Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a traffic light self-adaptive intelligent control method based on a block chain, which comprises the following steps: constructing an intelligent traffic light control system, wherein the system comprises a supervision mechanism RA, roadside units RSU, an intelligent traffic light ITL and a block chain network; the traffic light intelligent control system controls the intelligent traffic light ITL according to the information submitted by the vehicle user; the process of controlling the intelligent traffic light comprises the following steps:
s1: the method comprises the following steps that (1) system initialization is carried out, namely a plurality of monitoring authorities RA are combined, and a decentralized verifiable secret sharing algorithm is adopted to generate a master key of the system;
s2: the method comprises the steps that a supervision organization RA, a roadside unit RSU and an intelligent traffic light ITL register to a system, decentralized identity DID is generated, all documents related to the decentralized identity DID are uploaded to a block chain, and a public key bound with the DID is recorded in the DID documents;
s3: the method comprises the steps that a vehicle user provides vehicle information for a supervision organization RA, the RA generates a trusted identity TruDID for a vehicle after receiving the information, and issues a long-term verifiable statement StaVC for the vehicle according to the type and brand attribute of the vehicle;
s4: the vehicle user generates a traceable identity identification TruDID according to the credible identity identification TruDID, and applies a temporary verifiable statement TemVC to the roadside unit RSU according to the identity identification TruDID;
s5: the vehicle user generates a verifiable voucher VP according to the temporary verifiable statement TemVC and the long-term verifiable statement StaVC, and sends the verifiable voucher VP and a signal change request VoteReq to the intelligent traffic light ITL through a secure channel;
s6: the intelligent traffic light ITL verifies a verifiable voucher VP sent by a vehicle user, if the verification fails, the vehicle user request is refused, if the verification succeeds, a signal light is broadcasted to a vehicle in a vehicle-mounted network to change voting VoteInit, and the signal change voting VoteInit is recorded and linked up;
s7: other vehicles in the vehicle-mounted network generate self TraDID after receiving the voting information, and apply for a temporary verifiable statement TemVC from the RSU; the voting vehicle votes for the signal lamp change request according to the temporary verifiable statement and sends a voting opinion VoteRely to the intelligent signal lamp ITL through a secure channel;
s8: the ITL counts the received voting reply Voteply, calculates the final voting value according to the weight and the opinion of the vehicle, and changes the signal lamp if the voting value exceeds a threshold value; if the voting value does not exceed the threshold value, the signal lamp is not changed, and the signal change request is ignored; and uploading the final voting result VoteDecision.
Preferably, the process of generating the master key of the system using the decentralized verifiable secret sharing algorithm comprises:
step 1: inputting a system security parameter lambda, and defining a multiplication cycle group G with prime order p, a generation element G of the group G, the number n of a supervision organization RA and a threshold value t of key generation;
and 2, step: supervisory authority RA
i In that
Selecting a polynomial of order (t-1);
and step 3: pipe mechanism RA i Commitment value C of broadcast polynomial coefficient ik Calculating a secret value s ij Sending the secret value to the other authorities RA via a secure channel j ;
And 4, step 4: supervisory authority RA i Verifying a regulatory authority RA j Transmitted secret value s ji If the verification is passed, the center is honest; if not, requesting to send a new value until the verification is passed;
and 5: when all secret values s are received ji Supervision authority RA i Calculating its own private key share s i ;
Step 6: t supervision authorities RA i And jointly reconstructing a system main private key SK, wherein less than t participants can not recover, and meanwhile, calculating a system main public key PK.
Preferably, the process of registering the supervision authority RA, the roadside unit RSU and the intelligent traffic light ITL with the system includes:
step 1: registration of a generic identity by a supervision authority RA
Obtaining a pair of public and private keys
Chaining the DID document;
and 2, step: roadside unit RSU registers credible identification
Obtaining a pair of public and private keys
Chaining the DID document;
and step 3: intelligent traffic light ITL registers credible identification
Obtaining a pair of public and private keys
Preferably, the generation of the trusted identity for the vehicle user by the regulatory authority RA comprises: RA generates 10 credible identification labels according to vehicle information of vehicle users
Marking 10 authentic identities>
Is sent to a vehicle user who randomly selects a +>
Is a traceable identity. />
Preferably, the process of processing the signal change request VoteReq by the intelligent traffic light ITL comprises the following steps:
step 1: the intelligent traffic light ITL judges the content in VoteReq; if the URG position 1 in the request is an emergency request, the intelligent traffic light ITL immediately changes a signal light; if the request is a normal request, go to step S62;
and 2, step: intelligent signal lamp ITL operation Verify Sig The algorithm verifies the correctness of the request, if the request passes the verification, the intelligent traffic light ITL changes the voting VoteInit through the vehicle-mounted network broadcasting signal, and the signal is changed to vote VoteInit uplink; otherwise the request fails.
Preferably, the process of voting by the voting vehicle comprises: the voting vehicle verifies that the signal changes the authenticity of the voting Voteinit, if the voting vehicle does not vote, the signal lamp is omitted to change the voting Voteinit, otherwise, the voting vehicle sends an identity identification request to a vehicle-mounted network; voting vehicle generation voting plaintext { Reply, S) with verifiable credentials VP nonce And sending the voting opinions Votepeply to an intelligent traffic light ITL after signature.
Preferably, the process of processing the voting opinions voterepply by the intelligent signal lamp ITL includes:
step 1: the intelligent traffic light ITL first verifies the signature of each reply received to determine the authenticity of the VoteReply;
step 2: extracting the type of vehicle from the verifiable certificate of the vehicle, according to different weights, through a formula
Calculating the final voting value;
and step 3: if the voting value exceeds the threshold value 0, changing the signal lamp; if the voting value does not exceed the threshold value 0, the signal lamp is not changed;
and 4, step 4: the voting results are linked up with the agreed and disagreeable lists listagare and listdisagregated.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the invention designs a method for intelligently controlling signal lamps of vehicles in VANETs, wherein an Intelligent Traffic Light (ITL) in the method screens and verifies received votes according to attributes of vehicle voters, such as positions, driving directions, time periods and the like; the proportion of different types of vehicles is different; finally, if the result of the calculation exceeds a given threshold, the signal is changed.
2. The invention constructs an autonomous identity management model based on a block chain, and divides DID into three types, namely a common identity identifier GDID, a credible identity identifier TruDID and a traceable identity identifier TruDID. The verifiable assertion VC is divided into two categories, a long-term verifiable assertion StaVC and a temporary verifiable assertion TemVC. Privacy and supervisobility in distributed identities are balanced. The invention ensures the anonymity of the vehicle in the communication process, simultaneously prevents the vehicle from abusing the malicious behavior of the pseudonym of the vehicle, and the vehicle user can independently generate a plurality of distributed identity identifications DIDs without relevance among the DIDs.
3. In the invention, only a supervision department can restore the true identity TruDID of the vehicle through the TraDID, and other entities in the VANETs cannot track the track of the vehicle, thereby realizing conditional privacy protection.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
A traffic light self-adaptive intelligent control method based on a block chain comprises the following steps: the traffic light intelligent control system is constructed and comprises a supervision mechanism RA, roadside units RSU, intelligent traffic lights ITL and a block chain network, vehicle users submit traffic light control signals to the traffic light intelligent control system for control, and the traffic light intelligent control system controls the intelligent traffic lights ITL according to information submitted by the vehicle users.
A process for controlling an intelligent traffic light, as shown in fig. 2, comprising:
s1: the method comprises the following steps that (1) system initialization is carried out, namely a plurality of monitoring authorities RA are combined, and a decentralized verifiable secret sharing algorithm is adopted to generate a master key of the system;
s2: a supervision organization RA, a roadside unit RSU and an intelligent traffic light ITL register with the system to generate a decentralized identity DID, and all documents related to the decentralized identity DID are uploaded to a block chain, wherein public keys bound with the DID are recorded in the DID documents;
s3: the method comprises the steps that a vehicle user provides vehicle information for a supervision organization RA, the RA generates a trusted identity TruDID for a vehicle after receiving the information, and issues a long-term verifiable statement StaVC for the vehicle according to the type and brand attribute of the vehicle;
s4: the vehicle user generates a traceable identity TruDID according to the credible identity TruDID, and applies a temporary verifiable statement TemVC to the roadside unit RSU according to the identity TruDID;
s5: the vehicle user generates a verifiable voucher VP according to the temporary verifiable statement TemVC and the long-term verifiable statement StaVC, and sends the verifiable voucher VP and a signal change request VoteReq to the intelligent traffic light ITL through a secure channel;
s6: the intelligent traffic light ITL verifies a verifiable voucher VP sent by a vehicle user, if the verification fails, the vehicle user request is rejected, if the verification succeeds, a signal lamp change voting Voteinit is broadcasted to vehicles in a vehicle network, and the signal change voting Voteinit is recorded in a chain;
s7: other vehicles in the vehicle-mounted network generate self TraDID after receiving the voting information, and apply for a temporary verifiable statement TemVC from the RSU; the voting vehicle votes for the signal lamp change request according to the temporary verifiable statement and sends a voting opinion VoteRely to the intelligent signal lamp ITL through a secure channel;
s8: the ITL counts the received voting reply Votepy, calculates the final voting value according to the weight and the opinion of the vehicle, and changes the signal lamp if the voting value exceeds a threshold value; if the voting value does not exceed the threshold value, the signal lamp is not changed, and the signal change request is ignored; and uploading the final voting result VoteDecision.
As shown in FIG. 1, there are four entities in the present invention, including RA, RSU, ITL, and OBU.
The RA is a regulatory authority which is credible, has strong computing power and storage capacity, is mainly responsible for registration of vehicles, issues long-term VC for the vehicles and tracks identities of malicious vehicles.
The RSU is a roadside unit that communicates with the regulatory authority RA over a secure channel and with the vehicle over a wireless channel. In addition, the roadside units issue temporary VCs for vehicles within their communication range to prove the current direction and location of the vehicle.
The ITL is an intelligent traffic light which has certain computing power and can flexibly adjust signals with vehicle interaction.
The OBU is an on-board unit, i.e. a vehicle. Each vehicle is equipped with a tamper resistant device (TPD) to store secret security parameters and perform security parameter related calculations. Vehicles may interact with signal lights and roadside units to autonomously control traffic signals.
The vehicle plays two roles, a signal change requester and a signal change voter. When encountering an emergency or an unreasonable road condition, the signal change requester can initiate a signal change request VoteReq to the vehicle; when receiving the vote initiated by the intelligent traffic light ITL, the voter with the signal change can reply the vote VoteRely according to the wish of the voter.
A specific implementation mode of a traffic light self-adaptive intelligent control method based on a block chain comprises the following steps:
s1: initializing a system, combining a plurality of supervisory authorities RA, and generating a master key of the system through a decentralized verifiable secret sharing algorithm;
s11: inputting a system security parameter lambda, defining a multiplication cycle group G with prime order p, wherein G is a generation element of the group G, n is the number of the supervision authorities RA, and t is a threshold value of key generation;
s12: supervisory authority RA
i (i =1,2, ..., n) in
To select a polynomial f of order (t-1)
i (x)=a
i0 +a
i1 x+a
i2 x
2 +…+a
i(t-1) x
t-1 ;
S13: supervisory authority RA
i Commitment value of broadcast polynomial coefficient
Calculating a secret value s
ij =f
i (j) Passing the secret value s through a secure channel
ij To other authorities RA
j (j =1,2, \ 8230;, n), regulatory agency RA
i Secret saving s
ii ;
S14: supervisory authority RA
i By the formula
Verifying a regulatory authority RA
j Transmitted secret value s
ji If the verification is passed, the center is honest; if not, requesting to send a new value until the verification is passed;
s15: when all secret values s are verified
ji Supervision authority RA
i Computing its own private key share
S16: system master key
Can pass t regulatory agencies RA
i Joint reconstruction
Less than t participants cannot recover while computing the system master public key
Private key share s
i Corresponding public key->
S2: setting a de-centering threshold signature algorithm used by the system;
s21: initializing an algorithm Setup (lambda) → PP, inputting a system safety parameter lambda, and outputting a public parameter PP;
s22: private key share generation algorithm
Inputting public parameter PP, generating n private key shares SK through verifiable secret sharing algorithm in S1
i Public key share PK
i And a master public key PK;
s23: signature share generation algorithm SigShareGen (M, SK) i )→σ i Entering a signed message M and a private key share SK i Outputting the signature shares σ i ;
S24: signature share verification algorithm SigShareVer (M, PK) i ,σ i ) → 0/1, the input signature share σ i The associated public key PK i And a message M, if the verification is successful, outputting 1; if the verification fails, 0 is output;
s25: signature aggregation algorithm sigshareecomb (σ)
i1 ,σ
i2 ,...,σ
it ) → σ, input t valid signature shares
Outputting the aggregated signature sigma through Lagrange interpolation;
s26: a signature verification algorithm SigVer (sigma, M, PK) → 0/1, a message M, a signature sigma and a master public key PK are input, and if verification is successful, 1 is output; if the verification fails, 0 is output.
S3: setting an elliptic curve signature algorithm used by the system;
s31: key generation algorithm Gen
Sig (1
κ ) → (g, sk), randomly selecting the private key
Calculating Q = sk g, and outputting a generation key pair (Q, sk); />
S32: signature generation algorithm Sign
Sig (sk, m, k) → σ, and a random number is input
Plaintext information m ∈ {0,1}
* Calculating (r)
x ,r
y )=k·g,s=k
-1 ·(H(m)+sk·r
x ) H () represents a hash function, and the output signature σ = (s, r)
x modp);
S33: signature verification algorithm Verify Sig (pk, m, σ) → 0/1, and calculate R = s -1 ·(m·g+r x ·Q)=(r x ′ ,r y ′ ) If r is x ′ modp=r x modp, verifying successfully, and outputting 1; if the verification fails, 0 is output.
S4: in the system, a supervision organization RA, a roadside unit RSU and an intelligent traffic light ITL are respectively registered to generate a decentralized identity DID, DID documents related to the DID are uploaded to a block chain, and a public key bound with the DID is recorded in the DID documents.
In a constructed block chain-based self-ownership identity management (SSIM) platform, decentralized identity identifiers DID are divided into three types, namely common DID GDID, credible DID TruDID and traceable DID TruDID, wherein TruDID is endorsed by a plurality of credible authorities through threshold signatures, and the traceable DID is an identity which can be autonomously generated by a user;
s41: the supervision authority RA registers a common identity
Obtaining a pair of public and private keys
Chaining DID documents, of regulatory authority RAThe DID document mainly comprises 2 parts, namely id, and digital, wherein the general comprises an owner description which represents the description of the real identity of a user, and an authentication part which comprises the id of the user, a controller, a type and a public key;
s42: roadside unit RSU registers credible identification
Obtaining a pair of public and private keys
Linking up a DID document, wherein the document of a roadside unit RSU mainly comprises 3 parts, namely an id, a DID, a managed, an owner description and an authentication field, wherein the id, the managed, the owner description and the owner description represent the description of the real identity of a user; third, proof field, including signature creator signature of DID creator, type signature type of signature, list creator id list of signer;
s43: intelligent traffic light ITL registers credible identification
Obtaining a pair of public and private keys
And linking up the DID document, wherein the DID document structure of the DID document is the same as that of the RSU.
S5: when a new vehicle is added into the system, real vehicle information is provided for RA, the RA generates a credible identity TruDID for RA, and issues a long-term verifiable statement StaVC for the vehicle according to attributes such as the type and the brand of the vehicle;
s51: vehicle one-time application for 10 credible identification marks from supervision authority RA
The vehicle can select one->
To generate canRetroactive identification->
Anonymous communication is performed, vehicle identity privacy is protected, and DID documents are uplinked, wherein the DID documents are endorsed by at least t regulatory authorities RA through a decentralized threshold signature algorithm in S2 to restrict the rights of individual regulatory authorities.
S52: the regulatory authority RA issues a long-term verifiable statement StaVC for fixed attributes according to the type, brand, etc. of the vehicle. The vehicle types are various, such as ambulances, fire trucks, private cars, trucks, construction vehicles, and the like. The StaVC mainly comprises 3 parts, namely Metadata including the number vcid of the VC, the identification issuerdid of an issuer, the issuance time issuetime of VC, and the expiration time expiretime of VC; secondly, claiming Claims, declaring static attributes owned by the user, 10 TruDIDs of the vehicle, and the type and brand of the vehicle, wherein each attribute has a specific index and is arranged according to a Mercker tree; proof, includes the identity of this VC creator, i.e., did of RA, merkleroot of attribute merkel tree, signature root signature of creator on merkel root, creator id list of creator, i.e., list of t RAs, signature VC signature of creator on entire VC, type VC signature type of VC signature, i.e., decentralized (t-n) threshold signature described in S2.
S6: the vehicle which wants to initiate signal lamp change autonomously generates a traceable identity TruDID by using the credible identity TruDID, and applies a temporary verifiable statement TemVC to the roadside unit RSU by using the identity of the TruDID so as to prove the attributes of { position, direction, distance from the RSU, time slot } and the like owned by the vehicle. The vehicle integrates the StaVC and the TemVC of the vehicle to generate a verifiable voucher VP, and a signal change request VoteReq is sent to the ITL through a safety channel;
s61: vehicle base
Generating a traceable identity ≥>
Applying a temporary verifiable statement TemVC to an RSU in a district, and generating a verifiable voucher VP for an ITL (intelligent traffic light) to examine;
s611: a traceable DID generation algorithm that,
the vehicle can choose to generate different TrauDIDs under different scenes with different TrauDIDs>
Computing P Using the Master public Key PK
u,1 =g
u ∈G,/>
Get>
DID String of (D) = (P)
u,1 ,P
u,2 );
S612: adopting a temporary VC generation algorithm to generate a verifiable statement TemVC, wherein the calculation formula is
Dividing the time of day into a plurality of time slots T = { T = }
1 ,T
2 ,…,T
n And (4) the distance from the vehicle to the RSU measured by a Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), time slots, road names and driving direction attributes are grouped, and the RSU issues a temporary verifiable statement TemVC for the vehicles driving into the jurisdiction area of the RSU according to the attributes. The TemVC mainly comprises 3 parts, namely Metadata, namely serial number vcid of the VC, identification issuerdid of an issuer, issuance time issuetime of VC, and expiration time of VC; declaring Claims, declaring the dynamic attribute owned by the user, the identity threshold of the VC owner, distance, position location, direction location and time slot; IIIIs Proof, including identity identifier creator of this VC creator, i.e. did of RSU, and signature sign value of the creator to the entire VC;
s613: adopting a verifiable certificate generation algorithm to generate a verifiable certificate VP, wherein the calculation formula is as follows:
selectively disclosing the contents in the whole StaVC and TemVC of the vehicle, and generating a VP;
s62: the vehicle sends a signal change request VoteReq to the intelligent traffic light ITL, and the request information is { (URG =1, protocol, S) nonce )},S nonce Is a random number to specifically mark a request. Requesting SK with its own private key reqter And the elliptic curve signature ECDSA algorithm in S3 generates the signature of the request information, and the formula for generating the signature is as follows:
σ req =Sign Sig (SK reqter ,Hash({(URG=1),protocol,S nonce },timestamp req ))
the final signal change request is expressed as:
VoteReq=[{(Urg=1),protocol,S nonce }||σ req ||timestamp req |
|timestamp req ||TraDID reqter ||VP reqter ]
s7: after the signal lamp receives the change solicited VoteReq, verifying a verifiable certificate VP of the vehicle, identifying protocol content, broadcasting signal lamp change voting VoteInit to the vehicle in the vehicle-mounted network, and recording uplink of the signal change voting VoteInit;
s71: the intelligent traffic light ITL judges the content in VoteReq;
s72: the intelligent traffic light ITL has two working modes, if the requests of a police car, a fire truck and an ambulance are received and the URG bit is 1, the request is an emergency request, and the intelligent traffic light ITL immediately changes a signal light;
s73: if the request is a common request, the ITL operation algorithm Verify of the intelligent signal lamp Sig (SK reqter ,Hash({,protocol,S nonce },timestamp req ) Verify the correctness of the request;
s74: after verification, the intelligent traffic light ITL constructs a signal to change the plaintext { protocol, S nonce With its own private key SK ITL And S3, generating a signature sigma of the request information by the elliptic curve signature ECDSA algorithm init =Sign Sig (SK ITL ,Hash({protocol,S nonce },timestamp init ) Change voting voteiinit = [ { protocol, S) by a vehicle network V2I channel broadcast signal nonce }||σ init ||timestamp init ||TruDID ITL ];
S75: and voting VoteInit uplink on the signal change.
S8: after receiving the voting information, other vehicles in the vehicle-mounted network want to participate in the vehicle voting round, generate self TraDID, apply for a temporary verifiable statement TemVC to the RSU, give out self opinion agreement or disagreement for the signal lamp change voting VoteInit, and send the voting opinion VoteRely to the intelligent signal lamp ITL through a safety channel;
s81: the vehicle verifies the authenticity, verify of the signal change voting Voteinit by using the elliptic curve signature ECDSA algorithm in S3 Sig (PK ITL ,Hash({protocol,S nonce },timestamp init );
S82: if the vehicle does not want to participate in voting, the vehicle can be ignored;
s83: if the vehicle wants to participate in the voting, the vehicle is based on
Generating traceable identity
Applying a temporary verifiable statement TemVC to an RSU in a district, and generating a verifiable voucher VP for an ITL (intelligent traffic light) to examine;
s831: a traceable DID generation algorithm that,
the operation is the same as S611;
s832: the temporary VC generation algorithm operates as S612; the expression of the algorithm is as follows:
s833: the credential generation algorithm may be verified, operating as S613; the expression of the algorithm is as follows:
s84: vehicle generation voting plaintext { Reply, S nonce A content of 1 or-1, 1 for Reply indicates that a signal change is supported, and-1 indicates that a signal change is opposed to this time. With its own private key SK voter And S3, generating a signature sigma of the request information by the elliptic curve signature ECDSA algorithm Reply =Sign Sig (SK voter ,Hash({Reply,S nonce },timestamp Reply ) Votes voted in votes sent to the intelligent traffic light ITL, votes = [ { Reply, S) = nonce }||σ Reply ||timestamp Reply ||TruDID voter ||VP voter ];。
S9: the ITL counts the received voting reply Votepy, calculates the final voting value according to the weight and the opinion of the vehicle, and changes the signal lamp if the voting value exceeds a threshold value; and if the voting value does not exceed the threshold value, not changing the signal lamp and ignoring the signal change request. Finally, the voting result VoteDecision uplink is carried out;
s91: the intelligent traffic light ITL first verifies the verifiable credentials VP provided by the voter voter Verifying the signature in the VP to determine whether the current vehicle is eligible to participate in the vote;
s92: after the vehicle attributes meet the voting requirements, the intelligent traffic light ITL verifies the signature of each reply received using the elliptic curve signature ECDSA algorithm in S3 to determine the authenticity, verify, of the VoteReply Sig (PK voter ,Hash({Reply,S nonce },timestamp Reply );
S93: the type of vehicle is extracted from the verifiable certificate of the vehicle, in the system, the vehicle is divided into three types, high-level vehicles, and the voting weight is W
k =1.0; the voting weight value of the medium-level vehicle is W
k =0.7; low-grade vehicle, voting weight value is W
k =0.5. Some special vehicles, such as ambulances, police cars and fire fighting trucks, are classified as high-grade vehicles; buses, sanitation vehicles, engineering vehicles and the like are divided into medium-grade vehicles; and finally dividing private cars and trucks into low-level vehicles. The ITL of the intelligent traffic light passes through a formula according to different weights
The final vote value is calculated, k representing the total number of votes. Adding DID of the voter into an agreement list Listagree and a disagreement list Listdiscorge;
s94: if the voting value exceeds a threshold value V >0, changing a signal lamp; the voting value does not exceed the threshold value V <0, and the signal lamp is not changed;
s95: linking the voting result VoteDeversion = { Listagree, listdisagree } and Listagree = { TruDID = } voter1 ,TruDID voter2 ,...},Listdisagree={TruDID voter5 ,TruDID voter6 ,...}。
S10: and tracking the identity of the malicious vehicle by combining a plurality of supervision authorities RA, and marking the malicious vehicle.
S102: at least t RA jointly recover the master key of the system by Lagrange interpolation
S103: the RA extracts the authentic identity TruDID of the vehicle using the traceable identity of the vehicle TraDID and the system master key SK,
and marking the malicious train chains.
The above-mentioned embodiments, which further illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention, should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are only preferred embodiments of the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.