CN112651042A - Intersection solving method based on trusted third-party private data - Google Patents
Intersection solving method based on trusted third-party private data Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN112651042A CN112651042A CN202011537707.8A CN202011537707A CN112651042A CN 112651042 A CN112651042 A CN 112651042A CN 202011537707 A CN202011537707 A CN 202011537707A CN 112651042 A CN112651042 A CN 112651042A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- party
- data
- intersection
- participant
- participator
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 32
- 238000001914 filtration Methods 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004075 alteration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000003745 diagnosis Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002068 genetic effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Medical Informatics (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a trusted third party private data based intersection solving method, which comprises the following steps: step one, a participant A and a participant B jointly negotiate a secret key K; step two, the participator A and the participator B use the negotiated secret key K to convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
The data are processed by the trusted computer side C, so that excessive data filtering processes are omitted, time is saved, and meanwhile, the data set of the participant A and the data set of the participant B are encrypted by the through-hole secret key K, so that the data are encryptedGet whole in-process not anybody can crack data, when computer side C calculated the intersection of data, participant A and participant B decipher the set through secret key K to obtain required data, secret key K will become invalid automatically after finishing using, even the external personnel steal the set of data also can't crack, also make user's experience feel promote thereupon simultaneously.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of private data, in particular to a trusted third party private data intersection solving method.
Background
The privacy Protection Set Intersection (PSI) calculation belongs to the specific application problem in the field of secure multi-party calculation, and not only has important theoretical significance, but also has strong application value. With the increasing importance of privacy protection of user data, the research in this direction is more in line with the increasingly strong need of people to protect privacy of personal information to the greatest extent while enjoying convenience of various services depending on personal information.
Privacy preserving set intersection protocol allows two parties holding respective sets to jointly compute the intersection operation of the two sets. At the end of a protocol interaction, one or both parties should get the correct intersection and not get any information in the other party's set outside the intersection. Protecting the privacy of a collection is a natural or even necessary requirement in many scenarios, for example, when the collection is the address book of a user or the genome of a genetic diagnosis service user, such input must be protected by means of cryptography.
The invention is disclosed in China: a method for intersection solving of private data for secure multi-party computing and a verification method (public number: CN109104413B) disclose a method for intersection solving and verification of private data for secure multi-party computing, comprising: the intersection solving party filters a first set from the private data set of the intersection solving party according to the digit group corresponding to the private data set of the intersection solving party and the hash function used for obtaining the digit group; the intersection solving party filters a second set from the private data set of the intersection solving party according to the digit set corresponding to the private data set of the intersection solving party and the hash function used for obtaining the digit set corresponding to the private data set of the intersection solving party; and the intersection solving party filters a third set from the private data set of the party according to the digit group corresponding to the first set and the hash function used for obtaining the digit group corresponding to the first set, and the third set is used as the intersection of the private data sets of the two parties involved.
However, the invention still has certain problems, when intersection is required to be solved, two parties needing to participate in the intersection are filtered through the data sets for multiple times, the required time is increased when the intersection is required to be solved, the working efficiency is greatly reduced, meanwhile, the more the filtering times are, the higher the possibility that the data sets of the two parties are stolen is, in the process of the data intersection solving of the two parties, no security measures are provided, and the data sets can be easily cracked after being maliciously stolen by others, so that the information of the two parties is leaked, and certain loss is caused to the two parties.
Therefore, an intersection solving method based on the trusted third-party private data is provided.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for solving intersection based on trusted third-party private data, so as to solve the problems in the background technology.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme: a trusted third party privacy data based intersection solving method comprises the following steps:
step one, a participant A and a participant B jointly negotiate a secret key K;
step two, the participator A and the participator B use the negotiated secret key K to convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
Step three, the participator A and the participator B respectively process the sets processed by the pseudo-random function F
And collections
Sending the data to a credible calculator C;
step four, the calculator C calculates the set
And collections
And returning the obtained intersection to the participant A and the participant B respectively;
and step five, the party A and the party B decrypt the intersection set obtained from the party C by using the negotiated key K to obtain a final result.
Preferably: in the first step, the party a and the party B negotiate a secret key K, which is known only by both parties and unknown to the computer party C.
Preferably: in the second step, the party A and the party B convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
Party A can only get the set
Does not get a set of participants B
The participator B has the same reason.
Preferably: in the third step, the participant A and the participant B will have their respective sets
And collections
Respectively sent to the credible computer side C, in the process, the computer side C can not disclose the information of the other side to one side.
Preferably: in the fourth step, the computer side C calculates the future set
And a collectorCombination of Chinese herbs
The intersection of the two parties is respectively sent to the party A and the party B, but the part which is not the intersection is not sent, and the computer party C destroys the two parts.
Preferably: in the fifth step, the participator A and the participator B decrypt the data sent back by the computer side C through the secret key K respectively, and the secret key K is invalid after decryption is finished, even if external personnel obtain the set
And collections
The intersection of (a) and (b) cannot be decrypted.
Preferably: and the pseudo-random function F can not be obtained by the party A and the party B.
Preferably: and the participator A and the participator B carry out backward deduction through the key K and the pseudorandom function F to obtain the required intersection.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: data are processed through a trusted computer side C, excessive data filtering processes are omitted, time is saved, meanwhile, a through hole secret key K is used for encrypting data sets of a participant A and a participant B, anyone can not crack the data in the whole process, when the computer side C calculates intersection of the data, the participant A and the participant B can decrypt the sets through the secret key K, needed data are obtained, the secret key K can automatically fail after being used, even if the external personnel steal the sets of the data, the external personnel can not crack the sets, and meanwhile, experience and experience of users are improved accordingly.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Examples
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention provides a technical solution: a trusted third party privacy data based intersection solving method comprises the following steps:
step one, a participant A and a participant B jointly negotiate a secret key K;
step two, the participator A and the participator B use the negotiated secret key K to convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
Step three, the participator A and the participator B respectively process the sets processed by the pseudo-random function F
And collections
Sending the data to a credible calculator C;
step four, the calculator C calculates the set
And collections
And returning the obtained intersection to the participant A and the participant B respectively;
and step five, the party A and the party B decrypt the intersection set obtained from the party C by using the negotiated key K to obtain a final result.
In this embodiment, specifically: in the first step, a key K negotiated by the participant A and the participant B is only known by both parties, and the computer C does not know; through the arrangement, the computer side C can be made to assemble
And collections
The calculation is carried out, then the intersection is obtained, and the computer side C cannot calculate the secret key without the secret key K
And collections
And decryption is carried out, so that the required information of the participant A and the participant B cannot be acquired, and the condition that the participant A and the participant B are damaged due to information leakage is avoided.
In this embodiment, specifically: in step two, the participant A and the participant B convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
Party A can only get the set
Does not get a set of participants B
The participator B has the same reason; through the arrangement, the participant A, the participant B and the data sets A and B are converted through the pseudo-random function F, so that the identification of the computer C is facilitated, meanwhile, the participant A and the participant B only can obtain the data sets corresponding to the participant A and the participant B,the situation that the other side acquires the data set to cause information leakage is avoided.
In this embodiment, specifically: in step three, party A and party B will have their respective sets
And collections
Respectively sending the information to a credible computer side C, wherein the computer side C does not disclose the information of the other side to one side in the process; through the above arrangement, the collection can be carried out
And collections
When transmitting, the set is made
And collections
More safety, avoiding the situation that one party obtains corresponding information to cause the information leakage of the other party, and simultaneously, the computer party C does not provide any person
And collections
The credit of the computer side C is confirmed, so that the trust of the user on the computer side C is greatly improved.
In this embodiment, specifically: in step four, the computer side C calculates the future set
And collections
The intersection of the two parties is respectively sent to the party A and the party B, but the part which is not the intersection is not sent, and the part is destroyed by the computer party C; through the arrangement, the participant A and the participant B can only obtain the set
And collections
The intersection can not obtain other parts, the part that is not the intersection is destroyed through computer side C, and anyone can not obtain, has avoided participator A and participator B information to reveal to lead to the both sides to appear to the circumstances that computer side C's trust degree descends, improved user experience, along with user experience's promotion, user quantity also increases thereupon.
In this embodiment, specifically: in the fifth step, the participator A and the participator B decrypt the data sent back by the computer side C through the secret key K respectively, and the secret key K is invalid after decryption is finished, even if external personnel obtain the set
And collections
The intersection of (a) and (b) cannot be decrypted; through the arrangement, after the data sent back by the computer side C is decrypted, the key K is invalid, even if the corresponding data is obtained, decryption cannot be performed, the safety of the data is greatly improved, the user experience is improved, and the situations that the user experience is reduced and the trust degree of the computer side C is reduced due to the leakage of the information are avoided.
In this embodiment, specifically: both the party A and the party B of the pseudorandom function F can not obtain the pseudorandom function; through the setting, if one party acquires the pseudorandom function F, the data can be cracked, so that the data leakage of the other party occurs, and in order to avoid the situation, the participator A and the participator B cannot acquire the pseudorandom function F, and most information leakage can be avoided.
In this embodiment, specifically: the participator A and the participator B carry out backward deduction through a secret key K and a pseudorandom function F to obtain a required intersection; through the arrangement, the data sent back by the key K and the computer side C are sent to the pseudorandom function F by the participant A and the participant B, and the data sent back by the computer side C are reversely pushed through the pseudorandom function F, so that the data intersection needed by the participant A and the participant B can be obtained, meanwhile, the key K is used for operation, and the information security is improved
And collections
And then, the price data can be easily cracked, so that the information of the party A and the party B is leaked, the trust of people on the computer party C is reduced, and the experience of a user is also reduced.
Working principle or structural principle: when the calculation of data intersection is needed, the participator A and the participator B convert the respective data sets into sets through a secret key K and a pseudorandom function F
And collections
Collection
And collections
Only two parties know the pseudo-random function F, the party A and the party A cannot obtain the pseudo-random function FB also can not be obtained, and when the data sets of the participator A and the participator B are converted, the data sets are collected
And collections
The information is sent to a trusted computer party C, in the process, the computer party C does not disclose the set of the other party to one party, so that the condition that the information of the participating party A and the information of the participating party B are leaked is avoided, and the computer party C obtains the set through calculation
And collections
The intersection of party a and party B, and since party C does not have the key K, it is not possible to assemble the set
And collections
The intersection is cracked, the information security of the participant A and the participant B is improved, meanwhile, the trust of the user on the computer side C is also improved, the user experience is increased, and the computer side C is integrated
And collections
Sends the intersection of (A) to party A and (B) which will aggregate
And collections
Sending the intersection to a pseudorandom function F, simultaneously inputting a secret key K, and after confirming the accuracy of the secret key K, collecting the secret key K by the pseudorandom function F
And collections
The intersection set of the two parties is reversely pushed, so that the party A and the party B can obtain required data, and the key K can be invalid after the use is finished, even if external personnel obtain the set
And collections
The trusted computer party C is improved, the required data intersection can be obtained more quickly and conveniently by the participant A and the participant B, meanwhile, the safety and the accuracy of the data intersection can be guaranteed through the secret key K, and the experience of the user is improved.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (8)
1. A trusted third party privacy data based intersection solving method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step one, a participant A and a participant B jointly negotiate a secret key K;
step two, the participator A and the participator B use the negotiated secret key K to convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
Step three, the participator A and the participator B respectively process the sets processed by the pseudo-random function F
And collections
Sending the data to a credible calculator C;
step four, the calculator C calculates the set
And collections
And returning the obtained intersection to the participant A and the participant B respectively;
and step five, the party A and the party B decrypt the intersection set obtained from the party C by using the negotiated key K to obtain a final result.
2. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the first step, the party a and the party B negotiate a secret key K, which is known only by both parties and unknown to the computer party C.
3. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the second step, the party A and the party B convert the respective data sets A and B into sets through a pseudo-random function F
And collections
Party A can only get the set
Does not get a set of participants B
The participator B has the same reason.
4. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the third step, the participant A and the participant B will have their respective sets
And collections
Respectively sent to the credible computer side C, in the process, the computer side C can not disclose the information of the other side to one side.
5. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the fourth step, the computer side C calculates the future set
And collections
The intersection of the two parties is respectively sent to the party A and the party B, but the part which is not the intersection is not sent, and the computer party C destroys the two parts.
6. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: in the fifth step, the participator A and the participator B decrypt the data sent back by the computer side C through the secret key K respectively, and the secret key K is invalid after decryption is finished, even if external personnel obtain the set
And collections
The intersection of (a) and (b) cannot be decrypted.
7. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: and the pseudo-random function F can not be obtained by the party A and the party B.
8. The intersection method based on the private data of the trusted third party as claimed in claim 1, wherein: and the participator A and the participator B carry out backward deduction through the key K and the pseudorandom function F to obtain the required intersection.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011537707.8A CN112651042A (en) | 2020-12-23 | 2020-12-23 | Intersection solving method based on trusted third-party private data |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011537707.8A CN112651042A (en) | 2020-12-23 | 2020-12-23 | Intersection solving method based on trusted third-party private data |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN112651042A true CN112651042A (en) | 2021-04-13 |
Family
ID=75359457
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011537707.8A Pending CN112651042A (en) | 2020-12-23 | 2020-12-23 | Intersection solving method based on trusted third-party private data |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN112651042A (en) |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN114172746A (en) * | 2022-02-09 | 2022-03-11 | 神州融安科技（北京）有限公司 | Secure acquisition method and device of three-party intersection data |
| CN114553593A (en) * | 2022-03-22 | 2022-05-27 | 杭州博盾习言科技有限公司 | Multi-party secure computation privacy intersection method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114553593B (en) * | 2022-03-22 | 2024-05-28 | 杭州博盾习言科技有限公司 | Multiparty secure computing privacy exchange method, device, equipment and storage medium |
Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2015197368A1 (en) * | 2014-06-27 | 2015-12-30 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Device for determining a shared key |
| CN105812141A (en) * | 2016-03-07 | 2016-07-27 | 东北大学 | Outsourcing encrypted data-orientated verifiable intersection operation method and system |
| CN105871869A (en) * | 2016-04-28 | 2016-08-17 | 湖南科技学院 | Anonymous bidirectional authentication method in mobile social network based on single hash function and false identity |
| CN107124268A (en) * | 2017-04-01 | 2017-09-01 | 中国人民武装警察部队工程大学 | A kind of privacy set common factor computational methods for resisting malicious attack |
| CN107196926A (en) * | 2017-04-29 | 2017-09-22 | 河南师范大学 | A kind of cloud outsourcing privacy set comparative approach and device |
| CN109525386A (en) * | 2018-11-29 | 2019-03-26 | 东北大学 | A method of based on the privately owned intersection of Paillier homomorphic cryptography and |
-
2020
- 2020-12-23 CN CN202011537707.8A patent/CN112651042A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2015197368A1 (en) * | 2014-06-27 | 2015-12-30 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Device for determining a shared key |
| CN105812141A (en) * | 2016-03-07 | 2016-07-27 | 东北大学 | Outsourcing encrypted data-orientated verifiable intersection operation method and system |
| CN105871869A (en) * | 2016-04-28 | 2016-08-17 | 湖南科技学院 | Anonymous bidirectional authentication method in mobile social network based on single hash function and false identity |
| CN107124268A (en) * | 2017-04-01 | 2017-09-01 | 中国人民武装警察部队工程大学 | A kind of privacy set common factor computational methods for resisting malicious attack |
| CN107196926A (en) * | 2017-04-29 | 2017-09-22 | 河南师范大学 | A kind of cloud outsourcing privacy set comparative approach and device |
| CN109525386A (en) * | 2018-11-29 | 2019-03-26 | 东北大学 | A method of based on the privately owned intersection of Paillier homomorphic cryptography and |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN114172746A (en) * | 2022-02-09 | 2022-03-11 | 神州融安科技（北京）有限公司 | Secure acquisition method and device of three-party intersection data |
| CN114172746B (en) * | 2022-02-09 | 2022-04-26 | 神州融安科技（北京）有限公司 | Secure acquisition method and device of three-party intersection data |
| CN114553593A (en) * | 2022-03-22 | 2022-05-27 | 杭州博盾习言科技有限公司 | Multi-party secure computation privacy intersection method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114553593B (en) * | 2022-03-22 | 2024-05-28 | 杭州博盾习言科技有限公司 | Multiparty secure computing privacy exchange method, device, equipment and storage medium |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN109101822B (en) | Method for solving data privacy disclosure problem in multi-party computing | |
| CN106548345B (en) | Method and system for realizing block chain private key protection based on key partitioning | |
| CN109525386B (en) | Paillier homomorphic encryption private aggregation and method based on Paillier | |
| CN106104562B (en) | System and method for securely storing and recovering confidential data | |
| CN101282222B (en) | Digital signature method based on CSK | |
| CN107124268A (en) | A kind of privacy set common factor computational methods for resisting malicious attack | |
| CN110969431B (en) | Secure hosting method, device and system for private key of blockchain digital coin | |
| GB2538052A (en) | Encoder, decoder, encryption system, encryption key wallet and method | |
| WO2014029169A1 (en) | Communication method utilizing fingerprint information for authentication | |
| TW201201041A (en) | Data security method and system | |
| CN109274492B (en) | Self-secure tightly coupled secret sharing method | |
| CN109450648B (en) | Key generation device, data processing apparatus, and data transfer system | |
| CN111510464B (en) | Epidemic situation information sharing method and system for protecting user privacy | |
| WO2015192500A1 (en) | Remote sharing method, and vtm terminal, network side device and system | |
| JP2015537483A (en) | Drawing management system and drawing management method by fingerprint authentication | |
| CN112651051A (en) | Intersection hash check method based on private data of untrusted third party | |
| CN109802834A (en) | The method and system that a kind of pair of business layer data is encrypted, decrypted | |
| CN112651042A (en) | Intersection solving method based on trusted third-party private data | |
| Sarkar et al. | A multi-instance cancelable fingerprint biometric based secure session key agreement protocol employing elliptic curve cryptography and a double hash function | |
| WO2021102041A1 (en) | Method and apparatus for a blockchain-agnostic safe multi-signature digital asset management | |
| CN107733936A (en) | A kind of encryption method of mobile data | |
| Zhu et al. | A patient-centric key management protocol for healthcare information system based on blockchain | |
| Li et al. | Security and Efficiency Enhancement of Robust ID Based Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme Preserving User Anonymity in Mobile Networks. | |
| CN113965310B (en) | Method for realizing mixed privacy calculation processing based on label capable of being controlled to be de-identified | |
| CN115865311A (en) | Optimization method and system for efficient constant-round secure multi-party computing protocol |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |
Application publication date: 20210413 |