily activities for sale or in the process of production. Digital assets have a certain value due to their property of the asset. To render such digital assets, digital asset owners seek specialized issuing authorities to launch the owned digital assets into the market by way of distribution, thereby effecting the rendering.
However, unlike physical assets, digital assets are almost zero in marginal cost of replication and almost unlimited in replication due to their electronic nature. Thus, if a digital asset is compromised or stolen during distribution, this can result in a reduction in the value of the digital asset, severely compromising the rights of the digital asset owner.
Currently, digital certificates, digital signatures and the like are commonly used in the market to ensure the security of the digital asset issuing process. However, with the progress of computing power and algorithms, especially the progress of quantum computing technology, traditional CA certificates, digital signatures and other modes based on public-private key cryptosystems become no longer secure. This means that network communications, such as digital asset distribution processes, using traditional cryptography, are faced with serious security threats in front of quantum computers.
In order to address the above-mentioned security threats, there is a need for a cryptographic means that satisfies the information theory security or quantum security to address the security issues of the digital asset issuing process.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to: the invention aims to provide a method and a system for issuing digital assets, which can be applied to the issuing process of the digital assets, and solve the problem of security threat suffered by the existing public and private key cryptosystem so as to ensure that the security level of the issuing process can be improved to the quantum security level.
The technical scheme is as follows: the invention provides a method for issuing digital assets, which comprises the following steps:
(1) The applicant initiates a request req for acquiring the digital asset M to a digital asset issuing center, and generates a signature file sign, and a three-party quantum digital signature is carried out among a CA authentication center, the digital asset issuing center and the applicant for the signature file sign, wherein the applicant is a signature party, and the CA authentication center and the digital asset issuing center are signature verification parties;
(2) The digital asset issuing center extracts the corresponding digital asset M according to the received request req and generates a disposable CA certificate otCA' with the CA authentication center;
(3) The digital asset issuing center generates a digital asset abstract M 'and sends the digital asset abstract M' to an applicant in a message authentication code mode;
(4) The applicant sends the received digital asset abstract M' to a CA authentication center for auditing, and sends the auditing result to a digital asset issuing center;
(5) After the digital asset issuing center receives the auditing result of the applicant, the digital asset issuing center registers the digital asset M issued at this time in the digital asset database as issued in response to the auditing result being passed.
Further, the digital asset M is stored by the digital asset owner in a digital asset issuing center.
The invention also proposes a system for publishing digital assets, comprising: a digital asset issuing center, an applicant, and a CA authentication center; the digital asset issuing center, the applicant and the CA authentication center are connected in pairs and are used for executing the issuing process of the digital asset M.
Further, the digital asset distribution system further comprises a digital asset owner having the digital asset M, the digital asset owner being coupled to the digital asset distribution center for storing the digital asset M in the digital asset distribution center.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the digital asset issuing method and system provided by the invention have the advantages that the digital asset owners can issue the digital asset owned by the digital asset owners in a quantum security mode, the security threat caused by the improvement of calculation power and algorithms to the issuing process is solved, and the issuing process is improved to the quantum security level, so that the value of the digital asset in the issuing process is ensured, and the rights and interests of the digital asset owners are ensured.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an issuing system for digital assets of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of yet another distribution system for digital assets of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a process schematic diagram of a method of publishing a digital asset of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the drawings and examples.
The invention provides a method and a system for publishing digital assets, which can be applied to a digital asset publishing scene as described in the background art. The technical scheme of the invention is specifically described below.
As shown in fig. 1, in some embodiments, the distribution system of the present invention may include a digital asset distribution center, an applicant, and a CA certification center. The digital asset issuing center, the applicant and the CA authentication center are connected in pairs for executing the issuing process of the digital asset. Where the applicant may be an enterprise, institution or individual having a need for the digital asset being issued. In other embodiments, as shown in FIG. 2, the distribution system of the present invention may also include a digital asset owner. Wherein the digital asset owner is coupled to the digital asset issuing center for storing the owned digital asset at the digital asset issuing center. The participants in the system are connected into a quantum security network, and session keys can be generated between any two parties with the help of the quantum security network according to the requirements of communication tasks, namely quantum random numbers shared by the two parties according to the communication requirements are used for encryption and decryption of quantum security, message authentication and cryptography tasks of digital signature, so that cryptography in the issuance of digital assets is improved to a quantum security level.
As shown in FIG. 2, the present invention provides a method of publishing a digital asset comprising the following steps.
1. The applicant initiates a request req to acquire the digital asset M to a digital asset issuing center and generates a signature file sign. And carrying out three-party quantum digital signature on the signature file sign among the CA authentication center, the digital asset issuing center and the applicant, wherein the applicant is a signature party, and the CA authentication center and the digital asset issuing center are signature verification parties. When the CA authentication center and the digital asset issuing center pass the verification, the identity of the applicant is legal, and the next step is entered; otherwise, the signature verification is not passed, and the issuing process is ended.
The process for generating the signature file sign comprises the following steps:
(1) The digital asset issuing center applies for the public CA certificate from the CA authentication center
Figure BDA0004131710390000031
Privacy CA certificate->
Figure BDA0004131710390000032
The applicant applies for his public CA certificate +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000033
Privacy CA certificate->
Figure BDA0004131710390000034
The applicant and the CA authentication center generate a disposable CA certificate otCA;
the digital asset issuing center and the applicant apply for respective public CA certificates and private CA certificates from a CA authentication center for storage, wherein the CA authentication center can be a CA authentication center in a digital certificate generation and identity authentication method and a quantum CA authentication center and system of application number 2022101851462, and the method in the patent is adopted to distribute the respective public CA certificates and private CA certificates for the digital asset issuing center and the applicant, wherein the public CA certificates are generated according to provided real identity information and can comprise names or unit names (and domain names thereof if a network service operator), certificate numbers (with the whole network uniqueness), certificate issuing institutions and domain names or IP addresses thereof, certificate validity periods and other information which can be displayed to the public; the privacy CA certificate consists of a public CA certificate, a timestamp2 for generating the CA certificate and a quantum random number QRN, and the privacy of the privacy CA certificate is ensured by the privacy of the quantum random number QRN.
After the application is completed, the CA authentication center stores public CA certificates and private CA certificates of the digital asset issuing center and the applicant.
The specific process of the applicant and the CA authentication center generating the disposable CA certificate otCA is as follows:
1) The applicant obtains a selected set of n-bit random numbers s from the local 1 N-bit random number s 1 The method comprises the steps of generating an n-order irreducible polynomial p (x), and recording an n-bit character string consisting of each term coefficient except the highest term in the irreducible polynomial as str1;
wherein n-bit random number s 1 The specific procedure for generating the irreducible polynomial p (x) of order n is:
a) First, the applicant uses n-bit random number s in turn 1 Generating an n-order polynomial in GF (2) domain by corresponding the coefficients of each term except the highest term in the polynomial, wherein the coefficient of the highest term is 1; for example, the random number is n bits (a n-1 ,a n-2 ,…,a 1 ,a 0 ) The resulting polynomial is p (x) =x n +a n-1 x n-1 +…+a 1 x+a 0 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Preferably, only when a 0 When=1, the generated polynomial may be an irreducible polynomial, so, to reduce the calculation amount in the later verification of the irreducible polynomial, the random number may be first determined: if the last bit of the random number is 0, the last bit of the random number is 1; or if the last bit of the random number is 0, regenerating the random number until the last bit of the generated random number is 1; this reduces the amount of computation in post-verification irreducible polynomials, ultimately resulting in a 0 =1, the resulting polynomial is p (x) =x n +a n-1 x n-1 +…+a 1 x+1;
b) Then, verifying whether the polynomial is an irreducible polynomial, if the verification result is no, regenerating another set of random numbers by the applicant, returning the regenerated set of random numbers to the step a) as new random numbers to regenerate the polynomial and verifying; if the verification result is "yes", the verification is stopped, and the applicant obtains an irreducible polynomial p (x).
There are several ways to verify the irreducible polynomials here, preferably the two ways we mention in this invention:
method A: in turnVerification
Figure BDA0004131710390000041
Whether or not it is true, wherein->
Figure BDA0004131710390000042
Figure BDA0004131710390000043
Representation pair->
Figure BDA0004131710390000044
Rounding, if all i are verified to pass, p (x) is an irreducible polynomial of order n over GF (2); wherein gcd (f (x), g (x)) represents the maximum common factor of f (x) and g (x) over GF (2), f (x) and g (x) referring to two arbitrary polynomials.
Method B: verification condition (1)
Figure BDA0004131710390000045
(2)/>
Figure BDA0004131710390000046
Whether or not to do so at the same time, wherein->
Figure BDA0004131710390000047
Representation->
Figure BDA0004131710390000048
Where d is an arbitrary element of n, gcd (f (x), g (x)) represents the maximum factors of f (x) and g (x) over GF (2), f (x) and g (x) refer to two arbitrary polynomials, and when both validation conditions are satisfied, p (x) is an irreducible polynomial of order n over GF (2).
In general, take n=2 k Therefore, only d=2 needs to be taken in condition (2). Alternatively, take n=2 7 =128. Since this method only needs to verify these two conditions, we use Fast Modular Composition (FMC) algorithm to get it quickly
Figure BDA0004131710390000051
And->
Figure BDA0004131710390000052
Use->
Figure BDA0004131710390000053
Substitution condition (2)>
Figure BDA0004131710390000054
The calculation is performed, and the calculation result is obtained more quickly by a method of reducing the order. />
2) Sharing three sets of quantum keys s between applicant and CA authentication center 2 U and v, where s 2 The lengths of u and v are n; the applicant selects an irreducible polynomial p (x) of order n and a shared key s as an input random number 2 Obtaining a hash function based on a linear feedback shift register
Figure BDA0004131710390000055
Calculating the applicant's private CA certificate using the hash function>
Figure BDA0004131710390000056
Is recorded as +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000057
Subsequently the shared key u is encrypted->
Figure BDA0004131710390000058
Encryption is obtained by exclusive-or operation
Figure BDA0004131710390000059
Namely, a disposable CA certificate otCA, and the applicant stores the disposable CA certificate otCA;
the invention relates to hash value calculation, which is executed by adopting a hash function based on a linear shift register, preferably a Toeplitz hash function based on the linear shift register, and is generated by an n-order irreducible polynomial and a quantum random number on a GF (2) domain in order to avoid the hash collision problem caused by selecting other hash functions.
3) The applicant encrypts the character string str1 by using the shared key v, encrypts the character string str1 by using an exclusive OR operation, and then sends an encrypted result v [ str1 ] to the CA authentication center;
4) After the CA authentication center receives the encryption result, the encryption result is decrypted by using the shared secret key v to obtain a character string str1 identical to the applicant, the CA authentication center sequentially generates an n-order irreducible polynomial p (x) with a highest order coefficient of 1 on GF (2) domain by using coefficients of each item except the highest item in the corresponding polynomial of each bit of the character string str1, and then selects the irreducible polynomial p (x) and the shared secret key string s as an input random number 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function identical to an applicant
Figure BDA00041317103900000510
Use of hash function->
Figure BDA00041317103900000511
Calculating privacy CA certificate of applicant reserved in CA authentication center +.>
Figure BDA00041317103900000512
Is recorded as +.>
Figure BDA00041317103900000513
Subsequently the CA authentication center encrypts +_ using the shared key u>
Figure BDA00041317103900000514
Encryption using exclusive or operation to obtain->
Figure BDA00041317103900000515
Namely, the disposable CA certificate otCA, and the CA authentication center stores the disposable CA certificate otCA.
The CA authentication center may set a certificate validity period for the disposable CA certificate otCA issued this time, and if the certificate validity period is exceeded, the disposable CA certificate is invalidated.
(2) The applicant uses a disposable CA certificate otCA,Public CA certificates
Figure BDA00041317103900000516
And request req to generate signature file sign, i.e
Figure BDA00041317103900000517
The process of carrying out three-party quantum digital signature on the signature file sign among the CA authentication center, the digital asset issuing center and the applicant comprises the following steps:
s1, an applicant obtains a random number from the local to generate an irreducible polynomial l (x), and marks a character string formed by each term coefficient except the highest term in the irreducible polynomial l (x) as str2; the method of generating the irreducible polynomial l (x) is the same as the method of generating the irreducible polynomial described above, and will not be repeated;
s2, the applicant and the CA authentication center carry out key negotiation to respectively obtain a shared key w 1 、x 1 And y 1 Wherein w is 1 、x 1 And y 1 The lengths of the two are n; the applicant and the digital asset issuing center perform key negotiation to respectively obtain a shared key w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Wherein w is 2 、x 2 And y 2 The lengths of the two are n; the applicant has the key w 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a key w 3 、x 3 And y 3 The following are provided:
w 3 =w 1 ⊕w 2
x 3 =x 1 ⊕x 2
y 3 =y 1 ⊕y 2
s3, the applicant selects an irreducible polynomial l (x) and a secret key x as an input random number 3 Generating a hash function
Figure BDA0004131710390000061
Use of hash function->
Figure BDA0004131710390000062
Hash operation is carried out on the signature file sign to obtain a hash value +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000063
The applicant then uses the key w 3 And key y 3 Hash value +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000064
And the character string str2 to obtain a signature message:
Figure BDA0004131710390000065
the applicant transmits the signature message to the digital asset issuing center;
s4, after receiving the signature message, the digital asset issuing center sends the signature message and the own secret key w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Together to a CA authentication center which sends the own secret key w 1 、x 1 And y 1 The information is transmitted to a digital asset issuing center together, and the information exchange between the two parties is carried out through an authenticated channel, so that the information is prevented from being tampered; at this time, the key w owned by both the CA certification authority and the digital asset issuing authority 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 、y 2 And signing the message;
s5, the digital asset issuing center owns the secret key w 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a key w 3 ′、x 3 ' and y 3 ' wherein:
w 3 ′=w 1 ⊕w 2
x 3 ′=x 1 ⊕x 2
y 3 ′=y 1 ⊕y 2
digital asset issuing centerUsing a key w' 3 For in signed messages
Figure BDA0004131710390000066
Decrypting to obtain
Figure BDA0004131710390000071
Reuse key y 3 Str2 +.y in' Pair signature message 3 Decrypting to obtain a character string str2, then the digital asset issuing center generates an irreducible polynomial l '(x) with a highest term coefficient of 1 by using coefficients of each bit of the character string str2 corresponding to each term except the highest term, and selects the irreducible polynomial l' (x) and a key x as an input random number 3 ' generate hash function->
Figure BDA0004131710390000072
Use of hash function->
Figure BDA0004131710390000073
Hash operation is carried out on sign in the signature message to obtain a hash value +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000074
Comparing the calculated hash value +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000075
And decryption-derived->
Figure BDA0004131710390000076
If the two are equal, checking the signature to pass; otherwise, the verification sign does not pass;
s6, the CA authentication center holds the secret key w 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a key w 3 ″、x 3 "and y 3 "wherein:
w 3 ″=w 1 ⊕w 2
x 3 ″=x 1 ⊕x 2
y 3 ″=y 1 ⊕y 2
CA authentication center uses key w 3 In "pair-signed messages
Figure BDA0004131710390000077
Decrypting to obtain
Figure BDA0004131710390000078
Reuse key y 3 "fractiony to str2 in signed message 3 Decrypting to obtain a character string str2', then the CA authentication center uses the coefficients of each bit of the corresponding polynomial except the highest term of the character string str2' to generate an irreducible polynomial l '(x) with the highest term coefficient of 1, and selects the irreducible polynomial l' (x) and a secret key x as an input random number 3 "generate hash function>
Figure BDA0004131710390000079
Use of hash function->
Figure BDA00041317103900000710
Hash operation is carried out on sign in the signature message to obtain a hash value +.>
Figure BDA00041317103900000711
Comparing the calculated hash value +.>
Figure BDA00041317103900000712
And decryption-derived->
Figure BDA00041317103900000713
If the two types of the data are equal, the comparison is passed; otherwise, the comparison is not passed;
meanwhile, the CA authentication center compares the otCA in the sign in the signature message with the one-time CA certificate otCA generated by the CA authentication center, and if the otCA and the one-time CA certificate otCA are equal, the comparison is passed; otherwise, the comparison is not passed;
if only two types of comparison passes through the CA authentication center, the verification signature passes through; otherwise, the verification sign does not pass;
s7, when the digital asset issuing center and the CA authentication center pass the verification, the identity of the applicant is indicated to be legal, and the next step is carried out; otherwise, the verification sign is not passed, which indicates that the identity of the applicant is illegal, the digital asset M can not be acquired, and the issuing process is finished.
2. The digital asset issuing center extracts the corresponding digital asset M according to the received request req, distributes the service number SN for the issuing process, and generates a disposable CA certificate otCA' with the CA authentication center. The digital asset issuing center sends the service number SN to the CA authentication center, the CA authentication center stores the service number, and the service number SN and the stored one-time CA certificate otCA' are in corresponding relation. Wherein the digital asset issuing center may extract digital asset M from its own digital asset database. The digital asset issuing center may set an issuing service table, which may include a mapping relationship of the service number SN and the disposable CA certificate otCA 'held by the digital asset issuing center, and certificate information such as a validity period of the disposable CA certificate otCA'.
The specific process of the digital asset issuing center and the CA authentication center generating the disposable CA certificate otCA' is as follows:
a1: digital asset issuing centers select a set of n-bit random numbers k from local acquisitions 1 N-bit random number k 1 The method comprises the steps of generating an n-order irreducible polynomial q (x), and recording an n-bit character string consisting of each term coefficient except the highest term in the irreducible polynomial as str3;
a2: sharing three sets of quantum keys k between a digital asset issuing center and a CA authentication center 2 I and j, where k 2 The lengths of i and j are n; the digital asset issuing center selects an irreducible polynomial q (x) of order n and a shared key k as an input random number 2 Obtaining a hash function based on a linear feedback shift register
Figure BDA0004131710390000081
Calculating privacy CA certificate of digital asset issuing center by using the hash function>
Figure BDA0004131710390000082
Is recorded as +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000083
Subsequently encrypted with the shared key i>
Figure BDA0004131710390000084
Encryption using exclusive or operation to obtain->
Figure BDA0004131710390000085
Namely, a disposable CA certificate otCA ', and the digital asset issuing center stores the disposable CA certificate otCA';
a3: the digital asset issuing center encrypts the character string str3 by using the shared key j, encrypts to obtain j-super str3 by exclusive OR operation, and then sends the encrypted result j-super str3 to the CA authentication center;
a4: after the CA authentication center receives the data, the encryption result is decrypted by using the shared secret key j to obtain a character string str3 which is the same as the digital asset issuing center, the CA authentication center sequentially generates an n-order irreducible polynomial q (x) with a highest order coefficient of 1 on GF (2) domain by using coefficients of each item except the highest item in the corresponding polynomial of each bit of the character string str3, and then selects the irreducible polynomial q (x) and the shared secret key string k as an input random number 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function identical to a digital asset issuing center
Figure BDA0004131710390000086
Use of hash function->
Figure BDA0004131710390000087
Calculating privacy CA credentials for digital asset issuing centers maintained in CA certification centers>
Figure BDA0004131710390000088
Is recorded as +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000089
Subsequent CA authenticationCenter uses shared key i encryption ++>
Figure BDA00041317103900000810
Encryption using exclusive or operation to obtain->
Figure BDA00041317103900000811
Namely a disposable CA certificate otCA', which the CA authentication center stores.
3. The digital asset issuing center generates a digital asset digest M 'and transmits the digital asset digest M' to the applicant by means of a message authentication code. The digital asset digest M' is used as a response message for the request req.
Where the digital asset digest M' = (digital asset M,
Figure BDA0004131710390000091
service number SN, otCA', timestamp 1). />
The time stamp timestamp1 is the time of generating the digital asset digest M', and the time corresponding to the time stamp timestamp1 may be recorded in the foregoing distribution service table.
The process of the digital asset issuing center transmitting the digital asset digest M' to the applicant by means of a message authentication code includes:
b1: digital asset issuing centers share a string of n-bit random numbers z with applicants 1 Thereby performing preset generation of an irreducible polynomial f (x);
b2: sharing two sets of quantum keys z between a digital asset issuing center and an applicant 2 And t, the digital asset issuing center utilizes its own shared key z 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function as an input random number together with a preset generated irreducible polynomial f (x)
Figure BDA0004131710390000092
Inputting digital asset abstract M' into hash function>
Figure BDA0004131710390000093
Generating a first message authentication code, denoted +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000094
B3: the digital asset issuing center encrypts the digital asset abstract M' by using the shared key t; the digital asset issuing center sends the encrypted digital asset abstract M' and the first message authentication code to an applicant together;
b4: the applicant decrypts the encrypted digital asset abstract M 'by using the own shared key t to obtain a decrypted digital asset abstract M'; the applicant then uses his own shared secret z 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function as an input random number together with a preset generated irreducible polynomial f (x)
Figure BDA0004131710390000095
Inputting the decrypted digital asset abstract M' into a hash function>
Figure BDA0004131710390000096
Generating a second message authentication code, denoted +.>
Figure BDA0004131710390000097
B5: the applicant verifies the received first message authentication code
Figure BDA0004131710390000098
And the calculated second message authentication code
Figure BDA0004131710390000099
Whether or not the two are consistent; if the authentication is consistent, the authentication is passed, otherwise, the authentication is not passed, and re-authentication needs to be returned.
4. The applicant sends the received digital asset abstract M' to a CA authentication center for auditing, and sends the auditing result to a digital asset issuing center. For example, the applicant may send the service number SN in the digital asset digest M' to a CA authentication center for auditing. The specific process comprises the following steps:
the applicant obtains a service number SN in the digital asset abstract M ', the service number SN is sent to a CA authentication center, the CA authentication center searches according to the service number SN, if the corresponding disposable CA certificate otCA' is obtained through searching, the verification is passed, and the CA authentication center feeds back the verification passing result to the applicant; if the digital asset is not searched, the verification is not passed, and the CA authentication center feeds back the abnormality of the digital asset issued this time to the applicant.
After the disposable CA certificate otCA ' corresponding to the service number SN is retrieved, the CA authentication center can conduct timeliness checking on the retrieved certificate, whether the disposable CA certificate otCA ' exceeds the validity period is judged, if the disposable CA certificate otCA ' exceeds the validity period, checking is not passed, and the CA authentication center can feed back the digital asset abnormality issued this time to an applicant.
5. After the digital asset issuing center receives the auditing result of the applicant, the digital asset issuing center registers the digital asset M issued at this time in the digital asset database as issued in response to the auditing result being passed, which means that the digital asset M is successfully issued.
The digital asset M issued by the digital asset issuing center may be stored in the digital asset issuing center by the digital asset owner prior to performing steps 1-5 described above. Accordingly, the digital asset issuing center may have a digital asset database to store the digital asset M. The digital asset owners can issue the digital assets in a quantum security mode, so that the security threat caused by computational effort and algorithm progress to the issuing process is solved, the issuing process is improved to the quantum security level, the value of the digital assets in the issuing process is ensured, and the rights and interests of the digital asset owners are ensured.

Claims (12)

1. A method of publishing a digital asset, the method comprising the steps of:
(1) The applicant initiates a request req for acquiring the digital asset M to a digital asset issuing center, and generates a signature file sign, and a three-party quantum digital signature is carried out among a CA authentication center, the digital asset issuing center and the applicant for the signature file sign, wherein the applicant is a signature party, and the CA authentication center and the digital asset issuing center are signature verification parties;
(2) The digital asset issuing center extracts the corresponding digital asset M according to the received request req and generates a disposable CA certificate otCA' with the CA authentication center;
(3) The digital asset issuing center generates a digital asset abstract M 'and sends the digital asset abstract M' to an applicant in a message authentication code mode;
(4) The applicant sends the received digital asset abstract M' to a CA authentication center for auditing, and sends the auditing result to a digital asset issuing center;
(5) After the digital asset issuing center receives the auditing result of the applicant, the digital asset issuing center registers the digital asset M issued at this time in the digital asset database as issued in response to the auditing result being passed.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of generating the signature file sign comprises:
1) The digital asset issuing center applies for the public CA certificate from the CA authentication center
Figure FDA0004131710360000011
Privacy CA certificate->
Figure FDA0004131710360000012
The applicant applies for his public CA certificate +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000017
Privacy CA certificate->
Figure FDA0004131710360000014
The applicant and the CA authentication center generate a disposable CA certificate otCA;
2) The applicant uses a disposable CA certificate otCA and a public CA certificate
Figure FDA0004131710360000018
And request req to generate signature file sign, i.e
Figure FDA0004131710360000016
3. A method of issuing a digital asset according to claim 2, wherein the process of the applicant and CA authentication center generating a one-time CA certificate otCA comprises:
a) The applicant obtains a selected set of n-bit random numbers s from the local 1 N-bit random number s 1 The method comprises the steps of generating an n-order irreducible polynomial p (x), and recording an n-bit character string consisting of each term coefficient except the highest term in the irreducible polynomial as str1;
b) Sharing three sets of quantum keys s between applicant and CA authentication center 2 U and v, where s 2 The lengths of u and v are n; the applicant selects an irreducible polynomial p (x) of order n and a shared key s as an input random number 2 Obtaining a hash function h based on a linear feedback shift register p,s2 Calculating privacy CA certificate of applicant by using the hash function
Figure FDA0004131710360000021
Is recorded as the hash value of (2)
Figure FDA0004131710360000022
Subsequently the shared key u is encrypted->
Figure FDA0004131710360000023
Encryption is obtained by exclusive-or operation
Figure FDA0004131710360000024
Namely, a disposable CA certificate otCA, applies forThe person stores the disposable CA certificate otCA;
c) The applicant encrypts the character string str1 by using the shared key v, and the encryption is obtained by exclusive-or operation
Figure FDA0004131710360000025
Then the encrypted result ∈ ->
Figure FDA0004131710360000026
Sending the message to a CA authentication center;
d) After the CA authentication center receives the encryption result, the encryption result is decrypted by using the shared secret key v to obtain a character string str1 identical to the applicant, the CA authentication center sequentially generates an n-order irreducible polynomial p (x) with a highest order coefficient of 1 on GF (2) domain by using coefficients of each item except the highest item in the corresponding polynomial of each bit of the character string str1, and then selects the irreducible polynomial p (x) and the shared secret key string s as an input random number 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function identical to an applicant
Figure FDA0004131710360000027
Use of hash function->
Figure FDA0004131710360000028
Calculating privacy CA certificate of applicant reserved in CA authentication center +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000219
Is recorded as +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000029
Subsequently the CA authentication center encrypts +_ using the shared key u>
Figure FDA00041317103600000210
Encryption using exclusive or operation to obtain->
Figure FDA00041317103600000211
Namely, the disposable CA certificate otCA, and the CA authentication center stores the disposable CA certificate otCA.
4. The method for issuing a digital asset according to claim 2, wherein the process of performing a three-party quantum digital signature on the signature file sign among the CA certification center, the digital asset issuing center and the applicant comprises:
s1, an applicant obtains a random number from the local to generate an irreducible polynomial l (x), and marks a character string formed by each term coefficient except the highest term in the irreducible polynomial l (x) as str2;
s2, the applicant and the CA authentication center carry out key negotiation to respectively obtain a shared key w 1 、x 1 And y 1 Wherein w is 1 、x 1 And y 1 The lengths of the two are n; the applicant and the digital asset issuing center perform key negotiation to respectively obtain a shared key w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Wherein w is 2 、x 2 And y 2 The lengths of the two are n; the applicant has the key w 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a key w 3 、x 3 And y 3 The following are provided:
Figure FDA00041317103600000212
Figure FDA00041317103600000213
Figure FDA00041317103600000214
s3, the applicant selects an irreducible polynomial l (x) and a secret key x as an input random number 3 Generating a hash function
Figure FDA00041317103600000215
Use of hash function->
Figure FDA00041317103600000216
Hash operation is carried out on the signature file sign to obtain a hash value +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000217
The applicant then uses the key w 3 And key y 3 Hash value +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000218
And the character string str2 to obtain a signature message:
Figure FDA0004131710360000031
the applicant transmits the signature message to the digital asset issuing center;
s4, after receiving the signature message, the digital asset issuing center sends the signature message and the own secret key w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Together to a CA authentication center which sends the own secret key w 1 、x 1 And y 1 The information is transmitted to a digital asset issuing center together, and the information exchange between the two parties is carried out through an authenticated channel, so that the information is prevented from being tampered; at this time, the key w owned by both the CA certification authority and the digital asset issuing authority 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 、y 2 And signing the message;
s5, the digital asset issuing center owns the secret key w 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a key w 3 ′、x 3 ' and y 3 ' wherein:
Figure FDA0004131710360000032
Figure FDA0004131710360000033
Figure FDA0004131710360000034
digital asset issuing center uses key w' 3 For in signed messages
Figure FDA0004131710360000035
Decrypting to obtain
Figure FDA0004131710360000036
Reuse key y 3 ' Per->
Figure FDA0004131710360000037
Decrypting to obtain a character string str2, then the digital asset issuing center generates an irreducible polynomial l '(x) with a highest term coefficient of 1 by using coefficients of each bit of the character string str2 corresponding to each term except the highest term, and selects the irreducible polynomial l' (x) and a key x as an input random number 3 ' generate hash function->
Figure FDA0004131710360000038
Use of hash function->
Figure FDA0004131710360000039
Hash operation is carried out on sign in the signature message to obtain a hash value +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000310
Comparing the calculated hash value +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000311
And decryption-derived->
Figure FDA00041317103600000312
If the two are equal, checking the signature to pass; otherwise, the verification sign does not pass;
s6, the CA authentication center holds the secret key w 1 、x 1 、y 1 、w 2 、x 2 And y 2 Performing exclusive-or operation to obtain a key w 3 ″、x 3 "and y 3 "wherein:
Figure FDA00041317103600000313
Figure FDA00041317103600000314
Figure FDA00041317103600000315
CA authentication center uses key w 3 In "pair-signed messages
Figure FDA00041317103600000316
Decryption is carried out to obtain +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000317
Reuse key y 3 "Add>
Figure FDA00041317103600000318
Decrypting to obtain a character string str2', then the CA authentication center uses the coefficients of each bit of the corresponding polynomial except the highest term of the character string str2' to generate an irreducible polynomial l ' (x) with the highest term coefficient of 1, and selects the irreducible polynomialThe term l' (x) and the key x as an input random number 3 "generate hash function>
Figure FDA0004131710360000041
Use of hash function->
Figure FDA0004131710360000042
Hash operation is carried out on sign in the signature message to obtain a hash value +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000043
Comparing the calculated hash value +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000044
And decryption-derived->
Figure FDA0004131710360000045
If the two types of the data are equal, the comparison is passed; otherwise, the comparison is not passed;
meanwhile, the CA authentication center compares the otCA in the sign in the signature message with the one-time CA certificate otCA generated by the CA authentication center, and if the otCA and the one-time CA certificate otCA are equal, the comparison is passed; otherwise, the comparison is not passed;
only if the hash value and the one-time CA certificate are compared and passed, the CA authentication center confirms that the verification signature passes; otherwise, the verification sign does not pass;
s7, when the digital asset issuing center and the CA authentication center pass the signature verification, entering the next step; otherwise, the signature verification is not passed, and the issuing process is ended.
5. A method of issuing a digital asset according to claim 1, characterized in that the process of generating a disposable CA certificate otCA' by the digital asset issuing center and the CA certification center comprises:
a1: digital asset issuing centers select a set of n-bit random numbers k from local acquisitions 1 N-bit random number k 1 For generating an irreducible polynomial q (x) of order n, each term of the irreducible polynomial except for the highest termThe n-bit character string formed by the coefficients is recorded as str3;
a2: sharing three sets of quantum keys k between a digital asset issuing center and a CA authentication center 2 I and j, where k 2 The lengths of i and j are n; the digital asset issuing center selects an irreducible polynomial q (x) of order n and a shared key k as an input random number 2 Obtaining a hash function based on a linear feedback shift register
Figure FDA0004131710360000046
Calculating privacy CA certificate of digital asset issuing center by using the hash function>
Figure FDA0004131710360000047
Is recorded as +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000048
Subsequently encrypted with the shared key i>
Figure FDA0004131710360000049
Encryption using exclusive or operation to obtain->
Figure FDA00041317103600000410
Namely, a disposable CA certificate otCA ', and the digital asset issuing center stores the disposable CA certificate otCA';
a3: the digital asset issuing center encrypts the character string str3 by using the shared key j, and the encryption is obtained by exclusive-or operation
Figure FDA00041317103600000411
Then sending the encrypted result j str3 to a CA authentication center;
a4: after the CA authentication center user receives the data, the encryption result is decrypted by using the shared secret key j to obtain a character string str3 which is the same as the digital asset issuing center, and the CA authentication center sequentially generates an n-order impossibility with a highest-order coefficient of 1 on the GF (2) domain by using the coefficient of each item except the highest item in the polynomial corresponding to each bit of the character string str3An about polynomial q (x), and then selecting the irreducible polynomial q (x) and the shared key string k as an input random number 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function identical to a digital asset issuing center
Figure FDA0004131710360000051
Use of hash function->
Figure FDA0004131710360000052
Calculating privacy CA credentials for digital asset issuing centers maintained in CA certification centers>
Figure FDA0004131710360000053
Is recorded as +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000054
Subsequently the CA authentication center encrypts +_ using the shared key i>
Figure FDA0004131710360000055
Encryption using exclusive or operation to obtain->
Figure FDA0004131710360000056
Namely a disposable CA certificate otCA', which the CA authentication center stores.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the step (2) further comprises:
the digital asset issuing center distributes a service number SN and sends the service number SN to the CA authentication center;
the CA authentication center stores the service number SN and establishes a corresponding relation between the service number SN and the stored one-time CA certificate otCA'.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the step of generating the digital asset digest M' by the digital asset distribution center comprises:
digital asset issuing center generates digital asset digests
Figure FDA0004131710360000057
Figure FDA0004131710360000058
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the step of sending the digital asset digest M' to the applicant by means of a message authentication code comprises:
b1: digital asset issuing centers share a string of n-bit random numbers z with applicants 1 Thereby performing preset generation of an irreducible polynomial f (x);
b2: sharing two sets of quantum keys z between a digital asset issuing center and an applicant 2 And t, the digital asset issuing center utilizes its own shared key z 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function as an input random number together with a preset generated irreducible polynomial f (x)
Figure FDA0004131710360000059
Inputting digital asset abstract M' into hash function>
Figure FDA00041317103600000510
Generating a first message authentication code, denoted +.>
Figure FDA00041317103600000511
B3: the digital asset issuing center encrypts the digital asset abstract M' by using the shared key t; the digital asset issuing center sends the encrypted digital asset abstract M' and the first message authentication code to an applicant together;
b4: the applicant uses the own shared key t to enter the encrypted digital asset abstract MDecrypting the row to obtain a decrypted digital asset abstract M'; the applicant then uses his own shared secret z 2 Generating a linear feedback shift register based hash function as an input random number together with a preset generated irreducible polynomial f (x)
Figure FDA00041317103600000512
Inputting the decrypted digital asset abstract M' into a hash function>
Figure FDA00041317103600000513
Generating a second message authentication code, denoted +.>
Figure FDA0004131710360000061
B5: the applicant verifies the received first message authentication code
Figure FDA0004131710360000062
And the calculated second message authentication code
Figure FDA0004131710360000063
Whether or not the two are consistent; if the authentication is consistent, the authentication is passed, otherwise, the authentication is not passed, and re-authentication needs to be returned.
9. The method of claim 7, wherein the step (4) further comprises:
the applicant sends the service number SN in the received digital asset abstract M' to a CA authentication center for auditing, and the auditing process comprises the following steps:
the applicant obtains the service number in the digital asset abstract M ', the service number is sent to a CA authentication center, the CA authentication center searches in a safety storage module of the CA authentication center according to the service number, if the corresponding disposable CA certificate otCA' is obtained through searching, the verification is passed, and the CA authentication center feeds back the verification passing result to the applicant; if the digital asset is not searched, the verification is not passed, and the CA authentication center feeds back the abnormality of the digital asset issued this time to the applicant.
10. A digital asset issuing method according to claim 1, characterized in that the digital asset M is stored in the digital asset issuing center by the digital asset owner.
11. A digital asset distribution system, the system comprising: a digital asset issuing center, an applicant, and a CA authentication center;
wherein the digital asset issuing center, the applicant and the CA certification center are connected in pairs for performing the digital asset issuing method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.
12. The digital asset distribution system of claim 11 further comprising a digital asset owner having a digital asset M, the digital asset owner coupled to the digital asset distribution center for storing the digital asset M at the digital asset distribution center.
CN202310262386.2A 2023-03-17 2023-03-17 Digital asset issuing method and system Pending CN116192409A (en)

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