CN112953710A - Wireless/wired hybrid QKD network based on trusted relay - Google Patents
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0855—Quantum cryptography involving additional nodes, e.g. quantum relays, repeaters, intermediate nodes or remote nodes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/80—Optical aspects relating to the use of optical transmission for specific applications, not provided for in groups H04B10/03 - H04B10/70, e.g. optical power feeding or optical transmission through water
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/80—Optical aspects relating to the use of optical transmission for specific applications, not provided for in groups H04B10/03 - H04B10/70, e.g. optical power feeding or optical transmission through water
- H04B10/85—Protection from unauthorised access, e.g. eavesdrop protection
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
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Abstract
The invention provides a wireless/wired hybrid QKD network based on a trusted relay, which belongs to the technical field of quantum communication.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of quantum communication, relates to a wireless/wired hybrid QKD network, and particularly relates to a wireless/wired hybrid QKD network based on a trusted relay, which can be used for realizing quantum key distribution and application of an underwater vehicle terminal and an onshore terminal.
Background
The security of the key in the classical cryptography is established on the basis of the computational complexity, and along with the development of quantum computing, the security of the classical key is greatly challenged. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is established on the basis of Quantum mechanics, has the security characteristic that the Quantum Key Distribution cannot be eavesdropped from a channel but cannot be discovered, and can realize unconditional security of communication based on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Key Distribution of a one-time pad encryption system. The first Quantum Key Distribution protocol was proposed by c.h. bennett and g.brassard in 1984, called BB84 protocol, and then B92 protocol, decoy state protocol, measuring Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution protocol (MDI-QKD), two-field protocol, etc., a series of Quantum Key Distribution protocols were proposed, the performance was continuously improved, and the development from laboratory experiments to the actual application deployment stage has been advanced.
The quantum key distribution network expands the point-to-point quantum key distribution technology into end-to-end and multi-user secure key distribution. Experiments of quantum key distribution networks are carried out internationally and domestically, wherein the first quantum key distribution network in the world is researched and established by the united states department of Defense Advanced Research Program Administration (DARPA), the SECoQC quantum key distribution network is established in Europe, and the Tokyo high-speed quantum key distribution network is also established in Japan. The quantum key distribution network is mainly built by an optical QKD network based on optical connection, a QKD network based on quantum relay and a QKD network based on a trusted relay. Optical connections can only be used for small QKD networks, and cannot extend QKD distances significantly; quantum repeaters can greatly extend the distribution distance of quantum keys based on quantum entanglement exchange and entanglement purification, but because the realization difficulty and efficiency of the quantum repeaters cannot be practical, the quantum repeaters mostly adopt credible repeaters at present. The trusted repeater comprises a plurality of quantum key distribution devices, and can negotiate keys with different quantum key distribution devices respectively to establish link keys, so that the communication key of one device can be encrypted and transmitted to the trusted repeater through the link key, and then encrypted and transmitted to the next quantum key distribution device through another link key after decryption, thereby realizing principle transmission of the communication key. A communication key is said to be trusted repeater because it must be trusted because it is restored to plaintext at the repeater. In order to expand the key use distance, the DARPA, SECoQC, Tokyo high-speed quantum key distribution network and the quantum key distribution network established in China all adopt a trusted relay means.
In the SECoQC network, a quantum key distribution network is divided into four layers according to a TCP/IP architecture: the quantum key distribution system comprises a quantum key distribution link layer, a quantum key distribution network layer, a quantum key distribution transmission layer and a quantum key distribution application layer. The disadvantage of this architecture is that, because the state of the quantum key network changes rapidly, once the amount of keys of a certain link in the relay transmission path is insufficient or a failure occurs, the key resources of other links upstream of the link are gradually consumed and key concatenation is insufficient.
In the tokyo network, the quantum key network is functionally divided into three layers: quantum layer, key management layer, application layer. The quantum layer is composed of a point-to-point quantum key distribution system and is responsible for generating link key resources for adjacent nodes; the key management layer adopts a KM Server to perform centralized management on all keys, and comprises a plurality of important functions of key resource storage, key generation management of a link, key full-life cycle management, relay transmission path management, key distribution to an application system and the like; the application layer is mainly responsible for realizing information encryption transmission of both communication parties. However, the tokyo network is completely built on the land, only a wired quantum channel and a single type of trusted relay node are adopted, and a wireless terminal cannot use the network to distribute keys and cannot meet the requirements of quantum key distribution of an underwater vehicle terminal and an onshore terminal.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects in the prior art, provides a wireless/wired hybrid QKD network based on a trusted relay, and aims to meet the requirements of quantum key distribution of underwater vehicle terminals and onshore terminals.
The idea for realizing the purpose of the invention is as follows: the method comprises the steps of establishing a quantum key distribution network with a quantum layer, a key management layer and an application layer, setting different types of quantum key distribution credible relay nodes through the quantum layer, selecting a communication link for carrying out quantum key distribution between an underwater vehicle and onshore communication equipment through the key management layer, and encrypting secret information through a key by the application layer to realize quantum key distribution and application.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts a technical solution including a quantum layer, a key management layer, and an application layer, wherein:
the quantum layer comprises a plurality of QKD trusted relay nodes, at least one QKD sending terminal, and at least one QKD receiving terminal; the plurality of QKD trusted relay nodes comprise at least one underwater wireless QKD trusted relay node provided with an optical antenna, at least one underwater QKD trusted relay node and at least one onshore QKD trusted relay node; when the QKD sending terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal, the QKD receiving terminal can adopt an underwater vehicle QKD terminal or a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal provided with an optical antenna; when the QKD sending terminal adopts an underwater vehicle QKD terminal or a wireless type underwater vehicle QKD terminal provided with an optical antenna, the QKD receiving terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal.
A BB84 protocol or an MDI-QKD protocol is adopted to negotiate among the QKD trusted relay nodes to generate a key; the underwater wireless QKD trusted relay node adopts BB84 protocol to negotiate with a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal to generate a key; the underwater QKD trusted relay node adopts a BB84 protocol to negotiate with an underwater vehicle QKD terminal to generate a key; the shore QKD trusted relay node adopts BB84 protocol to negotiate with the shore QKD terminal to generate a key;
the key management layer is used for selecting an optimal link matched with the types of the QKD sending terminal and the QKD receiving terminal, managing the storage of key resources and managing the generation of a link key;
and the application layer is used for generating quantum key requirements and encrypting the secret information by using the key.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
first, as different types of trusted relay nodes are adopted in the quantum layer, the QKD sending terminal and the QKD receiving terminal can adopt wireless and wired underwater vehicle QKD terminals and onshore QKD terminals, thereby meeting the quantum key distribution application and application requirements of the underwater vehicle and onshore equipment and having stronger applicability.
Secondly, because the invention adopts wireless and wired quantum transmission channels, the number of the supporting nodes is increased on the basis of at least three, the compatibility and the expandability of the network are improved, and the invention can be expanded and applied according to the change of the requirements.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic view of the overall structure of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart of the process of quantum key distribution and application of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the figures and specific examples.
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention includes a quantum layer, a key management layer, and an application layer.
A quantum layer in the network includes a plurality of QKD trusted relay nodes, at least one QKD sending terminal, and at least one QKD receiving terminal; the plurality of QKD trusted relay nodes comprise at least one underwater wireless QKD trusted relay node provided with an optical antenna, at least one underwater QKD trusted relay node and at least one onshore QKD trusted relay node. The number of the QKD trusted relay nodes is more than or equal to three, three QKD trusted relay nodes with different numbers can be added on the basis of three according to the actual architecture distance and scale to form a quantum layer, and after the arrangement of the QKD trusted relay nodes is completed, each QKD trusted relay node can communicate with other surrounding QKD trusted relay nodes through a channel according to the actual position. QKD receiving and transmitting terminals can also be added more on a single basis, or can be of different types, with the types: when the QKD sending terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal, the QKD receiving terminal can adopt an underwater vehicle QKD terminal or a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal provided with an optical antenna; when the QKD sending terminal adopts an underwater vehicle QKD terminal or a wireless type underwater vehicle QKD terminal provided with an optical antenna, the QKD receiving terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal.
In the figure, nine QKD reliable relay nodes are adopted, including one onshore QKD reliable relay node, two underwater wireless QKD reliable relay nodes and six underwater QKD reliable relay nodes; the system comprises five QKD receiving and sending terminals, wherein the five QKD receiving and sending terminals comprise an onshore QKD terminal, two underwater vehicle QKD terminals and two wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminals. In the example, when the onshore QKD terminal is used as the QKD sending terminal, one of the two underwater vehicle QKD terminals is used as the QKD receiving terminal, or one of the two wireless type underwater vehicle QKD terminals is used as the QKD receiving terminal.
In the example, keys are generated between two adjacent QKD trusted relay nodes and between the QKD trusted relay node and the QKD terminal according to protocols, and keys are generated between the adjacent QKD trusted relay nodes by adopting a BB84 protocol or an MDI-QKD protocol negotiation; the method comprises the following steps that different types of QKD trusted relay nodes negotiate with different types of QKD receiving and sending terminals by adopting a BB84 protocol to generate keys, and the underwater wireless type QKD trusted relay nodes negotiate with wireless type underwater vehicle QKD terminals by adopting a BB84 protocol to generate keys; the underwater QKD trusted relay node adopts a BB84 protocol to negotiate with an underwater vehicle QKD terminal to generate a key; the on-shore QKD trusted relay node uses the BB84 protocol to negotiate with the on-shore QKD terminal to generate a key.
And the key management layer in the network is used for selecting an optimal link matched with the types of the QKD sending terminal and the QKD receiving terminal, managing the storage of key resources and managing the generation of a link key. In the example, when the wireless type underwater vehicle QKD terminal is used as a QKD sending terminal, a wireless type QKD trusted relay node is selected as an initial link node; and when the onshore QKD terminal is used as the QKD receiving terminal, the onshore QKD credible relay node is selected as the end link node.
And the application layer in the network is used for generating quantum key requirements and encrypting the secret information by using the key. In the example, the secret information can be secret data, secret files and the like, and the application layer encrypts the data and the files by using keys. The application layer applies the secret key to the actual encryption process to complete the encryption of the unconditional safe quantum secret key theoretically.
Referring to fig. 2, the process of realizing quantum key distribution and application of the present invention includes the following steps:
step 1) the application layer generates quantum key requirements.
Step 2) the key management layer selects a key transmission link according to the requirement of the application layer:
when the QKD sending terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal and the QKD receiving terminal adopts an underwater vehicle QKD terminal, the control layer selects an onshore QKD trusted relay node as an initial link node and an underwater QKD trusted relay node as an ending link node;
when the QKD sending terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal and the QKD receiving terminal adopts a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal, the control layer selects an onshore QKD trusted relay node as an initial link node and an underwater wireless QKD trusted relay node as an ending link node;
when the QKD sending terminal adopts an underwater vehicle QKD terminal and the QKD receiving terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal, the control layer selects an underwater QKD trusted relay node as an initial link node and an onshore QKD trusted relay node as an ending link node;
when the QKD sending terminal adopts a wireless type underwater vehicle QKD terminal and the QKD receiving terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal, the control layer selects an underwater wireless type QKD trusted relay node as an initial link node and an onshore QKD trusted relay node as an ending link node;
when the starting link node is directly connected with the ending link node or only forms a link, a quantum key distribution link is directly formed;
when a plurality of links are formed between the starting link node and the ending link node, the control layer selects the shortest link from the plurality of links formed between the starting link node and the ending link node as a quantum key distribution link.
Meanwhile, the key management layer manages storage of key resources on the link and generation of keys on the link.
Step 3) key transmission on the selected link:
QKD transmitting terminal determines communication key k transmitted to QKD receiving terminalABThe communication key can be a classical key, or a quantum key generated by the initial link node by adopting a BB84 protocol, and a link key k generated by the initial link node by adopting a BB84 protocol1The idea of reusing one-time pad is to use the link key k1Encrypted communication key kABSending to the starting link node, using k after the starting link node receives1Decrypting to obtain kAB；
The process of generating the link key by the QKD sending terminal and the initial link node by adopting the BB84 protocol comprises the following steps:
the QKD transmitting terminal randomly selects a string of binary bits by using a random number generator, randomly selects a vertical basis (0 degree/90 degrees) or a slant basis (45 degrees/135 degrees) as a modulation basis for each bit corresponding to a polarized photon, modulates the polarization state of the photon according to the basis selected by the QKD transmitting terminal and the binary bit string, and sequentially transmits the modulated photon string to an initial link node at intervals;
secondly, the initial link node randomly selects a vertical basis or an oblique basis as a measurement basis for measuring the polarization state of each received photon, converts the result into a binary bit, and tells a QKD sending terminal that the measurement basis is selected by each bit;
fourthly, the QKD sending terminal tells the initial link node which bits are the same as the measurement basis and keeps the bits, and the rest bits are discarded to obtain an original key;
fifthly, randomly selecting part of bits from the original key by the QKD sending terminal and the initial link node to calculate the error rate, judging whether the error rate is smaller than a threshold value, and if the error rate is smaller than the threshold value, performing the next step and performing post-processing on the original key; otherwise, the eavesdropper exists, and the protocol is terminated.
And sixthly, carrying out post-processing on the original secret key by the QKD sending terminal and the initial link node, wherein the post-processing comprises error correction and confidentiality amplification, and finally obtaining the unconditional safe secret key.
When only the starting link node and the ending link node are on the link, the starting link node and the ending link node generate a link key k by adopting a BB84 protocol or an MDI-QKD protocol2And will use k2Encrypted kABTo the end link node, the end link node uses k2Decrypting to obtain kAB(ii) a The MDI-QKD protocol adopted by the starting link node and the ending link node can be a polarized coding MDI-QKD protocol or a phase coding MDI-QKD protocol;
when other link nodes exist on the link, the starting link node and the next link node generate a link quantum key k by adopting a BB84 protocol or an MDI-QKD protocol2Will use k2Encrypted kABPassed to the next link node, using k2Decrypting to obtain kABAccording to the process, the communication quantum key is transmitted on the link node in sequence, and finally the communication quantum key kABTransmitting to the end link node;
the end link node and the QKD receiving terminal adopt BB84 protocol to generate link quantum key k3And will use the link quantum key k3Encrypted communication key kABSending the data to a QKD receiving terminal, and using k after the QKD receiving terminal receives the data3Decrypting to obtain kAB。
And 4) the application layer encrypts the secret information by using the secret key.
Claims (1)
1. A wireless/wired hybrid QKD network based on trusted relays, comprising a quantum layer, a key management layer, and an application layer, wherein:
the quantum layer comprises a plurality of QKD trusted relay nodes, at least one QKD sending terminal, and at least one QKD receiving terminal; the plurality of QKD trusted relay nodes comprise at least one underwater wireless QKD trusted relay node provided with an optical antenna, at least one underwater QKD trusted relay node and at least one onshore QKD trusted relay node; when the QKD sending terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal, the QKD receiving terminal can adopt an underwater vehicle QKD terminal or a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal provided with an optical antenna; when the QKD sending terminal adopts an underwater vehicle QKD terminal or a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal provided with an optical antenna, the QKD receiving terminal adopts an onshore QKD terminal;
a BB84 protocol or an MDI-QKD protocol is adopted to negotiate among the QKD trusted relay nodes to generate a key; the underwater wireless QKD trusted relay node adopts BB84 protocol to negotiate with a wireless underwater vehicle QKD terminal to generate a key; the underwater QKD trusted relay node adopts a BB84 protocol to negotiate with an underwater vehicle QKD terminal to generate a key; the shore QKD trusted relay node adopts BB84 protocol to negotiate with the shore QKD terminal to generate a key;
the key management layer is used for selecting an optimal link matched with the types of the QKD sending terminal and the QKD receiving terminal, managing the storage of key resources and managing the generation of a link key;
and the application layer is used for generating quantum key requirements and encrypting the secret information by using the key.
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