CN112054907A - Block chain general certificate retrieving method and system when private key is forgotten - Google Patents
Block chain general certificate retrieving method and system when private key is forgotten Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
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Abstract
The invention provides a block chain general certificate retrieving method and system when a private key is forgotten, wherein a general certificate retrieving framework is established and consists of two parts, wherein one part is responsible for constructing declaration data, and the data declares a processing rule of how a general certificate owner retrieves the general certificate when the private key is forgotten; the other part is responsible for executing a specific retrieving method represented by the declaration data, and the method is realized by an intelligent contract, wherein the intelligent contract firstly judges whether the input data is signed by a certification owner by a signature verification method, and when the data input by a user is matched with the signature data, the input data is processed according to an agreed processing rule, and the lost certification is retrieved. Different from the prior art, the method regenerates the private key or needs to encrypt and store the private key in advance, so that the cost for storing or recovering is high and the difficulty is high. The technical scheme of the invention is simple to implement, has low cost and has important popularization value.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of block chain core technology and application, and particularly provides a technical scheme for finding back a corresponding pass certificate of a private key under the condition that the private key is forgotten.
Background
The blockchain technology is a brand new distributed infrastructure and computing paradigm that utilizes blockchain data structures to verify and store data, utilizes distributed node consensus algorithms to generate and update data, cryptographically secures data transmission and access, and utilizes intelligent contracts composed of automated script code to program and manipulate data. With the popularity of the bitcoin concept, a large number of blockchain items have emerged. Blockchains are of great interest due to their outstanding characteristics of decentralization, collective maintenance, openness and transparency, non-falsification, quasi-anonymity, etc. The current blockchain may be divided into a public chain, a federation chain, and a private chain by access scope. While the general certificate (token) is the basic and essential function of the public chain. The general evidence is based on a UTXO (unspent transactionioutput) model, such as a bitcoin platform, and an account model, such as an EtherFang platform. However, both the certification based on the UTXO model and the certification based on the account model are implemented by a public-private key mechanism based on cryptography, and a private key is required to be provided to obtain the corresponding certification. However, the management of the private key is troublesome, and the loss of the corresponding pass certificate caused by forgetting the private key also often occurs. For example, the "wealth" magazine has counted, and about 300 ten thousand bit coins have lost control over its own address for various reasons, that is, the private keys corresponding to these addresses are lost, so that the bit coins in the addresses are permanently lost. This loss has reached the point of being severe, knowing that bitcoil has a total of 2100 million bits. A method is necessary to alleviate this situation. China's digital currency is also advancing, and the follow-up is urgently needed by the support of related technologies.
Due to the realistic requirements of this problem, a large number of studies have been conducted to deal with the loss of private keys. The method can be roughly divided into two categories, namely, the private key is encrypted and stored and can be retrieved when the private key is lost; secondly, the private key can be regenerated when the private key is lost. For example 1) the private key is generated by using mnemonics, which is based on the fact that it is easier to memorize the mnemonic than the private key, but the mnemonic itself needs to be kept safely and has the risk of forgetting. 2) The private key is generated by using the user identity information, but the security is not high. 3) And binding the account based on the user identity information with the blockchain account, thereby retrieving the private key stored in the server through identity verification. There are also safety drawbacks. 4) By using the scheme of threshold signature, when the user loses the sub-private key, one sub-private key can be taken out from the pre-stored backup sub-private key to the user. The scheme has the problem that the scheme cannot be fused with the existing block chain signature scheme. 5) And encrypting and storing the private key of the user, for example, sequentially encrypting the private key to be protected by using the public keys of a plurality of other credible users, and requesting the credible party to successively decrypt and finally obtain the private key when the private key of the user is lost. The problem with this scheme is that the last decryptor needs to be trusted, since he can directly obtain the private key. If an encrypted private key is submitted, there is also a possibility that the encryption key is lost.
Disclosure of Invention
The scheme provided by the invention does not depend on the regeneration or proper storage of the private key, and aims to ensure that a user can retrieve the corresponding certificate depending on the private key without retrieving the private key under the condition of losing the private key, so that the application range is wider and the implementation is easier.
The technical scheme of the invention provides a block chain general certificate retrieving method when a private key is forgotten, which establishes a general certificate retrieving framework and consists of two parts,
one part is responsible for constructing declaration data which declares how the passport owner gets back the processing rules of the passport when the private key is forgotten;
the other part is responsible for executing a specific retrieving method represented by the declaration data, and the method is realized by an intelligent contract, wherein the intelligent contract firstly judges whether the input data is signed by a certification owner by a signature verification method, and when the data input by a user is matched with the signature data, the input data is processed according to an agreed processing rule, and the lost certification is retrieved.
Moreover, the construction declaration data adopts a declaration mode 1, including a declaration that if the private key is forgotten, the forgotten pass certificate is transferred to a certain address specified in advance.
Moreover, when the declaration mode 1 is adopted, the following process is executed, and when the user owns a UTXO, the user also owns a private key of the UTXO; the user signs with the private key of UTXO as follows:
sig＝sigPrk(Hash (type 1| | address 2| | | | … | | address n | | | | retrieval time | | Hash (user entity identity))), and save the signature result sig and (type 1| | address 2| | … | | address n | | | | | retrieval time),
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
sigPrk() Representing privacySigning by using the key prk;
hash () represents a Hash function;
n represents the number of input recovery addresses, and address 1, address 2 …, address n are recovery addresses.
Furthermore, the selection of the respective recovery addresses entered follows the principle,
the user grasps the corresponding private key or other users grasping the private key will return the transferred UTXO to the user.
And the corresponding processing rule is that the input address data and the signature data are utilized to ensure that the forgotten pass certificate is transferred to the correct address specified in advance by verifying the legality of the input address and the legality of the signature.
Or, the statement constructing data adopts a statement mode 2, which includes that the forgotten general certificate is transferred to a new address under the condition that the statement meets a certain condition, and the condition enables the intelligent contract to confirm that the user specifying the new address is the owner of the forgotten general certificate.
Moreover, when the declaration mode 2 is adopted, the following process is executed, and when the user owns a UTXO, the user also owns a private key of the UTXO; the user signs with the private key of UTXO:
sig＝sigPrk(Hash (a segment of text | | | conventional password of type 2| | | user's choice)),
and saves the signature result.
Moreover, when the declaration mode 2 is adopted, the corresponding processing rule is that the input data and the signature data are used for checking whether the user knows or possesses the condition required by the previous declaration by verifying the correctness of the input data, if so, the condition shows that the person who finds the passphrase is really the true owner who is forgotten to pass the passphrase, and the forgotten passphrase is supported to be transferred to the address specified by the user.
Moreover, the scenario for the block chain adopting the UTXO mode or the account mode is regarded as a case of one UTXO when the block chain is in the account mode, and is consistent with the UTXO mode processing procedure.
The invention also provides a block chain general certificate retrieving system when the private key is forgotten, which is used for realizing the block chain general certificate retrieving method when the private key is forgotten.
Different from the prior art, the method regenerates the private key or needs to encrypt and store the private key in advance, so that the cost for storing or recovering is high and the difficulty is high. The invention provides a technical scheme for finding out a block chain general certificate when a private key is forgotten, and provides a new general certificate finding frame, so that a user can find out the general certificate of the user under the condition of losing the private key, and the technical blank in the aspect is solved. The technical scheme of the invention is simple to implement, has low cost and has important popularization value.
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Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solution and technical principle related to the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
The invention provides a block chain general certificate retrieving method when a private key is forgotten. The method establishes a general evidence finding frame which consists of two parts. One part is responsible for constructing the claim data that states how the passport owner should get back the passport when the private key is forgotten. The other part is responsible for executing a specific retrieving method represented by the statement data and is realized by an intelligent contract, the intelligent contract firstly judges whether the input data is signed by a certification owner by a signature verification method, and when the data input by a user is matched with the signature data and the processing method of the current statement of the user is really embodied, the intelligent contract processes the input data according to the agreed processing rule and retrieves the lost certification. Under this framework, various specific retrieving methods can be designed, and the invention gives 2 specific retrieving methods as an example. The invention can reduce the problem of certificate passing loss caused by key loss and can generate a new business mode of certificate passing retrieval service.
For convenience of description, the following description is introduced in the UTXO mode, and the processing procedure is consistent for the case where the account mode is regarded as one UTXO.
Referring to fig. 1, a block chain credential retrieving method for forgotten private keys according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the following two processes:
the declaration process of the UTXO owner to the certification processing method comprises the following steps:
statement mode 1: and stating that the forgotten pass certificate is transferred to a certain address specified in advance under the condition that the private key is forgotten.
When a user owns a UTXO, then the user also owns the private key of the UTXO. The user client performs the following signature with the private key of the UTXO:
sig＝sigPrk(Hash (type 1| | address 2| | | | … | address n | | | | retrieval time | | | Hash (user entity identity))), and well store the signature result sig and (type 1| | address 2| | … | | address n | | | | | | | | retrieval time), for example, store on other block chains.
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
sigPrk() Indicating that the content in the parentheses is signed by the private key prk;
hash () represents a Hash function;
n represents the number of incoming recovery addresses.
The selection of the respective recovery addresses (address 1, address 2 …, address n) entered follows the following principle:
or the user grasps the corresponding private key, or other users who grasp the private key answer (promise) to return the transferred UTXO to the user.
1) For the situation that the user grasps the private keys corresponding to all the addresses, the following application scenarios exist: the user generates a plurality of addresses and stores the corresponding private keys by different methods so as to reduce the condition that all the private keys are lost simultaneously. Of course, if the user has multiple addresses with UTXO, these addresses may be mutually used as the retrieval address.
2) For the situation that other users who master the private key answer to return the transferred UTXO to the user, for example, two good friends mutually use the address of the other party as a retrieval address, or a retrieval mechanism with public credibility is directly established, and the mechanism has strong protection capability on the private key of the retrieval address.
In specific implementation, the addresses can be mixed and used, and only the private key of the address needs to be known.
The recovery time is added to avoid the following unfavorable conditions: the owner of the certificate of correspondence does not forget the private key of the certificate of correspondence, but the owner who retrieves the address transfers the certificate of correspondence in advance, and after the time is added, the system can stipulate that the subsequent retrieving operation cannot be executed before the time point.
The Hash (user entity identity) functions as follows: when a user applies for transferring money to a trusted authority, a physical identity document (such as an identity card) can be displayed offline, and a hash value is calculated so as to facilitate subsequent transferring money of the trusted authority, and the user entity identity is not left on a chain, and only the hash value of the identity is kept, so that the user privacy is protected.
Type 1 and type 2 below are respectively the identifiers of declaration mode 1 and declaration mode 2, and can take number 1 and number 2 respectively to facilitate different processing of the intelligent contract.
Statement 2: the forgotten pass is transferred to a new address when the statement meets a condition that lets the intelligent contract believe that the user specifying the new address is indeed the owner of the forgotten pass.
When a user owns a UTXO, then the user also owns the private key of the UTXO. The user signs the following with the private key of the UTXO: sig is sig ═ sigPrk(Hash (type 2| | | a section of text | | | conventional password selected by a user)), and the signature result is properly stored, for example, the signature result can be put on another block chain for chain storage, and the input information of the Hash cannot be exposed. The scheme converts the storage of the private key by the user into data which is easy to remember by the user but difficult for an attacker to exhaustively attack. The entropy of the input data is sufficiently large that the length suggestion has at least 100 characters and is easy to remember. A user-selected text segment is added, which has sufficient random entropy and is easy to remember, such as to extract a specific text segment from a book. And a conventional password is required to increase the attack difficulty of an attacker. The scheme is suitable for application scenes with small money amount.
The two declaration modes show two specific processing schemes, and actually, the user can also declare other processing methods or processing types. For example, the user may state to have the system transfer the missing pass certificate to a multi-signature account to prevent single person cheating, which is not described in detail herein. In particular implementations, the declaration component may be executed on the user client.
2. And (3) intelligent contract processing:
the intelligent contracts are processed according to the two statements. For the first statement, the validity of the input address and the validity of the signature are mainly verified by using the input address data and the signature data, so that the forgotten pass certificate is guaranteed to be transferred to the correct address specified in advance. For the second declaration, the input data and the signature data are mainly used to check whether the user knows or possesses the conditions required by the original declaration by verifying the correctness of the input data, and if the user knows that the person who finds the passphrase is really the true owner of the forgotten passphrase, the forgotten passphrase can be transferred to the address specified by the user.
If other means are declared, the intelligent contracts should be handled accordingly.
In one embodiment, the blockchain system adds an intelligent contract that functions as follows: first, it is judged whether the type 1 or the type 2 is based on the inputted data, and then processed separately.
In the implementation, the block chain system deployment contract is to install one contract, and different system methods are different and generally exist in the form of system contracts.
Corresponding processing of statement mode 1: when the type 1 is used, the input data is (the type 1| | address 2| | … | | | address n | | | retrieve time | | | Hash (user entity identity)), the signature data sig, and one of the n addresses (the private key corresponding to the address is not lost).
Contract processing procedure: and recovering the public key according to the input data and the signature data, and judging whether the UTXO associated with the address corresponding to the public key still exists or not and whether the current recovery time meets the recovery time specified by the statement or not according to the public key. If the time is legal even if the UTXO is still legal, the contract calculates the hash value (hash value) of the input data and verifies the signature by using the signature data sig. If both pass, the contract transfers the UTXO of the address corresponding to the signature private key to the input address. This time, the contract is processed. The following treatment is also needed subsequently:
A. if this address is the address where the user himself has the private key, the user does not need to do anything further.
B. If the address is the friend's address, the user needs to give the friend a new address and ask the friend to transfer the credentials to his new address.
C. When the input address is the address of the trusted authority, a chain verification process is also needed, namely, the user presents the user entity identity, the trusted authority calculates the hash value of the user entity identity, the hash value is compared with the hash (the user entity identity) input by retrieving the transaction on the chain, if the hash value is matched with the hash value, the certification transfer transaction is executed, and the certification transfer transaction is transferred from the address of the trusted authority to the new address presented by the user. It should be noted that the receipt retrieval transaction itself does not require the involvement of a trusted authority.
In specific implementation, the public key can be recovered by using the prior art, for example, based on an elliptic curve signature mode, and the public key can be recovered according to the message and the signature.
Corresponding processing of claim 2: when the type 2 is used, the input data is parameters of a hash function in the declaration mode 2 (a section of word | | | conventional password selected by the user in the type 2| |), signature data sig and an address newly generated by the user.
Contract processing procedure: and recovering the public key according to the signature sig of the contract and the input data, and judging whether the UTXO associated with the address corresponding to the public key still exists according to the public key. If the UTXO is still legal, the contract calculates the hash value of the input data and verifies the signature by using the signature data sig. If both pass, the contract transfers the UTXO of the address corresponding to the signature private key to the input address.
In specific implementation, the above proposed method can be implemented by those skilled in the art using computer software technology to implement automatic operation process, and a system device implementing the method, such as a computer readable storage medium storing a corresponding computer program according to the technical solution of the present invention and a computer device including a corresponding computer program for operating, should also be within the scope of the present invention.
In some possible embodiments, a system for obtaining blockchain general evidence when a private key is forgotten is provided, which includes a processor and a memory, where the memory is used for storing program instructions, and the processor is used for calling the storage instructions in the processor to execute the method for obtaining blockchain general evidence when a private key is forgotten.
In some possible embodiments, a system for retrieving a blockchain general certificate when a private key is forgotten is provided, which includes a readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed, the method for retrieving a blockchain general certificate when a private key is forgotten is implemented.
For the purpose of understanding the technical effects of the present invention, an application scenario will be described below by way of example of statement 1. Suppose there are 3 personal agreements that each other is the address retrieved from the other, i.e. a the user signs with the private key of his own address: sigPrk(Hash (type 1| | b address | | | retrieve time | | | | Hash (user entity identity))), b user signs with private key of own address: sigPrk(Hash (type 1| | c address | | | retrieve time | | | | Hash (user entity identity))), c user signs with private key of own address: sigPrk(Hash (type 1| | a address | | | retrieve time | | | | Hash (user entity identity))). Assuming that after a period of time, a and b forget or lose their private keys, only c still remembers their private keys. Then a can be retrieved by the address of b and b can be retrieved by the address of c, and finally c forwards the certificate to the new address of b and b to the new address of a. Naturally, only the people who retrieve the certificate can get in a string (namely, the addresses are retrieved to form a closed loop), and the lost certificate can be retrieved as long as one of the people remembers the private key of the person. Further, theoretically, if each user randomly selects a plurality of addresses from the existing addresses as the retrieval addresses, the problem of evidence loss is basically solved.
The specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the spirit of the invention. Various modifications or additions may be made to the described embodiments or alternatives may be employed by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit or ambit of the invention as defined in the appended claims.
Claims (10)
1. A block chain general certificate retrieving method when a private key is forgotten is characterized in that: the establishment of the evidence finding frame consists of two parts,
one part is responsible for constructing declaration data which declares how the passport owner gets back the processing rules of the passport when the private key is forgotten;
the other part is responsible for executing a specific retrieving method represented by the declaration data, and the method is realized by an intelligent contract, wherein the intelligent contract firstly judges whether the input data is signed by a certification owner by a signature verification method, and when the data input by a user is matched with the signature data, the input data is processed according to an agreed processing rule, and the lost certification is retrieved.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: the statement constructing data adopts a statement mode 1, and includes that the forgotten general certificate is transferred to a certain address specified in advance when the private key is forgotten.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the method further comprises: in statement manner 1, the following process is performed,
when a user owns a UTXO, the user also owns a private key of the UTXO; the user signs with the private key of UTXO as follows:
sig＝sigPrk(Hash (type 1| | address 2| | | … | | address n | | | | retrieve time | | | Hash (user entity identity))),
and saves the signature result sig and (type 1| | address 2| | | … | | address n | | | | retrieve time),
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
sigPrk() Representing signing with the private key prk;
hash () represents a Hash function;
n represents the number of input recovery addresses, and address 1, address 2 …, address n are recovery addresses.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the method further comprises: the selection of the respective retrieved addresses entered follows the principle,
the user grasps the corresponding private key or other users grasping the private key will return the transferred UTXO to the user.
5. The method of claim 2, wherein the method further comprises: when the declaration mode 1 is adopted, the corresponding processing rule is that the input address data and the signature data are used to ensure that the forgotten pass certificate is transferred to the correct address specified in advance by verifying the legality of the input address and the legality of the signature.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: the statement constructing data adopts a statement mode 2, and comprises the step of transferring the forgotten general certificate to a new address under the statement meeting a certain condition, wherein the condition enables the intelligent contract to confirm that the user specifying the new address is the owner of the forgotten general certificate.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the method further comprises: in statement manner 2, the following process is performed,
when a user owns a UTXO, the user also owns a private key of the UTXO; the user signs with the private key of UTXO:
sig＝sigPrk(Hash (a segment of text | | | conventional password of type 2| | | user's choice)),
and saves the signature result.
8. The method of claim 6, wherein the method further comprises: when the declaration mode 2 is adopted, the corresponding processing rule is that the input data and the signature data are used for checking whether the user knows or has the condition required by the previous declaration by verifying the correctness of the input data, if so, the condition shows that the passphrase retriever is really the true owner of the forgotten passphrase, and the forgotten passphrase is transferred to the address specified by the user.
9. A blockchain credential recovery method as claimed in claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8, wherein said method further comprises: the method is used for a scenario that the block chain adopts the UTXO mode or the account mode, and is considered as a UTXO when the block chain is in the account mode, and the processing procedure of the UTXO mode is consistent with that of the UTXO mode.
10. The utility model provides a block chain general evidence when private key forgets system of getting back which characterized in that: the method for retrieving the blockchain general certificate when the private key is forgotten according to any one of claims 1 to 9.
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