CN111970238B - Reliable method for controlling safe transmission of near space airship load instruction - Google Patents
Reliable method for controlling safe transmission of near space airship load instruction Download PDFInfo
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- CN111970238B CN111970238B CN202010659003.1A CN202010659003A CN111970238B CN 111970238 B CN111970238 B CN 111970238B CN 202010659003 A CN202010659003 A CN 202010659003A CN 111970238 B CN111970238 B CN 111970238B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention relates to a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of a load instruction of an aircraft, which adopts the technical means of public key encryption, digital signature and symmetric encryption based on identity and aims to solve the problems of reliability, safety and the like of the transmission of the load instruction of the aircraft. When the airship load interacts with the commander, the aircraft approaching load A updates the instruction packet according to the flight mission and encrypts the instruction packet by using a digital signature encryption key containing the identity information of the commander B, and the two parties share the same time. And the commander B issues an instruction within a certain time T and encrypts the instruction by using a public key encryption key based on the identity information. After the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky receives the encryption instruction, the public key decryption key of the commander B is used for decryption to confirm whether the specific condition is met, and the symmetric key is used for encryption reply. And after receiving the reply of the load A of the aircraft in the sky, the commander B decrypts the load A by using the symmetric key and makes corresponding response according to different decrypted replies. Therefore, the invention has strong guarantee on safety and reliability.
Description
Technical Field
The method relates to the field of traffic instruction safe transmission control, in particular to a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of a load instruction of an aircraft airship.
Background
The development of aerospace technology greatly changes the structure of transportation, airplanes provide people with a quick, convenient, economic, safe and comfortable transportation means, international flights have replaced ocean passenger ships, become main tools for people to come and go between continents, and closely link all countries in the world. An airship is a lighter-than-air craft, and is largely distinguished from a hot air balloon by having means for propelling and controlling flight conditions. The airship consists of a huge streamline hull, a nacelle positioned below the hull, a tail surface for stabilizing and controlling and a propelling device. The special shape of the airship also determines a plurality of special purposes, and the airbag of the airship body is filled with buoyancy gas with density smaller than that of air so as to generate buoyancy force to lift the airship off. The gondola is used for passengers to take and load cargo. The tail surface is used for controlling and maintaining the stability of course and pitching.
The airship in the adjacent space has a large amount of helium filled into the air bag to make the density of the whole airship lower than that of air below 2 ten thousand meters, so that no extra power consumption is needed to maintain the height of two thousand meters. Because the low earth orbit satellite has the characteristics of needing to orbit around the earth, the low earth orbit satellite cannot be resident and monitored in a certain area for a long time, and the geosynchronous satellite is too far away from the ground, the monitoring range is wide, and the monitoring resolution is not high. The air airship can reside for a long time or in a near space area 20 kilometers above the ground, so that the concerned area can be monitored and resided for a long time, a high-resolution monitoring effect is obtained, and the air airship can be widely applied to monitoring of regional traffic conditions, natural disasters and the like in a large range.
The aircraft needs to be matched with different loads in order to realize specific functions. How to ensure safe and reliable control and management of the load of the air airship is a difficult problem which needs to be solved urgently, for example, lawless persons may tamper with a control instruction of the load, and then hijack and control the air airship to implement illegal attacks and other behaviors, so that huge economic loss and social harm are caused. At present, all schemes for controlling the load of the air airship only stay in the aspect of enhancing the reliability of communication and flight control protocols for the airship, but lack how to ensure the information security of control command transmission, and once the control command is invaded, tampered or forged by illegal molecules, great loss is brought.
Therefore, aiming at the problem of the method for transmitting the load instruction of the blinker, the method provides a reliable method for safely transmitting the load instruction of the blinker, and the safety and the reliability of controlling the transmission of the load instruction of the blinker are ensured.
Disclosure of Invention
The method provides a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of the load instruction of the aircraft airship. The method adopts technical means such as public key encryption based on identity, digital signature, integrity verification and the like, and aims to solve the problems of reliability, safety and the like of the transmission of the load instruction of the blinker in the air at present.
A method for reliably controlling safe transmission of load instructions of an aircraft airship comprises the following steps:
s1: the method involves two participants, an airborne airship payload a and a commander B running an identity-based key generation algorithm to generate a public key pair (pk, sk), a digital signature key pair (spk, ssk) and a symmetric key k, where p represents encrypted, the second s of sk and ssk represents decrypted, the first s of spk and ssk represents a digital signature;
s2: updating the command packet by the load A of the aircraft airship according to the flight mission, and encrypting the command packet by using a digital signature encryption key spk of a commander B, wherein the command packet and the commander B share the same time;
s3: command B issues instruction m within a certain time TiAnd i represents the ith instruction issued in sequence, m is encrypted by the public key encryption key pkiAnd time t at that time1Carrying out public key encryption to obtain an encryption command C ═ Epk(mi||i||t1) Wherein E represents encryption;
s4: after the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky receives the encrypted instruction C, the instruction m is obtained by decrypting the encrypted instruction sk by using the public key decryption key sk of the commander BiInstruction sequence number i and time t1. When the following four conditions are met simultaneously, the load A of the aircraft approaching to the sky replies the received instruction r and the time t at the moment2And for r and t2Obtaining an encryption command R ═ E by adopting symmetric encryptionk(r||t2)：
(1) Receiving an instruction within time T;
(2) compare the instruction packet, when miConforming to the content of the instruction packet;
(3) when the sequence numbers i are arranged in sequence;
(4) when time t is1When correctness is satisfied;
otherwise, return error instruction wrongg and time t at the moment2And for wrong and t2Obtaining an encryption command R ═ E by adopting symmetric encryptionk(wrong||t2) The instructions are detailed in table 1:
TABLE 1 error feedback code representation
| Type of error | Instruction mismatch | Sequence number error | Timestamp error | Not receiving instruction within time T |
| wrong instruction | II | IE | TE | NR |
S5: after receiving the reply of the load A of the aircraft in the sky, the commander B decrypts by adopting a symmetric key; if r is received, sending the next instruction within the time T; if wrong is received, the previous instruction is retransmitted.
The method provides a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of the load instruction of the aircraft airship, the integrity of the instruction is guaranteed by adopting a digital signature technology, and the safety is guaranteed by adopting an identity-based encryption technology.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a simplified flow chart of a method for implementing reliable control of safe transmission of a load command of an aircraft blinker, provided by the method.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, schemes and effects of the embodiments of the method clearer and clearer, the method is further described in detail by way of example with reference to the attached figure 1.
The method comprises the following specific implementation steps:
s1: the method relates to two participants of an aircraft airship load A and a commander B, wherein the commander B generates a public key pair (pk, sk), a digital signature key pair (spk, ssk) and a symmetric key k by adopting an identity-based key generation algorithm according to an IBE cryptosystem; wherein, the digital signature adopts BLS short signature to generate a digital signature key pair (spk, ssk); symmetric encryption adopts AES cryptosystem to generate a symmetric key k, wherein p represents encrypted, the second s of s and ssk in sk represents decrypted, and the first s of s and ssk in spk represents digital signature;
s2: updating the command packet by the load A of the aircraft airship according to the flight mission, and encrypting the command packet by using a digital signature encryption key spk of a commander B, wherein the command packet and the commander B share the same time;
s3: command B issues instruction m within a certain time TiAnd i represents the ith instruction issued in sequence, and m is encrypted by using a public key encryption key pkiAnd time t at this time1Carrying out public key encryption to obtain an encryption command C ═ Epk(mi||i||t1) Wherein E represents encryption;
s4: after the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky receives the encrypted instruction C, the instruction m is obtained by decrypting the encrypted instruction sk by using the public key decryption key sk of the commander BiInstruction sequence number i and time t1. When the following four conditions are met, the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky replies to receive the command r and the time t at the moment2And for r and t2Obtaining an encryption command R ═ E by adopting symmetric encryptionk(r||t2)：
(1) Receiving an instruction within time T;
(2) compare the instruction packet, when miConforming to the content of the instruction packet;
(3) when the sequence numbers i are arranged in sequence;
(4) when time t is1When correctness is satisfied;
otherwise, return error instruction wrongg and time t at the moment2And for wrong and t2Obtaining an encryption command R ═ E by adopting symmetric encryptionk(wrong||t2) The instructions are detailed in table 1:
TABLE 1 error feedback code representation
| Type of error | Instruction mismatch | Sequence number error | Timestamp error | Not receiving instruction within time T |
| wrong instruction | II | IE | TE | NR |
S5: after receiving the reply of the load A of the aircraft in the sky, the commander B decrypts by adopting a symmetric key; if r is received, sending the next instruction within the time T; if wrong is received, the previous instruction is retransmitted.
Claims (6)
1. A method for reliably controlling safe transmission of load instructions of an aircraft airship is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1: the method involves two participants, an airborne airship payload a and a commander B running an identity-based key generation algorithm to generate a public key pair (pk, sk), a digital signature key pair (spk, ssk) and a symmetric key k, where p represents encrypted, the second s of sk and ssk represents decrypted, the first s of spk and ssk represents a digital signature;
s2: updating the command packet by the load A of the aircraft airship according to the flight mission, and encrypting the command packet by using a digital signature encryption key spk of a commander B, wherein the command packet and the commander B share the same time;
s3: the commander B issues within a certain time TCloth order miAnd i represents the ith instruction issued in sequence, m is encrypted by the public key encryption key pkiAnd time t at this time1Carrying out public key encryption to obtain an encryption command C ═ Epk(mi||i||t1) Wherein E represents encryption;
s4: after the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky receives the encrypted instruction C, the instruction m is obtained by decrypting the encrypted instruction sk by using the public key decryption key sk of the commander BiInstruction sequence number i and time t1When the following four conditions are met, the load A of the aircraft flying in the sky replies to the received command r and the time t at the moment2And for r and t2Obtaining an encryption command R ═ E by adopting symmetric encryptionk(r||t2)：
(1) Receiving an instruction within time T;
(2) compare the instruction packet, when miConforming to the content of the instruction packet;
(3) when the sequence numbers i are arranged in sequence;
(4) when time t is1When correctness is satisfied;
otherwise, return error instruction wrongg and time t at the moment2And for wrong and t2Obtaining an encryption command R ═ E by adopting symmetric encryptionk(wrong||t2) The instructions are detailed in table 1:
TABLE 1 error feedback code representation
S5: after receiving the reply of the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky, the commander B decrypts by adopting a symmetric key; if r is received, the next instruction is sent within the time T; if wrong is received, the previous instruction is retransmitted.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that before sending the instruction, 3 types of keys, namely a public key pair, a digital signature key pair and a symmetric key, are generated between the commander B and the airship load A, and the encryption is carried out for 3 times in total; the public key pair and the digital signature key pair adopt a key system based on identity, namely, the public key pair and the digital signature key pair of the commander B are both related to identity information of the commander B, and the identity information comprises a user identity number, a mobile phone number, a mailbox, an address and biological characteristic information.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the blimp load A updates the command packet according to the mission and digitally signs the command packet using a digitally signed encryption key of the commander B, the two parties unifying time, the digital signature being used to ensure that the flight command cannot be destroyed, the unification ensuring the immediacy of the flight command.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein commander B encrypts the commands, the command sequence number and the command issuing time by using an identity-based encryption key for judging the correctness of the commands of the airship load A, wherein the command issuing time t for verifying the conditions1And t2Are all time instants.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the Critical airship load A decrypts the received encrypted command to obtain the command, the command sequence number and the command issuing time, and verifies the correctness of the command, the command sequence number and the command issuing time; in the face of different conditions, the oncoming airship carries out encryption reply by adopting the symmetric key k, and if the load A of the oncoming airship does not receive an instruction within the time T, the load A of the oncoming airship carries out encryption reply by adopting the symmetric key.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the execution subject of the 3 encryptions performed in the process is different, according to the flight mission update instruction packet, the airborne airship load A is firstly encrypted with a digital signature, and the execution subject is the airborne airship load A; then, the commander B performs public key encryption on the sent instruction according to the instruction, the instruction sequence number and the instruction issuing time, wherein the public key encryption is secondary encryption, and the execution main body is the commander B; after receiving the instruction of the commander B, the load A of the aircraft flying in the sky carries out different replies according to conditions, the replies are symmetrically encrypted for three times, and the execution main body is the load A of the aircraft flying in the sky; and the commander B confirms whether the command is safely delivered or not according to the received reply of the load A of the aircraft approaching the sky, determines the next action and encrypts by adopting a symmetric key during the reply.
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