CN113259092A - Document distributed encryption system - Google Patents

Document distributed encryption system Download PDF

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Publication number
CN113259092A
CN113259092A CN202110364159.1A CN202110364159A CN113259092A CN 113259092 A CN113259092 A CN 113259092A CN 202110364159 A CN202110364159 A CN 202110364159A CN 113259092 A CN113259092 A CN 113259092A
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CN
China
Prior art keywords
storage area
document
information
main storage
key
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Pending
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CN202110364159.1A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
不公告发明人
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Yu Shaoxiang
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Yu Shaoxiang
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Publication date
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Priority to CN202110364159.1A priority Critical patent/CN113259092A/en
Publication of CN113259092A publication Critical patent/CN113259092A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/06—Protocols specially adapted for file transfer, e.g. file transfer protocol [FTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage

Abstract

The invention discloses a document distributed encryption system which comprises a plurality of servers, wherein the servers communicate with each other and comprise temporary storage areas and main storage areas. Since the decryption key is generated from the encryption key by an asymmetric algorithm provided in advance in the main storage area, even if a hacker obtains the encryption key by analysis, the hacker cannot obtain the decryption key without intruding into the main storage area of another server that has received the encrypted information. And the other servers receive the encrypted information and store the encrypted information in the temporary storage area, and cut off a transmission channel between the temporary storage area and the main storage area. The encryption information stored in the temporary storage area may carry viruses, and after the transmission channel is cut off, the viruses can be effectively prevented from invading the main storage area of the server, and the possibility that hackers acquire decryption keys is eliminated.

Description

Document distributed encryption system
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of file encryption management, in particular to a document distributed encryption system.
Background
At present, in an operating system of a smart mobile device (such as a smart phone and a smart tablet), "Private Cloud" (Private Cloud), Public Cloud (Public Cloud), a Cloud system of a Hybrid Cloud (Hybrid Cloud), a GPS positioning system, a baseband OS system of a mobile phone and a SIM card OS system, an RFID, a Wireless Sensor Network (Wireless Sensor Network), a wired Router (Router) and a Wireless Router (Wireless Router), a Software Defined Network (SDN), a system on chip (SoC), an Enterprise Digital Rights Management (Enterprise Digital Rights Management), video compression, power line Network transmission, a Network phone, etc., there is a possibility that a hacker may steal document information, which may cause personal information leakage such as call records, message records, download data, photos, images, and collected positioning data.
Therefore, solving the problem of document information security caused by hacker malicious intrusion in the digital age is an important issue to be faced in the present and future information security.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a document distributed encryption system which can quickly encrypt and transfer a document after finding hacker invasion, can effectively prevent invading viruses from stealing the transferred document and accepting the original document of a transferred storage area, and can effectively prevent document information from being leaked.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that: a document distributed encryption system comprises a plurality of servers, wherein different servers communicate with each other, each server comprises a temporary storage area and a main storage area, each main storage area is used for storing document information, a transmission channel is arranged between each temporary storage area and each main storage area, the transmission channels can be switched on and off, and each server further comprises a document security protection strategy, wherein each document security protection strategy comprises a key generation step and a document protection step;
the key generation step, namely acquiring the characteristic information of the server, generating an encryption key according to the characteristic information, sending the encryption key to other servers, generating a decryption key according to the encryption key by adopting a preset asymmetric algorithm by the other servers, and storing the decryption key in a main storage area, wherein the decryption algorithm is also stored in the main storage area;
and in the document protection step, when a server detects a hacked signal, the operation of the key generation step is stopped, the document information in the main storage area is encrypted by adopting the encryption key and a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted information, the encrypted information is sent to other servers, then the data in the main storage area is cleared, the other servers receive the encrypted information and store the encrypted information in the temporary storage area, a transmission channel between the temporary storage area and the main storage area is cut off, and the decryption key and the decryption algorithm are used for decrypting the encrypted information.
Preferably, the key generation step is repeatedly executed according to a certain rule, the newly generated encryption key replaces the original encryption key, and the newly generated decryption key replaces the original decryption key.
Preferably, a start signal is generated when the document in the main storage area is updated, the start signal triggering the key generation step to operate.
Preferably, in the key generation step, the characteristic information includes an update time of a document in the main storage area and a factory code of the server.
Preferably, in the document protection step, the document in the main storage area is divided into a plurality of parts, the parts are encrypted respectively to obtain a plurality of pieces of encrypted information, and different pieces of encrypted information are sent to different servers.
Preferably, in the document protection step, the document in the main storage area is divided into a plurality of parts and encrypted respectively to obtain a plurality of parts of encrypted information, and the encrypted information is copied and randomly sent to different servers.
Preferably, in the document protection step, the temporary storage area and the main storage area are restored only by manual restoration after a transmission channel between the temporary storage area and the main storage area is cut off.
Preferably, in the document protection step, after the document information in the main storage area is encrypted by using the encryption key and a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted information, the encryption key is deleted.
Preferably, the temporary storage area includes an information receiving module and an information sending module, and in the document protection step, after the information receiving module receives the encrypted information sent by another server, the information sending module stops operating.
Preferably, a timer is arranged in the temporary storage area, a reset algorithm is adopted to reset the time of the timer at set time intervals, and in the document protection step, if the timer cannot be reset at the set time intervals, the information sending module stops running.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: since the decryption key is generated from the encryption key by an asymmetric algorithm provided in advance in the main storage area, even if a hacker obtains the encryption key by analysis, the hacker cannot obtain the decryption key without intruding into the main storage area of another server that has received the encrypted information. And after the encrypted information is sent to other servers, the data in the main storage area is cleared, and a hacker can timely grab the opportunity of obtaining the encrypted information. And the other servers receive the encrypted information and store the encrypted information in the temporary storage area, and cut off a transmission channel between the temporary storage area and the main storage area. The encryption information stored in the temporary storage area may carry viruses, and after the transmission channel is cut off, the viruses can be effectively prevented from invading the main storage area of the server, and the possibility that hackers acquire decryption keys is eliminated.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a plurality of server communications;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of server storage area distribution;
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of a document security protection policy.
The reference numerals are explained below: 100. a server; 110. a document security protection policy; 111. a key generation step; 112. a document protection step; 120. a temporary storage area; 130. a main storage area.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
Example 1:
as shown in fig. 1, a document distributed encryption system includes a plurality of servers 100, and different servers 100 communicate with each other, and as shown in fig. 2, the server 100 includes a temporary storage area 120 and a main storage area 130, and the main storage area 130 is used for storing document information. The temporary storage area 120 is used to store encrypted information received from other servers 100. A transmission channel is arranged between the temporary storage area 120 and the main storage area 130, and the transmission channel can be switched on and off. Under normal circumstances, the data in the temporary storage area 120 may be transferred to the main storage area 130, thereby ensuring that the temporary storage area 120 has sufficient space for receiving information from other servers 100. When a hacker is found, the transmission channel is cut off to prevent information which can be provided with viruses in the temporary storage area 120 from being transmitted to the main storage area 130, so that the documents in the main storage area 130 are prevented from being polluted.
As shown in fig. 3, the server 100 further includes a document security protection policy 110, where the document security protection policy 110 includes a key generation step 111 and a document protection step 112;
the key generation step 111 obtains the feature information of the server 100, and generates an encryption key based on the feature information. Since the feature information is unique to the server 100, a hacker cannot easily obtain the feature information from other ways, and the generation of the encryption key from the feature information of the server 100 can reduce the possibility that the hacker can obtain the corresponding information. Sending the encryption key to other servers 100, generating a decryption key by the other servers 100 according to the encryption key by adopting a preset asymmetric algorithm, and storing the decryption key in the main storage area 130, wherein the main storage area 130 also stores a decryption algorithm; since the decryption key is generated from the encryption key by an asymmetric algorithm provided in advance in the main storage area 130, even if a hacker obtains the encryption key by analysis, the hacker cannot obtain the decryption key without intruding into the main storage area 130 of another server 100 that has received the encrypted information.
The document protection step 112 stops the operation of the key generation step 111 when the server 100 detects a hacked signal, and timely blocks a path that a virus may enter the primary storage area 130 of another server 100. The document information in the main storage area 130 is encrypted by using the encryption key and a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted information, and a hacker cannot decrypt the encrypted information without a corresponding decryption key and a corresponding decryption algorithm, so that the corresponding information cannot be obtained even if the encrypted information is copied. After the encrypted information is sent to other servers 100, the data in the primary storage area 130 is cleared, and hackers can be captured in time to obtain the encrypted information. The other server 100 receives the encrypted information and stores it in the temporary storage area 120, and cuts off the transmission channel between the temporary storage area 120 and the main storage area 130, and the decryption key and the decryption algorithm are used to decrypt the encrypted information. The encrypted information stored in the temporary storage area 120 may carry viruses, and after the transmission channel is cut off, the viruses can be effectively prevented from invading the main storage area 130 of the server 100, and hackers are prevented from acquiring the decryption key.
As another example, the key generation step 111 is repeated according to a certain rule, the newly generated encryption key replaces the original encryption key, and the newly generated decryption key replaces the original decryption key. Timely updating of the encryption key and decryption key can further reduce the possibility of hacking and stealing documents.
As another example, a start signal is generated when a document in the main storage area 130 is updated, which triggers the key generation step 111 to run. Since the document update time in the main storage area 130 is uncertain, the key generation step 111 is performed according to the update of the document, and the security of the document can be further improved.
As another example, in the key generating step 111, the characteristic information includes an update time of a document in the main storage area 130 and a factory code of the server 100. The update time of the document in the main storage area 130 has uncertainty and is information that is characteristic of the server 100, and there is no correlation between the factory code of the server 100 and the update time, so a hacker will not consider both of them.
As another example, in the document protection step 112, the document in the main storage area 130 is divided into several parts and encrypted to obtain several pieces of encrypted information, and different pieces of encrypted information are sent to different servers 100. The documents are stored in a distributed mode, and the risk that the documents are all leaked can be effectively reduced.
As another example, in the document protection step 112, the document in the main storage area 130 is divided into several parts and encrypted to obtain several pieces of encrypted information, and the encrypted information is copied and randomly sent to different servers 100. The encrypted information part may be lost due to poor channel stability and other reasons in the transmission process, and the possibility of document loss can be effectively reduced through transmission after backup.
As another example, in the document protection step 112, after the transmission channel between the temporary storage area 120 and the main storage area 130 is cut off, the restoration can be performed only by manual operation. The hacker hacking can cut off the channel of the hacker hacking main memory area 130 completely to ensure the security of the document.
As another example, in the document protection step 112, after the document information in the main storage area 130 is encrypted by using the encryption key and a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted information, the encryption key is deleted.
As another example, the temporary storage area 120 includes an information receiving module and an information sending module, in the document protection step 112, after the information receiving module receives the encrypted information sent by another server 100, the information sending module stops operating, and after receiving the encrypted information, a channel for information leakage is cut off in time, so as to ensure the security of the document.
Preferably, a timer is disposed in the temporary storage area 120, the time of the timer is reset at set time intervals by using a reset algorithm, and in the document protection step 112, if the timer is not reset at the set time intervals, the information sending module stops operating. Another program is arranged in the temporary storage area 120 to detect the hacking behavior, so that a channel for information leakage is cut off in time, and the security of the document is ensured.
While one embodiment of the present invention has been described in detail, the description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and should not be taken as limiting the scope of the invention. All equivalent changes and modifications made within the scope of the present invention shall fall within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (7)

1. A document distributed encryption system comprises a plurality of servers (100), and communication among different servers (100) is realized.
2. The document distributed encryption system according to claim 2, wherein the server (100) comprises a temporary storage area (120) and a main storage area (130), the main storage area (130) is used for storing document information, a transmission channel is arranged between the temporary storage area (120) and the main storage area (130), the transmission channel can be switched on and off, the server (100) further comprises a document security protection policy (110), and the document security protection policy (110) comprises a key generation step (111) and a document protection step (112);
the key generation step (111) is used for obtaining the characteristic information of the server (100), generating an encryption key according to the characteristic information, and sending the encryption key to other servers (100), wherein other servers (100) adopt a preset asymmetric algorithm to generate a decryption key according to the encryption key, and store the decryption key in a main storage area (130), and the main storage area (130) also stores a decryption algorithm;
the file protection step (112) is that when the server (100) detects a hacked signal, the operation of the key generation step (111) is stopped, the file information in the main storage area (130) is encrypted by adopting the encryption key and a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted information, the encrypted information is sent to other servers (100) and then data in the main storage area (130) is cleared, the other servers (100) receive the encrypted information and store the encrypted information in the temporary storage area (120), a transmission channel between the temporary storage area (120) and the main storage area (130) is cut off, and the decryption key and the decryption algorithm are used for decrypting the encrypted information; the key generation step (111) is repeatedly executed according to a certain rule, the newly generated encryption key replaces the original encryption key, and the newly generated decryption key replaces the original decryption key; generating a start signal when the document in the main storage area (130) is updated, wherein the start signal triggers the key generation step (111) to operate; in the key generating step (111), the characteristic information includes an update time of a document in a main storage area (130) and a factory code of the server (100); in the document protection step (112), the document in the main storage area (130) is divided into a plurality of parts and encrypted respectively to obtain a plurality of encrypted information, and different encrypted information is sent to different servers (100).
3. The distributed document encryption system according to claim 2, wherein in the document protection step (112), the document in the primary storage area (130) is divided into several parts and encrypted to obtain several encrypted information, and the encrypted information is copied and randomly sent to different servers (100).
4. A document distributed encryption system according to claim 2, wherein in the document protection step (112), the transmission channel between the temporary storage area (120) and the main storage area (130) is cut off, and then the document can be recovered only by manual operation.
5. The distributed document encryption system according to claim 2, wherein in the document protection step (112), after the document information in the main storage area (130) is encrypted by using the encryption key and a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted information, the encryption key is deleted.
6. The distributed document encryption system according to claim 2, wherein the temporary storage area (120) includes an information receiving module and an information sending module, and in the document protection step (112), the information receiving module receives the encrypted information sent by the other server (100), and the information sending module stops operating.
7. The distributed document encryption system according to claim 6, wherein a timer is disposed in the temporary storage area (120), a reset algorithm is used to reset the time of the timer at set time intervals, and in the document protection step (112), if the timer fails to be reset at the set time intervals, the information sending module stops running.
CN202110364159.1A 2021-04-04 2021-04-04 Document distributed encryption system Pending CN113259092A (en)

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