CN111679298B - Integrity monitoring method and device of navigation system and electronic equipment - Google Patents

Integrity monitoring method and device of navigation system and electronic equipment Download PDF

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CN111679298B
CN111679298B CN202010387470.3A CN202010387470A CN111679298B CN 111679298 B CN111679298 B CN 111679298B CN 202010387470 A CN202010387470 A CN 202010387470A CN 111679298 B CN111679298 B CN 111679298B
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track
integrity
value
estimation
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CN111679298A (en
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孟骞
许立达
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Shenzhen Research Institute HKPU
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13Receivers
    • G01S19/23Testing, monitoring, correcting or calibrating of receiver elements
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13Receivers
    • G01S19/20Integrity monitoring, fault detection or fault isolation of space segment

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Abstract

The application is applicable to the field of navigation, and provides an integrity monitoring method, an integrity monitoring device, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium of a navigation system, wherein the method comprises the following steps: acquiring a track true value and a navigation signal which are output by a signal simulator and are associated with a carrier motion process; acquiring the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator, wherein the missing simulation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator misses out to output the navigation signal compared with the real carrier motion process; inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system; comparing the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number; and calculating to obtain an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and the preset integrity risk sum. By the aid of the method and the device, most of integrity risks are borne by the signal simulator, and pressure and complexity of online integrity monitoring of the navigation system are reduced.

Description

Integrity monitoring method and device of navigation system and electronic equipment
Technical Field
The application belongs to the technical field of navigation, and particularly relates to an integrity monitoring method, an integrity monitoring device, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium of a navigation system.
Background
Integrity (Integrity) is a quantitative indicator of confidence of positioning information provided by a navigation system, and comprises the capability of timely giving an alarm to a user when the system cannot meet navigation requirements, and is a representative indicator for evaluating navigation safety. Integrity monitoring was originally applied to performance evaluation of global satellite navigation systems (Global Navigation Satellite System, GNSS) and is well-established and generalized in the field of civilian aviation. However, current integrity monitoring is severely dependent on online computing of the navigation system, which results in greater difficulty in integrity monitoring of current navigation systems, given that the online computing process of navigation systems tends to be complex.
Disclosure of Invention
The utility model provides an integrity monitoring method, an integrity monitoring device, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium of a navigation system, which can reduce the difficulty of integrity monitoring of the navigation system.
In a first aspect, the present application provides a method for monitoring the integrity of a navigation system, including:
Obtaining a track true value and a navigation signal output by a signal simulator, wherein the navigation signal and the track true value are related to a carrier motion process;
acquiring the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator, wherein the missing simulation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator missing the navigation signal output compared with the real carrier motion process;
inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system;
comparing the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number, wherein the error positioning number is the number of positioning points with errors when the track estimation value is compared with the track true value;
and calculating to obtain an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and a preset integrity risk sum, wherein the total positioning number is the number of positioning points contained in the track estimation value.
In a second aspect, the present application provides an integrity monitoring apparatus of a navigation system, comprising:
the first acquisition unit is used for acquiring a track true value and a navigation signal output by the signal simulator, wherein the navigation signal and the track true value are related to a carrier motion process;
The second acquisition unit is used for acquiring the missing imitation probability of the signal simulator, wherein the missing imitation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator missing the output navigation signal compared with the real carrier movement process;
the navigation output unit is used for inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system;
a track comparison unit, configured to compare the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number, where the error positioning number is the number of positioning points where an error exists between the track estimation value and the track true value;
and a result calculation unit, configured to calculate an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, a total positioning number of the track estimation value, and a preset integrity risk sum, where the total positioning number is the number of positioning points included in the track estimation value.
In a third aspect, the present application provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the method as in the first aspect when the computer program is executed.
In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer readable storage medium storing a computer program which when executed by a processor performs the steps of the method as in the first aspect.
In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising a computer program which, when executed by one or more processors, implements the steps of the method as in the first aspect.
From the above, in the present application, firstly, a trace true value and a navigation signal output by a signal simulator are obtained, and a missing simulation probability of the signal simulator is obtained, then the navigation signal is input to a navigation system to be tested, so as to obtain a trace estimated value output by the navigation system, then the trace estimated value is compared with the trace true value, so as to obtain an error positioning number, and finally, an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system is calculated based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the trace estimated value and a preset integrity risk sum. According to the method and the device, a part of integrity risk is transferred to the signal simulator, so that the pressure and complexity of online integrity monitoring of the navigation system are reduced. It will be appreciated that the advantages of the second to fifth aspects may be seen from the relevant description of the first aspect, and will not be repeated here.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the following description will briefly introduce the drawings that are needed in the embodiments or the description of the prior art, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of an implementation of an integrity monitoring method of a navigation system according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 2 is an example diagram of an integrity risk distribution tree model provided by an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of integrity analysis optimization provided by an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an integrity monitoring apparatus of a navigation system provided in an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application.
Detailed Description
In the following description, for purposes of explanation and not limitation, specific details are set forth, such as particular system configurations, techniques, etc. in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the present application. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present application may be practiced in other embodiments that depart from these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the present application with unnecessary detail.
In the prior art, the core of the integrity monitoring of autonomous navigation of a GNSS is to provide a confidence level satisfying a given probability for a positioning result on line, and the core equation is as follows:
Figure SMS_1
/>
wherein the method comprises the steps of
Figure SMS_2
Indicating positioning error, PL indicating protection level, AL indicating alarm threshold, PHMI being risk misleading information probability, i.e. integrity risk. The warning threshold is set according to the prior safety requirements of each stage of civil aviation, and solving of the protection level needs to solve two problems: firstly, whether the calculated protection level meets a given integrity risk; and whether the protection level faithfully reflects the absolute physical relationship between the positioning error and the alarm threshold. The calculation of the protection level has two major difficulties: firstly, a clearer understanding of an error distribution model of a positioning system is needed; and secondly, a strict mathematical relationship from the test statistic to the positioning error is constructed. In order to overcome the above difficulties, the protection level is often calculated by adopting an overstepping (overstepping) manner, which makes the obtained protection level have great redundancy, and the true distribution of positioning errors can not be reflected, so that the problems of false alarm and/or false alarm and the like occur. Based on the above, the present application proposes an integrity monitoring method, an integrity monitoring device, an electronic device and a computer readable storage medium for a navigation system, which skip the difficulty of calculating the protection level, reduce the pressure and complexity of online autonomous integrity monitoring, and make the determination of the unavailability of the integrity of the navigation system more accurate. In order to illustrate the technical solutions proposed in the embodiments of the present application, the following description is made by specific embodiments.
Example 1
An integrity monitoring method of a navigation system provided in an embodiment of the present application is described below. Referring to fig. 1, the integrity monitoring method includes:
step 101, obtaining the trace true value and the navigation signal output by the signal simulator.
In the embodiment of the application, a signal simulator is introduced first, and the signal simulator can output a track true value and a navigation signal in the carrier movement process. In the navigation field, development and commercialization of signal simulators have been mature. Current signal simulators have enabled more diversification and realisation of reproduced application scenarios, carrier dynamics and output of sensor signals (i.e. navigation signals), which provides technical support and feasibility for verifying the integrity of navigation systems off-line. The signal simulator can simulate a small probability event which is difficult to occur in an actual test by combining Monte Carlo simulation on the basis of big data analysis and machine learning. The Monte Carlo simulation is simulated mathematically by grasping the geometric number and geometric characteristics of the motion of the object, i.e., a digital simulation experiment is performed. In general, monte Carlo simulation can be generalized to three main steps: constructing or describing a probabilistic process; sampling from a known probability distribution; various estimators are established. Therefore, in the embodiment of the application, the off-line integrity monitoring of the navigation system is realized by introducing a signal simulator with higher reliability and based on the navigation signal and the track true value output by the simulation function and/or the reproduction function of the signal simulator, so that the traditional on-line integrity monitoring is reduced or even finally replaced. The true value of the track can be regarded as a track observation value in the carrier movement process.
Specifically, the simulation function of the signal simulator is: the signal simulator can simulate and give out the output of various sensors in a typical scene in the carrier movement process according to a given movement track, wherein the output comprises a standard signal, a fault signal, an abnormal signal and the like. The standard signal is a signal which only contains Gaussian white noise except the normal output of the sensor; the fault signal is a signal caused by the fault of the sensor; the abnormal signal is a signal caused by a problem of complex scene and the like. For example, the signal simulator simulates a satellite signal for a period of 100 seconds, and the specific scenario is: the first 50 seconds is in an open area; the middle 40 seconds is the area where there are many tall buildings in the city (this results in many satellites being blocked); the last 10 seconds the satellite failed. Then the navigation signal obtained is simulated: the first 50 seconds is the standard signal; the satellite may be unavailable due to the blocking of the high-rise building in the middle 40 seconds, and abnormal signals of standard signals and reflected signals are mixed together; the last 10 seconds is the fault signal.
Specifically, the reproduction function of the signal simulator is: the signal simulator can store and re-output the navigation signals acquired in the real test process.
Step 102, obtaining the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator.
In the embodiment of the application, the missing simulation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator missing the output navigation signal compared with the real carrier motion process. It is also understood that the missing probability is used to indicate the probability that the signal simulator is not outputting, but that there is actually a navigation signal during the movement of the carrier. The embodiment of the application adds the integrity risk sum P risk Split into two parts, on-line and off-line. Wherein, integrity risk sum P risk An on-line integrity risk P is a predetermined value risk,oline On-line estimation by navigation system, off-line integrity risk P risk,offline Is undertaken by the signal simulator. In the embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned missing simulation probability is numerically equal to the on-line integrity risk P risk,oline The relationship can be expressed as:
P MS =P risk,online =P risk -P risk,offline
wherein P is MS To miss the imitative probability, P risk,oline P is an on-line integrity risk risk P, being the integrity risk sum risk,oline Is an off-line integrity risk.
In particular, the offline integrity risk may be determined by a preset integrity risk distribution tree model. Referring to fig. 2, fig. 2 shows a simple example of an integrity risk distribution tree model. Assume a total integrity risk of 10 -7 In conventional autonomous integrity monitoring, the integrity risk needs to be completed by the online algorithm of the navigation system, that is, the online algorithm needs to monitor several failure modes to meet the requirements of the integrity risk of the navigation system, which results in that the online algorithm technology is often relatively higherComplex and computationally expensive. Whereas in the present embodiment, most of the integrity risk may be borne by the signal simulator, represented in fig. 2 as a priori integrity risk (i.e., off-line integrity risk). The more perfect the signal simulator functions, the more integrity risks are shared, the prior integrity risk ratio shown in fig. 2 can be more than 99%, the integrity risks to be monitored by the online algorithm are significantly reduced, and the pressure and the computational complexity are greatly relieved, wherein the integrity risks are only about 1% of the total integrity risks. Meanwhile, the signal simulator may further assign integrity risks to the subsystems, where the relationship among the integrity risk sum, the on-line integrity risk, and the off-line integrity risk may be expressed as:
P risk =P risk,online +P risk,offline
=P risk,online +(P risk,offline,sub1 +P risk,offline,sub2 +...+P risk,offline,subn )
wherein P is risk,offline,sub1 ,P risk,offline,sub2 ,...P risk,offline,subn May be used to represent the integrity risk assumed by the various subsystems in the signal simulator. For example, the signal simulator may be partitioned into a scene subsystem corresponding to the scene integrity risk of fig. 2; meanwhile, a moving body (i.e. carrier) state subsystem is divided, and the moving body state integrity risk of fig. 2 is corresponded; a sensor subsystem may also be partitioned, corresponding to the sensor integrity risk of fig. 2. It can be seen that, in this embodiment of the present application, the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator may be determined according to a preset integrity risk distribution tree model, and then the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator is obtained based on the integrity risk sum and the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator, specifically, the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator is obtained by subtracting the integrity risk sum of each subsystem from the integrity risk sum (i.e., subtracting the off-line integrity risk from the integrity risk sum).
It will be appreciated that the integrity risk distribution tree model may remain unchanged or may change dynamically during the integrity monitoring process, and is not limited herein.
Step 103, inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system.
In the embodiment of the application, the navigation signal output by the signal simulator is output to a navigation system to be checked, and the navigation system is the object to be monitored for integrity. The navigation signal can be preprocessed, navigation filtered and optimized, fault detected and isolated and/or position resolved by a navigation system, and the navigation system finally outputs a track estimated value obtained based on the navigation signal. It is believed that the trajectory estimation is predicted by the navigation system based on the navigation signal, and thus, the trajectory estimation is typically different from the trajectory truth. It should be noted that, the navigation system is used as an object for integrity monitoring, and the scheme does not care about what kind of processing is specifically performed on the navigation signal in the navigation system; that is, the navigation system is regarded as a black box, and only the track estimation value output by the navigation system after the navigation signal is input to the navigation system is considered; that is, the present solution only concerns the input and output of the navigation system.
And 104, comparing the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number.
In the embodiment of the application, the number of the positioning points in the track estimation value is the same as the number of the positioning points in the track true value, wherein each positioning point in the track estimation value and each positioning point in the track true value show a one-to-one correspondence. For convenience of explanation, the anchor points in the track estimation values are denoted as anchor estimation points, and the anchor points in the track truth values are denoted as track truth points. It can be simply understood that a first setpoint in the track estimate corresponds to a first setpoint in the track truth, a second setpoint in the track estimate corresponds to a second setpoint in the track truth, and so on. To obtain the number of error positions, it is possible to detect whether there is an error between each pair of the corresponding positioning estimation points and the positioning truth points, and determine the number of positioning estimation points having an error with the corresponding positioning truth points as the number of error positions.
Alternatively, more than two coordinate axes are often involved in the integrity monitoring process. For any coordinate axis associated with integrity monitoring, a component difference between a positioning estimation point and a corresponding positioning truth point on the coordinate axis can be calculated, and if the component difference is greater than a preset alarm threshold, an error exists between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point. It should be noted that the alarm threshold is associated with a coordinate axis. For example, assume that the coordinate system associated with the present integrity monitoring is a two-dimensional coordinate system composed of a horizontal coordinate axis and a vertical coordinate axis. As long as the difference between the component of a positioning estimation point on the vertical coordinate axis and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the vertical coordinate axis (i.e. the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the vertical coordinate axis) is greater than a preset vertical alarm threshold, and/or the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point on the horizontal coordinate axis and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the horizontal coordinate axis (i.e. the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the horizontal coordinate axis) is greater than a preset horizontal alarm threshold, the error between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point can be confirmed. Otherwise, if the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point on the vertical coordinate axis and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the vertical coordinate axis (i.e., the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the vertical coordinate axis) is smaller than or equal to the preset vertical alarm threshold, and the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point on the horizontal coordinate axis and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the horizontal coordinate axis (i.e., the difference between the component of the positioning estimation point and the component of the corresponding positioning truth point on the horizontal coordinate axis) is smaller than or equal to the preset horizontal alarm threshold, it can be confirmed that the error between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point is negligible.
For a better understanding of the error locator statistics, a statistical formula is given below:
N risk =N risk +1 if(PE (q) >AL (q) )
wherein N is risk An initial value of 0, which is used for representing the error positioning number; PE is used for representing a component difference value between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning true value point; AL is used for representing an alarm threshold; subscript of (q) The coordinate axis used for representing the position is q coordinate axis; that is, PE (q) The component difference value of the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning true value point on the q coordinate axis is obtained; AL (AL) (q) Is the alarm threshold associated with the q coordinate axis.
Referring to fig. 3, a conventional Stanford analysis chart (Stanford Plot) based on a protection level is shown on the left side of fig. 3, and an analysis chart obtained by using the embodiment of the present application is shown on the right side. In the Steady analysis chart, there are six cases according to the magnitude relation of the component difference PE, the protection level PL and the alarm threshold AL, wherein:
1. PE < PL < AL: the component difference value is smaller than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is available; and the calculated protection level correct envelope component difference is less than the alarm threshold. Under the scene, the navigation system has correct decision, and belongs to an ideal normal working state;
2. PL < PE < AL: the component difference value is smaller than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is available; but the estimated protection level is not the correct envelope component difference. Under the scene, the navigation system makes a correct decision, but the protection level calculation fails, and the navigation system belongs to misleading information events;
3. PL < AL < PE: the component difference is larger than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is not practically usable; but the calculated protection level is less than the alarm threshold. Under the scene, the navigation system outputs normal work, the decision is incorrect, and the protection level calculation fails, thus the navigation system belongs to dangerous misleading information;
4. PE < AL < PL: the component difference value is smaller than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is available; however, the calculated protection level redundancy is too large and exceeds the alarm threshold, resulting in an alarm. Under the scene, the decision of the navigation system is incorrect, and the protection level calculation fails, and the navigation system belongs to a false alarm event;
5. AL < PE < PL: the component difference is larger than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is not practically usable; the calculated protection level correctly envelopes the component difference. In this scenario, the navigation system makes the right decisions.
6. AL < PL < PE: the component difference is larger than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is not practically usable; the calculated protection level is greater than the alarm threshold but less than the component difference. Under the scene, the navigation system has correct decision, but the protection level calculation fails, and belongs to misleading information events.
It can be seen that in the Stanford analysis graph, the decision of integrity is complicated by the presence of a level of protection. On the contrary, in the analysis chart obtained by the embodiment of the application, the link of calculating the protection level is skipped, and the component difference value and the alarm threshold are directly compared, so that the number of scenes is greatly reduced. Two possible scenarios obtained with embodiments of the present application are given below:
1. PE is less than or equal to AL: the component difference value is smaller than or equal to the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is available; the navigation system makes the right decision.
2. AL < PE: the component difference is larger than the alarm threshold, and the navigation system is not available; the navigation system makes the right decision.
Compared with the existing Steady analysis chart, the decision analysis process provided by the embodiment of the application is greatly simplified, and the calculation result does not have any misleading information or incorrect decision, so that the integrity monitoring of the navigation system is more direct and accurate.
Step 105, calculating to obtain the integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and the preset integrity risk sum.
In the embodiment of the present application, the total positioning number of the track estimation value is the number of positioning points included in the track estimation value, that is, the number of positioning estimation points. Specifically, according to a preset integrity calculation formula, an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system, specifically an a priori integrity monitoring result, can be obtained based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number and the integrity risk sum. The integrity calculation formula is:
Figure SMS_3
Wherein P is prior,risk For the integrity monitoring result obtained by calculation, N risk To fix the number of errors, N total To the total number of positions, P MS To miss the imitative probability, P risk Is the sum of integrity risks.
From the above, the embodiment of the application transfers a part of integrity risk to the signal simulator, reduces the pressure and complexity of online integrity monitoring of the navigation system, and facilitates improvement and optimization of the safety of the navigation system. Meanwhile, the embodiment of the application skips the difficult problem of calculating the protection level, so that the obtained integrity monitoring result of the navigation system is more accurate.
It should be understood that the sequence number of each step in the foregoing embodiment does not mean that the execution sequence of each process should be determined by the function and the internal logic of each process, and should not limit the implementation process of the embodiment of the present application in any way.
Example two
An embodiment II of the application provides an integrity monitoring device of a navigation system. As shown in fig. 4, the integrity monitoring apparatus 400 in the embodiment of the present application includes:
a first obtaining unit 401, configured to obtain a trajectory truth value and a navigation signal output by the signal simulator, where the navigation signal and the trajectory truth value are associated with a carrier motion process;
A second obtaining unit 402, configured to obtain a missing simulation probability of the signal simulator, where the missing simulation probability is used to indicate a probability that the signal simulator misses the output navigation signal compared with a real carrier motion process;
a navigation output unit 403, configured to input the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked, to obtain a track estimation value output by the navigation system;
a track comparison unit 404, configured to compare the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number, where the error positioning number is the number of positioning points where an error exists between the track estimation value and the track true value;
and a result calculation unit 405, configured to calculate, based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value, and a preset integrity risk sum, obtain an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system, where the error positioning number is the number of positioning points where an error exists in the track estimation value compared to the track true value.
Optionally, the positioning point in the track estimation value is recorded as a positioning estimation point, the positioning point in the track truth value is a positioning truth value point, and the track comparison unit 404 includes:
An error detection subunit, configured to determine, for each positioning estimation point in the trajectory estimation value, a positioning truth point corresponding to the positioning estimation point in the trajectory truth value, and detect whether an error exists between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point;
and the quantity counting subunit is used for determining the quantity of the positioning estimation points with errors corresponding to the positioning truth points as the error positioning quantity.
Optionally, the error detection subunit includes:
a component difference calculating subunit, configured to calculate, under a target coordinate axis, a component difference between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point, where the target coordinate axis is any coordinate axis associated with integrity monitoring;
and the error determination subunit is used for determining that the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point have errors if the component difference value is larger than a preset alarm threshold, wherein the alarm threshold is related to the target coordinate axis.
Optionally, the second acquiring unit 402 includes:
a subsystem integrity risk determining subunit, configured to determine an integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator according to a preset integrity risk distribution tree model;
And the missing simulation probability calculation subunit is used for calculating the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator based on the preset integrity risk sum and the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator.
Optionally, the result calculation unit 405 is specifically configured to calculate, according to a preset integrity calculation formula, an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the trajectory estimation value, and the integrity risk sum, where the integrity calculation formula is:
Figure SMS_4
/>
wherein, P is as described above prior,risk For the integrity monitoring result, the N is risk For the error positioning number, the N is total For the total positioning number, P is MS For the missing simulation probability, the P is risk Is the sum of the integrity risks.
Optionally, the first obtaining unit 401 is specifically configured to obtain the trajectory truth value and the navigation signal output by the signal simulator through the playback function or the simulation function.
From the above, the embodiment of the application transfers a part of integrity risk to the signal simulator, reduces the pressure and complexity of online integrity monitoring of the navigation system, and facilitates improvement and optimization of the safety of the navigation system. Meanwhile, the embodiment of the application skips the difficult problem of calculating the protection level, so that the obtained integrity monitoring result of the navigation system is more accurate.
Example III
Referring to fig. 5, an electronic device 5 in the third embodiment of the present application includes: memory 501, one or more processors 502 (only one shown in fig. 5) and computer programs stored on memory 501 and executable on the processors. Wherein: the memory 501 is used for storing software programs and units, and the processor 502 executes various functional applications and data processing by running the software programs and units stored in the memory 501 to obtain resources corresponding to the preset events. Specifically, the processor 502 realizes the following steps by running the above-described computer program stored in the memory 501:
obtaining a track true value and a navigation signal output by a signal simulator, wherein the navigation signal and the track true value are related to a carrier motion process;
acquiring the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator, wherein the missing simulation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator missing the navigation signal output compared with the real carrier motion process;
inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system;
Comparing the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number, wherein the error positioning number is the number of positioning points with errors when the track estimation value is compared with the track true value;
and calculating to obtain an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and a preset integrity risk sum, wherein the total positioning number is the number of positioning points contained in the track estimation value.
In a second possible implementation provided by the first possible implementation, assuming that the first possible implementation is the first possible implementation, the comparing the trajectory estimation value with the trajectory true value to obtain an error locator includes:
recording a locating point in the track estimation value as a locating estimation point, and recording a locating point in the track truth value as a locating truth value point, determining a locating truth value point corresponding to the locating estimation point in the track truth value for each locating estimation point in the track estimation value, and detecting whether errors exist between the locating estimation point and the corresponding locating truth value point;
And determining the number of positioning estimation points with errors corresponding to the positioning true value points as the error positioning number.
In a third possible implementation manner provided by the second possible implementation manner, the detecting whether the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning true value point have errors includes:
calculating a component difference value between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point under a target coordinate axis, wherein the target coordinate axis is any coordinate axis related to integrity monitoring;
if the component difference is greater than a preset alarm threshold, determining that an error exists between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point, wherein the alarm threshold is associated with the target coordinate axis.
In a fourth possible implementation manner provided by the one possible implementation manner, the obtaining the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator includes:
determining the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator according to a preset integrity risk distribution tree model;
and calculating the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator based on a preset integrity risk sum and the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator.
In a fifth possible implementation manner provided by the one possible implementation manner, the calculating to obtain the integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the trajectory estimation value and a preset integrity risk sum includes:
calculating according to a preset integrity calculation formula, based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and the integrity risk sum, obtaining an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system, wherein the integrity calculation formula is as follows:
Figure SMS_5
wherein, P is as described above prior,risk For the integrity monitoring result, the N is risk For the error positioning number, the N is total For the total positioning number, P is MS For the missing simulation probability, the P is risk Is the sum of the integrity risks.
In a sixth possible implementation manner provided by the first possible implementation manner, the acquiring the trajectory truth value and the navigation signal output by the signal simulator includes:
and acquiring a track true value and a navigation signal which are output by the signal simulator through a replay function or a simulation function.
It should be appreciated that in embodiments of the present application, the processor 502 may be a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), which may also be other general purpose processors, digital signal processors (Digital Signal Processor, DSPs), application specific integrated circuits (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASICs), off-the-shelf programmable gate arrays (Field-Programmable Gate Array, FPGAs) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, or the like. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.
Memory 501 may include read only memory and random access memory and provides instructions and data to processor 502. Some or all of memory 501 may also include non-volatile random access memory. For example, the memory 501 may also store information of a device class.
From the above, in the embodiment of the present application, a part of integrity risk is transferred to the signal simulator, so that the pressure and complexity of online integrity monitoring of the navigation system are reduced, and the safety of the navigation system is conveniently improved and optimized. Meanwhile, the embodiment of the application skips the difficult problem of calculating the protection level, so that the obtained integrity monitoring result of the navigation system is more accurate.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, only the above-described division of the functional units and modules is illustrated, and in practical application, the above-described functional distribution may be performed by different functional units and modules according to needs, i.e. the internal structure of the apparatus is divided into different functional units or modules to perform all or part of the above-described functions. The functional units and modules in the embodiment may be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated in one unit, where the integrated units may be implemented in a form of hardware or a form of a software functional unit. In addition, specific names of the functional units and modules are only for convenience of distinguishing from each other, and are not used for limiting the protection scope of the present application. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above system may refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiment, which is not described herein again.
In the foregoing embodiments, the descriptions of the embodiments are emphasized, and in part, not described or illustrated in any particular embodiment, reference is made to the related descriptions of other embodiments.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the various illustrative elements and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, or combinations of external device software and electronic hardware. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present application.
In the embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method may be implemented in other manners. For example, the system embodiments described above are merely illustrative, e.g., the division of modules or units described above is merely a logical functional division, and there may be additional divisions when actually implemented, e.g., multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not performed. Alternatively, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection via interfaces, devices or units, which may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed over a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
The integrated units described above, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as stand-alone products, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the present application implements all or part of the flow of the method of the above-described embodiments, or may be implemented by a computer program to instruct associated hardware, where the computer program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, where the computer program, when executed by a processor, may implement the steps of each of the method embodiments described above. The computer program comprises computer program code, and the computer program code can be in a source code form, an object code form, an executable file or some intermediate form and the like. The above computer readable storage medium may include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code described above, a recording medium, a U disk, a removable hard disk, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a computer readable Memory, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a random access Memory (RAM, random Access Memory), an electrical carrier wave signal, a telecommunications signal, a software distribution medium, and so forth. It should be noted that the content of the computer readable storage medium described above may be appropriately increased or decreased according to the requirements of the jurisdiction's legislation and the patent practice, for example, in some jurisdictions, the computer readable storage medium does not include electrical carrier signals and telecommunication signals according to the legislation and the patent practice.
The above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical solution of the present application, and are not limiting thereof; although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it should be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical scheme described in the foregoing embodiments can be modified or some technical features thereof can be replaced by equivalents; such modifications and substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, and are intended to be included in the scope of the present application.

Claims (10)

1. A method for integrity monitoring of a navigation system, comprising:
acquiring a track true value and a navigation signal output by a signal simulator, wherein the navigation signal and the track true value are associated with a carrier motion process;
obtaining the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator, wherein the missing simulation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator missing the navigation signal output compared with the real carrier motion process;
inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system;
comparing the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number, wherein the error positioning number is the number of positioning points with errors when the track estimation value is compared with the track true value;
And calculating to obtain an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and a preset integrity risk sum, wherein the total positioning number is the number of positioning points contained in the track estimation value.
2. The method of integrity monitoring as set forth in claim 1, wherein said comparing the trajectory estimation value with the trajectory truth value to obtain an error locator number comprises:
recording positioning points in the track estimation values as positioning estimation points, wherein the positioning points in the track truth values are positioning truth value points, determining positioning truth value points corresponding to the positioning estimation points in the track truth values for each positioning estimation point in the track estimation values, and detecting whether errors exist between the positioning estimation points and the corresponding positioning truth value points;
and determining the number of the positioning estimation points with errors corresponding to the positioning true value points as the error positioning number.
3. The integrity monitoring method of claim 2 wherein said detecting whether said location estimate point is in error with said corresponding location true point comprises:
Calculating a component difference value between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth value point under a target coordinate axis, wherein the target coordinate axis is any coordinate axis related to integrity monitoring;
if the component difference value is larger than a preset alarm threshold, determining that an error exists between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth value point, wherein the alarm threshold is associated with the target coordinate axis.
4. The method of integrity monitoring of claim 1, wherein said obtaining a missing simulation probability of the signal simulator comprises:
determining the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator according to a preset integrity risk distribution tree model;
and calculating the missing simulation probability of the signal simulator based on a preset integrity risk sum and the integrity risk of each subsystem in the signal simulator.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the calculating the integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error localization number, the total localization number of the trajectory estimation values, and a preset integrity risk sum comprises:
Calculating according to a preset integrity calculation formula, and obtaining an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and the integrity risk sum, wherein the integrity calculation formula is as follows:
Figure FDA0002484589660000021
/>
wherein the P is prior,risk For the integrity monitoring result, the N risk To fix the number of errors, the N total For the total positioning number, the P MS For the missing simulation probability, the P risk Is the integrity risk sum.
6. The method of integrity monitoring as set forth in claim 1, wherein said obtaining trace truth values and navigation signals output by a signal simulator comprises:
and acquiring a track true value and a navigation signal which are output by the signal simulator through a replay function or a simulation function.
7. An integrity monitoring device of a navigation system, comprising:
the first acquisition unit is used for acquiring a track true value and a navigation signal output by the signal simulator, wherein the navigation signal and the track true value are related to a carrier motion process;
the second acquisition unit is used for acquiring the missing imitation probability of the signal simulator, wherein the missing imitation probability is used for indicating the probability that the signal simulator missing the output navigation signal compared with the real carrier movement process;
The navigation output unit is used for inputting the navigation signal to a navigation system to be checked to obtain a track estimated value output by the navigation system;
the track comparison unit is used for comparing the track estimation value with the track true value to obtain an error positioning number, wherein the error positioning number is the number of positioning points with errors when the track estimation value is compared with the track true value;
and the result calculation unit is used for calculating and obtaining an integrity monitoring result of the navigation system based on the missing simulation probability, the error positioning number, the total positioning number of the track estimation value and a preset integrity risk sum, wherein the total positioning number is the number of positioning points contained in the track estimation value.
8. The integrity monitoring apparatus of claim 7, wherein anchor points in the trace estimate are anchor estimate points, anchor points in the trace truth are anchor truth points, the trace comparison unit comprising:
an error detection subunit, configured to determine, for each positioning estimation point in the trajectory estimation value, a positioning truth point corresponding to the positioning estimation point in the trajectory truth value, and detect whether an error exists between the positioning estimation point and the corresponding positioning truth point;
And the quantity counting subunit is used for determining the quantity of the positioning estimation points with errors corresponding to the positioning truth points as the error positioning quantity.
9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that the processor implements the method according to any of claims 1 to 6 when executing the computer program.
10. A computer readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that the computer program when executed by a processor implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.
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