CN112906022A - Semi-selfish ore excavation strategy in block chain - Google Patents
Semi-selfish ore excavation strategy in block chain Download PDFInfo
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- CN112906022A CN112906022A CN202110193452.6A CN202110193452A CN112906022A CN 112906022 A CN112906022 A CN 112906022A CN 202110193452 A CN202110193452 A CN 202110193452A CN 112906022 A CN112906022 A CN 112906022A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
- G06Q20/06—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
- G06Q20/065—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme using e-cash
Abstract
The invention discloses a semi-selfish mining strategy in a block chain, and aims to reduce the discovered probability of selfish miners in the selfish mining process and improve the mining income of the selfish miners. Meanwhile, the yield of the semi-selfish mining method is obviously higher than that of the traditional selfish mining algorithm under the given parameters by considering the calculation force distribution of the actual mine pool. The method has the technical key point that in the process of mining the selfish, the selfish miner can divide partial computing power to carry out honest mining, and the partial computing power is called as semi-selfish miner. Unlike the strategy of selfish miners, semi-selfish miners always dig mines on public chains. For honest miners, they can only view the blocks that are currently disclosed, i.e. they cannot view the block information on the private chain. The semi-selfish mining strategy can reduce the discovered probability of the selfish miners to the maximum extent, and meanwhile, the selfish miners can obtain greater relative benefits.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and relates to a selfish mining-based strategy.
Background
Bitcoin has been gaining wide attention as the largest decentralized cryptocurrency. One of the most important reasons is that the bitcoin has great economic benefits and miners can obtain corresponding rewards by digging mines. Traditionally, bitcoin mining has been incentivized to be compatible, i.e., miners can only obtain maximum revenue if they adhere to bitcoin mining protocols. However, in the selfish mining algorithm, the selfish miners can obtain a relative gain higher than the calculation power ratio. Thus, more miners may choose to mine selfish under incentives of revenue. In this case, the maximum profit cannot be obtained by following the bitcoin protocol.
In the traditional selfish mining model, when the selfish miner has over 25% of calculation power of the whole bitcoin network, the relative benefit higher than the calculation power ratio can be obtained. In other words, in the above case, the profit of selfish mining is higher than honest mining. Thus, with more revenue incentives, more miners will choose to dig mines privately. However, conventional selfish mining tends to result in excessively high bifurcation rates. Under the condition, honest miners can easily find that selfish excavation exists in the network, and the benefit of selfish excavation is reduced. Therefore, on the basis of traditional selfish mining, a semi-selfish mining-based strategy is provided, so that the bifurcation rate in the selfish mining is reduced, and meanwhile, the relative income of the selfish miners is improved to a certain extent.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a semi-selfish mining strategy, which comprises the steps of strategy model construction, selfish mining, bifurcation rate calculation, income calculation and the like, and the specific process is as follows:
an attacker has the computing power of alpha, and the attacker distributes the computing power of alpha, rho to honestly dig the ore on the public chain, so that the attacker is called a semi-selfish miner (semi-selfish) and performs selfish excavation on the private chain, so that the attacker is called a selfish miner (selfish) and the attacker can also dig the ore;
an attacker constructs a semi-selfish mining strategy model and optimizes related model parameters;
the semi-selfish miner honestly excavates the mine on the public chain, and the selfish miner adopts selfish excavation according to the strategy in the SM1 algorithm;
based on a semi-selfish mining strategy model, calculating a block bifurcation rate forkRate caused in the selfish mining process:
based on the semi-selfish mining strategy model, the relative gains relRevenue and absolute gains absRevenue obtained by attackers (semi-selfish miners and selfish miners) in the selfish mining process are calculated.
In order to prove the effectiveness of the invention, the semi-selfish mining strategy and the SM1 algorithm are compared among different measures such as bifurcation rate, relative gain and absolute gain. The experimental result shows that in the current actual ore pond calculated force distribution, the semi-selfish ore excavation strategy has lower bifurcation rate and higher relative gain and absolute gain.
Drawings
Fig. 1 details the bifurcation rate of the semi-selfish mining strategy.
Fig. 2 details the relative gains of the semi-selfish mining strategy.
Fig. 3 details the absolute gain of the semi-selfish mining strategy.
Detailed Description
(1) An attacker has the calculation power of the whole network a of the current bitcoin system and initializes related parameters:
(1.1) allocating the computing power of alpha rho by an attacker to carry out honest mining, wherein miners with the computing power are called semi-selfish miners (semi-selfish miners);
(1.2) allocating the calculation power of alpha (1-rho) to carry out selfish mining by an attacker, wherein miners with the calculation power are called selfish miners (selfish miners);
(2) constructing a semi-selfish mining strategy model by an attacker;
(3) the selfish miner digs the mine according to the SM1 algorithm:
(3.1) when the selfish miner finds a block, if the lengths of the current public chain and the current private chain are equal, the selfish miner publishes the newly found block; otherwise, the newly discovered tile remains private as part of the private chain;
(3.2) when an honest miner or a semi-selfish miner finds a block, if the length of the private chain is smaller than that of the public chain, the selfish miner abandons the private chain and selects the public chain; if the length of the public chain is equal to that of the private chain or the private chain leads the public chain by one building block, the private miner publishes all blocks on the private chain; in other cases, the selfish miners still maintain the privacy of the private chain.
(4) The attacker calculates the bifurcation rate in the semi-selfish mining strategy model:
(5) the attacker calculates the relative gain and the absolute gain in the semi-selfish mining strategy model:
Claims (1)
1. the specific process of the semi-selfish mining strategy is as follows:
the first step is as follows: the self-selfish miners perform initial allocation on the calculated force, the calculated force of the self-selfish miners is assumed to be alpha, and the calculated force of the semi-self-private miners is rho alpha;
the second step is that: defining a semi-selfish mining strategy model, and optimizing related model parameters;
the third step: carrying out ore excavation by the selfish miner according to a traditional selfish ore excavation strategy (SM1), and carrying out honest ore excavation by the semi-selfish miner on a public chain;
the fourth step: under the current semi-selfish mining strategy model, calculating a selfish miner with calculation power alpha, and adopting a block chain network bifurcation rate forkRate caused by selfish mining:
wherein C isforkIndicating the number of bifurcations, L, resulting from semi-selfish miningmain_chainRepresenting the length of the longest legal chain in the selfish mining process;
the fifth step: under a semi-selfish mining strategy model, the relative gain relRevenue and the absolute gain absRevenue which can be obtained by a selfish miner with the calculation power of alpha are as follows:
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| CN202110193452.6A CN112906022A (en) | 2021-02-20 | 2021-02-20 | Semi-selfish ore excavation strategy in block chain |
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| CN202110193452.6A CN112906022A (en) | 2021-02-20 | 2021-02-20 | Semi-selfish ore excavation strategy in block chain |
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN115412454A (en) * | 2022-04-28 | 2022-11-29 | 深圳大学 | Detection method, device and equipment for selfish mining behavior and storage medium |
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2021
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN115412454A (en) * | 2022-04-28 | 2022-11-29 | 深圳大学 | Detection method, device and equipment for selfish mining behavior and storage medium |
| CN115412454B (en) * | 2022-04-28 | 2023-07-07 | 深圳大学 | Detection method, device, equipment and storage medium for selfish mining behavior |
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Application publication date: 20210604 |
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