CN115941168A - Anti-eavesdropping data transmission method and system - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method and system, wherein the method comprises the following steps: each user is used as a sender and a receiver, the message to be sent is divided into different message packets and encrypted, each message packet is sent to the entrance server, the entrance server distributes the message packets to the exchange server, the exchange server exchanges and calculates the message packets and sends the message packets back to the corresponding entrance server, and the entrance server sends the message packets back to the corresponding user. The method provided by the invention has stronger anti-eavesdropping performance and higher communication efficiency, and in addition, the exchange server also provides an offline message storage service, so that the communication is simpler and more flexible.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of network space security, in particular to an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method and an anti-eavesdropping data transmission system.
Background
Security of communication privacy is of increasing concern due to the exposure of a large number of large-scale monitoring projects, particularly some network monitoring and auditing projects that are either national or dominated. The attack behavior of stealing the privacy information data of the network user through means of network tracking, monitoring and the like becomes one of the main security threats of the internet, and the protection of the network communication privacy data and the user identity data information becomes an increasingly important security requirement. Therefore, under the current complex network environment, in the face of the malicious behaviors invading the privacy of the network user, such as network tracking, network monitoring and the like, which are increasingly serious by lawbreakers, the protection of the relevant privacy information, such as the identity, the network behavior and the like, of the network user is very urgent, and the method becomes an important research field gradually.
In order to solve the above problems, online privacy of network users is protected to provide anonymous and anti-eavesdropping communication services, some formed systems have appeared at home and abroad, however, with the continuous upgrade of network tracking and tracing technologies, a plurality of effective technical methods for network eavesdropping and tracing appear, but the existing anonymous system sacrifices anonymity for efficient communication, and vice versa, all of them face the defect or bottleneck which is difficult to overcome. By taking Tor as an example, tor is the most widely distributed anonymous network in the world, and provides anonymous communication service with low delay for many users in an open access mode. Unfortunately, anonymous networks based on onion routing are vulnerable to traffic analysis by attackers who can monitor or tamper with network traffic between nodes and cannot guarantee eavesdropping resistance of transmitted information.
There are many methods for implementing network message transmission anti-eavesdropping in anonymous network, and generally, the methods can be mainly divided into three categories: a multi-hop based method, a hybrid network based method, and a DC-Net based method. The multi-hop based method uses a plurality of relay nodes to transmit information, and each relay node only knows own direct communication node, thereby hiding the whole transmission path. Tor is the most popular anonymous network based on multi-hop transmission, providing sender anonymity through multi-hop onion routing. The method based on the hybrid network uses the hybrid nodes to disturb the traffic and outputs the traffic in a re-disturbed form, so that the input-output relationship between different traffic can be hidden, and an adversary cannot establish the correlation between the input-output traffic. Riffle employs a new hybrid verifiable shuffling technology and private information retrieval technology to achieve bandwidth and computationally efficient anonymous communication. Non-interactive anonymous communication is provided based on a DC-Net protocol, safe multiparty calculation and theoretically safe anonymity of information are used, the anonymity of a sender is guaranteed, and meanwhile, all participants verify a final result. Dissend provides demonstrable anonymity and accountability for medium-sized communities and efficiently handles unbalanced loads that few members wish to transmit in a given round. Each DC-Net run transmits variable length batches of data consisting of one member's messages using the minimum number of bits required for anonymity.
The evaluation is carried out from two index evaluation indexes of system performance and eavesdropping prevention capability, and various methods have respective advantages and disadvantages. The method based on the multi-hop has the advantages of low network expandability and communication delay, but is easily influenced by traffic analysis and malicious node penetration. An attacker can monitor network traffic, identify anonymous traffic and track a transmission path of the anonymous traffic through the characteristics of the anonymous traffic, eavesdrop transmission data, and in addition, malicious nodes can break anonymity by observing a communication relationship. The hybrid network-based approach may be effective against traffic analysis and correlation analysis. However, the computational overhead of the hybrid nodes may cause high delays in communication, and the hybrid nodes need to be deployed exclusively, so the hybrid network-based approach is prone to single point failures. The DC-Net based approach can effectively protect users from traffic analysis attacks, but also sacrifices bandwidth. The DC-Net protocol lacks flexibility for anonymous communications, requiring cooperation of all participants, allowing only one user to communicate in a round. Therefore, how to perform data transmission for preventing eavesdropping becomes an urgent problem to be solved.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problem, the invention provides an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method and system.
The technical solution of the invention is as follows: an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method, comprising:
step S1: each user acts as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And then UN i Is sent to each exchange server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l According to msk l And SN l Should be calculatedIs a key of
And give its pseudonym SN l Is issued to each user u i To perform key agreement; each of the users uses its sk i And said switching server MS l Is of a pseudonym UN l Calculating an encryption key k i,l Or the exchange server MS l Can also be based on its own key>
And each user u i Is of a pseudonym UN i Calculating an encryption key k i,l ；
Step S2: each of the senders s i Using the own encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping the obtained message packets, and sending the message packets to different entry servers;
and step S3: different ingress servers will obtain different said message packets and forward them to all of said switching servers;
and step S4: the exchange server groups the corresponding pseudonym UN of the user according to the received message i Sequencing said message packets, each of said switching servers MS l Calculating a hash value of all the received message packets
And will->
Comparing the hash value calculated by the other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, the message exchange is carried out if all the exchange servers receive correct message packets; otherwise, malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the exchange server;
step S5: after the exchange servers complete the exchange of message packets, each exchange server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends the output message packets back to the corresponding entry server, and then the entry server sends the message packets to the corresponding users according to the pseudonyms in each message packet;
step S6: for offline user message transmission, if the sender forwards the message packets to the switching server but no receiver requests them, the switching server will store the message packets and wait for requests from the receiver until the storage service for these message packets expires.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
1. the invention discloses an anti-eavesdrop data transmission method, which adopts a double-layer framework structure to separate two processes of data forwarding and data exchange, wherein the data forwarding process protects the real IP of a user, and the data exchange process protects the object of data transmission, thereby effectively improving the tracking resistance of data transmission.
2. The invention adopts the data grouping technology to divide the original data of the user into a plurality of groups for transmission, the grouping information is forwarded to the exchange server through different entrance servers, the exchange server can restore the original information only on the premise of receiving all the information groups, and the eavesdropping and the decoding of the transmission information by an attacker can be effectively prevented.
3. The invention adopts the online cache technology, caches the message block without the receiver in the exchange server, and can obtain the message block cached in the exchange server when the receiver is online, thereby improving the robustness of data transmission.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method according to an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the communication between a user and a switching server according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3A is a schematic diagram illustrating an operation principle of offline message transmission in case 1 according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3B is a schematic diagram illustrating the operation of offline message transmission in case 2 according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a block diagram of an anti-eavesdropping data transmission system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention provides an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method.
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Example one
As shown in fig. 1, an anti-eavesdropping data transmission method provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:
step S1: each user acts as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And will UN i To each switching server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l According to msk l And SN l Calculating the key of the response
And its pseudonym SN l Distributed to each user u i To perform key agreement; each user uses its sk i And a switching server MS l Is UN l Calculating an encryption key k i,l Or exchange server MS l Can also be based on its own key>
And each user u i Is UN i Calculating an encryption key k i,l ；
Step S2: each sender s i Using its own encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping the obtained message packets, and sending the message packets to different entrance servers;
and step S3: different ingress servers will get different message packets and forward them to all switching servers;
and step S4: the exchange server groups the corresponding user's pseudonym UN according to the received message i Sequencing the message packets, each switching server MS l Calculating hash value of all received message packets according to the received message packets
And will->
Comparing with the hash values calculated by other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, indicating that all the exchange servers receive correct message packets, then carrying out message exchange; otherwise, malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the exchange server;
step S5: after the exchange servers finish message packet exchange, each exchange server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends the output message packets back to the corresponding entrance server, and then the entrance server sends the message packets to corresponding users according to the pseudonyms in each message packet;
step S6: for offline user message transmission, if the sender forwards message packets to the switching server, but no receiver requests them, the switching server will store the message packets and wait for a request from the receiver until the storage service for these message packets expires.
In one embodiment, the step S1: each user acts as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And will UN i To each switching server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l And for each user u i Generate its corresponding key sk i (ii) a Switching server based on msk l And SN l Calculating the key of the response
And its pseudonym SN l And sk of each user i Sent to each user u i (ii) a Each user uses its sk i And SN l Calculating to obtain an encryption key k i,l Or the exchange server can also use->
And UN i Calculating to obtain an encryption key k i,l The method specifically comprises the following steps:
step S11: each user u i Generating unique 64-bit pseudonyms UN i And will UN i To each switching server MS l Each exchange server obtains the pseudonym list C of all users UN ＝{UN 1 ,UN 2 ,……,UN M M is the number of users;
in the embodiment of the invention, each user can serve as a sender and a receiver, and in order to ensure anonymity, the user provides a unique pseudonym UN of the user to the exchange server i And will UN i Is sent to all switching servers for registration, so that each switching server MS l Obtaining a pseudonym list C of all users UN ＝{UN 1 ,UN 2 ,……,UN M M is the number of users;
step S12: each switching server MS l And l is E {1, …, N }, which is used as a key generation center KGC, and each { MS is generated according to a key arrangement protocol based on the identity identifier l Corresponding master key msk l And each user gets each MS l Using msk l Combined with its pseudonym UN i Generating a corresponding set of keys { sk } 1 ,sk 2 ,……,sk N N is the number of the exchange servers;
each switching server MS l Acting as a Key Generation Center (KGC), each MS is generated by an identity-based Key arrangement protocol (id-based KAP) l Corresponding master key msk l And use master key msk l According to eachUser pseudonym UN i Generating a corresponding key sk i Sent to each user u i Thus, each user will get a set of keys { sk } 1 ,sk 2 ,……,sk N N is the number of the exchange servers;
step S13: each switching server MS l Generate its own pseudonym SN l And use its master key msk l Calculate the corresponding key
Then each MS l Its pseudonym SN l Distributed to each user u i To perform subsequent key agreement;
step S14: each user uses sk i And a corresponding switching server MS l Is SN of pseudonym l Calculating an encryption key k i,l Or exchange server MS l Or use its own key
And each user u i Is UN i Calculating an encryption key k i,l 。
In one embodiment, the step S2: each sender s i Using its own encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping to obtain message packets, and sending the message packets to different ingress servers, specifically comprising:
step S21: defining that all users must be one of three types:
a) A sender for sending a message to a specific user;
b) A receiver checking a message of a specific user;
c) The shelter sends an easy message to the exchange server to serve as a camouflage for avoiding the threat of flow analysis and displaying the online state through the transmission system;
step S22: define the message packet as { L, u i ,u j M, where L represents the user type: l = S tableIndicating a sender, L = R indicating a receiver, and L = C indicating a masker; u. of i Indicates the sender of the message, u j Representing the message recipient, M representing a message communication context;
when there is no need to deliver a message, M = M may be set c Wherein m is c Representing a spoofed message; when the masker creates a message packet, u may be set j =0, representing that the transmitted message is a redundant message;
step S23: each sender s i First creates its message m using an additive secret sharing mechanism i Is applied to ring Z, the additive secret sharing mechanism is applied to ring Z N Wherein a secret value x ∈ Z N To be shared by N parties, N groupings of X can be created by first choosing a random number of N-1 modulo a positive integer X, and the final share is calculated by X minus the N-1 random number and then modulo X:
x 1 ←random()(mod X)
x 2 ←random()(mod X)
……
x N ←x-x 1 -…-x N-1 (mod X
to m i Are grouped to obtain:
wherein +>
Indicating that the ith message packet is to be transmitted to the switching server SM i ；/>
Step S24: each user u i Using encryption k i,l And encrypting the message packet and sending the message packet to the entrance server.
As shown in fig. 2, there are 3 switching servers, so each sender s i For its message m i Divided into three message packets
Receiver r j Creating a packet (R, R) j ,s i 0) represents r j Is from s i Is requested. Each screen c k Creating a message packet (C, C) k ,0,0)。
In one embodiment, the step S3: different ingress servers will obtain different message packets and forward them to all switching servers;
as shown in fig. 2, a simple diagram is given of the communication between user u and the switching server MS via the portal server. The ingress servers ES forward the message packets to the switching server MS, which can identify to which ingress server ES each message packet belongs. After the exchange servers MS complete the exchange of message packets, each exchange server MS calculates the outgoing message packets containing the message delivery results and sends them back to the corresponding ingress server ES, which then sends these message packets to the corresponding users u according to the user pseudonyms in each message packet.
It can be seen that the user and the switching server in the embodiment of the present invention have no identity information about each other except for the pseudonym of the other, and therefore the portal server relays messages between the user and the switching server by mapping the pseudonym to a real address. Each user u i Randomly sending its message packets to one portal server, which will then obtain different message packets from different users. The portal server records the correspondence between the user and the message packet. The exchange server also records the correspondence between the ingress server and the message packets. By this way, the entrance server cuts off the direct link between the user and the exchange server, and the exchange server only uses the pseudonym of the user to complete the message exchange, thereby ensuring the anti-eavesdropping property of the user information.
In one embodiment, the step S4: the exchange server groups the corresponding pseudonym UN of the user according to the received message i Sequencing the message packets, each switching server MS l Calculating hash value of all received message packets
And will->
Comparing with the hash values calculated by other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, indicating that all the exchange servers receive correct message packets, then carrying out message exchange; otherwise, the malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the exchange server, and specifically includes:
step S41: exchange server MS l After receiving the message packet from each user, using an explicit quick sorting algorithm, according to the pseudonym UN of the user corresponding to the message packet i Ordering message packets and then according to each UN i Calculating the MS in the order of appearance after sorting l Hash value
If the hash values are equal, which indicates that all the switching servers receive correct message packets, the step S32 is switched to carry out information switching; otherwise, the malicious operation is shown to occur in the portal server or the exchange server, and information exchange is not carried out;
step S42: the switching server implements a message switching process between different message packets according to the types of the message packets and the pseudonyms of the users, and specifically includes:
the share of the messages of the sender, the receiver and the covering party is respectively b s ＝(S,s i ,r j ,m)，b r ＝(R,r j ,s i 0), and b) c ＝(C,c k ,0,0). The exchange server realizes the message exchange process between different message packets according to the types of the message packets and the user pseudonyms, and the process is divided into the following five cases:
(1)b s ＝(S,u i ,u j ,m)，b r ＝(R,u j ,u i ,m req ). In this case, b s And b r With identical parties representing users u i And u j It is desirable to exchange messages. The switching server calculates outgoing message packets, b s ′＝(S,u i ,u j ,m req ) And b r ′＝(R,u j ,u i M) and separately towards user u i And u j Sending b s ' and b r ′。b s Fourth component m of req Denotes u j Request information of b r The fourth component m of' is to be sent to u j The message of (2).
(2)b s ＝(S,u i ,u j ,m)，b c ＝(C,u j ,u i ,m req ). In this case, user u i To u j Sending messages, but user u j Out of direction u i A request message. The switching server calculates outgoing message packets, b s ′＝(S,u i ,u j ,info s ) And b c ′＝(C,u j ,u i M) and to user u, respectively i And u j Sending b s ' and b c ′。b s ' use info s Modifying its fourth component for feedback to u i Completion of message exchange, b c ' use b separately c U of (a) i And m changes its third and fourth components to feedback to u j Represents u i The message m has already been sent.
(3)b r ＝(S,u i ,u j ,m req )，b c ＝(C,u j ,0,0). In this case, user u i Received user u j B, the exchange server calculates the outgoing message packet, b r ′＝(R,u i ,u j ,info r )，b c ′＝(C,u j ,u i ,m req ) And respectively transmit b r ' and b c ' to user u i And u j 。b r ' use b r ' of info r Change its fourth component to feed back u i Its request information has been sent to u j ,b c ' use b c U of (a) i And m req Changing its third and fourth components for feedback to u j ，u i With a request message m req 。
(4)b s ＝(S,u i ,u j M) but not from u) j The message packet of (2). In this case, consider user u j And is in an off-line state. The switching server then stores the data from u i Until b s And (4) expiration. In addition, the switching server calculates an outgoing message packet b s ′＝(S,u i ,u j ,info off ) And to user u i Sending b s ' to report user u j Off-line status of (1).
(5)b r ＝(R,u i ,u j ,m req ) But not from u j The message packet of (2). In this case, the switching server stores the data from u i Of the message packet, computing an output message packet b r ′＝(R,u i ,u j ,info off ) And b is r ' send to user u i Reporting user u j Off-line status of (1).
In one embodiment, the step S5: after the exchange servers complete message packet exchange, each exchange server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends the output message packets back to the corresponding entry server, and then the entry server sends the message packets to the corresponding users according to the pseudonyms in each message packet, specifically comprising:
after the exchange servers complete the exchange of message packets, each exchange server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends the output message packets back to the corresponding portal server, and then the portal server sends the message packets to corresponding users according to the pseudonyms in each message packet, thereby completing the data transmission process.
In one embodiment, the step S6: for offline user message transmission, if the sender forwards message packets to the switching server, but no receiver requests them, the switching server will store the message packets and wait for the request from the receiver until the storage service of these message packets expires, which specifically includes:
in each round of message transmissionAll online users need to send messages to the system. I.e. if the switching server does not receive a message from user u k The user is considered offline. If valid message packet
And b r ＝(R,r j ,s i 0) do not match the corresponding users, the exchange server will store them for future message exchanges.
Let Seq assume r ＝(a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n ) And Seq s ＝(b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n ) Indicating the order of received message packets and stored message packets, respectively. Source (x) and Target (x denotes the Source and Target users, respectively, of message packet x.
(1) Exists a i ∈Seq r (1≤i≤n)，b j ∈Seq s (1≤j≤m)，Source(a i )＝Target(b j ). But for the other a k ∈Seq r (1≤k≤n,k≠i)，Sourec(a i )≠Target(b j ). In this case, the message exchange only exists between the received message packet and the stored message packet. As shown in fig. 3A, the switching server extracts the valid information from the stored message packets and calculates the outgoing message packets from the communicated message packets.
(2) Presence of a i ,a k ∈Seq r (1≤i,k≤n,i≠k)，b j ∈Seq s (1≤j≤m)，Source(a i )＝Target(a k ) And Source (a) i )＝Target(b j ). In this example, the received message packet and the stored message packet have the same messaging target user. As shown in fig. 3B, the switching server outputs two message packets, one carrying the validity information of the received message packet and the other carrying the validity information of the stored message packet. At each round of message deliveryWhen the valid information is transmitted or expired, the exchange server deletes the stored message packet.
The invention discloses an anti-eavesdrop data transmission method, which adopts a double-layer framework structure to separate two processes of data forwarding and data exchange, wherein the data forwarding process protects the real IP of a user, the data exchange process protects the object of data transmission, and the anti-tracking performance of data transmission is effectively improved. The invention adopts the data grouping technology to divide the original data of the user into a plurality of groups for transmission, the grouping information is forwarded to the exchange server through different entrance servers, the exchange server can restore the original information only on the premise of receiving all the information groups, and the eavesdropping and the decoding of the transmission information by an attacker can be effectively prevented. The invention adopts the online caching technology to cache the message block without the receiver in the exchange server, and when the receiver is online, the message block cached in the exchange server can be obtained, thereby improving the robustness of data transmission.
Example two
As shown in fig. 4, an embodiment of the present invention provides an anti-eavesdropping data transmission system, which includes the following modules:
a key generation module 61 for each user as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And then UN i Is sent to each exchange server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l And for each user u i Generate its corresponding key sk i (ii) a Switching server according to msk l And SN l Calculating the key of the response
And its pseudonym SN l And sk of each user i Sent to each user u i (ii) a Each user uses its sk i And SN l Calculating to obtain an encryption key k i,l Or the exchange server can also use->
And UN i Calculating to obtain an encryption key k i,l ；
A message grouping module 62 for each sender s i Using its own encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping the obtained message packets, and sending the message packets to different entrance servers;
a message forwarding module 63, configured to obtain different message packets by different ingress servers, and forward the message packets to all the switching servers;
a message exchange module 64, configured to exchange the pseudonyms UN of the users corresponding to the message packets received by the server i Sequencing the message packets, each switching server MS l Calculating hash value of all received message packets
And will->
Comparing with the hash values calculated by other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, indicating that all the exchange servers receive correct message packets, then carrying out message exchange; otherwise, malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the exchange server;
a message return module 65, configured to, after the switching servers complete message packet switching, each switching server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends them back to the corresponding ingress server, and then the ingress server sends the message packets to the corresponding users according to pseudonyms in each message packet;
an offline message processing module 66 for message transmission for offline users, if the sender forwards message packets to the switching server, but no receiver requests them, the switching server will store the message packets and wait for a request from the receiver until the storage service for these message packets expires.
The above examples are provided only for the purpose of describing the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. The scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims. Various equivalent substitutions and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and principles of the invention, and are intended to be included within the scope of the invention.
Claims (5)
1. An eavesdropping-proof data transmission method, comprising:
step S1: each user acts as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And will UN i To each switching server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l And for each of said users u i Generate its corresponding key sk i (ii) a Said switching server is according to msk l And SN l Calculating the key to be used
And its pseudonym SN l And sk of each user i Sent to each user u i (ii) a Each of the users uses its sk i And SN l Calculating to obtain an encryption key k i,l Or the switching server can also use +>
And UN i Calculating to obtain the encryption key k i,l ；
Step S2: each of the senders s i Using the own said encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping the obtained message packets, and sending the message packets to different entry servers;
and step S3: different ingress servers will obtain different said message packets and forward them to all of said switching servers;
and step S4: the exchange server is according to the connectionThe pseudonym UN of the subscriber corresponding to the received message packet i Sequencing said message packets, each of said switching servers MS l Calculating a hash value of all the received message packets
And will->
Comparing the hash value calculated by the other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, the message exchange is carried out if all the exchange servers receive correct message packets; otherwise, malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the exchange server;
step S5: after the exchange servers complete the exchange of message packets, each exchange server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends the output message packets back to the corresponding entry server, and then the entry server sends the message packets to the corresponding users according to the pseudonyms in each message packet;
step S6: for offline user message transmission, if the sender forwards the message packets to the switching server but no receiver requests them, the switching server will store the message packets and wait for requests from the receiver until the storage service for these message packets expires.
2. The eavesdropping-proof data transmission method according to claim 1, wherein the step S1: each user acts as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And will UN i To each switching server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l According to msk l And SN l Calculating the key of the response
And its pseudonym SN l Is issued to each user u i To perform key agreement; each of the users uses its sk i And said switching server MS l Is UN l Calculating an encryption key k i,l Or the exchange server MS l Can also be based on its own key>
And each user u i Is UN i Calculating an encryption key k i,l The method specifically comprises the following steps:
step S11: each user u i Generating unique 64-bit pseudonyms UN i And will UN i To each switching server MS l Each exchange server obtains the pseudonym lists C of all the users UN ＝{UN 1 ,UN 2 ,……,UN M M is the number of users;
step S12: each of the switching servers MS l L is in the range of {1, …, N }, and serves as a key generation center KGC, and each MS is generated according to a key arrangement protocol based on the identity l Corresponding master key msk l And each said user gets each MS l Using msk l Combined with its pseudonym UN i Generating a corresponding set of keys { sk 1 ,sk 2 ,……,sk N N is the number of the exchange servers;
step S13: each of the switching servers MS l Generate its own pseudonym SN l And use its master key msk l Calculate the corresponding key
Then each MS l Its pseudonym SN l Distributed to each user u i To perform subsequent key agreement;
step S14: each of the users uses sk i And corresponding said switching server MS l Is SN of pseudonym l Calculating and addingSecret key k i,l Or said switching server MS l Or use its own key
And each user u i Is UN i Calculating an encryption key k i,l 。
3. The eavesdropping-proof data transmission method according to claim 1, wherein the step S2: each of the senders s i Using the own encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping to obtain a message packet, and sending the message packet to different ingress servers, specifically comprising:
step S21: defining that all of said users must be of one of three types:
a) A sender for sending a message to a specific user;
b) A receiving side checking a message of a specific user;
c) The shelter sends an easy message to the exchange server to serve as a camouflage for avoiding the threat of flow analysis and displaying the online state through a transmission system;
step S22: defining the message packet as { L, u } i ,u j M, where L represents the user type: l = S denotes a sender, L = R denotes a receiver, and L = C denotes a masker; u. u i Indicates the sender of the message, u j Representing the message recipient, M representing a message communication context;
when there is no need to deliver a message, M = M may be set c Wherein m is c Representing a spoofed message; when the masker creates a message packet, u may be set j =0, representing that the transmitted message is a redundant message;
step S23: each sender s i First creates its message m using an additive secret sharing mechanism i Is applied to ring Z, the additive secret sharing mechanism is applied to ring Z N Wherein a secret value x ∈ Z N To be coveredSharing on the N sides, N groupings of X can be created by first choosing a random number of N-1 modulo a positive integer X, and the final share is calculated by X minus the N-1 random number and then modulo X:
x 1 ←random()(mod X)
x 2 ←random()(mod X)
……
x N ←x-x 1 -…-x N-1 (mod X)
to m i Are grouped to obtain:
wherein it is present>
Indicating that the ith message packet is to be transmitted to the switching server SM i ；
Step S24: each user u i Using encryption k i,l And encrypting the message packet and then sending the message packet to the entrance server.
4. The eavesdropping-proof data transmission method according to claim 1, wherein the step S4: the exchange server groups the corresponding pseudonym UN of the user according to the received message i Sequencing said message packets, each of said switching servers MS l Calculating a hash value of all the received message packets
And will->
Comparing the hash value calculated by the other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, the message exchange is carried out if all the exchange servers receive correct message packets; otherwise, malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the switching server, specifically including：
Step S41: the switching server MS l After receiving the message packet from each user, using an explicit quick sorting algorithm according to the pseudonym UN of the user corresponding to the message packet i Sorting the message packets and then according to each UN i Calculating the MS in the order appearing in the sorted order l Hash value
If the hash values are equal, which indicates that all the switching servers receive the correct message packets, the step S32 is performed to perform information switching; otherwise, the malicious operation is indicated to occur in the portal server or the exchange server, and information exchange is not performed;
step S42: and the exchange server realizes the message exchange process among different message packets according to the types of the message packets and the pseudonyms of the users.
5. An eavesdropping-proof data transmission system, comprising the following modules:
a key generation module for each user as a sender and a receiver, each user u i Generating unique pseudonyms UN i And will UN i Is sent to each exchange server MS l (ii) a Each switching server MS l Generating its own master key msk l And its own pseudonym SN l And for each of said users u i Generate its corresponding key sk i (ii) a Said switching server is according to msk l And SN l Calculating the key of the response
And give its pseudonym SN l And sk of each user i Sent to each user u i (ii) a Each of the users uses its sk i And SN l Calculating to obtain an encryption key k i,l Or the switching server can also use +>
And UN i Calculating to obtain the encryption key k i,l ；
A message grouping module for each of said senders s i Using the own encryption key k i,l Message m to be sent i Encrypting and randomly encrypting m i Grouping the obtained message packets, and sending the message packets to different entry servers;
a message forwarding module, configured to obtain different message packets by different portal servers, and forward the message packets to all the switching servers;
a message exchange module, configured to, by the exchange server, perform packet forwarding on the received message packet according to the pseudonym UN of the user corresponding to the packet forwarding request i Sequencing said message packets, each of said switching servers MS l Calculating a hash value of all the received message packets
And will->
Comparing the hash value calculated by the other exchange servers; if the hash values are equal, the message exchange is carried out if all the exchange servers receive correct message packets; otherwise, malicious operation has occurred in the portal server or the exchange server;
a message return module, configured to, after the switching servers complete message packet switching, each switching server calculates output message packets containing message transmission results and sends them back to the corresponding ingress server, and then the ingress server sends the message packets to the corresponding users according to pseudonyms in each message packet;
an offline message processing module, configured to, for message transmission of an offline user, if the sender forwards the message packets to the switching server, but no receiver requests them, the switching server stores the message packets and waits for a request from the receiver until storage services of the message packets expire.
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| CN116319084B (en) * | 2023-05-17 | 2023-09-29 | 北京富算科技有限公司 | Random grouping method and device, computer program product and electronic equipment |
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