CN116156489A - Position privacy protection method based on collaborative service - Google Patents

Position privacy protection method based on collaborative service Download PDF

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Publication number
CN116156489A
CN116156489A CN202211650176.2A CN202211650176A CN116156489A CN 116156489 A CN116156489 A CN 116156489A CN 202211650176 A CN202211650176 A CN 202211650176A CN 116156489 A CN116156489 A CN 116156489A
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rsu
lsp
service
user
location
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Inventor
周权
曾志廉
曾志康
郑玉龙
王科梦
陈梦龙
卫凯俊
陈民辉
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Guangzhou University
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Guangzhou University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
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  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of software communication, and discloses a position privacy protection method based on collaborative services, which comprises the following steps of S1, system initialization: the TA generates a system public key PK, a system private key MSK, a tracking key TK and a system parameter params; s2, user registration: RU (remote Unit) i 、CU j Registering the RSU and the LSP with the TA respectively to generate respective public and private key pairs; s3, service inquiry: RU (remote Unit) i Generating location services query SQ i And sends it to the LSP through the RSU; the position privacy protection method based on the collaborative service can provide the position service for the user on the premise of higher safety coefficient, and the following three targets are realized. First, a secure cable is constructed for the user by using a Bloom filterGuiding to provide secure location services; secondly, the position privacy of the user is not revealed when the user responds to the RSU, and finally, the position privacy of the other user cannot be deduced by any user through the content of the collaborative service when any two users perform the collaborative service.

Description

Position privacy protection method based on collaborative service
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of software communication, in particular to a position privacy protection method based on collaborative services.
Background
The internet of vehicles refers to the realization of omnibearing network connection of the interior of a vehicle, vehicles and people, vehicles and vehicles, vehicles and roads, vehicles and service platforms by means of a new generation of mobile communication technology. The system brings great convenience to people in transportation and great help to government departments in establishing an intelligent transportation system, such as road safety and traffic passing efficiency improvement, but the data fingerprint generated in the data interaction process brings privacy safety threat to users, and hackers can analyze collected user data through technologies such as data mining and the like, so that sensitive information of the users is obtained.
In order to solve the problems, scholars propose an internet of vehicles privacy protection scheme based on anonymity and cryptography. For some attackers with a certain knowledge background, the common anonymity-based location privacy protection scheme cannot well protect the location privacy of the user, and further, a double anonymity-based location privacy protection scheme is provided, and the correlation between the user and the service request is reduced by introducing a trusted cloud service between the user and the location service provider, so that the location privacy of the user is protected to the greatest extent. In order to improve the effectiveness, uncertainty and dispersion of the virtual position under the condition of road constraint and avoid the privacy safety problem caused by providing the real position information of the user, a position privacy protection algorithm based on the virtual position under the condition of road constraint without a trusted third party server is provided. The convenience of carpooling is realized by sacrificing identity privacy of a driver and a passenger, and an anonymous mutual authentication protocol is further provided, wherein the driver and the passenger in the protocol send a carpooling inquiry to a cloud server in an anonymous mode to finish carpooling service. In order to help a driver to quickly and accurately find a required parking space, an intelligent parking navigation scheme with privacy protection is provided. In the scheme, after a user initiates a parking space inquiry to a cloud server, the cloud server searches and generates a parkable position meeting the expectations of the user, and then the user is required to search. These schemes have limitations in user privacy security and resource overhead. On the one hand, the anonymity-based scheme is to replace the real location information of the user with an anonymized set and perform location-based service, but the communication overhead of the anonymized set generally increases linearly with the increase of the anonymized set; on the other hand, the cryptography-based scheme generally encrypts and transmits the location information to a server, and then the server decrypts and obtains the corresponding plaintext information and returns to the corresponding location-based service. In this process, the private information of the user is often revealed due to a system vulnerability of the server or attack by a malicious adversary.
The use of location-based services typically requires users to submit their past, present, or future location information, which inevitably presents the problems described above. One existing research approach is based on distributed collaborative services. The research method supports that the requesting user initiates a location-based service request in a privacy-safe manner, and the cooperative user can respond to the corresponding location service to the requesting user accordingly. In the process, any sensitive information about the user is not revealed, so that the privacy security of the user can be well protected, but the problems of repeated response resources, waste and the like exist, and the main reason is that the repeated response service from the cooperative user cannot be filtered.
Bloom filters are a random data structure that is space efficient and fast to query, and can be used to check if an element is in a collection. And because it does not need to store the element itself, it also has some confidentiality to the element itself. In addition, as a technology capable of performing an equivalence test in a ciphertext state, the ciphertext equivalence test is widely applied to test whether corresponding plaintext information between different ciphertexts is equal, thereby supporting the judgment of the relationship between the ciphertexts on the premise that a decryption key is not required.
As can be seen from the above, the existing internet of vehicles privacy protection scheme based on anonymity and cryptography can protect the privacy security of users to a certain extent, but has some disadvantages. As shown in fig. 1, X pre-processes its own location information in a K-anonymous or cryptographic manner and initiates a service query to Y. And Y returns a corresponding service response to X according to the service query received by the Y. In the process, the existing privacy protection scheme of the internet of vehicles still faces a great challenge due to the existing privacy safety hidden trouble and the large communication resource consumption. Improvements are therefore needed.
Disclosure of Invention
(one) solving the technical problems
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a location privacy protection method based on collaborative services, which has the advantages of privacy safety, low communication overhead, high collaborative service efficiency and repeatability test based on ciphertext equivalent test, and solves the hidden danger of privacy and larger communication resource consumption caused by location service inquiry initiated in a K anonymous or cryptology mode.
(II) technical scheme
In order to achieve the purposes of privacy security, low communication overhead, high collaborative service efficiency and repeatability test based on ciphertext equivalent test, the invention provides the following technical scheme:
a location privacy protection method based on collaborative services comprises the following steps:
s1, initializing a system: the TA generates a system public key PK, a system private key MSK, a tracking key TK and a system parameter params;
s2, user registration: RU (remote Unit) i 、CU j Registering the RSU and the LSP with the TA respectively to generate respective public and private key pairs;
s3, service inquiry: RU (remote Unit) i Generating location services query SQ i And sends it to the LSP through the RSU;
s4, inquiring and verifying: LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, the validity is verified a priori. If the verification is not passed, rejecting the query, otherwise querying the location service for SQ i ' send to RSU;
s5, proxy service: RSU receives LS P Transmitted SQ i After' broadcast a co-signal CS to surrounding CUs j And is RU i Executing proxy services to thereby interact with CUs i And carrying out data interaction. In this process, CU i Identity and co-verification is to be performed to the RSU. For a CU that is verified to be successful i Generating a ciphertext O of a position service set S and sending the ciphertext O to the RSU;
s6, testing repeatability: RSU is composed of RU i Test trapdoor ET sent over secure channel for n CUs j Generated by n The individual location service cryptograms O are tested for repeatability. If the test passes, a location service response SR is generated i，j Sending the LSP to LSP for storage;
s7, service retrieval: RU (remote Unit) i Sending a location service search trapdoor ST to the LSP, and the LSP returning corresponding search results to the RU based thereon i ；
S8, user tracking: when a user exhibits malicious behaviour, the TA can reveal its identity by tracking the key TK.
Preferably, the following detailed description is given in S1:
s1.1, setting a security parameter lambda, and generating TA with a prime number p (p is more than or equal to 2) λ ) Is a cyclic group of (a)
Figure BDA0004010137130000041
Wherein->
Figure BDA0004010137130000042
To generate a primitive;
s1.2, given a security parameter delta, TA generates a reversible matrix
Figure BDA0004010137130000043
Vector v= { (V) 1 ，...,v 8 ) T )|v i ∈ R {0,1}, hash key set +.>
Figure BDA0004010137130000044
Pseudo-random function F: {0,1} * ×{0，1} 8 →{0，1} * And/or one mutually independent location-sensitive hash function->
Figure BDA0004010137130000045
S1.3, TA generates three secure hash functions
Figure BDA0004010137130000046
H 2 ：{0，1} * →{0,1} 2ρ And H 3 ：{0，1} * →{L，1} λ ；
S1.4, TA selection number
Figure BDA0004010137130000047
Calculate->
Figure BDA0004010137130000048
S1.5, TA generation system public key pk= (h) 1 ，h 2 ，h 3 ) System private key msk= (α, M) 1 ，M 2 V), tracking key tk= (ζ 1 ，ξ 2 ) System parameters
Figure BDA0004010137130000049
Wherein the TA discloses the system parameters params, and retains the system private key MSK and the tracking key TK.
Preferably, in S2, the following detailed description is provided:
S2.1、RU i selecting a number
Figure BDA00040101371300000410
Calculate->
Figure BDA00040101371300000411
And will->
Figure BDA00040101371300000412
Transmitting to the TA through a secure channel;
s2.2, TA received
Figure BDA00040101371300000413
After that, calculate +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300000414
And will->
Figure BDA0004010137130000051
Transmitted to RU through secure channel i ；
S2.3、RU i Received the
Figure BDA0004010137130000052
After that, store->
Figure BDA0004010137130000053
And will->
Figure BDA0004010137130000054
Split into two parts->
Figure BDA0004010137130000055
And->
Figure BDA0004010137130000056
Satisfy the following requirements
Figure BDA0004010137130000057
S2.4、RU i Calculation of
Figure BDA0004010137130000058
And->
Figure BDA0004010137130000059
RU then i Public key of +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300000510
The private key is +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300000511
S2.5, like S2.1-2.4, CU can be generated j Is pk cu The private key is sk cu ；
S2.6, RSU selection number
Figure BDA00040101371300000512
Calculate->
Figure BDA00040101371300000513
And will->
Figure BDA00040101371300000514
Is sent to the TA through the secure channel, the public and private key pair of the RSU is +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300000515
S2.7 LSP selection number
Figure BDA00040101371300000516
Calculate->
Figure BDA00040101371300000517
And will->
Figure BDA00040101371300000518
Sent to the TA over the secure channel, the public-private key pair of LSP is +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300000519
Preferably, in the step S3, the following detailed description is provided:
S3.1、RU i random generation of a random number including a start point
Figure BDA00040101371300000520
Final occupation->
Figure BDA00040101371300000521
Location point set of (2)
Figure BDA00040101371300000522
And constructing a delta-position bloom filter for it
Figure BDA00040101371300000523
Each x at the beginning i Are all 0; />
S3.2、RU i Using functions
Figure BDA00040101371300000524
Will->
Figure BDA00040101371300000525
The point in (a) is inserted into->
Figure BDA00040101371300000526
Then to
Figure BDA00040101371300000527
If v i E V is 0, let x' i ＝、x″ i ＝x i Otherwise, choose the number->
Figure BDA00040101371300000528
Let->
Figure BDA00040101371300000529
Figure BDA00040101371300000530
Final output->
Figure BDA00040101371300000531
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300000532
S3.3、RU i Calculation of
Figure BDA0004010137130000061
Output related +.>
Figure BDA0004010137130000062
Pairing index (PI' ru ，PI″ ru )
S3.4、RU i Selecting a number
Figure BDA0004010137130000063
Calculate->
Figure BDA0004010137130000064
And->
Figure BDA0004010137130000065
S3.5、RU i Calculate L 1 ＝H 1 (E 1 ，...，E 4 ，PI′ ru ，PI″ ru )，
Figure BDA0004010137130000066
S3.6, RUi output
Figure BDA0004010137130000067
Wherein->
Figure BDA0004010137130000068
Preferably, in S4, the following detailed description is provided:
s4.1, LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, verify SQ i Time stamp T of (2) ru . If not satisfy |T ru -T lsp Rejecting the query if delta T is less than or equal to deltat; otherwise, continuing the next step;
s4.2, LSP is calculated
Figure BDA0004010137130000069
And L' 1 ＝H 1 (E 1 ，E 2 ，E′ 3 E 4 ，PI′ ru ，PI″ ru ) To judge
Figure BDA00040101371300000610
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300000611
Whether or not to do so simultaneously. If not, rejecting the query; otherwise output
Figure BDA00040101371300000612
And sends it to the RSU.
Preferably, in the step S5, the following detailed description is provided:
s5.1, the RSU receives the SQ sent by the LSP i After' broadcast a co-signal CS to surrounding CUs j ；
S5.2、CU j Upon receipt of the CS, a set of location points providing location services is generated based on existing background knowledge
Figure BDA00040101371300000613
And constructing a delta-position bloom filter for it>
Figure BDA00040101371300000614
Each y at the beginning j Is 0;
S5.3、CU j using functions
Figure BDA00040101371300000615
Will->
Figure BDA00040101371300000616
The point in (a) is inserted into->
Figure BDA00040101371300000617
Then pair->
Figure BDA00040101371300000618
If v j E V is 1, let y' j ＝y″ j ＝y j Otherwise, choose the number->
Figure BDA00040101371300000619
Let->
Figure BDA00040101371300000620
Finally output
Figure BDA00040101371300000621
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300000622
S5.4、CU j Calculation of
Figure BDA0004010137130000071
Output related +.>
Figure BDA0004010137130000072
Pairing index (PI' cu ，PI″ cu )；
S5.5、CU j Calculate E 1 ，E″ 2 ，E″ 3 ，E″ 4 And L' 1 ，L″ 2 And will
Figure BDA0004010137130000073
To be sent to RSU, wherein
Figure BDA0004010137130000074
S5.6, RSU receives
Figure BDA0004010137130000075
After that, for CU j Carrying out identity and collaborative verification; />
S5.6.1 and RSU by calculation
Figure BDA0004010137130000076
And L' " 1 ＝H 1 (E″ 1 ，E″ 2 ，E′″ 3 ，E″ 4 ，PI′ CM ，PI″ CM ) To judge->
Figure BDA0004010137130000077
And->
Figure BDA0004010137130000078
Whether or not to do so simultaneously. If not, rejecting CU j Participate in the collaboration; otherwise, continuing the next step;
s5.6.2, RSU by calculating n= (PI' cu ) T ·PI′ ru +(PI″ cu ) T ·PI″ ru To judge
Figure BDA0004010137130000079
Whether or not it is. If not, rejecting CU j Participate in the collaboration; otherwise to CU j Sending an instruction for successful verification;
s5.7, after the CUj receives the verification success instruction sent by the RSU, according to the position point set
Figure BDA00040101371300000710
Generating corresponding location services
Figure BDA00040101371300000711
And calculate
Figure BDA00040101371300000712
Wherein f (x) =f 0 +f 1 x+…+f n-1 x n-1 ；
S5.8、CU j Selecting a number
Figure BDA00040101371300000713
Calculation of
Figure BDA00040101371300000714
Figure BDA00040101371300000715
Figure BDA00040101371300000716
Let o= (O) 1 ，O 2 ，O 3 ) And sends it to the RSU.
Preferably, in the step S6, the following detailed description is provided:
s6.1, RSU received by n CUs j The generated position service ciphertext O;
s6.2, RSU is composed of RU i A test trapdoor ET sent over the secure channel;
s6.3 pair
Figure BDA0004010137130000081
RSU is through calculating->
Figure BDA0004010137130000082
To determine whether the following formula is established
Figure BDA0004010137130000083
If the equations are all true, the process is interrupted and the n CUs are refused to be received i Generating n position service cryptograms O, otherwise generating position service response SR i，j ＝{E″ 1 ， E″ 2 ，O 1 ，O 2 ，O 3 ，PI′ cu ，PI″ cu And sends it to the LSP for storage.
Preferably, in S7, the following detailed description is provided:
S7.1、RU i transmitting a location service search trapdoor st= to LSP PI ′ ru ，PI″ ru )；
S7.2, after receiving ST, the LSP calculates n=(PI′ cu ) T ·PI′ ru +(PI″ cu ) T ·PI″ ru To judge
Figure BDA0004010137130000084
Whether or not it is.
S7.3 (PI 'if any, which makes the formula true' cu ，PI″ cu The service response SR associated therewith is then i，j Sent to RU i ；
S7.4、RU i Received SR i，j After that, calculate
Figure BDA0004010137130000085
Then self-check>
Figure BDA0004010137130000086
And retrieve the relevant location service.
Preferably, in S8, the following detailed description is provided:
s8.1 if there is a user U k Stable RU i CU j In case of malicious behavior, the TA obtains the user U with malicious behavior by calculating the following formula k Private key
Figure BDA0004010137130000087
Figure BDA0004010137130000091
S8.2, since TA knows private key
Figure BDA0004010137130000092
The corresponding relationship with the user identity can be used for revealing the identity of the user;
s8.3, TA generating a public revocation list
Figure BDA0004010137130000093
To reject private key->
Figure BDA0004010137130000094
Is used again.
(III) beneficial effects
Compared with the prior art, the invention provides a position privacy protection method based on collaborative services, which has the following beneficial effects:
1. the position privacy protection method based on the collaborative service is different from the existing research scheme based on cryptography, can provide the position service for the user on the premise of higher safety coefficient, and achieves the following three targets. Firstly, a Bloom filter is used for constructing a security index for a user so as to provide a secure location service; secondly, the position privacy of the user is not revealed when the user responds to the RSU, and finally, the position privacy of the other user cannot be deduced by any user through the content of the collaborative service when any two users perform the collaborative service.
2. The collaborative service-based location privacy protection method is different from the existing K anonymity-based research scheme, and has lower communication overhead while protecting the privacy security of users. Specifically, the anonymized set and the tedious cryptography algorithm which require large communication overhead in the past are replaced by a secure one-way hash function, a pseudo-random function, a bloom filter and the like to initiate the location-based service query, so that the communication overhead can be about 1.39kbytes constantly. This has a greater advantage when the population of users is large than existing anonymous research schemes.
3. The pairing (searching) index constructed based on the Bloom filter is not changed along with the change of the number of the user position points, but is constant at about 0.2146s. The invention can improve the collaborative location service efficiency of the user to a certain extent.
4. The position privacy protection method based on cooperative service provides a repeatability test based on ciphertext equivalent test, and supports judging whether a plurality of cooperative service ciphertexts are encrypted by using different public keys in a ciphertext state. In addition, in the process of repeatability test, any plaintext information corresponding to the related service recommendation is not revealed, so that the privacy security of the user can be well protected.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an existing Internet of vehicles privacy protection scheme based on anonymity and cryptography;
FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a collaborative location service according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 shows RSU-CU of the present invention j A schematic calculation is performed.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Referring to fig. 2-4, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
s1, initializing a system: the TA generates a system public key PK, a system private key MSK, a tracking key TK and a system parameter params;
s2, user registration: RU (remote Unit) i 、CU j Registering the RSU and the LSP with the TA respectively to generate respective public and private key pairs;
s3, service inquiry: RU (remote Unit) i Generating location services query SQ i And sends it to the LSP through the RSU;
s4, inquiring and verifying: LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, the validity is verified a priori. If the verification is not passed, rejecting the query, otherwise querying the location service for SQ i ' send to RSU;
s5, proxy service: the RSU receives the SQ sent by the LSP i After' broadcast a co-signal CS to surrounding CUs j And is RU i Executing proxy services to thereby interact with CUs j And carrying out data interaction. In this process, CU j To enter into RSULine identity and collaborative authentication. For a CU that is verified to be successful j Which generates a set of location services
Figure BDA0004010137130000111
Ciphertext O of (a), and sending the ciphertext O to the RSU;
s6, testing repeatability: RSU is composed of RU i Test trapdoor ET sent over secure channel for n CUs j And carrying out repeatability test on the generated n position service ciphertext O. If the test passes, a location service response SR is generated i，j Sending the LSP to LSP for storage;
s7, service retrieval: RU (remote Unit) i Sending a location service search trapdoor ST to the LSP, and the LSP returning corresponding search results to the RU based thereon i ；
S8, user tracking: when a user exhibits malicious behaviour, the TA can reveal its identity by tracking the key TK.
In order to make the technical scheme of the invention more clear, the invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
S1, initializing a system: TA generates a system public key PK, a system private key MSK and a system parameter params;
s1.1, setting a security parameter lambda, and generating TA with a prime number p (p is more than or equal to 2) λ ) Is a cyclic group of (a)
Figure BDA0004010137130000112
Wherein->
Figure BDA0004010137130000113
To generate a primitive;
s1.2, given a security parameter delta, TA generates a reversible matrix
Figure BDA0004010137130000114
Vector v= { (V) 1 ，...，v δ ) T |v i ∈ R {0,1}, hash key set +.>
Figure BDA0004010137130000115
Pseudo-random functionNumber F: {0,1} * ×{ 0 ，1} δ →{0，1} * And/or one mutually independent location-sensitive hash function->
Figure BDA0004010137130000116
S1.3, TA generates three secure hash functions
Figure BDA0004010137130000117
H 2 ：{0，1} * →{0.1} 2ρ And H 3 ：{0，1} * →{0，1} λ ；
S1.4, TA selection number
Figure BDA0004010137130000118
Calculate->
Figure BDA0004010137130000119
/>
S1.5, TA generation system public key pk= (h) 1 ，h 2 ，h 3 ) System private key msk= (α, M) 1 ，M 2 V), tracking key tk= (ζ 1 ，ξ 2 ) System parameters
Figure BDA0004010137130000121
Wherein the TA discloses the system parameters params, and retains the system private key MSK and the tracking key TK.
S2, user registration: RU (remote Unit) i 、CU j Registering the RSU and the LSP with the TA respectively to generate respective public and private key pairs;
S2.1、RU i selecting a number
Figure BDA0004010137130000122
Calculate->
Figure BDA0004010137130000123
And will->
Figure BDA0004010137130000124
Transmitted to the mobile terminal through a secure channelTA；
S2.2, TA received
Figure BDA0004010137130000125
After that, calculate +.>
Figure BDA0004010137130000126
And will->
Figure BDA0004010137130000127
Transmitted to RU through secure channel i ；
S2.3、RU i Received the
Figure BDA0004010137130000128
After that, store->
Figure BDA0004010137130000129
And will->
Figure BDA00040101371300001210
Split into two parts->
Figure BDA00040101371300001211
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001212
Satisfy the following requirements
Figure BDA00040101371300001213
S2.4、RU i Calculation of
Figure BDA00040101371300001214
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001215
RU then i Public key of +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300001216
The private key is +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300001217
S2.5, like S2.1-2.4, CU can be generated j Is pk cu The private key is sk cu ；
S2.6, RSU selection number
Figure BDA00040101371300001218
Calculate->
Figure BDA00040101371300001219
And will->
Figure BDA00040101371300001220
Is sent to the TA through the secure channel, the public and private key pair of the RSU is +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300001221
S2.7 LSP selection number
Figure BDA00040101371300001222
Calculate->
Figure BDA00040101371300001223
And will->
Figure BDA00040101371300001224
Sent to the TA over the secure channel, the public-private key pair of LSP is +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300001225
In order to make the collaborative location service (S3-S7) of the present invention more clearly apparent, the collaborative location service in the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to fig. 3.
S3, service inquiry: RU (remote Unit) i Generating location services query SQ i And sends it to the LSP through the RSU;
S3.1、RU i random generation of a random number including a start point
Figure BDA0004010137130000131
Final occupation->
Figure BDA0004010137130000132
Location point set of (2)
Figure BDA0004010137130000133
And constructing a delta-position bloom filter for it
Figure BDA0004010137130000134
Each x at the beginning i Are all 0;
S3.2、RU i using functions
Figure BDA0004010137130000135
Will->
Figure BDA0004010137130000136
The point in (a) is inserted into->
Figure BDA0004010137130000137
Then to
Figure BDA0004010137130000138
If v i E V is 0, let x' i ＝x″ i ＝x i Otherwise, choose the number->
Figure BDA00040101371300001326
Let->
Figure BDA00040101371300001310
Figure BDA00040101371300001311
Final output->
Figure BDA00040101371300001312
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001313
/>
S3.3、RU i Calculation of
Figure BDA00040101371300001314
Output related +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300001315
Pairing index (PI' ru ，PI′ ru )；
S3.4、RU i Selecting a number
Figure BDA00040101371300001316
Calculate->
Figure BDA00040101371300001317
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001318
S3.5、RU i Calculate L 1 ＝H′ 1 (E 1 ，...，E 4 ，PI′ ru ，PI″ ru )，
Figure BDA00040101371300001319
S3.6、RU i Output of
Figure BDA00040101371300001320
Wherein->
Figure BDA00040101371300001321
S4, inquiring and verifying: LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, the validity is verified a priori. If the verification is not passed, rejecting the query, otherwise querying the location service
Figure BDA00040101371300001327
Sending to the RSU;
s4.1, LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, verify SQ i Time stamp T of (2) ru . If notSatisfy |T ru T lsp Rejecting the query if delta T is less than or equal to deltat; otherwise, continuing the next step;
s4.2, LSP is calculated
Figure BDA00040101371300001322
And L' 1 ＝H1(E 1 ，E 2 ，E′ 3 ，E 4 ，PI′ ru ，PI″ ru ) To judge
Figure BDA00040101371300001323
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001324
Whether or not to do so simultaneously. If not, rejecting the query; otherwise output
Figure BDA00040101371300001325
And sends it to the RSU.
To more clearly describe S5, further details are provided below in conjunction with fig. 4.
S5, proxy service: the RSU receives LSP transmission
Figure BDA00040101371300001420
Thereafter, a cooperative signal CS is broadcast to surrounding CUs j And is RU i Executing proxy services to thereby interact with CUs j And carrying out data interaction. In this process, CU j Identity and co-verification is to be performed to the RSU. For a CU that is verified to be successful j Which generates a location service set +.>
Figure BDA0004010137130000141
Ciphertext O of (a), and sending the ciphertext O to the RSU;
s5.1, the RSU receives the SQ sent by the LSP i After' broadcast a co-signal CS to surrounding CUs j ；
S5.2、CU j Upon receipt of the CS, a set of location points providing location services is generated based on existing background knowledge
Figure BDA0004010137130000142
And constructing a delta-position bloom filter for it>
Figure BDA0004010137130000143
Each y at the beginning j Is 0;
S5.3、CU j using functions
Figure BDA0004010137130000144
Will->
Figure BDA0004010137130000145
The point in (a) is inserted into->
Figure BDA0004010137130000146
Then pair->
Figure BDA0004010137130000147
If v j E V is 1, let y' j ＝y″ j ＝y j Otherwise, choose the number->
Figure BDA0004010137130000148
Let->
Figure BDA0004010137130000149
Finally output
Figure BDA00040101371300001410
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001411
S5.4、CU j Calculation of
Figure BDA00040101371300001412
Output related +.>
Figure BDA00040101371300001413
Pairing index (PI' cu ，PI″ cu )；
S5.5、CU j Calculate E 1 ，E″ 2 E″ 3 ，E″ 4 And L' 1 L″ 2 And will
Figure BDA00040101371300001414
To be sent to RSU, wherein
Figure BDA00040101371300001415
S5.6, RSU receives
Figure BDA00040101371300001416
After that, for CU j Carrying out identity and collaborative verification;
s5.6.1 and RSU by calculation
Figure BDA00040101371300001417
And L'. 1 ＝H 1 (E″ 1 ，E″ 2 E″′ 3 ，E″ 4 ，PI′ cu ，PI″ cu ) To judge->
Figure BDA00040101371300001418
And->
Figure BDA00040101371300001419
Whether or not to do so simultaneously. If not, rejecting CU j Participate in the collaboration; otherwise, continuing the next step;
s5.6.2, RSU by calculating n= (PI' cu ) T ·PI′ ru +(PI″ cu ) T ·PI″ ru To judge
Figure BDA0004010137130000151
Whether or not it is. If not, rejecting CU j Participate in the collaboration; otherwise to CU j Sending an instruction for successful verification;
s5.7, after the CUj receives the verification success instruction sent by the RSU, according to the position point set
Figure BDA0004010137130000152
Generating corresponding location services
Figure BDA0004010137130000153
And calculate
Figure BDA0004010137130000154
Wherein f (x) =f 0 +f 1 x+…+f n-1 x n-1 ；
S5.8、CU j Selecting a number
Figure BDA0004010137130000155
Calculation of
Figure BDA0004010137130000156
Figure BDA0004010137130000157
Figure BDA0004010137130000158
Let o= (O) 1 ，O 2 ，O 3 ) And sends it to the RSU.
S6, testing repeatability: RSU is composed of RU i Test trapdoor ET sent over secure channel for n CUs j And carrying out repeatability test on the generated n position service ciphertext O. If the test passes, a location service response SR is generated i，j Sending the LSP to LSP for storage;
s6.1, RSU received by n CUs j The generated position service ciphertext O;
s6.2, RSU is composed of RU i A test trapdoor ET sent over the secure channel;
s6.3 pair
Figure BDA0004010137130000159
RSU is through calculating->
Figure BDA00040101371300001510
To determine whether the following formula is established
Figure BDA00040101371300001511
If the equations are all true, the process is interrupted and the n CUs are refused to be received j Generating n position service cryptograms O, otherwise generating position service response SR i，j ＝{E″ 1 ， E″ 2 ，O 1 ，O 2 ，O 3 ，PI′ cu ，PI″ cu And sends it to the LSP for storage.
S7, service retrieval: RU (remote Unit) i Sending a location service search trapdoor ST to the LSP, and the LSP returning corresponding search results to the RU based thereon i ；
S7.1、RU i Transmitting a location service search trapdoor st=to LSP ( PI′ ru ，PI″ ru )；
s7.2, after receiving ST, LSP calculates n= (PI' cu ) T ·PI′ ru +(PI″ cu ) T ·PI″ cu To judge
Figure BDA0004010137130000161
Whether or not it is.
S7 . 3 If there is a catalyst that makes the formula hold ( PI′ cu -PI″ cu ) The service response SR associated therewith is then i，j Sent to RU i ；
S7.4、RU i Received SR i，j After that, calculate
Figure BDA0004010137130000162
Then self-check>
Figure BDA0004010137130000163
And retrieve the relevant location service.
S8, user tracking: when a user exhibits malicious behaviour, the TA can reveal its identity by tracking the key TK.
S8.1 if there is a user U k Stable RU i CU j In case of malicious behavior, the TA obtains the user U with malicious behavior by calculating the following formula k Private key
Figure BDA0004010137130000164
Figure BDA0004010137130000165
S8.2, since TA knows private key
Figure BDA0004010137130000166
The corresponding relationship with the user identity can be used for revealing the identity of the user;
s8.3, TA generating a public revocation list
Figure BDA0004010137130000167
To reject private key->
Figure BDA0004010137130000168
Is used again.
The position privacy protection method based on the collaborative service is different from the existing research scheme based on cryptography, can provide the position service for the user on the premise of higher safety coefficient, and achieves the following three targets. Firstly, a Bloom filter is used for constructing a security index for a user so as to provide a secure location service; secondly, the position privacy of the user is not revealed when the user responds to the RSU, and finally, the position privacy of the other user cannot be deduced by any user through the content of the collaborative service when any two users perform the collaborative service.
Unlike the existing research scheme based on K anonymity, the method can protect the privacy security of users and simultaneously has lower communication overhead. Specifically, the anonymized set and the tedious cryptography algorithm which require large communication overhead in the past are replaced by a secure one-way hash function, a pseudo-random function, a bloom filter and the like to initiate the location-based service query, so that the communication overhead can be about 1.39kbytes constantly. This has a greater advantage when the population of users is large than existing anonymous research schemes.
Pairing (search) indexes built on the basis of Bloom filters have pairing efficiency which does not change with the number of user location points, but is constant at about 0.2146s. The invention can improve the collaborative location service efficiency of the user to a certain extent.
The repeated cooperative service can not improve the position service efficiency, and can also bring the problems of resource waste and the like. In this regard, the invention provides a repeatability test based on ciphertext equivalent test, which supports judging whether a plurality of cooperative service ciphertexts are encrypted by different public keys in the ciphertext state. In addition, in the process of repeatability test, any plaintext information corresponding to the related service recommendation is not revealed, so that the privacy security of the user can be well protected.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made therein without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims (9)

1. The location privacy protection method based on the collaborative service is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, initializing a system: the TA generates a system public key PK, a system private key MSK, a tracking key TK and a system parameter params;
s2, user registration: RU (remote Unit) i 、CU j Registering the RSU and the LSP with the TA respectively to generate respective public and private key pairs;
s3, service inquiry: RU (remote Unit) i Generating location services query SQ i And sends it to the LSP through the RSU;
s4, inquiring and verifying: LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, the validity is verified a priori. If the verification is not passed, rejecting the query, otherwise, sending a location service query SQ' to the RSU;
s5, proxy service: after receiving the SQ' sent by LSP, RSU broadcasts a cooperative signal CS to surrounding CUs j And is RU i Executing proxy services to thereby interact with CUs j And carrying out data interaction. In this process, CU j Identity and co-verification is to be performed to the RSU. For a CU that is verified to be successful j Generating a ciphertext O of a position service set S and sending the ciphertext O to the RSU;
s6, testing repeatability: RSU is composed of RU i Test trapdoor ET sent over secure channel for n CUs j And carrying out repeatability test on the generated n position service ciphertext O. If the test passes, a location service response SR is generated i，j Sending the LSP to LSP for storage;
s7, service retrieval: RU (remote Unit) i Sending a location service search trapdoor ST to the LSP, and the LSP returning corresponding search results to the RU based thereon i ；
S8, user tracking: when a user exhibits malicious behaviour, the TA can reveal its identity by tracking the key TK.
2. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein the S1 has the following detailed description:
s1.1, setting a security parameter lambda, and generating TA with a prime number p (p is more than or equal to 2) λ ) Is a cyclic group of (a)
Figure FDA0004010137120000012
Wherein->
Figure FDA0004010137120000011
To generate a primitive;
s1.2, given a security parameter delta, TA generates a reversible matrix
Figure FDA0004010137120000021
Vector v= { (V) 1 ，...，v δ ) T |v i ∈ R {0,1}, hash key set +.>
Figure FDA0004010137120000022
Pseudo-random function F: {0,1} * ×{0，1} δ →{0，1} * And, a mutually independent location-sensitive hash function +.>
Figure FDA0004010137120000023
S1.3, TA generates three secure hash functions H 1 ：
Figure FDA0004010137120000024
H 2 ：{0，1} * →{0,1} 2ρ And H 3 ：{0，1} * →{0，1} λ ；
S1.4, TA selection number
Figure FDA0004010137120000025
Calculate->
Figure FDA00040101371200000218
S1.5, TA generation system public key pk= (h) 1 ，h 2 ，h 3 ) System private key msk= (α, M) 1 ，M 2 V), tracking key tk= (ζ 1 ，ξ 2 ) System parameters
Figure FDA0004010137120000026
Wherein the TA discloses the system parameters params, and retains the system private key MSK and the tracking key TK.
3. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein the S2 has the following detailed description:
S2.1、RU i selecting a number
Figure FDA0004010137120000027
Calculate->
Figure FDA0004010137120000028
And will->
Figure FDA0004010137120000029
Transmitting to the TA through a secure channel;
s2.2, TA received
Figure FDA00040101371200000210
After that, calculate +.>
Figure FDA00040101371200000211
And will->
Figure FDA00040101371200000212
Transmitted to RU through secure channel i ；/>
S2.3、RU i Received the
Figure FDA00040101371200000213
After that, store->
Figure FDA00040101371200000214
And will->
Figure FDA00040101371200000215
Split into two parts->
Figure FDA00040101371200000216
And->
Figure FDA00040101371200000217
Satisfy the following requirements
Figure FDA0004010137120000031
S2.4、RU i Calculation of
Figure FDA0004010137120000032
And->
Figure FDA0004010137120000033
RU then i Public key of +.>
Figure FDA0004010137120000034
The private key is +.>
Figure FDA0004010137120000035
S2.5, like S2.1-2.4, CU can be generated j Is pk cu The private key is sk cu ；
S2.6, RSU selection number
Figure FDA0004010137120000036
Calculate->
Figure FDA0004010137120000037
And will->
Figure FDA0004010137120000038
Is sent to the TA through the secure channel, the public and private key pair of the RSU is +.>
Figure FDA0004010137120000039
S2.7 LSP selection number
Figure FDA00040101371200000310
Calculate->
Figure FDA00040101371200000311
And will->
Figure FDA00040101371200000312
Sent to the TA over the secure channel, the public-private key pair of LSP is +.>
Figure FDA00040101371200000313
4. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein in S3, the following detailed description is provided:
S3.1、RU i random generation of a random number including a start point
Figure FDA00040101371200000328
Endpoint->
Figure FDA00040101371200000327
Position point set->
Figure FDA00040101371200000314
And constructing a delta-position bloom filter for it>
Figure FDA00040101371200000315
Each x at the beginning i Are all 0;
S3.2、RU i using functions
Figure FDA00040101371200000329
Will->
Figure FDA00040101371200000317
The point in (a) is inserted into->
Figure FDA00040101371200000318
Then to
Figure FDA00040101371200000319
If v i E V is 0, let x' i ＝x i ″＝x i Otherwise, choose the number->
Figure FDA00040101371200000320
Let->
Figure FDA00040101371200000321
Figure FDA00040101371200000322
Final output->
Figure FDA00040101371200000323
And->
Figure FDA00040101371200000324
S3.3、RU i Calculation of
Figure FDA00040101371200000325
Output related +.>
Figure FDA00040101371200000326
Pairing index (PI' ru ，PI″ ru )；
S3.4、RU i Selecting a number
Figure FDA0004010137120000041
Calculate->
Figure FDA0004010137120000042
And->
Figure FDA0004010137120000043
S3.5、RU i Calculate L 1 ＝H 1 (E 1 ，...，E 4 ，PI′ ru ，PI″ ru )，
Figure FDA0004010137120000044
S3.6、RU i Output of
Figure FDA0004010137120000045
Wherein->
Figure FDA0004010137120000046
5. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein in S4, the following detailed description is provided:
s4.1, LSP receives RU i Transmitted SQ i After that, verify SQ i Time stamp T of (2) ru . If not satisfy |T ru T lsp Rejecting the query if delta T is less than or equal to deltat; otherwise, continuing the next step;
s4.2, LSP is calculated
Figure FDA0004010137120000047
And L 1 ′＝H 1 (E 1 ，E 2 ，E′ 3 ，E 4 ，PI′ ru ，PI″ ru ) To judge
Figure FDA00040101371200000421
And->
Figure FDA00040101371200000422
Whether or not to do so simultaneously. If not, rejecting the query; otherwise output
Figure FDA0004010137120000048
And sends it to the RSU.
6. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein in S5, the following detailed description is provided:
s5.1, the RSU receives the SQ sent by the LSP i After' broadcast a co-signal CS to surrounding CUs j ；
S5.2、CU j Upon receipt of the CS, a set of location points providing location services is generated based on existing background knowledge
Figure FDA0004010137120000049
And constructing a delta-position bloom filter for it>
Figure FDA00040101371200000410
Each y at the beginning j Is 0;
S5.3、CU j using functions
Figure FDA00040101371200000411
Will->
Figure FDA00040101371200000412
The point in (a) is inserted into->
Figure FDA00040101371200000413
Then pair->
Figure FDA00040101371200000414
If v j E V is 1, let y' j ＝y″ j ＝y j Otherwise, choose the number->
Figure FDA00040101371200000415
Let->
Figure FDA00040101371200000416
Finally output
Figure FDA00040101371200000417
And->
Figure FDA00040101371200000418
S5.4、CU j Calculation of
Figure FDA00040101371200000419
Output related +.>
Figure FDA00040101371200000420
Pairing index (PI' cu ，PI″ cu )；
S5.5、CU j Calculation E 1 ″，E″ 2 ，E″ 3 ，E″ 4 And L' 1 ，L″ 2 And will
Figure FDA0004010137120000051
To be sent to RSU, wherein
Figure FDA0004010137120000052
S5.6, RSU receives
Figure FDA0004010137120000053
After that, for CU j Carrying out identity and collaborative verification;
s5.6.1 and RSU by calculation
Figure FDA0004010137120000054
And->
Figure FDA0004010137120000055
To judge->
Figure FDA00040101371200000514
And->
Figure FDA00040101371200000513
Whether or not to do so simultaneously. If not, rejecting CU j Participate in the collaboration; otherwise, continuing the next step;
S5.6.2、RSu by calculating n= (PI' cu ) T ·PI′ ru +(PI″ cu ) T ·PI″ cu To judge
Figure FDA00040101371200000515
Whether or not it is. If not, rejecting CU j Participate in the collaboration; otherwise to CU j Sending an instruction for successful verification;
S5.7、CU j after receiving a verification success instruction sent by the RSU, according to the position point set
Figure FDA0004010137120000056
Generating corresponding location services
Figure FDA0004010137120000057
And calculate
Figure FDA0004010137120000058
Wherein f (x) =f 0 +f 1 x+…+f n-1 x n-1 ；
S5.8、CU j Selecting a number
Figure FDA0004010137120000059
Calculation of
Figure FDA00040101371200000510
Figure FDA00040101371200000511
Figure FDA00040101371200000512
Let o= (O) 1 ，O 2 ，O 3 ) And sends it to the RSU.
7. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein in S6, the following detailed description is provided:
s6.1, RSU received by n CUs i The generated position service ciphertext O;
s6.2, RSU is composed of RU i A test trapdoor ET sent over the secure channel;
s6.3 pair
Figure FDA0004010137120000061
RSU is through calculating->
Figure FDA0004010137120000062
To determine whether the following formula is established
Figure FDA0004010137120000063
If the equations are all true, the process is interrupted and the n CUs are refused to be received j Generating n position service cryptograms O, otherwise generating position service response SR i，j ＝{E″ 1 ，E″ 2 ，O 1 ，O 2 ，O 3 ，PI′ cu ，PI″ cu And sends it to the LSP for storage.
8. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein in S7, the following detailed description is provided:
S7.1、RU i transmitting a location service search trapdoor st= (PI 'to LSP' ru ，PI″ cu )；
S7.2, after receiving ST, LSP calculates N= (PI' cu ) T ·PI′ ru +(PI″ cu ) T ·PI″ ru To judge that N is larger than or equal to TH i ru Whether or not it is.
S7.3 (PI 'if any, which makes the formula true' cu ，PI″ cu ) The service response SR associated therewith is then i，j Sent to RU i ；
S7.4、RU i Received SR i，j After that, calculate
Figure FDA0004010137120000064
The relevant location service is then retrieved by itself in S.
9. The location privacy protection method based on collaborative services according to claim 1, wherein in S8, the following detailed description is provided:
s8.1 if there is a user U k Stable RU i CU j In case of malicious behavior, the TA obtains the user U with malicious behavior by calculating the following formula k Private key
Figure FDA0004010137120000065
Figure FDA0004010137120000071
S8.2, since TA knows private key
Figure FDA0004010137120000072
The corresponding relationship with the user identity can be used for revealing the identity of the user; />
S8.3, TA generating a public revocation list
Figure FDA0004010137120000073
To reject private key->
Figure FDA0004010137120000074
Is used again. />
CN202211650176.2A 2022-12-21 2022-12-21 Position privacy protection method based on collaborative service Pending CN116156489A (en)

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