CN115694792A - Method and device capable of detecting blind attack caused by intense pulse light and receiving end - Google Patents
Method and device capable of detecting blind attack caused by intense pulse light and receiving end Download PDFInfo
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- CN115694792A CN115694792A CN202111178351.8A CN202111178351A CN115694792A CN 115694792 A CN115694792 A CN 115694792A CN 202111178351 A CN202111178351 A CN 202111178351A CN 115694792 A CN115694792 A CN 115694792A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a device for detecting strong pulse light blinding attack and a receiving end. On the basis of an original measuring optical path of a receiving end, a beam splitter is arranged at an input end, a detection branch is introduced, and the detection branch detects attack light by means of an avalanche photodiode in a linear mode, so that various loopholes existing in an attack detection mode realized based on an APD working current detection principle can be completely avoided, and various strong pulse light blindness attack schemes including but not limited to those proposed at present can be perfectly detected. Meanwhile, the whole optical path of the detection device realized based on the detection principle provided by the invention is simple and reliable, the original measurement optical path is not required to be changed, and the detection device is easy to realize and maintain.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of quantum communication, in particular to a method and a device for detecting strong pulse light blinding attack and a receiving end.
Background
In the strong light blinding attack of the quantum key distribution system, the control of the output 0 and 1 of the single photon detector is usually realized by using the detection characteristic that a linear mode possibly exists in the actual work of the single photon detector due to the strong light, so that the key stealing is implemented. An attacker can change a geiger mode of single photon detection into a linear mode of non-single photon detection by injecting blind strong light, and a time interval in which the linear mode is positioned is called a blind interval. By utilizing a linear mode, an eavesdropper Eve can use the pulse trigger light, so that a detection part which is adopted by the eavesdropper Eve and is different from a basis vector used by a receiving end for measurement is not found by the receiving end, and the attack influence is eliminated.
In order to change a geiger mode of single photon detection into a linear mode of non-single photon detection, an attacker injects strong light for blindness into a detector to enable an APD (avalanche photodiode) to output larger current, so that larger voltage drop can be formed on a resistor connected in series with the APD, the voltage at two ends of the APD is reduced, the working voltage is lower than breakdown voltage, and the APD exits the geiger mode and enters the linear mode.
As a receiving end, generally, it is impossible to prevent external light from being injected and prevent a detector from being blinded, so that such a strong light blinding attack can be prevented only by ensuring that a blinding state, strictly speaking, a detector blinding state at a signal light arrival time can be effectively found. Because the voltage at two ends of the APD can be reduced only when the photocurrent output by the APD is large enough, and then the APD exits from the geiger mode, the current defense measures are to determine whether there is a strong light attack by detecting the magnitude of the APD working current, for example, the output current of a boost chip providing bias voltage for the APD is monitored on hardware, when the APD working current exceeds a normal threshold value, an alarm is given, the system stops working, and relevant data are screened out.
Based on the attack detection principle, the prior art proposes a plurality of specific defense schemes, for example, see the documents "Hacking commercial quantity systems by real detailed breakdown," "Avoding the revealing attack in QKD," and the like. FIG. 1 shows a strong light attack protection scheme based on the principle of detecting the operating current of an APD in the prior art, in which the current I flowing through the APD is measured by means of a sampling resistor APD To carry out miningAnd sampling and outputting a voltage signal, collecting the voltage signal through the ADC, and converting the voltage signal into the magnitude of the current of the APD, thereby monitoring the magnitude of the current flowing through the APD.
However, in research, it is found that the defense scheme based on detecting the APD operating current can effectively detect continuous blind attacks, but is limited by the bandwidth of the current detection circuit, and cannot effectively discriminate the improved intense pulse light blind attacks. For example, an improved intense pulsed light blind attack scheme is proposed in the document "Hacking single-photon amplitude detector in square key distribution view pulse analysis", which can effectively avoid the detection of the working current of the APD and control the output state of the detector. Wherein, the variation of the strong pulse light on the APD working current is filtered by a low-pass filter for filtering high-frequency noise.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention discloses a method, a device and a receiving end for detecting strong pulse light blinding attack. On the basis of an original measuring light path of a receiving end, a detection branch is introduced through a beam splitter arranged at an input end, and the attack light is detected by means of an avalanche photodiode in a linear mode, so that various loopholes existing in an attack detection mode realized based on an APD working current detection principle can be completely avoided, and various strong pulse light blinding attack schemes including but not limited to those proposed at present can be perfectly detected. Meanwhile, the whole optical path of the detection device based on the detection principle provided by the invention is simple and reliable, the original measurement optical path is not required to be changed, and the detection device is easy to realize and maintain.
Specifically, a first aspect of the present invention relates to a detection apparatus for intense pulsed light-induced blind attacks, which includes a beam splitter, an avalanche photodiode, and an attack detection unit; wherein, the first and the second end of the pipe are connected with each other,
the beam splitter is arranged to split signal light entering a receiving end into a first component and a second component and to send the first component to a signal light detection module and the second component to the avalanche photodiode;
said avalanche photodiode being arranged to detect said second component at an operating voltage lower than an avalanche voltage;
the attack detection unit is used for detecting a counting signal of the avalanche photodiode and judging whether the strong pulse light blinding attack exists or not according to the counting signal.
Further, the avalanche photodiode is set to have an operating voltage 1 to 3V lower than the avalanche voltage; and/or the ratio of the light intensity of the first component to the second component is between 9.
Further, the attack detection unit includes a sampling resistor, a count signal discriminating portion, and a judging portion;
the sampling resistor is used for converting a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode into a voltage signal;
the counting signal screening part is used for comparing the voltage signal with a screening threshold value to generate the counting signal;
the judging part is used for judging whether the blind attack caused by the intense pulse light exists or not by detecting the counting signal.
Furthermore, the voltage signal is input to the counting signal discriminating portion by means of ac coupling.
Still further, the discrimination threshold is set to be higher than the electronic noise of the avalanche photodiode.
Furthermore, the judging part comprises a pulse stretching device and an FPGA device; the pulse stretching device is used for pulse stretching the counting signal; the FPGA device is configured to detect the count signal. Wherein the pulse stretching device may preferably comprise a D flip-flop.
The second aspect of the present invention relates to a receiving end capable of detecting blind attacks caused by intense pulsed light, which includes a signal light detection module for detecting signal light, and a detection apparatus for blind attacks caused by intense pulsed light.
The third aspect of the invention relates to a method for detecting strong pulse light blinding attack, which comprises a light splitting step and a detection step;
in the light splitting step, one path of light is split from the input signal light and introduced into an avalanche photodiode, wherein the working voltage of the avalanche photodiode is lower than an avalanche voltage;
in the detecting step, whether the strong pulse light blinding attack exists is judged by detecting the counting signal of the avalanche photodiode.
Further, the detecting step further comprises the step of discriminating the count signal from the output signal of the avalanche photodiode.
Further, at least one of the splitting ratio of the signal light and the operating voltage is determined according to the detection range of the intense pulse light blind attack.
Further, the difference between the avalanche voltage and the operating voltage is greater than a maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage.
Preferably, the detection method of the present invention can be implemented by the detection device described above.
Drawings
The following describes embodiments of the present invention in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 illustrates a prior art scheme for detecting a strong light blind attack based on the principle of detecting the operating current of an APD;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method, an apparatus and a receiving end for detecting blind attacks caused by intense pulsed light according to the present invention;
fig. 3 shows an example of an attack detection unit according to the invention.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are provided by way of illustration in order to fully convey the spirit of the invention to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains. Accordingly, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed herein.
Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a method, an apparatus and a receiving end for detecting strong pulse light blinding attack according to the present invention.
As shown in fig. 2, the apparatus for detecting intense pulsed light blinding attack according to the present invention may include a beam splitter, an avalanche photodiode, and an attack detection unit.
The beam splitter is disposed at a signal light input end (e.g., a signal light input end of a receiving end for quantum key distribution) for splitting an input signal light into two paths, i.e., a first component and a second component.
After being output from the beam splitter, the first component continues to be input into the signal light detection module along the original optical path, and the signal light detection module detects the first component, so that the first component is used for a quantum key distribution process, for example.
The second component, after being output from the beam splitter, will be directed into an avalanche photodiode for detection thereof. According to the invention, an operating voltage (e.g. bias voltage V in FIG. 3) is applied across the avalanche photodiode b ) Slightly below its avalanche (breakdown) voltage, so that the avalanche photodiode operates in linear mode rather than geiger mode with high gain.
Because the avalanche photodiode does not have dark counting in the geiger mode in the linear mode, under the normal working environment (no light signal input or signal light input such as single photon level exists at a receiving end) without blind attack caused by intense pulse light, the avalanche photodiode in the detection device for blind attack caused by intense pulse light cannot generate counting, namely, counting signals cannot be output. When strong pulse light is injected from the input end of the receiving end, that is, blind attack behavior caused by the strong pulse light occurs, a part of the strong pulse light is introduced into the avalanche photodiode by the beam splitter in the detection device, and since the intensity of the part of the strong pulse light is higher than that of normal signal light (such as single photon level), the avalanche photodiode generates counting by virtue of high gain in a linear mode, that is, outputs a counting signal.
It can be seen that, by setting the detection apparatus of the present invention as above, it is allowed to realize the detection of the intense pulsed light input to the receiving end only by detecting the count signal of the avalanche photodiode in the linear mode, that is: when detecting that the avalanche photodiode in the detection device outputs a counting signal, the detection device indicates that the blind attack behavior caused by intense pulse light occurs at the moment. Obviously, the intense pulsed light blind attack detection device abandons the existing intense pulsed light blind attack detection mode based on APD working current detection, and firstly proposes that on the basis of the original measuring optical path of a receiving end, a beam splitter is arranged at the input end to introduce a detection branch, and an avalanche photodiode in a linear mode is used for detecting the attack light, so that various loopholes existing in the attack detection mode realized based on the APD working current detection principle are completely avoided, and various intense pulsed light blind attack schemes including but not limited to the existing scheme can be perfectly detected. Meanwhile, the whole optical path of the detection device based on the detection principle provided by the invention is simple and reliable, the original measurement optical path is not required to be changed, and the detection device is easy to realize and maintain.
Further, in the detection apparatus of the present invention, the splitting ratio (first component: second component) of the beam splitter and the operating voltage of the avalanche photodiode (which determines the gain of the APD) will affect the response of the avalanche photodiode to the strong pulse attack light. The higher the gain of the APD in the linear mode is advantageous for this response, and therefore the operating voltage should be as high as possible below the avalanche voltage, for example, the operating voltage may be set to be only below the difference between the avalanche voltage and the maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage. In this case, the lower the splitting ratio (first component: second component) of the beam splitter is, the more advantageous is this response, but too low a splitting ratio may have an influence on the normal measurement of the signal light to some extent, and therefore, the splitting ratio may preferably be selected between 9.
In a more preferred example, the splitting ratio can be chosen to be around 9. Therefore, on the basis of ensuring that the normal measurement of the receiving end on the signal light is not influenced, the avalanche photodiode has high gain, and a larger detection range about the blind attack caused by intense pulse light is obtained.
Fig. 3 shows an example of an attack detection unit for detecting an avalanche photodiode count signal according to the present invention.
As shown in fig. 3, the attack detection unit may include a sampling resistor, a count signal discriminating portion, and a determining portion.
The sampling resistor is connected with the avalanche photodiode in series and used for converting a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode into a voltage signal. The voltage signal may be input to the count signal discriminating unit by ac coupling.
As a preferred example, the sampling resistor may have a resistance of 1K ohm.
The counting signal discrimination part is used for discriminating whether the avalanche photodiode outputs the counting signal currently or not according to the voltage signal.
As a preferred example, the count signal discriminating portion may include a high-speed discriminator for discriminating the voltage signal from a preset discrimination threshold V th And comparing, and outputting a counting signal when the voltage signal is higher than a discrimination threshold value.
Since only dark current noise exists in the avalanche photodiode in the linear mode, and dark count in the geiger mode does not exist, the discrimination threshold can be set to be slightly higher than the electronic noise (including dark current noise) of the avalanche photodiode. It follows that the setting of the discrimination threshold is very simple and reliable.
The judging part is used for detecting the counting signal so as to judge whether the strong pulse light blinding attack exists or not. For example, when the determination section detects that the count signal discrimination section outputs the count signal, it can be determined that a strong pulse for carrying out a blinding attack exists corresponding to the count signal.
As a preferred example, detection of the count signal may be implemented using FPGA devices. In order to ensure reliable detection of the attack light with high frequency (narrow pulse width), a pulse widening device may be provided in the determination unit to widen the pulse width of the counting signal, so as to ensure that the FPGA device can realize effective detection of the counting signal.
Preferably, the pulse stretching device can be implemented by using a high-speed D flip-flop.
In summary, with the preferred structure of the attack detection unit shown in fig. 3, the detection of the strong pulse can be reliably and efficiently achieved with a simple circuit structure.
Further, fig. 2 also shows a receiving end structure capable of detecting the blind attack caused by intense pulse light according to the present invention.
As shown in fig. 2, the receiving end may include a signal light detection module, and the apparatus for detecting blind attack by intense pulsed light.
The signal light detection module is used for detecting a first component output by a beam splitter in the detection device so as to realize single photon detection of signal light for quantum key distribution.
Based on the above, the receiving end of the invention can effectively detect the blind attack behavior caused by the strong pulse light injected from the input end, thereby properly stopping working, screening out related data and preventing the key from being stolen.
Furthermore, the invention also discloses a detection method of the blind attack caused by the intense pulse light, which mainly comprises a light splitting step and a detection step.
In the light splitting step, one path of light is split from the input signal light and introduced into one avalanche photodiode by providing a beam splitter at the signal light input end. As mentioned before, the avalanche photodiode should be set to operate at a voltage lower than the avalanche voltage to ensure that it is in linear mode (and has a high gain).
Since the splitting ratio of the signal light and the operating voltage of the avalanche photodiode both affect the detection response of the avalanche photodiode to the input signal light, the splitting ratio of the signal light and the operating voltage of the avalanche photodiode can be determined according to the range of the intense pulse light for blind attack (i.e., the detection range of the intense pulse light for blind attack) to be detected. For example, to ensure that the avalanche photodiode is in the linear mode, the difference between the avalanche voltage and the operating voltage may be set to be greater than the maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage.
In the detection step, whether strong pulse light is injected at the signal light input end is judged by detecting whether the avalanche photodiode outputs a counting signal, namely whether the strong pulse light causes blind attack behavior.
In the detecting step, a step of discriminating whether the signal output from the avalanche photodiode is a count signal may be further included to allow correct detection of the count signal. For example, a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode may be converted into a voltage signal, and the voltage signal may be compared with a preset discrimination threshold value to determine whether the avalanche photodiode outputs a count signal.
Further, in the detecting step, an FPGA device may be employed to detect the count signal. The counting signals output by screening can be subjected to pulse broadening, so that the FPGA device can detect intense pulsed light with narrow pulses.
Preferably, the detection method of the present invention can be implemented in the detection apparatus and the receiving end described with respect to fig. 2 and 3.
Although the present invention has been described in connection with the embodiments illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it will be readily understood by those skilled in the art that the above embodiments are exemplary only, serve to explain the principles of the invention and not to limit the scope of the invention, and that various combinations, modifications and equivalents of the above embodiments may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Claims (13)
1. A detection device for blind attack caused by intense pulse light comprises a beam splitter, an avalanche photodiode and an attack detection unit; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the beam splitter is arranged to split signal light entering a receiving end into a first component and a second component and to send the first component to a signal light detection module and the second component to the avalanche photodiode;
said avalanche photodiode being arranged to detect said second component at an operating voltage below an avalanche voltage;
the attack detection unit is used for detecting a counting signal of the avalanche photodiode and judging whether the strong pulse light blinding attack exists or not according to the counting signal.
2. The detection apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the avalanche photodiode is arranged to have an operating voltage 1 to 3V lower than the avalanche voltage; and/or the ratio of the light intensity of the first component to the second component is between 9.
3. The detection apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the attack detection unit includes a sampling resistor, a count signal discrimination section, and a judgment section;
the sampling resistor is used for converting a photocurrent signal output by the avalanche photodiode into a voltage signal;
the counting signal screening part is used for comparing the voltage signal with a screening threshold value to generate the counting signal;
the judging part is used for judging whether the blind attack caused by the intense pulse light exists or not by detecting the counting signal.
4. The detection apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the voltage signal is input to the count signal discriminating portion by means of ac coupling.
5. The detection apparatus of claim 3, wherein the discrimination threshold is set above an electronic noise of the avalanche photodiode.
6. The detection apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the determination section includes a pulse stretching device and an FPGA device;
the pulse stretching device is used for pulse stretching the counting signal;
the FPGA device is configured to detect the count signal.
7. The detection apparatus of claim 6, wherein the pulse stretching device comprises a D flip-flop.
8. A receiving end capable of detecting intense pulsed light blind attacks, which comprises a signal light detection module for detecting signal light, and the intense pulsed light blind attack detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
9. A detection method of strong pulse light blinding attack comprises a light splitting step and a detection step;
in the light splitting step, one path of light is split from the input signal light and introduced into an avalanche photodiode, wherein the working voltage of the avalanche photodiode is lower than the avalanche voltage;
in the detection step, whether the blind attack caused by the intense pulse light exists or not is judged by detecting the counting signal of the avalanche photodiode.
10. The detection method of claim 9, wherein the detecting step further comprises the step of discriminating the count signal based on an output signal of the avalanche photodiode.
11. The detection method according to claim 9, wherein at least one of the splitting ratio of the signal light and the operating voltage is determined according to a detection range of the intense pulsed light blind attack.
12. The detection method of claim 11, wherein the difference between the avalanche voltage and the operating voltage is greater than a maximum fluctuation value of the operating voltage.
13. The detection method according to claim 9, which is carried out by means of a detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
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