CN114666041A - Key injection method, device, medium and vehicle - Google Patents
Key injection method, device, medium and vehicle Download PDFInfo
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- CN114666041A CN114666041A CN202110598374.8A CN202110598374A CN114666041A CN 114666041 A CN114666041 A CN 114666041A CN 202110598374 A CN202110598374 A CN 202110598374A CN 114666041 A CN114666041 A CN 114666041A
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- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 title claims abstract description 68
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 54
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- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 23
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 abstract description 10
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 8
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 5
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
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- 238000003491 array Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
Abstract
The disclosure relates to a key injection method, device, medium and vehicle. The key injection method is applied to the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal and comprises the following steps: receiving an initial key sent by a diagnostic apparatus; responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument, and performing an authentication learning process with the vehicle body control system; under the condition that the authentication learning is passed, encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal to obtain a first authentication key, and storing the first authentication key into a storage module; detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored; in case the first authentication key is stored correctly, a first indication message for indicating that the key injection is successful is generated. Therefore, the authentication key can be correctly stored in the storage module, the situation that the remote control function cannot be normally used due to the fact that the engine is started and authentication fails is avoided, and the experience of using a vehicle of a user is improved.
Description
Technical Field
The present disclosure relates to the field of vehicles, and in particular, to a key injection method, apparatus, medium, and vehicle.
Background
As the automobile industry develops more and more mature, many new emerging functions appear on automobiles: automatic driving, remote control, V2X (vehicle wireless communication technology), etc., which are all functions that do not leave the automobile T-Box (Telematics Box), wherein the remote control function is an important function that currently increases the experience of the customer using the automobile. The remote control functions may include remote starting of the engine, remote turning on of the air conditioner, remote seat heating, remote door opening, remote window closing, etc., wherein the functions related to starting of the engine require authentication with a PEPS (Passive Entry Passive Start) and a BCM (body control module) (collectively referred to as a body control system KBCM) before starting the engine.
A basic key is provided in the MCU (Microcontroller Unit) of the T-Box, and this basic key is responsible for encrypting the injected initial key, and the authentication key obtained after encryption is stored in FLASH. The authentication key in The FLASH can not be modified by FOTA (Firmware Over-The-Air, Over-The-Air software upgrade) and can not be lost when power is off. When authentication is carried out, the T-Box calls an authentication key stored in the FLASH. However, in some scenarios, a phenomenon of authentication failure may occur.
Disclosure of Invention
The disclosure provides a secret key injection method, a secret key injection device, a secret key injection medium and a vehicle, which ensure that an authentication secret key can be correctly stored in a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, reduce engine starting authentication failure and improve the experience of vehicle use of a user.
In order to achieve the above object, a first aspect of the present disclosure provides a key injection method applied to a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, the method including:
receiving an initial key sent by a diagnostic instrument;
responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument, and performing an authentication learning process with a vehicle body control system;
under the condition that authentication learning is passed, encrypting the initial key by using a basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal to obtain a first authentication key, and storing the first authentication key into a storage module;
detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored;
in case the first authentication key is stored correctly, a first indication message indicating that key injection was successful is generated.
Optionally, in the case that the authentication learning passes, the method further includes:
when the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is powered on or restarted, checking a basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal;
and if the basic key passes the verification, the step of encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is executed again.
Optionally, the verifying the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal includes:
detecting basic key zone bit information of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal;
determining that the basic key passes verification when the flag bit information of the basic key is a target value, wherein the target value is used for indicating that the basic key is valid;
and determining that the basic key is not verified under the condition that the basic key flag bit information is not the target value.
Optionally, the method further comprises:
calling the backup basic key under the condition that the basic key is not verified;
covering the original basic key by using the backup basic key, and setting the flag bit information of the basic key as the target value;
and then, the step of verifying the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is executed again.
Optionally, the detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored includes:
encrypting the initial key by using the basic key to obtain a second authentication key;
determining whether the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key stored in the storage module;
determining that the first authentication key is correctly stored if the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key;
determining that the first authentication key is not properly stored if the second authentication key is not consistent with the first authentication key.
Optionally, the method further comprises:
generating a second indication message indicating a failure of key injection in case the first authentication key is not stored correctly.
A second aspect of the present disclosure provides a key injection device applied to a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, including:
the receiving module is used for receiving the initial key sent by the diagnostic instrument;
the learning module is used for responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument and performing an authentication learning process with the vehicle body control system;
the encryption module is used for encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal under the condition that authentication learning is passed to obtain a first authentication key and storing the first authentication key into the storage module;
the detection module is used for detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored;
and the message generation module is used for generating a first indication message for indicating that the key injection is successful under the condition that the first authentication key is correctly stored.
Optionally, the apparatus further comprises:
and the verification module is used for verifying the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal under the condition that authentication learning is passed and in the power-on or restarting state of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, and triggering the encryption module to execute the operation of encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal under the condition that the basic key passes the verification.
Optionally, the verification module includes:
the detection submodule is used for detecting the basic key zone bit information of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal;
a first determining submodule, configured to determine that the basic key passes verification when the flag bit information of the basic key is a target value, where the target value is used to indicate that the basic key is valid;
and the second determining submodule is used for determining that the basic key is not verified under the condition that the flag bit information of the basic key is not the target value.
Optionally, the apparatus further comprises:
the calling module is used for calling the backup basic key under the condition that the basic key does not pass the verification;
the covering module is used for covering the original basic key by using the backup basic key and setting the flag bit information of the basic key as the target value;
and then, triggering the verification module again to execute the operation of verifying the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal.
Optionally, the detection module includes:
the encryption submodule is used for encrypting the initial key by using the basic key to obtain a second authentication key;
a third determining sub-module, configured to determine whether the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key stored in the storage module;
a fourth determining sub-module, configured to determine that the first authentication key is correctly stored if the second authentication key is identical to the first authentication key;
a fifth determining sub-module, configured to determine that the first authentication key is not correctly stored if the second authentication key is inconsistent with the first authentication key.
Optionally, the message generating module is further configured to:
generating a second indication message indicating a failure of key injection in case the first authentication key is not stored correctly.
A third aspect of the present disclosure provides a key injection device applied to a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, including:
a memory having a computer program stored thereon;
a controller, said computer program, when executed by the controller, implementing the steps of the method of the first aspect of the present disclosure.
A fourth aspect of the present disclosure provides a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, performs the steps of the method of the first aspect of the present disclosure.
A fifth aspect of the present disclosure provides a vehicle comprising the apparatus provided in the second aspect of the present disclosure, or the apparatus provided in the third aspect of the present disclosure.
Through the technical scheme, in the key injection process of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, after the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal stores the encrypted first authentication key in the storage module, a detection mechanism for detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored is added, and only under the condition that the first authentication key is correctly stored is determined, the first indication message for indicating the successful key injection is generated. Therefore, the authentication key can be correctly stored in the storage module, the problem that the remote control function cannot be normally used due to the failure of the authentication of the starting engine is avoided, and the experience of the vehicle use of a user is improved.
Additional features and advantages of the disclosure will be set forth in the detailed description which follows.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the disclosure and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the disclosure and together with the description serve to explain the disclosure without limiting the disclosure. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a key injection method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 2 is a flowchart of a key injection method provided by another exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 3 is a block diagram of a key injection apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 4 is a block diagram of a key injection device according to another exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure.
Detailed Description
The following detailed description of specific embodiments of the present disclosure is provided in connection with the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the detailed description and specific examples, while indicating the present disclosure, are given by way of illustration and explanation only, not limitation.
In the existing key injection method applied to the T-Box, the T-Box encrypts an initial key by using a basic key to obtain an authentication key, and then stores the authentication key into a storage module for subsequent engine authentication. Therefore, in the existing key injection method, after the authentication key is obtained and stored, the key injection process is completed. However, if the basic key of the T-Box is abnormal, the correct authentication key cannot be generated and stored, and the subsequent authentication fails.
In view of the above, the present disclosure provides a key injection method, apparatus, medium, and vehicle to solve the above problems.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a key injection method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure, which may be applied to a T-Box. As shown in fig. 1, the method may include:
and S101, receiving the initial key sent by the diagnostic instrument.
And S102, responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument, and performing an authentication learning process with the vehicle body control system.
S103, under the condition that the authentication learning is passed, the initial key is encrypted by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal to obtain a first authentication key, and the first authentication key is stored in the storage module.
Illustratively, the first authentication key may be stored by FLASH memory. Alternatively, the first authentication key may be stored by an EEPROM memory. It is worth noting that the form of the memory module is not limited to the two examples shown above, and other types of memory are equally applicable to the present disclosure.
S104, whether the first authentication key is correctly stored is detected.
In order to ensure that a correct authentication key is generated and stored and avoid engine starting authentication failure caused by key injection errors, a detection mechanism for detecting whether the authentication key is correctly stored is added in the key injection method provided by the disclosure, so that the authentication key is verified.
S105, if the first authentication key is correctly stored, generates a first indication message indicating that the key injection is successful. At this point, the key injection process is complete.
Through the technical scheme, in the key injection process of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, after the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal stores the encrypted first authentication key in the storage module, a detection mechanism for detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored is added, and only under the condition that the first authentication key is correctly stored is determined, the first indication message for indicating the successful key injection is generated. Therefore, the authentication key can be correctly stored in the storage module, the situation that the remote control function cannot be normally used due to the fact that the engine is started and authentication fails is avoided, and the experience of using a vehicle of a user is improved.
For example, the implementation manner of detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored may be: encrypting the initial key by using the basic key to obtain a second authentication key; determining whether the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key stored in the storage module; under the condition that the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key, determining that the first authentication key is correctly stored; in the event that the second authentication key is not consistent with the first authentication key, it is determined that the first authentication key is not properly stored.
To further ensure that the correct authentication key is generated and stored, in another embodiment of the present disclosure, a verification mechanism for the base key is added to ensure the validity of the base key. Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a key injection method provided by another exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure, which may be applied to a T-Box. As shown in fig. 2, the method may include:
s201, receiving an initial key sent by the diagnostic instrument.
S202, responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument, and performing an authentication learning process with the vehicle body control system.
S203, determining whether the authentication learning passes. If so, S204 is performed, and if not, S209 is performed.
S204, determining the current state of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, and if the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is in a power-on or restarting state currently, performing S205; if the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is in the sleep-wake state currently, S206 is performed.
S205, checking the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal. If the basic key check passes, S206 is performed.
S206, the initial key is encrypted by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal to obtain a first authentication key, and the first authentication key is stored in the storage module.
S207, it is detected whether the first authentication key is correctly stored.
S208, if the first authentication key is correctly stored, a first indication message indicating that the key injection is successful is generated.
S209, a third indication message indicating that the authentication learning failed is generated.
Illustratively, the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal can be checked in the following manner: detecting basic key zone bit information of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal; determining that the basic key passes verification under the condition that the flag bit information of the basic key is a target value, wherein the target value is used for indicating that the basic key is valid; and determining that the basic key is not verified under the condition that the flag bit information of the basic key is not the target value.
In the present disclosure, the target value is a preset numerical value. For example, the target value is set to 1. If the flag bit information of the basic key is 1, the flag bit information is consistent with the target value, and the basic key is determined to pass verification at the moment; if the flag bit information of the basic key is 0, the flag bit information is inconsistent with the target value, and it is determined that the basic key does not pass the verification, that is, the basic key is not valid.
Through the technical scheme, when the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is powered on or restarted, the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is checked at first to judge whether the basic key is effective or not. And after the basic key is confirmed to pass the verification (namely, the basic key is judged to be valid), the initial key is encrypted by utilizing the basic key to obtain a first authentication key. In this way, the accuracy of the generated authentication key can be further ensured.
Optionally, as shown in fig. 2, in a case that the base key is not verified, the method may further include:
and S210, calling the backup basic key.
The MCU of the T-Box also stores a backup basic key. When it is determined after S205 that the base key does not pass the verification, the backed up base key stored in the MCU of the T-Box is called.
S211, overwriting the original basic key with the backed-up basic key. Through this step, the resetting of the basic key can be achieved.
And S212, setting the flag bit information of the basic key as a target value, thereby representing that the reset basic key is valid. After that, S205 is re-executed.
Through the technical scheme, the backup basic key can be used for resetting operation under the condition that the original basic key does not pass the verification so as to ensure that the effective basic key is recovered.
Optionally, in a case where the first authentication key is not stored correctly, the key injection method provided by the present disclosure may further include the steps of: a second indication message is generated to indicate a failure of the key injection.
In the present disclosure, the first indication message, the second indication message, and the third indication message may be output in various manners. For example, a vehicle-mounted display screen may be disposed in the vehicle, and the indication message may be displayed on the vehicle-mounted display screen to prompt the user accordingly. Alternatively, a loudspeaker can be arranged in the vehicle, and the indication message can be broadcasted through the loudspeaker in a voice mode so as to prompt the user correspondingly.
Based on the same inventive concept, the disclosure also provides a key injection device. Fig. 3 is a block diagram of a key injection apparatus provided in an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure, which may be used in a T-Box. Referring to fig. 3, the key injection apparatus 300 may include:
a receiving module 301, configured to receive an initial key sent by a diagnostic apparatus;
the learning module 302 is used for responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument and performing an authentication learning process with the vehicle body control system;
the encryption module 303 is configured to encrypt the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal to obtain a first authentication key when authentication learning passes, and store the first authentication key in the storage module;
a detecting module 304, configured to detect whether the first authentication key is correctly stored;
a message generating module 305, configured to generate a first indication message for indicating that key injection is successful if the first authentication key is correctly stored.
Through the technical scheme, in the key injection process of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, after the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal stores the encrypted first authentication key in the storage module, a detection mechanism for detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored is added, and only under the condition that the first authentication key is correctly stored is determined, the first indication message for indicating the successful key injection is generated. Therefore, the authentication key can be correctly stored in the storage module, the situation that the remote control function cannot be normally used due to the fact that the engine is started and authentication fails is avoided, and the experience of using a vehicle of a user is improved.
In some optional embodiments, the key injection device 300 may further include:
and the verification module is configured to verify a basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal in a power-on or restart state of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal when authentication learning passes, and then trigger the encryption module 303 to perform the operation of encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal when the basic key passes verification.
In some optional embodiments, the verification module may include:
the detection submodule is used for detecting the basic key zone bit information of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal;
a first determining submodule, configured to determine that the basic key passes verification when the flag bit information of the basic key is a target value, where the target value is used to indicate that the basic key is valid;
and the second determining submodule is used for determining that the basic key is not verified under the condition that the flag bit information of the basic key is not the target value.
In some optional embodiments, the key injection device 300 may further include:
the calling module is used for calling the backup basic key under the condition that the basic key does not pass the verification;
the covering module is configured to cover an original basic key with the backup basic key, and then set the flag bit information of the basic key as the target value;
and then, triggering the verification module again to execute the operation of verifying the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal.
In some optional embodiments, the detection module 304 may include:
the encryption submodule is used for encrypting the initial key by using the basic key to obtain a second authentication key;
a third determining sub-module, configured to determine whether the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key stored in the storage module;
the fourth determining submodule is used for determining that the first authentication key is correctly stored under the condition that the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key;
a fifth determining sub-module, configured to determine that the first authentication key is not correctly stored if the second authentication key is inconsistent with the first authentication key.
In some optional embodiments, the message generation module 305 may be further configured to:
generating a second indication message indicating a failure of key injection in case the first authentication key is not stored correctly.
With regard to the apparatus in the above-described embodiment, the specific manner in which each module performs the operation has been described in detail in the embodiment related to the method, and will not be elaborated here.
Fig. 4 is a block diagram illustrating a key injection apparatus 400 according to an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 4, the key injection apparatus 400 may include: a processor 401 and a memory 402. The key injection device 400 may also include one or more of a multimedia component 403, an input/output (I/O) interface 404, and a communication component 405.
The processor 401 is configured to control the overall operation of the key injection apparatus 400, so as to complete all or part of the steps in the key injection method. The memory 402 is used to store various types of data to support the operation of the key injection device 400, such data may include, for example, instructions for any application or method operating on the key injection device 400, as well as application-related data, such as contact data, transceived messages, pictures, audio, video, and so forth. The Memory 402 may be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile Memory device or combination thereof, such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM), Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM), Read-Only Memory (ROM), magnetic Memory, flash Memory, magnetic disk or optical disk. The multimedia components 403 may include a screen and an audio component. Wherein the screen may be, for example, a touch screen and the audio component is used for outputting and/or inputting audio signals. For example, the audio component may include a microphone for receiving external audio signals. The received audio signal may further be stored in the memory 402 or transmitted through the communication component 405. The audio assembly also includes at least one speaker for outputting audio signals. The I/O interface 404 provides an interface between the processor 401 and other interface modules, such as a keyboard, mouse, buttons, etc. These buttons may be virtual buttons or physical buttons. The communication component 405 is used for wired or wireless communication between the key injection apparatus 400 and other devices. Wireless Communication, such as Wi-Fi, bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), 2G, 3G, 4G, NB-IOT, eMTC, or other 5G, etc., or a combination of one or more of them, which is not limited herein. The corresponding communication component 405 may therefore include: Wi-Fi modules, Bluetooth modules, NFC modules, and the like.
In an exemplary embodiment, the key injection apparatus 400 may be implemented by one or more Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), Digital Signal Processors (DSPs), Digital Signal Processing Devices (DSPDs), Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic components for performing the key injection method described above.
In another exemplary embodiment, a computer readable storage medium comprising program instructions which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the key injection method described above is also provided. For example, the computer readable storage medium may be the memory 402 comprising program instructions executable by the processor 401 of the key injection device 400 to perform the key injection method described above.
In another exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, which comprises a computer program executable by a programmable apparatus, the computer program having code portions for performing the above-mentioned key injection method when executed by the programmable apparatus.
The present disclosure also provides a vehicle including the key injection device 300 provided by the present disclosure, or the key injection device 400 provided by the present disclosure.
The preferred embodiments of the present disclosure are described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, however, the present disclosure is not limited to the specific details of the above embodiments, and various simple modifications may be made to the technical solution of the present disclosure within the technical idea of the present disclosure, and these simple modifications all belong to the protection scope of the present disclosure.
It should be noted that, in the foregoing embodiments, various features described in the above embodiments may be combined in any suitable manner, and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, various combinations that are possible in the present disclosure are not described again.
In addition, any combination of various embodiments of the present disclosure may be made, and the same should be considered as the disclosure of the present disclosure, as long as it does not depart from the spirit of the present disclosure.
Claims (10)
1. A key injection method is applied to a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, and comprises the following steps:
receiving an initial key sent by a diagnostic apparatus;
responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument, and performing an authentication learning process with a vehicle body control system;
under the condition that authentication learning is passed, encrypting the initial key by using a basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal to obtain a first authentication key, and storing the first authentication key into a storage module;
detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored;
in case the first authentication key is stored correctly, a first indication message indicating that key injection was successful is generated.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein if the authentication learning passes, the method further comprises:
when the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is powered on or restarted, checking a basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal;
and if the basic key passes the verification, the step of encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is executed again.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the verifying the base key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal comprises:
detecting basic key zone bit information of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal;
determining that the basic key passes verification when the flag bit information of the basic key is a target value, wherein the target value is used for indicating that the basic key is valid;
and determining that the basic key is not verified under the condition that the basic key flag bit information is not the target value.
4. The method of claim 3, further comprising:
calling the backup basic key under the condition that the basic key is not verified;
covering an original basic key by using the backup basic key, and setting the flag bit information of the basic key as the target value;
and then, the step of verifying the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal is executed again.
5. The method according to any of claims 1-4, wherein said detecting whether said first authentication key is properly stored comprises:
encrypting the initial key by using the basic key to obtain a second authentication key;
determining whether the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key stored in the storage module;
determining that the first authentication key is correctly stored if the second authentication key is consistent with the first authentication key;
determining that the first authentication key is not properly stored if the second authentication key is not consistent with the first authentication key.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, further comprising:
generating a second indication message indicating a failure of key injection in case the first authentication key is not stored correctly.
7. A key injection device, applied to a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, comprising:
the receiving module is used for receiving the initial key sent by the diagnostic instrument;
the learning module is used for responding to the received authentication learning request sent by the diagnostic instrument and performing an authentication learning process with the vehicle body control system;
the encryption module is used for encrypting the initial key by using the basic key of the vehicle-mounted wireless terminal under the condition that authentication learning is passed to obtain a first authentication key and storing the first authentication key into the storage module;
the detection module is used for detecting whether the first authentication key is correctly stored;
and the message generation module is used for generating a first indication message for indicating that the key injection is successful under the condition that the first authentication key is correctly stored.
8. A key injection device, applied to a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal, comprising:
a memory having a computer program stored thereon;
a controller, which when executed by the controller, implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 6.
9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.
10. A vehicle comprising an apparatus as claimed in claim 7, or an apparatus as claimed in claim 8.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110598374.8A CN114666041A (en) | 2021-05-31 | 2021-05-31 | Key injection method, device, medium and vehicle |
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| US20140310816A1 (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2014-10-16 | Dell Products L.P. | Method to Prevent Operating System Digital Product Key Activation Failures |
| CN109150514A (en) * | 2018-08-30 | 2019-01-04 | 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 | A kind of wiring method and equipment of key |
| CN112653548A (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2021-04-13 | 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 | Key processing method, gateway, electric detection equipment, diagnostic instrument and electronic control unit |
| CN113658360A (en) * | 2021-08-18 | 2021-11-16 | 安徽江淮汽车集团股份有限公司 | Digital key security control method for vehicle |
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| US20140310816A1 (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2014-10-16 | Dell Products L.P. | Method to Prevent Operating System Digital Product Key Activation Failures |
| CN109150514A (en) * | 2018-08-30 | 2019-01-04 | 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 | A kind of wiring method and equipment of key |
| CN112653548A (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2021-04-13 | 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 | Key processing method, gateway, electric detection equipment, diagnostic instrument and electronic control unit |
| CN113658360A (en) * | 2021-08-18 | 2021-11-16 | 安徽江淮汽车集团股份有限公司 | Digital key security control method for vehicle |
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