CN114615046B - Administrator double-factor authentication method based on national secret certificate - Google Patents
Administrator double-factor authentication method based on national secret certificate Download PDFInfo
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- CN114615046B CN114615046B CN202210223946.9A CN202210223946A CN114615046B CN 114615046 B CN114615046 B CN 114615046B CN 202210223946 A CN202210223946 A CN 202210223946A CN 114615046 B CN114615046 B CN 114615046B
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- security
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 17
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 13
- GPUADMRJQVPIAS-QCVDVZFFSA-M cerivastatin sodium Chemical compound [Na+].COCC1=C(C(C)C)N=C(C(C)C)C(\C=C\[C@@H](O)C[C@@H](O)CC([O-])=O)=C1C1=CC=C(F)C=C1 GPUADMRJQVPIAS-QCVDVZFFSA-M 0.000 claims abstract description 7
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000004888 barrier function Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005336 cracking Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001681 protective effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
Abstract
The invention relates to an administrator double-factor authentication method based on a national cryptographic certificate, which comprises the following steps: initializing equipment to generate a national encryption certificate, wherein the national encryption certificate comprises an encryption certificate CertB of the security encryption equipment and a signature certificate CertA of an administrator A; administrator a uses the national cryptographic certificate to log in to the secure encryption device: after the administrator A and the security encryption equipment B establish SSL connection, the administrator A sends a request to log in the security encryption equipment B; the secure encryption device B generates a random number R B and sends an encryption certificate CertB of the secure encryption device B to the administrator A; after receiving the encryption certificate CertB, the administrator A encrypts TokenAB, namely RA|| sSA; after receiving the encrypted TokenAB, the security encryption equipment B executes decryption, signature verification and user name and password consistency comparison operation. The invention realizes that an administrator logs in the security encryption equipment by using the national encryption certificate through the standard browser, thereby realizing double-factor authentication and improving the security intensity of the administrator logging in the equipment by using the national encryption certificate.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to an administrator double-factor authentication method based on a national secret certificate.
Background
At the present time of cyber attack threat gain ground, to ensure security protection of its own network environment, a secure encryption device is one of the indispensable network devices. The security encryption device mainly acts as a protective barrier between the environment of the internal and external networks, so as to block the unsafe network factors of the computer, but the security encryption device is also an object of network attack.
Enterprises deploy secure encryption devices, and require full-time administrators to manage and configure the devices. The administrator logs into the secure encryption device, and in most cases authenticates using a username and password. The network attacker logs in the security encryption equipment through the password of the violent cracking administrator, and the tamper configuration is subjected to deeper damage. In order to enhance the security of the administrator authentication, a user name/password single authentication mode is not used any more, but a two-factor authentication mode is adopted. The two-factor authentication modes include certificate authentication, OTP token, short message authentication and the like.
An administrator logs in the security encryption equipment and adopts an HTTPS mode to encrypt and protect data by using an SSL protocol. The SSL protocol itself can perform certificate authentication, which is a way of two-factor authentication.
There are two ways of SSL certificate authentication: international certificate authentication and national secret certificate authentication. The international certificate authentication adopts an international protocol, and the authentication is completed by adopting an international algorithm in the SSL connection process. The national cipher certificate authentication adopts a national cipher protocol, and the SSL connection process adopts a set of standards of a national cipher algorithm (SM 1/SM2/SM3/SM 4).
The standard browser only supports SSL international protocol, supports SSL certificate authentication based on international certificates, does not support national-secret SSL protocol based on national-secret certificates, namely, the standard browser cannot support an administrator to log in the security encryption device by SSL double-factor authentication by using the national-secret certificates. The international certificate is usually RSA algorithm (2048 bits), the ECC algorithm is adopted at the current stage of the national encryption certificate, the ECC algorithm is issued by the national code administration in 2010 and is a public key cryptographic algorithm which is independently designed in China, the encryption strength of the international certificate is higher than that of the RSA algorithm (2048 bits) based on elliptic curve cryptography theory.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an administrator double-factor authentication method based on a national secret certificate, which realizes that an administrator logs in a security encryption device by using the national secret certificate through a standard browser, not only realizes double-factor authentication, but also improves the security intensity of the administrator logging in the device by using the national secret certificate.
The invention provides an administrator double-factor authentication method based on a national cryptographic certificate, which comprises the following steps:
Initializing equipment to generate a national encryption certificate, wherein the national encryption certificate comprises an encryption certificate CertB of the security encryption equipment and a signature certificate CertA of an administrator A;
The process of using the national cryptographic certificate to log in the security encryption device by the administrator A comprises the following steps:
Step 1, after an administrator A and a security encryption device B establish SSL connection, the administrator A sends a request to log in the security encryption device B;
Step 2, the secure encryption device B generates a random number R B and sends the encrypted certificate CertB of the secure encryption device B to the administrator a;
step 3, after receiving the encryption certificate CertB, the administrator a performs the following operations:
1) Generating a random number R A;
2) The manager A signs the random number R A, the random number R B, the user name and the password by using the manager signature certificate CertA to obtain sSA;
3) The administrator A encrypts TokenAB, namely RA sSA by using a public key in CertB encryption key pairs of the security encryption device B;
4) Sending the encrypted TokenAB to a secure encryption device B;
Step 4, after the secure encryption device B receives the encrypted TokenAB, the following operations are executed:
(1) The secure encryption equipment B decrypts TokenAB by using a private key of the encryption key pair to obtain RA| sSA;
(2) The security encryption equipment B signs and verifies the public key pair sSA by using the signing key of the administrator A stored in the equipment; successfully obtaining a random number R A, a random number R b, a user name and a password;
(3) The security encryption equipment B compares the obtained R A with the R A obtained in the signature verification, and simultaneously compares the R B generated by the security encryption equipment B with the R B obtained in the signature verification, if the R A is consistent with the R B obtained in the signature verification, the security encryption equipment B passes through the security encryption equipment, otherwise, the security encryption equipment B fails to report errors;
(4) The security encryption equipment B compares the user name and the password obtained in the signature verification with the user name and the password stored in the equipment in a consistency manner, if the user name and the password are consistent with the user name and the password, the login is successful, otherwise, the login is failed;
(5) The secure encryption apparatus B returns a login success/failure message to the administrator a.
Further, the method further comprises: after the login of the manager A is successful, the signature certificate of the manager is updated.
By means of the scheme, the administrator double-factor authentication method based on the national secret certificate has the following technical effects:
1) The manager uses the national secret certificate to carry out double-factor authentication and login to the security encryption equipment by relying on the international SSL protocol, the SSL connection still uses the international protocol, and the standard browser is supported to access the security encryption equipment by using the national secret certificate.
2) The administrator uses the national secret signature certificate, so that the integrity, counterfeiting prevention and non-repudiation of the authentication data of the administrator are ensured, the national secret signature certificate uses an ECC algorithm, and the encryption strength is higher than that of an RSA algorithm used by the international certificate.
The foregoing description is only an overview of the present invention, and is intended to provide a better understanding of the present invention, as it is embodied in the following description, with reference to the preferred embodiments of the present invention and the accompanying drawings.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of an administrator double factor authentication method based on a national cryptographic certificate of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following describes in further detail the embodiments of the present invention with reference to the drawings and examples. The following examples are illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a dual factor authentication method of an administrator based on a national cryptographic certificate,
Firstly, initializing equipment, namely generating a national encryption certificate, namely an encryption certificate CertB of a security encryption device and a signature certificate CertA of an administrator A, and the following flow of using the national encryption certificate to log in the security encryption device by the administrator A is as follows:
1. after the administrator a establishes SSL connection with the secure encryption device, the administrator a sends a request to log in the secure encryption device B.
2. The secure encryption device B generates a random number R B and sends the encrypted certificate CertB of the secure encryption device to the administrator a.
3. After receiving the information, the administrator a performs the following operations:
1) A random number R A is generated.
2) The administrator A signs the random number R A, the random number R B, the user name, the certificate CertA with the administrator,
Password, signature, and sSA.
3) Administrator a encrypts TokenAB, i.e., R A || sSA, with the public key of the CertB encryption key pair of secure encryption device B.
4) And sending the encrypted TokenAB to the secure encryption device B.
4. After the secure encryption apparatus B receives, the following operations are performed:
1) The secure encryption device B decrypts TokenAB with the private key of the encryption key pair to obtain R A | sSA.
2) The secure encryption device B signs the public key pair sSA with the administrator a's signing key stored in the device. The success will result in random number R A, random number R b, username, password.
3) The security encryption equipment B compares the obtained R A with the R A obtained in the signature verification, compares the R B generated by the security encryption equipment B with the R B obtained in the signature verification, and passes if the R A is consistent with the R B obtained in the signature verification, otherwise, fails to report errors.
4) And the security encryption equipment B compares the user name and the password obtained in the signature verification with the consistency stored in the equipment, if the user name and the password are consistent with the consistency stored in the equipment, the login is successful, and otherwise, the login is failed.
The secure encryption apparatus B returns a login success/failure message to the administrator a. After the login of the manager A is successful, the signature certificate of the manager can be updated.
The administrator double-factor authentication method based on the national secret certificate has the following technical effects:
1) The manager uses the national secret certificate to carry out double-factor authentication and login to the security encryption equipment by relying on the international SSL protocol, the SSL connection still uses the international protocol, and the standard browser is supported to access the security encryption equipment by using the national secret certificate.
2) The administrator uses the national secret signature certificate, so that the integrity, counterfeiting prevention and non-repudiation of the authentication data of the administrator are ensured, the national secret signature certificate uses an ECC algorithm, and the encryption strength is higher than that of an RSA algorithm used by the international certificate.
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, and it should be noted that it is possible for those skilled in the art to make several improvements and modifications without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (2)
1. The administrator double-factor authentication method based on the national cryptographic certificate is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
Initializing equipment to generate a national encryption certificate, wherein the national encryption certificate comprises an encryption certificate CertB of the security encryption equipment and a signature certificate CertA of an administrator A;
The process of using the national cryptographic certificate to log in the security encryption device by the administrator A comprises the following steps:
Step 1, after an administrator A and a security encryption device B establish SSL connection, the administrator A sends a request to log in the security encryption device B;
Step 2, the secure encryption device B generates a random number R B and sends the encrypted certificate CertB of the secure encryption device B to the administrator a;
step 3, after receiving the encryption certificate CertB, the administrator a performs the following operations:
1) Generating a random number R A;
2) The manager A signs the random number R A, the random number R B, the user name and the password by using the manager signature certificate CertA to obtain sSA;
3) The administrator A encrypts TokenAB, namely RA sSA by using a public key in CertB encryption key pairs of the security encryption device B;
4) Sending the encrypted TokenAB to a secure encryption device B;
Step 4, after the secure encryption device B receives the encrypted TokenAB, the following operations are executed:
(1) The secure encryption equipment B decrypts TokenAB by using a private key of the encryption key pair to obtain RA| sSA;
(2) The security encryption equipment B signs and verifies the public key pair sSA by using the signing key of the administrator A stored in the equipment; successfully obtaining a random number R A, a random number R b, a user name and a password;
(3) The security encryption equipment B compares the obtained R A with the R A obtained in the signature verification, and simultaneously compares the R B generated by the security encryption equipment B with the R B obtained in the signature verification, if the R A is consistent with the R B obtained in the signature verification, the security encryption equipment B passes through the security encryption equipment, otherwise, the security encryption equipment B fails to report errors;
(4) The security encryption equipment B compares the user name and the password obtained in the signature verification with the user name and the password stored in the equipment in a consistency manner, if the user name and the password are consistent with the user name and the password, the login is successful, otherwise, the login is failed;
(5) The secure encryption apparatus B returns a login success/failure message to the administrator a.
2. The national cryptographic certificate-based administrator two-factor authentication method of claim 1, further comprising: after the login of the manager A is successful, the signature certificate of the manager is updated.
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| CN202210223946.9A CN114615046B (en) | 2022-03-07 | 2022-03-07 | Administrator double-factor authentication method based on national secret certificate |
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| CN202210223946.9A CN114615046B (en) | 2022-03-07 | 2022-03-07 | Administrator double-factor authentication method based on national secret certificate |
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| CN114615046B true CN114615046B (en) | 2024-04-30 |
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