CN112346331B - Channel selection method of three-redundancy flight control computer - Google Patents

Channel selection method of three-redundancy flight control computer Download PDF

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CN112346331B
CN112346331B CN202011289841.0A CN202011289841A CN112346331B CN 112346331 B CN112346331 B CN 112346331B CN 202011289841 A CN202011289841 A CN 202011289841A CN 112346331 B CN112346331 B CN 112346331B
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channel
parameter
flight
level
safety
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CN112346331A (en
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潘计辉
李厚春
田心宇
田云鹏
王威
李青原
龚麟
荆家玮
武耀发
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Northwestern Polytechnical University
Xian Aisheng Technology Group Co Ltd
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Northwestern Polytechnical University
Xian Aisheng Technology Group Co Ltd
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    • G05CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05BCONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B9/00Safety arrangements
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    • G05B9/03Safety arrangements electric with multiple-channel loop, i.e. redundant control systems

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Abstract

The invention relates to a channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer, belonging to the technical field of design of a multi-redundancy computer system. Acquiring flight parameters of each channel, and comprehensively obtaining the flight parameter safety level of the channel; the security level of the channel is further synthesized by combining the internal parameters of the channel, and the security levels of other channels of the flight control computer are obtained through data transmission among the channels; comparing the security levels of a plurality of channels of the redundancy computer to obtain the channel effectiveness of the redundancy computer; one of the computers is selected as a control computer by a voting arbitration circuit. The method adopts a channel dynamic security level method, combines an inter-channel comparison technology, realizes the selection of an optimal security channel, and can give full play to the error tolerance capability of the system and improve the fault tolerance performance of the aircraft by the multi-channel security level method.

Description

Channel selection method of three-redundancy flight control computer
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of aerospace flight control, relates to a redundancy computer system design technology, and particularly relates to a channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer.
Background
In the field of airborne computers, in order to improve the reliability and fault-tolerant capability of the system, a flight control computer mostly adopts redundancy technology. The existing redundancy management method mostly adopts a self-detection mode, a known patent (patent number: CN 110865908A) applies a voting technology to improve the fault detection rate, critical classification to the fault is lacked, and a non-critical fault can cause channel failure, so that the fault tolerance of the triple-redundancy flight control computer is reduced.
Disclosure of Invention
Technical problem to be solved
The invention provides a channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer, aiming at solving the problem of low fault tolerance of the three-redundancy flight control computer.
Technical scheme
A channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer and a control right arbitration method of a channel are disclosed, wherein the channel acquires flight parameters through software and comprehensively obtains the flight parameter security level of the channel; further combining the internal parameters of the channel to synthesize the security level of the channel, and acquiring the security levels of other channels of the redundancy computer through transmission between the channels; comparing the security levels of a plurality of channels of the redundancy computer to obtain the channel effectiveness of the redundancy computer; one of the computers is selected as the control computer by a voting arbitration circuit. The method comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: and a parameter acquisition stage, namely acquiring external input parameters of the channel. The external input parameters are divided into three parameter sets, which are respectively: the parameter set of the safe execution task of the aircraft, the parameter set of the safe flight and guidance of the aircraft and the parameter set of the stable flight attitude of the aircraft.
The first parameter set for ensuring the stability of the flight attitude of the aircraft comprises a pitch angle, an inclination angle, a course angle, a pitch angle rate, an inclination angle rate, a course angle rate, an air pressure altitude, an indication airspeed and a steering engine communication parameter (the steering engine communication state is normal);
the second parameter set is a parameter set for ensuring safe flight and guidance of the aircraft, and comprises position parameters of the aircraft in addition to the first parameter set. The second parameter set comprises a pitch angle, an inclination angle, a course angle, a pitch angle rate, an inclination angle rate, a course angle rate, an air pressure height, an indication airspeed, a steering engine communication parameter and a position parameter;
the third parameter set is a parameter set for ensuring the safety of the aircraft to execute the task, and comprises the parameters of the aircraft influencing the task execution besides the second parameter set. The third parameter set comprises pitch angle, inclination angle, course angle, pitch angle rate, inclination angle rate, course angle rate, air pressure height, indication airspeed, steering engine communication parameter, position parameter and task load parameter.
Step two: and a channel flight parameter safety level synthesis stage. The external input parameters are classified into three parameter sets according to the difference of the criticality of the parameters. Respectively as follows: the parameter set of the flight attitude stabilization, the parameter set of the safe flight and guidance of the aircraft and the parameter set of the safe execution task of the aircraft. And acquiring states according to external input parameters of the channel, and synthesizing the flight parameter safety level of the channel. The safety level of the channel flight parameters is divided into 4 levels, 0 level: task parameter security, level 1: flight parameter safety, level 2: flight parameter degradation safety, level 3: flight parameters are unsafe.
Level 0: the task parameter safety is realized by the aid of a parameter set of the safe execution task of the aircraft, and all parameters capable of safely executing the task are included.
Level 1: the flight parameter safety is provided with a parameter set of the safe flight and guidance of the aircraft, including the safe flight and guidance parameters of the aircraft, but not the load parameters for completing the task.
And 2, stage: the flight parameters are degraded safely, and the system has a parameter set with stable flight attitude and degraded safe flight parameters.
And 3, level: the flight parameters are unsafe and do not have a parameter set with stable flight attitude.
Step three: and (5) channel internal parameter validity synthesis. The channel internal parameter validity depends on: channel power supply validity, channel memory validity, channel power supply validity, channel watchdog validity. The channel security level synthesis method is characterized by comprising the following steps: and when the power supply of the channel is valid, the channel memory is valid, the channel power supply is valid, and the channel watchdog is valid, the internal parameters of the channel are valid, otherwise, the internal parameters of the channel are invalid.
Step four: and (5) a channel security level synthesis stage. And according to the safety level of the flight parameters of the channel and the effectiveness of the internal parameters of the channel, the safety level synthesis of the channel is realized.
According to the channel security level comprehensive method, the channel security level is divided into 4 levels: level 0: channel task security, level 1: safe channel flight, level 2: safe degradation of channel flight, level 3: the flight of the passage is unsafe.
According to the channel safety level comprehensive method, when the internal parameters are effective, the channel safety level is equal to the channel flight parameter safety level; otherwise the channel security level is equal to level 3.
Step five: and comparing the channel effectiveness in a comprehensive stage. And comparing the safety levels among the three channels, and respectively and comprehensively obtaining the effectiveness of the three channels.
The channel validity comparison comprehensive method comprises the steps that 3 channel safety levels are input, three channel validity is output, if the safety level number of the current channel is not larger than the other two channels, the channel is valid, and if the safety level number of the current channel is not larger than the other two channels, the channel is invalid.
Step six: the channel controls the arbitration phase. And voting out the channel with the optimal health as a control channel according to the priority of the three channels and the effectiveness of the channels.
The input of the three-channel control right arbitration circuit is 3-channel validity, and the output of the three-channel control right arbitration circuit is channel enable. If channel 1 is active, then channel 1 enables the output to be active; if channel 1 fails and channel 2 is active, then channel 2 enables the output to be active; if channel 1 fails, channel 2 fails and channel 3 is valid, then channel 3 enables output to be valid; if all three channels fail, channel 1 enables the output to be valid.
Advantageous effects
The invention provides a channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer, which designs different channel safety levels by dividing a parameter set and automatically selects a channel with the optimal safety level by combining with a dynamic safety level to realize system control. The method of the dynamic security level of the channel is adopted, the inter-channel comparison technology is combined, the selection of the optimal security channel is realized, the fault tolerance capability of the system is fully exerted by distinguishing the fault levels, and the fault tolerance performance of the aircraft is improved. The circuit is simple, the reliability is strong, and the practical value is high.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a channel redundancy management method;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of fault synthesis and control authority arbitration of a triple-redundancy flight control computer according to the present invention;
Detailed Description
The invention will now be further described with reference to the following examples and drawings:
referring to fig. 1, a schematic diagram of a working flow of a channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer. The channel acquires flight parameters through software, and flight parameter safety levels of the channel are obtained comprehensively; further combining the internal parameters of the channels to synthesize the security levels of the channels, and acquiring the security levels of other channels of the redundancy computer through transmission among the channels; comparing the security levels of a plurality of channels of the redundancy computer to obtain the channel effectiveness of the redundancy computer; one of the computers is selected as a control computer by a voting arbitration circuit.
Referring to fig. 2, a schematic diagram of a channel selection method, fault synthesis and control right arbitration of a triple-redundancy flight control computer.
The channel selection method of the three-redundancy flight control computer comprises the following steps: the method comprises the following steps: and a parameter acquisition stage, namely acquiring external input parameters of the channel. The external input parameters are classified into flight key parameters influencing the flight safety of the airplane and non-key parameters influencing the execution of flight tasks.
Step two: and a channel flight parameter safety level synthesis stage. And acquiring states according to external input parameters of the channel, and synthesizing the flight parameter safety level of the channel. The safety level of the channel flight parameters is divided into 4 levels:
level 0: the task parameters are safe, have safe flight parameters and have parameters for completing the task.
Level 1: the flight parameters are safe, safe and complete, but the flight parameters do not have the parameters for completing the task.
And 2, stage: the flight parameters are degraded safely, and the degraded safe flight parameters are provided.
And 3, level: the flight parameters are unsafe and do not have safe flight parameters.
The channel flight parameter safety Level External _ Pa _ Level is one of the above 4 values, and the External _ Pa _ Level is composed of bits bit1, bit0 and 2. 00 denotes a 0 level, 01 denotes a 1 level, 10 denotes a 2 level, and 11 denotes a 3 level.
The channel internal parameter validity depends on: channel power supply validity, channel memory validity, channel power supply validity, channel watchdog validity. When Cpu _ V is Power valid, ram _ V is memory valid, power _ V is Power valid, and Watthdog _ V is watchdog valid at the same time, the channel internal parameter Inside _ Pa _ V is valid, otherwise Inside _ Pa _ V is invalid (signal low level is valid, high level is invalid). And 4 or doors are adopted to realize the synthesis of the internal parameters of the channel.
And a channel security Level Chx _ Pa _ Level integration stage. And according to the channel flight parameter safety Level External _ Pa _ Level and in combination with the internal parameter validity Inside _ Pa _ V of the channel, the channel safety Level integration is realized. When the internal parameter Inside _ Pa _ V is effective, the channel safety Level Chx _ Pa _ Level is equal to the channel flight parameter safety Level; otherwise the channel security level is equal to level 4. And (3) performing OR operation on the Inside _ Pa _ V and bit1 and bit0 of the External _ Pa _ Level respectively to synthesize a channel security Level Chx _ Pa _ Level, wherein the Chx _ Pa _ Level is composed of 2 bits. 00 denotes a 0 level, 01 denotes a 1 level, 10 denotes a 2 level, and 11 denotes a 3 level.
Step five: and comparing the channel effectiveness in a comprehensive stage. And comparing the security levels Chx _ Pa _ Level between the three channels, and respectively and comprehensively obtaining the three-channel validity Chx _ V.
The comprehensive method for comparing the channel effectiveness is characterized in that: the input is 3 channel security levels Chx _ Pa _ Level, the output is three-channel validity Chx _ V, if the security Level number of the current channel is not more than other two channels, the channel is valid, otherwise the channel is invalid (the high Level of the Chx _ V signal is valid, and the low Level is invalid).
Step six: the channel controls the arbitration phase. And voting out the channel with the optimal health as a control channel according to the priority of the three channels and the effectiveness of the channels.
The three-channel control right arbitration circuit is characterized in that: the input is 3 channel activity Chx _ V and the output is channel enable Chx _ En (Chx _ En signal active high and inactive low).
The channel with the optimal health is used as a control method, and is characterized in that: if channel 1 is active, then channel 1 enables the output to be active; if channel 1 fails and channel 2 is active, then channel 2 enables output to be active; if channel 1 fails, channel 2 fails and channel 3 is active, then channel 3 enables output to be active; if all three channels fail, channel 1 enables the output to be valid.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, it is possible to make various improvements and modifications without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and those improvements and modifications should be considered as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (1)

1. A channel selection method of a three-redundancy flight control computer is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: a parameter acquisition stage, which is used for realizing the acquisition of external input parameters of the channel; the external input parameters are divided into three parameter sets, which are respectively: the parameter set of the flight attitude stability, the parameter set of the safe flight and guidance of the aircraft and the parameter set of the safe execution task of the aircraft;
the first parameter set for ensuring the stability of the flight attitude of the aircraft comprises a pitch angle, an inclination angle, a course angle, a pitch angle rate, an inclination angle rate, a course angle rate, an air pressure altitude, an indication airspeed and a steering engine communication parameter;
the second parameter set is a parameter set for ensuring safe flight and guidance of the aircraft, and comprises the position parameters of the aircraft in addition to the first parameter set; the second parameter set comprises a pitch angle, an inclination angle, a course angle, a pitch angle rate, an inclination angle rate, a course angle rate, an air pressure height, an indication airspeed, a steering engine communication parameter and a position parameter;
the third parameter set is a parameter set for ensuring the safety of the aircraft to execute the task, and comprises parameters of the aircraft influencing the task execution besides the second parameter set; the third parameter set comprises a pitch angle, an inclination angle, a course angle, a pitch angle rate, an inclination angle rate, a course angle rate, an air pressure height, an indication airspeed, a steering engine communication parameter, a position parameter and a task load parameter;
step 2: and a channel flight parameter safety level synthesis stage, wherein the channel flight parameter safety level is obtained according to the external input parameter of the channel, and the flight parameter safety level of the channel is synthesized and divided into 4 levels, namely 0 level: task parameter security, level 1: flight parameter safety, level 2: flight parameter degradation safety, level 3: flight parameters are unsafe;
level 0: the task parameter safety system comprises a task parameter safety system, a task execution system and a task execution system, wherein the task parameter safety system is provided with a parameter set for safely executing a task by an aircraft and comprises all parameters capable of safely executing the task;
level 1: the flight parameter safety is realized, and the flight parameter safety system has a parameter set of safe flight and guidance of the aircraft, comprises safe flight and guidance parameters of the aircraft, and does not have a task load completing parameter;
and 2, stage: the flight parameters are degraded safely, and the degraded safe flight parameters are provided with a parameter set with stable flight attitude;
and 3, level: the flight parameters are unsafe, and no parameter set with stable flight attitude is provided;
and step 3: and in the channel internal parameter validity synthesis stage, the channel internal parameter validity depends on: channel power supply validity, channel memory validity, channel power supply validity, channel watchdog validity; when the power supply of the channel is valid, the channel memory is valid, the channel power supply is valid, and the channel watchdog is valid, the internal parameters of the channel are valid, otherwise, the internal parameters of the channel are invalid;
and 4, step 4: in the channel safety level synthesis stage, channel safety level synthesis is realized according to the channel flight parameter safety level and by combining the effectiveness of the internal parameters of the channel;
the channel security level is classified into 4 levels: level 0: channel task security, level 1: safe channel flight, level 2: channel flight degradation safety, level 3: the channel flight is unsafe;
according to the channel safety level comprehensive method, when the internal parameters are effective, the channel safety level is equal to the channel flight parameter safety level; otherwise, the channel security level is equal to level 3;
and 5: the channel validity comparison and synthesis stage is used for comparing the safety levels among three channels and respectively synthesizing to obtain the validity of the three channels;
inputting 3 channel security levels, outputting three-channel validity, if the security level number of the current channel is not more than the other two channels, the channel is valid, otherwise the channel is invalid;
and 6: in the channel control right arbitration stage, a channel with the optimal health is voted out as a control channel according to the priority of the three channels and the effectiveness of the channels;
inputting validity of 3 channels and outputting enabling of the channels; if channel 1 is active, then channel 1 enables the output to be active; if channel 1 fails and channel 2 is active, then channel 2 enables the output to be active; if channel 1 fails, channel 2 fails and channel 3 is active, then channel 3 enables output to be active; if all three channels fail, channel 1 enable output is invalid.
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