CN114095242B - Storage type hidden channel construction method based on Tor hidden service domain name state - Google Patents
Storage type hidden channel construction method based on Tor hidden service domain name state Download PDFInfo
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- 230000006854 communication Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 34
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- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 6
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- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000005206 flow analysis Methods 0.000 abstract description 4
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
- H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/50—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wire-line communication networks, e.g. low power modes or reduced link rate
Abstract
The invention provides a storage type hidden channel construction method based on a Tor hidden service domain name state, which comprises the following steps of initializing a hidden channel: the sender and the receiver perform channel initialization, including out-of-band channel construction and parameter negotiation, domain name list generation and directory server selection; remodulation algorithm: the sender modifies the accessible state of the hidden service domain name by uploading the hidden service descriptor, and the receiver traverses the corresponding directory server to determine the domain name state according to the parameters and the initialization configuration; and finally, optimizing the performance of the hidden channel through a coding and decoding algorithm with enhanced robustness. The invention utilizes the hidden service protocol mechanism of the Torr, realizes the hidden communication which does not depend on the flow characteristics through the data carrier in the domain name state, avoids the attack of a flow analysis detection method while providing anonymity assurance, and improves the hidden channel concealment.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a storage type hidden channel construction method based on a Tor hidden service domain name state, belonging to the technical fields of network hidden channels (Network Covert Channel) and anonymous networks (Anonymity Network).
Background
The wide application of the internet makes network space security particularly important, and some special government departments put higher demands on data security in network communication. Communication behavior hiding (also called covert communication) is a technical means for hiding the actual communication behavior of a user from other communication processes so as to protect the communication behavior from being discovered. As a typical application of covert communication in the network field, the security of the network covert channel is widely paid attention to in the network communication field, and the basic model of the network covert channel can be expressed by a prison model proposed by Simmons. However, the prison model belongs to a single-to-single communication mode, and once the concealment is destroyed, an attacker can easily acquire address information of both communication parties of the concealed channel through the exposed channel. Therefore, the conventional network hidden channel has the problem of anonymity loss. Meanwhile, with research and development of network hidden channel technology, attack means for network hidden channels are continuously emerging, wherein flow detection is a universal and effective way, and the method detects the existence of hidden channel carrier characteristics through means such as flow analysis and the like so as to destroy hidden channel concealment, so that the concealment of the traditional network hidden channels is challenged.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to: aiming at the problems of anonymity hidden danger of a hidden channel of a traditional network and flow analysis attack facing, the invention provides a storage type hidden channel construction method based on a Tor hidden service domain name state.
The technical scheme is as follows: the method for solving the technical problems is realized by the following technical scheme:
the invention relates to a storage type hidden channel construction method based on a Tor hidden service domain name state, which comprises the following steps:
(1) Hidden channel initialization: the sender and the receiver perform channel initialization, including out-of-band channel construction and parameter negotiation, domain name list generation and directory server selection;
(2) Modulation and demodulation algorithm: the sender modifies the accessible state of the hidden service domain name by uploading the hidden service descriptor, and the receiver traverses the corresponding directory server to determine the domain name state according to the parameters and the initialization configuration;
(3) Coding and decoding scheme: the performance of the hidden channel is optimized by a robust codec algorithm.
Further, the step (1) specifically includes:
(11) Out-of-band channel construction and parameter negotiation: the sender and the receiver construct an anonymous link through the Torr. The sender of the link transmits the time period T, the number N of directory servers used in the unit period and the number N of end bits e Sender initial transmission time T 0 Sending the parameters to a receiver, wherein each parameter is 4 bytes, and initializing the parameters by the receiver;
(12) Domain name list generation: according to the initial transmission time T of the sender 0 And cycle number i, a domain name list is generated using the following method: first, a seed string list is generated in which the sender and receiver strings are identical, each of which is a 22-byte random string and a 10-byte time stamp (T 0 +i×t); then, using the Torr domain name generation method to generate a domain name list from the seed character string table;
(13) Directory server selection: the method comprises the steps that a network consensus file exists in the Torr network, a sender and a receiver ensure that the consensus file is the same through modifying a consensus file acquisition rule and calibrating local time, and then the sender and the receiver generate a directory server list for hidden communication and cache by using a Torr built-in binary selection algorithm according to a Torr network complete hidden service directory server list in the consensus file and the number N of directory servers used in a unit period in parameters.
Further, the step (2) specifically includes:
(21) The sender according to the start time T 0 Uploading hidden service descriptors according to the sequence order of the directory server in the time period T, if the data bit is '1', the sender sends the descriptors to the directory server, otherwise, silence is kept;
(22) The receiving side according to the starting time T 0 Requesting descriptors of the corresponding domain names according to the sequence order of the directory server in a time period T;
(23) The receiving party successfully acquires the marking data bit '1', the marking data bit '0' is failed to acquire, and the marking data bit is the failed bit 'x' when the acquiring time is overtime;
(24) Repeating (21) to (23) the process using the time period, the synchronized directory server sequence and the domain name list, and the receiving ends when the receiving side continuously receives N '0's or 'x's.
Further, the step (3) specifically includes:
(31) Because the modulation and demodulation scheme of the hidden channel is carried out based on the bit data, the normal communication data is required to be converted into the bit data through Unicode coding;
(32) Because of the error code problem caused by the uploading failure of the sender and the receiving failure problem of the receiving overtime in the process of the hidden communication, the bit data is subjected to data coding through the Hamming error correction code so as to improve the robustness.
The beneficial effects are that: compared with the prior art, the invention has the remarkable advantages that:
1. with the increasing of network hidden channel detection work, the hidden channel single-to-single communication mode of the traditional network has the hidden danger of anonymity defect, and the anonymity of the hidden communication can be effectively improved by constructing the network hidden channel based on the anonymous communication network.
2. The scheme design of the third party component based on the hidden service directory server provides a brand new hidden channel design thought, and the thought does not depend on flow characteristics, so that the traditional hidden channel attack scheme based on flow analysis is invalid, and the concealment of the hidden communication is improved.
3. The anonymous network is combined with the covert communication, so that the security level of the data communication is further improved. The invention adds an anonymity mechanism on the basis of the hidden communication, and provides a data communication solution with higher security level for the communication scene with high security requirement.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a storage type hidden channel based on a hidden service domain name status according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is an illustration of an example of a modem algorithm of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention provides a method for constructing a storage type hidden channel based on a Tor hidden service domain name state, which provides a high-data security hidden communication scheme. The technology is divided into three parts, namely hidden channel initialization, a modulation-demodulation algorithm and a coding-decoding scheme. The completion process is shown in fig. 1, and specifically comprises the following steps:
1. hidden channel initialization
The hidden channel initialization comprises three steps of out-of-band channel construction, parameter negotiation, domain name list generation and directory server selection.
Out-of-band channel construction and parameter negotiation: as shown in fig. 1, the sender is connected with the receiverThe recipient builds a directly connected out-of-band channel based on the anonymous network. The sender uses the out-of-band channel to make the time period T, the number N of directory servers used in unit period and the number N of end bits e Sender initial transmission time T 0 Organizing into a data packet with the size of 16 bytes, wherein each parameter occupies 4 bytes; and the receiver receives the data packet and analyzes the protocol parameters to complete protocol parameter negotiation of the covert communication.
Domain name list generation: according to the Tor hidden service mechanism, the hidden service domain name is generated by a public key in a public-private key pair generated by a 32-byte random character string, so that a sender and a receiver can synchronously generate the domain name by generating the same 32-byte character string through a specific rule, the data volume of a public channel is reduced, and the concealment is improved. The design herein is based on the start time T 0 And a string list seeds (T 0 The construction rule of i) is as follows:
(1) From T 0 The generated 22-byte random string RNG (T 0 ) Constitute seeds (T) 0 I) the first 22 bytes, the random string is computed synchronously by the sender and the receiver and remains the same;
(2) String () is defined as a timestamp-to-String method. By String (T) 0 +i.times.T) constitute seeds (T) 0 I) the last 10 bytes.
By the above rule, the sender and the receiver synchronously construct and hold the same string table seeds (T 0 I), further calculating and generating the same hidden service domain name address list ons]A domain name representing the i-th period.
Directory server selection: the Tor network has network consensus files, and the Tor nodes can acquire the consensus files periodically to synchronize the Tor network information such as network bandwidth, directory server list and the like. The time information of the sender and the receiver is calibrated to ensure that the version of the two-party consensus file is the same. routerstatus_list is a Tor network complete directory server information list in the Tor network consensus file. The directory server list dirs for covert communication is generated herein using a Tor built-in binary selection method based on the list and the number of directory servers N used in a unit period in the parameters.
3. Modulation-demodulation algorithm
The hidden service descriptor is generated by the hidden service, and includes introduction node information, authentication client information, and the like of the hidden service. The hidden service descriptor is stored in the directory server and has a certain life cycle. Before the client connects with the hidden service, the hidden service descriptor is acquired through the domain name, so that the accessible state of the domain name can be determined according to the existence of the descriptor.
The sender server uploads the descriptor on a certain directory server, and the receiver client can acquire corresponding information from the corresponding directory server; if the sender remains silent, the receiver's acquisition operation at the corresponding directory server will fail. Therefore, different behaviors of the sender can be perceived by the receiver, namely, the sender can change the accessible state of the corresponding domain name through uploading the descriptor and take the accessible state as a data carrier of a hidden channel to realize the transmission of the hidden data. According to the characteristics, the invention designs a modulation-demodulation algorithm of a storage type hidden channel based on the state of the hidden service domain name, which comprises the following steps:
hidden channel initial environment is available from out-of-band channel construction and hidden channel initialization: starting time T 0 The time is divided into equal time intervals I according to a period T i The list of the directory servers used for hidden communication is dirs, the list length is N, and the list of the hidden service addresses is ons. The algorithm comprises two parts of sender data modulation and receiver data demodulation.
Sender data modulation: when entering interval I i At this time, the sender reads N bits of data to be sent (N 1 ,n 2 ,…,n j ,…,n N ). When the ith N+j data bit is '1', the transmitting end is at I i By combining ons [ i ]]Uploading corresponding descriptors to dirs [ j ]]The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the When '0', the sender remains silent. The specific algorithm flow is as follows:
and (3) demodulating the data of a receiving party: after a certain delay, the receiverAt interval I i Concurrent to dirs [ j ]]Request ons [ i ]]To read N bits of data (N 1 ,n 2 ,…,n j ,…,n N ). Successfully obtaining the descriptor, wherein the ith N+j bit data bit is '1'; if the acquisition fails, the ith N+j bit data bit '0'; the timeout in the period is marked 'x', which represents the failure of the bit to receive. The communication ends when N '0' or 'x' are received consecutively. Removing the last N e And outputting the secret data after 0 or x bits. The specific algorithm flow is as follows:
for example, the bit data of 1101011 is transmitted in a hidden manner, T is 1s, N is 3, and N e For 2, the sender and the receiver generate descriptor lists [ dir1, dir2, dir 3] with the size of 3 through pre-initialization]The domain name list is ons.
As shown in fig. 2, since N takes a value of 3, the amount of data transmitted per domain name is 3 bits. The data corresponding to the ons [0] is 110, and the sender concurrently uploads descriptors to dir1 and dir2 within 1 s; the data corresponding to the ons [1] is '101', and the sender concurrently uploads descriptors to dir1 and dir3 within 1s time; the data corresponding to ons [2] is "1", and the sender concurrently uploads the descriptor to dir1 within 1 s.
After the receiver delays sigma, concurrently traversing the domain name states of ons [0] in the descriptor list within 1s, wherein dir1 and dir2 can be accessed, and data '110' is recorded; concurrently traversing the domain name states of ons [1] in the descriptor list within 1s, wherein dir1 and dir3 are accessible, and recording data '101'; concurrently traversing the domain name state of ons [2] in the descriptor list within 1s, wherein dir1 can be accessed, and recording data of 100; and (3) concurrently traversing the domain name state of ons [3] in the descriptor list within 1s, wherein no domain name is accessible, recording data "000", wherein the number of last data bits of 0' is more than N, and the last data bits of 0' are end marks, so that the covert communication is ended, and the covert data "1101011" is output after the last 2 last data bits of 0' in the record are removed. If the time-out is 1s in the inquiry process, the corresponding bit is marked as a failure bit 'x'.
Because the descriptor has a survival period, the sender only needs to upload the descriptor before the receiver inquires the domain name accessible state, and strict period synchronization is not needed for the sender and the receiver.
4. Coding and decoding scheme
Because the modulation and demodulation scheme of the hidden channel is carried out based on the bit data, the normal communication data is required to be converted into the bit data through Unicode coding; meanwhile, the error code problem caused by the uploading failure of the sender and the receiving failure problem caused by the overtime acquisition of the receiver exist in the process of the hidden communication, so that the bit data is subjected to data coding through the Hamming error correction code to improve the robustness.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical solution of the present application and not for limiting the scope of protection thereof, although the present application is described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, it should be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: various changes, modifications, or equivalents may be made to the particular embodiments of the application by those skilled in the art after reading the present application, but such changes, modifications, or equivalents are within the scope of the claims appended hereto.
Claims (2)
1. A method for constructing a storage type hidden channel based on a Tor hidden service domain name state is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) Hidden channel initialization: the sender and the receiver perform channel initialization, including out-of-band channel construction and parameter negotiation, domain name list generation and directory server selection;
(2) Modulation and demodulation algorithm: the sender modifies the accessible state of the hidden service domain name by uploading the hidden service descriptor, and the receiver traverses the corresponding directory server to determine the domain name state according to the parameters and the initialization configuration;
(3) Coding and decoding scheme: optimizing the performance of the hidden channel by a robust enhanced codec algorithm;
the step (1) specifically comprises the following steps:
(11) Out-of-band channel construction and parameter negotiation: the sender and the receiver construct an anonymous link by Torr, and the sender uses the directory server number N and the end bit number N in the time period T and the unit period through the link e Sender initial transmission time T 0 Sending the parameters to a receiver, wherein each parameter is 4 bytes, and initializing the parameters by the receiver;
(12) Domain name list generation: according to the initial transmission time T of the sender 0 And cycle number i, a domain name list is generated using the following method: first, a seed string list is generated in which the sender and receiver strings are identical, each of which is a 22-byte random string and a 10-byte time stamp (T 0 +i×t); then, using the Torr domain name generation method to generate a domain name list from the seed character string table;
(13) Directory server selection: the method comprises the steps that a network consensus file exists in a Torr network, a sender and a receiver ensure that the consensus file is the same by modifying a consensus file acquisition rule and calibrating local time, and then the sender and the receiver generate a directory server list for hidden communication and cache the directory server list by using a Torr built-in binary selection algorithm according to a Torr network complete hidden service directory server list in the consensus file and the number N of directory servers used in a unit period in parameters;
the step (2) specifically comprises:
(21) The sender according to the start time T 0 Uploading hidden service descriptors according to the sequence order of the directory server in the time period T, if the data bit is '1', the sender sends the descriptors to the directory server, otherwise, silence is kept;
(22) The receiving side according to the starting time T 0 Requesting descriptors of the corresponding domain names according to the sequence order of the directory server in a time period T;
(23) The receiving party successfully acquires the marking data bit '1', the marking data bit '0' is failed to acquire, and the marking data bit is the failed bit 'x' when the acquiring time is overtime;
(24) Repeating (21) to (23) the process using the time period, the synchronized directory server sequence and the domain name list, and the receiving ends when the receiving side continuously receives N '0's or 'x's.
2. The method for constructing a storage type hidden channel based on the state of a Tor hidden service domain name according to claim 1, wherein the step (3) specifically comprises:
(31) Because the modulation and demodulation scheme of the hidden channel is carried out based on the bit data, the normal communication data is required to be converted into the bit data through Unicode coding;
(32) Because of the error code problem caused by the uploading failure of the sender and the receiving failure problem of the receiving overtime in the process of the hidden communication, the bit data is subjected to data coding through the Hamming error correction code so as to improve the robustness.
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| US20210352053A1 (en) * | 2020-05-11 | 2021-11-11 | Northeastern University | Private 5G Cellular Connectivity as a Service Through Full-Stack Wireless Steganography |
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| CN110392050A (en) * | 2019-07-18 | 2019-10-29 | 北京理工大学 | A kind of construction method of the Use of Covert Storage Channels based on timestamp |
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