CN111539718A - Block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on side chain - Google Patents

Block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on side chain Download PDF

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CN111539718A
CN111539718A CN202010062108.9A CN202010062108A CN111539718A CN 111539718 A CN111539718 A CN 111539718A CN 202010062108 A CN202010062108 A CN 202010062108A CN 111539718 A CN111539718 A CN 111539718A
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message
tgs
user
chain
signature information
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CN111539718B (en
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王堃
孙雁飞
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Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management

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Abstract

A block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on a side chain comprises the following steps: the server S obtains K through calculationc,sAlso using the public key KPcVerifying signature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) Verification of the Authentication code2Generated by user C; the server S utilizes the private key KRsTicket for decrypting billsObtain the parameter Q4And signature information
Figure DDA0002374497320000011
Reusing TGS in Block chain B2Public key KPtgs2Verifying signature information
Figure DDA0002374497320000012
Server S using secret key Kc,sAuthentication of decrypted Authentication codes2Judging the Random number Random4Value of (D) and TicketsThe parameter values in (1) are consistent; when the authentication of the user C is completed, the server S constructs a message M10By usingSession key pair message M for user C and server S in blockchain A10Encryption is performed. Compared with the prior art, the invention ensures the effectiveness and the rigor of the authentication process, and improves the safety performance while ensuring the authentication of the cross-chain transaction.

Description

Block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on side chain
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of block chains, and particularly relates to a block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on a side chain.
Background
The blockchain is essentially a distributed shared account book, and the core problem solved by the blockchain is how to enable two mutually untrusted parties in a peer-to-peer network to trust each other and to securely conduct transactions without a trust background. In the block chain, transactions in a certain time period form blocks after being processed by a cryptographic algorithm so as to record confirmation information of the transactions, and the blocks are mutually related and connected in series to form a head-to-tail related block chain.
All transactions in the block chain go through the following five processes and are finally recorded into the book, and assuming that the transaction in the block chain is transferred from A to B, the specific process is as follows:
the first step is as follows: encrypting the previous transaction by using the public key of the payee B to obtain a hash value h, encrypting h by using the private key of the payer A to obtain a digital signature, attaching the signature to a transaction list, and sending the transaction list to the payee B, thereby successfully creating a new transaction;
the second step is that: payer A broadcasts the transaction order to other nodes in the whole network in the P2P network, and the other nodes record the transaction order into a block;
the third step: each node strives to calculate the hash value of the characteristics so as to carry out workload certification, thereby obtaining the accounting right and corresponding rewards;
the fourth step: the first node which calculates the result broadcasts a block containing the transaction to other nodes in the whole network, and attaches a timestamp, and each broadcasted node verifies the block;
the fifth step: after other nodes verify that all transactions in the block are correct, the block is synchronized to the block chain of all nodes in the whole network, and then the account book is recorded.
The existing single-chain authentication technology is mainly divided into the following three stages:
the first stage is as follows: the client C requests the authentication server AS to issue a permission ticket to access the ticket granting server TGS. The AS sends back an encrypted ticket, the encryption key being derived from the user password. When the response reaches the client, the client prompts user C to enter a password, thereby generating a key and attempting to decrypt the received message. If the password is correct, the bill can be correctly recovered.
And a second stage: the client C accesses the TGS to obtain a service license ticket for accessing the server S. The TGS decrypts the received license ticket, and verifies whether the decryption is successful by checking whether the ID of the TGS exists. The ticket life cycle is then checked to ensure that the ticket is not expired. And finally, comparing whether the user information in the ticket is consistent with the user information in the received data packet or not, determining that the user is a legal user according to the user information, and sending a service permission ticket.
And a third stage: the client C accesses the server S with the service ticket and performs mutual authentication.
The above prior art scheme can only perform effective authentication on single-chain transactions within a blockchain, but is not applicable to user authentication required by cross-chain transactions.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provide a block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on a side chain, so that the validity and the rigor of an identity authentication process are ensured, and the safety performance is improved while the cross-chain transaction identity authentication is ensured.
The invention provides a block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on a side chain, which comprises the following steps,
step S1, user C of block chain B constructs message Q1Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure BDA0002374497300000021
using private key KRcTo Q1Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000022
Using message Q1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000023
Constructing a message M1(ii) a Using AS1The public key KR of (what meaning)cFor message M1Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M1AS sent to Block chain A1；
Step (ii) ofS2、AS1Using a private key
Figure BDA0002374497300000024
Decrypting message M1Obtaining a message Q1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000025
Using the public key KRcVerifying signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000026
Sending out for the user C; AS1Looking up a local database according to the message Q1ID of (1)cConfirming the existence and the legality of the user C; when user C is confirmed to be legal, AS1Construct access TGS1The bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000027
Signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000028
Is AS1Using a private key
Figure BDA0002374497300000029
To Q2Signature information of AS1By TGS1Public key pair bill
Figure BDA00023744973000000210
Performs encryption, AS1To the note
Figure BDA00023744973000000211
Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000031
AS1According to access TGS1The bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000032
Address IDtgs1Random number Random1+1 and signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000033
Constructing a message M2Using public key of user C to message M2Encrypting, the encrypted message M2Sending the data to a user C;
step S3, user C uses private key KRcFor message M2Decrypting and confirming the parameter Random obtained by decryption1+1 is a message Q1Random number Random in (1)1+1,; user C uses AS1Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA0002374497300000034
Verification signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000035
The correctness of the test; user C uses the address IDCAnd Random number Random2Architecture Authentication code1And using the private key KRcAuthentication of verification code1Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000036
User C reuses address IDtgs2Access to TGS1The bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000037
Authentication code Authentication1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000038
Constructing a message M3(ii) a Using TGS1Public key pair message M3Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M3To TGS1Requesting cross-chain access to the ticket;
step S4, TGS1With the private key KRtgs1For message M3Decrypting to obtain bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000039
Authentication of Authentication code1And signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000310
Using public key KR of user CcVerifying signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000311
Verification of the correctness of the Authentication code1Is issued by user C; TGS1Using private keys KRtgs1Decrypted access TGS1The bill
Figure BDA00023744973000000312
Obtaining a parameter Q2And signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000313
TGS1By AS1Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA00023744973000000314
Verifying signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000315
Acknowledgement parameter Q2By AS1Sending out; TGS1Using the parameter Q2Parameter (2) of
Figure BDA00023744973000000316
Authentication of decrypted Authentication codes1The obtained parameter IDcAnd parameter Random2Comparing IDcAnd Q2ID of (1)cIf they are consistent, the bill is confirmed
Figure BDA00023744973000000317
Owned by user C;
TGS1constructing cross-chain access tickets
Figure BDA00023744973000000318
TGS1With the private key KRtgs1For parameter Q3Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000319
TGS1To cross the chainAccess ticket
Figure BDA00023744973000000320
Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000321
TGS1According to the use of address IDtgs2Random number Random2+1, cross-chain access ticket
Figure BDA00023744973000000322
And signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000323
Constructing a message M4；TGS1Message M with public key of user C4Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M4Sending the data to a user C;
step S5, user C uses private key KRcFor message M4Decrypting to obtain parameters
Figure BDA00023744973000000324
And confirms the Random number Random2+1 is the Random number Random sent in step 32+ 1; TGS for user C1Public key KPtgs1Verifying signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000041
Confirming cross-chain access Tickettgs2Is composed of TGS1The information is issued; for user C
Figure BDA0002374497300000042
Decryption cross-chain access ticket
Figure BDA0002374497300000043
Obtain the parameter Q3And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000044
And will be
Figure BDA0002374497300000045
Stored as secret information, and parameter Q3And parameters
Figure BDA0002374497300000046
As proof-of-knowledge data for zero; user C constructs message M5(ii) a Message M5TGS Using Block chain B2Encrypting the public key; and will message M5TGS sent to Block chain B2；
Step S6 TGS of Block chain B2With the private key KRtgs2For message M5Decrypting to obtain parameter IDRealm，IDs，
Figure RE-GDA0002547202380000047
KPc,Random3,Q3,
Figure RE-GDA0002547202380000048
According to TGS2The trust value information about the block chain A stored in the step (A) is used for calculating a parameter t and a parameter e which meet zero knowledge proof; TGS of Block chain B2Obtaining a public parameter p and a parameter g, and selecting a random number n1,n2,...ni,...,ne},i∈[1,e]And n isi∈ (1, p-1), calculating
Figure RE-GDA0002547202380000049
Restructuring a message M6As a query, message M6Sending the data to a user C;
step S7, user C receives message M6Then, the parameter T is obtained1,T2,...,TeObtaining public parameter p and parameter g from a third party and using secret information
Figure BDA00023744973000000410
Computing
Figure BDA00023744973000000411
[1,e](ii) a Restructuring a message M7As a pair message M6In response to (2), message M7Is sent toTGS of Block chain B2；
Step S8 TGS of Block chain B2Receiving message M7Then, the parameter C is obtained1,C2,...,Ce(ii) a Reusing TGS in Block chain A1Public key KPtgs1Parameter Q3And parameters
Figure BDA00023744973000000412
Verification equation
Figure BDA00023744973000000413
Is established, wherein
Figure BDA00023744973000000420
When verifying the equation
Figure BDA00023744973000000414
If yes, judging whether zero knowledge proving conditions are met, and if not, continuing to select e random numbers
Figure BDA00023744973000000421
And repeating steps S6 through S8; when the zero knowledge proof condition is satisfied after the repetition, the TGS of the block chain B2TGS based on Block chain A1Trusting, and confirming that the user C is a legal user; TGS of Block chain B2Ticket for user C to access service
Figure BDA00023744973000000415
Ticket for accessing servicesUsing the public key of the server S for encryption, wherein
Figure BDA00023744973000000416
Also for TGS2Ticket for accessing servicesSigning to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000417
TGS2Constructing a message M8Message M8Occurs to user C;
step 9, user C uses private key KRcFor message M8Decrypting to obtain parameters
Figure RE-GDA0002547202380000051
Verifying the received Random number Random3+1 is Random generated in step 53A random number + 1; TGS for user C2KR public keytgs2Verifying signature information
Figure RE-GDA0002547202380000052
If the verification is correct, a verification code is generated
Figure RE-GDA0002547202380000053
Using the private key KRcAuthentication of verification code2Signature derivation (r)Auth2,sAuth2) (ii) a Finally, user C constructs message M9(ii) a Message M with public key pair of server S9Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M9Sending the data to a server S;
step 10. Server S utilizes private Key KRsDecrypting message M9Get the Ticket Ticket of the access servicesAuthentication code2Public key KPcSignature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000054
The server S obtains K through calculationc,sAlso using the public key KPcVerifying signature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) Verification of the Authentication code2Generated by user C; the server S utilizes the private key KRsTicket for decrypting billsObtain the parameter Q4And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000055
Reusing TGS in Block chain B2Public key KPtgs2Verification signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000056
Ticket to validate access to servicessFrom TGS2Issuing; server S using secret key Kc,sAuthentication of decrypted Authentication codes2To obtain a parameter IDRealm，Random4，
Figure BDA0002374497300000057
Judging Random number Random4Value of (D) and TicketsThe parameter values in the bill are consistent, and the bill is ensured to be held by a user C who initially applies for the bill; when the authentication of the user C is completed, the server S constructs a message M10Message M is paired with the session key of user C and server S in blockchain A10Encryption is performed.
As a further technical solution of the present invention, in step S1, a message Q is used1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000058
Constructing a message M1Is of the formula
Figure BDA0002374497300000059
Further, in step S2, a TGS is accessed1The bill
Figure BDA00023744973000000510
Figure BDA00023744973000000511
Message
Figure BDA00023744973000000512
Further, in step S3, the code is verified
Figure BDA00023744973000000513
Medicine for treating disease
Figure BDA00023744973000000514
Further, in S4: cross-chain access ticket
Figure BDA00023744973000000515
Wherein, the parameter Q3＝h(IDtgs2,IDtgs1,IDc) H () is a one-way hash function; message
Figure BDA0002374497300000061
Further, in step S5, the message
Figure BDA0002374497300000062
Further, in step S6, the message
Figure BDA0002374497300000063
Further, in step S7, the message
Figure BDA0002374497300000064
Further, in step S8, the message
Figure BDA0002374497300000065
In step 9, the message
Figure BDA0002374497300000066
Further, in step 10: parameter(s)
Figure BDA0002374497300000067
Message
Figure BDA0002374497300000068
The invention ensures the effectiveness and the rigor of the authentication process through the zero-knowledge proof algorithm, improves the safety performance while ensuring the authentication of the cross-chain transaction, and can effectively resist common network attacks such as replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, eavesdropping and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a server application module of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Side chain and chain spanning technology
The block chain system is developed from a POW-based bitcoin network, an Ethernet network to a PBFT-and-DPOS-consensus-algorithm-based alliance chain and a public chain network, and although the TPS is greatly promoted from single digit to ten thousand levels, certain decentralization is sacrificed, and the block chain system does not conform to the core concept of the block chain system.
The side chain technology is promoted along with the capacity expansion dilemma of bitcoin. The concept of side chains is relative to the main chain. When the performance of the main chain is bottleneck or some functions cannot be expanded, the assets are transferred to the side chain, and related transactions only need to be executed on the side chain, so that the purposes of sharing the pressure of the main chain and expanding the performance and the functions of the main chain are achieved.
The side chain technical scheme is mainly proposed for bitcoin. Because of the technical structure of bitcoin, it has the disadvantage of self-extensibility. For example, long transaction delay, low throughput, and no support for smart contracts with complete graphics are inherent design defects of bitcoin. And these defects must be resolved by reconstructing the bitcoin base framework and algorithm.
However, considering that the bitcoin is the digital currency with the largest market value, the highest currency and the widest acceptance, modifying the infrastructure of the bitcoin may cause great risks, which determines that the bitcoin is difficult to improve the scalability of the bitcoin through technical upgrading.
The basic idea of the side chain technology is to additionally activate a side chain to transfer the bitcoin asset to the side chain, and vice versa, the asset on the side chain can be transferred back to the bitcoin. The assets of bitcoin on the main chain and the side chain can be transferred in two directions, and the process is the anchor of the assets in two directions.
With respect to sidechains, cross-chaining refers to the transfer, communication, and exchange of assets and states on two or more different chains through a trusted mechanism. In a cross-chain scenario, the chain-to-chain relationship is not only a main-side relationship, but also can be a peer-to-peer relationship, and assets on the chain can be anchored in both directions, exchanged with each other through a variable exchange rate, and even can complete interaction in an intelligent contract manner. In order to realize interconnection and interworking between chains, an identity authentication mechanism between blockchain systems is designed first, so that one blockchain can receive and verify a transaction on another blockchain.
Side chain based cross-chain identity authentication
Symbol interpretation
The Client represents a Client;
AS (authentication Server) is an authentication server;
KDC (Key Distribution center) key Distribution center
Tgt (ticket grading ticket) ticket authorization ticket
Tgs (ticket ranking server) bill authorization server
Ek{ M } represents the key K encryption information M;
random represents a Random number set to prevent replay attack;
KP and KR respectively represent a public key and a private key;
kx, y denotes a session key shared by x and y;
(rM,sM) Represents a signature on the information M;
Tickettgs1representing an in-chain access permission ticket;
Ticketsrepresenting a cross-chain access permission ticket;
Tickettgs1representing a service license ticket.
Referring to fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on side chains, including the following steps:
step 1. user C of block chain B constructs message Q1Wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000081
Using the private key KRcTo Q1Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000082
Using message Q1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000083
Constructing a message M1Wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000084
Using AS1KR public keycFor message M1Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M1AS sent to Block chain A1；
Step 2.AS1Using a private key
Figure BDA0002374497300000085
Decrypting message M1Get the message Q1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000086
AS1Also using public key KRcVerifying signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000087
Sending out for the user C; AS1Looking up a local database according to the message Q1ID of (1)cConfirming the existence and the legality of the user C; when user C is confirmed to be legal, AS1Construct access TGS1The bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000088
Wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000089
Figure BDA00023744973000000810
Is AS1Using a private key
Figure BDA00023744973000000811
To Q2Signature information of AS1By TGS1Public key pair bill
Figure BDA00023744973000000812
Performs encryption, AS1To the note
Figure BDA00023744973000000813
Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000814
AS1According to the ticket
Figure BDA00023744973000000815
Address IDtgs1Random number Random1+1 and signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000816
Constructing a message M2Wherein
Figure BDA00023744973000000817
Message M with public key of user C2Encrypting, the encrypted message M2Sending the data to a user C;
step 3, the user C uses the private key KRcFor message M2Decrypting and confirming the parameter Random obtained by decryption1+1 is the message Q in step 11Random number Random in (1)1+1,; user C uses AS1Is provided with a key
Figure BDA00023744973000000818
Verifying signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000819
The correctness of the test; user C uses the address IDCAnd Random number Random2Structure verification code
Figure BDA00023744973000000820
Using the private key KRcFor Authentication1Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000091
User C reuses address IDtgs2Bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000092
Authentication of Authentication code1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000093
Constructing a message M3Wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000094
Using TGS1Public key pair message M3Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M3To TGS1Requesting cross-chain access to the ticket;
step 4.TGS1With the private key KRtgs1For message M3Decrypting to obtain the bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000095
Authentication of Authentication code1And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000096
Using public key KR of user CcVerifying signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000097
Verification of the correctness of the Authentication code1Is issued by user C; TGS1Using private keys KRtgs1Deciphering bill
Figure BDA0002374497300000098
Obtain the parameter Q2And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000099
TGS1By AS1Is provided with a key
Figure BDA00023744973000000910
Verifying signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000911
Acknowledgement parameter Q2By AS1Sending out; TGS1Using the parameter Q2Parameter (1) of
Figure BDA00023744973000000912
Authentication of decrypted Authentication codes1The obtained parameter IDcAnd parameter Random2Comparing IDcAnd Q2ID of (1)cIf they are consistent, the bill is confirmed
Figure BDA00023744973000000913
Owned by user C;
TGS1constructing cross-chain access tickets
Figure BDA00023744973000000914
Wherein the parameter Q3＝h(IDtgs2,IDtgs1,IDc) H () represents a one-way hash function; TGS1With the private key KRtgs1For parameter Q3Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000915
TGS1Accessing tickets for cross-chaining
Figure BDA00023744973000000916
Signing to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000917
TGS1According to the use of address IDtgs2Random number Random2+1, cross-chain access ticket
Figure BDA00023744973000000918
And signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000919
Constructing a message M4Wherein the message
Figure BDA00023744973000000920
TGS1Message M with public key of user C4Encrypting, and encryptingMessage M of4Sending the data to a user C;
step 5, user C private key KRcFor message M4Decrypting to obtain parameters
Figure BDA00023744973000000921
And confirms the Random number Random2+1 is the Random number Random sent in step 32+ 1; TGS for user C1Public key KPtgs1Verifying signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000922
Confirming cross-chain access Tickettgs2Is composed of TGS1The information is issued; for user C
Figure BDA00023744973000000923
Decryption cross-chain access bill Tickettgs2To obtain a parameter Q3And signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000000924
And will be
Figure BDA00023744973000000925
Stored as secret information, and parameter Q3And parameters
Figure BDA00023744973000000926
As proof-of-knowledge data for zero; user C constructs message M5Wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000101
Message M5TGS Using Block chain B2Encrypting the public key; and will message M5TGS sent to Block chain B2；
Step 6. TGS of Block chain B2With the private key KRtgs2For message M5Decrypting to obtain parameter IDRealm，IDs，
Figure BDA0002374497300000102
KPc,Random3,Q3,
Figure BDA0002374497300000103
According to TGS2The trust value information about the block chain A stored in the step (A) is used for calculating a parameter t and a parameter e which meet zero knowledge proof; TGS of Block chain B2Obtaining a public parameter p and a parameter g, and selecting a random number
Figure BDA00023744973000001017
And is
Figure BDA00023744973000001018
Computing
Figure BDA00023744973000001016
Restructuring a message M6As a query, wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000105
Message M6Sending the data to a user C;
step 7, user C receives message M6Then, the parameter T is obtained1,T2,...,TeObtaining public parameter p and parameter g from a third party and using the secret information
Figure BDA0002374497300000106
Computing
Figure BDA0002374497300000107
[1,e](ii) a Restructuring a message M7As a pair message M6In which
Figure BDA0002374497300000108
Message M7TGS sent to Block chain B2；
Step 8. TGS of Block chain B2Receiving message M7Then, the parameter C is obtained1,C2,...,Ce(ii) a Reusing TGS in Block chain A1Public key KPtgs1Parameter Q3And parameters
Figure BDA0002374497300000109
Verification equation
Figure BDA00023744973000001010
Is established, wherein
Figure BDA00023744973000001019
When verifying the equation
Figure BDA00023744973000001011
If yes, judging whether zero knowledge proving conditions are met, and if not, continuing to select e random numbers
Figure BDA00023744973000001020
And repeating step 6, step 7 and step 8; when the zero knowledge proof condition is satisfied after repeating the steps 6, 7 and 8, the TGS of the blockchain B2TGS based on Block chain A1Trusting, and confirming that the user C is a legal user; TGS of Block chain B2Ticket for user C to access service
Figure BDA00023744973000001012
Ticket for accessing servicesUsing the public key of the server S for encryption, wherein
Figure BDA00023744973000001013
Also for TGS2Ticket for accessing servicesSigning to obtain signature information
Figure BDA00023744973000001014
TGS2Constructing a message M8Wherein
Figure BDA00023744973000001015
Message M8Occurs to user C;
step 9, user C uses private key KRcFor message M8Decrypting to obtain parameters
Figure BDA0002374497300000111
Verifying the received Random number Random3+1 is Random generated in step 53A random number + 1; TGS for user C2KR public keytgs2Verifying signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000112
If the verification is correct, a verification code is generated
Figure BDA0002374497300000113
Using the private key KRcAuthentication of verification code2Signature derivation (r)Auth2,sAuth2) (ii) a Finally, user C constructs message M9Wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000114
Message M with public key pair of server S9Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M9Sending the data to a server S;
step 10. Server S utilizes private Key KRsDecrypting message M9Get the Ticket Ticket of the access servicesAuthentication code2Public key KPcSignature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) And signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000115
The server S obtains K through calculationc,sAlso using the public key KPcVerifying signature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) Verification of Authentication code2Generated by user C; the server S utilizes the private key KRsTicket for decrypting billsObtain the parameter Q4And
Figure BDA0002374497300000116
wherein
Figure BDA0002374497300000117
Reusing TGS in Block chain B2Public key KPtgs2Verifying signature information
Figure BDA0002374497300000118
Ticket to validate access to servicessFrom TGS2Issuing; server S using secret key Kc,sAuthentication of decrypted Authentication codes2To obtain a parameter IDRealm，Random4，
Figure BDA0002374497300000119
Judging Random number Random4Value of (D) and TicketsThe parameter values in the bill are consistent, and the bill is ensured to be held by a user C who initially applies for the bill; when the authentication of the user C is completed, the server S constructs a message
Figure BDA00023744973000001110
Pair of messages M using session keys of user C and server S in blockchain A10Encryption is performed.
Security analysis
A block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on a side chain provides a basic identity authentication trust mechanism, ensures the security in the cross-chain transaction process, and is specifically analyzed as follows:
replay attack, in the process of cross-chain identity authentication, because the identity authentication process needs to strictly meet the zero-knowledge proof condition, information in the interaction process between the whole chain and the whole chain does not contain private information of a user, and even if an attacker can resend certain steps of attack, more valuable information cannot be obtained; in addition, random numbers are introduced in the encryption and decryption stages, so that a receiver can confirm whether received messages are sent by the receiver, and interference caused by clock synchronization is avoided.
The whole system adopts the digital signature and zero knowledge proving method, so that a receiver can confirm whether the information is sent by the original sender, and the possibility of existence of a man-in-the-middle is avoided.
The collusion attack adopts a strict zero-knowledge proof mechanism, so that a user does not need to submit private information related to the identity information of the user while proving the identity of the user to other chains, and the collusion attack can be effectively avoided.
And eavesdropping is carried out, and the session key between the user and the application server is negotiated by the user and the application server, so that the possibility of eavesdropping is avoided in the session process.
The foregoing illustrates and describes the principles, general features, and advantages of the present invention. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, which are intended to further illustrate the principles of the invention, and that various changes and modifications may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. The scope of the invention is defined by the claims and their equivalents.

Claims (10)

1. A block chain cross-chain identity authentication method based on a side chain is characterized by comprising the following steps,
step S1, user C of block chain B constructs message Q1Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000011
using private key KRcTo Q1Signing to obtain signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000012
Using message Q1And signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000013
Constructing a message M1(ii) a Using AS1Public key KR of (authentication server 1)cFor message M1Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M1AS sent to Block chain A1；
Step S2, AS1Using a private key
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000014
Decrypting message M1Obtaining a message Q1And signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000015
Using the public key KRcVerifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000016
Sending out for the user C; AS1Looking up a local database according to the message Q1ID of (1)cConfirming the existence and the legality of the user C; when user C is confirmed to be legal, AS1Construct access TGS1The bill
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000017
Signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000018
Is AS1Using a private key
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000019
To Q2Signature information of AS1By TGS1Public key pair bill
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000110
Performs encryption, AS1To the note
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000111
Signing to obtain signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000112
AS1According to access TGS1The bill
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000113
Address IDtgs1Random number Random1+1 and signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000114
Construction eliminatorMessage M2Using public key of user C to message M2Encrypting, the encrypted message M2Sending the data to a user C;
step S3, user C uses private key KRcFor message M2Decrypting and confirming the parameter Random obtained by decryption1+1 is a message Q1Random number Random in (1)1+1,; user C uses AS1Of (2) a public key
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000115
Verifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000116
The correctness of the test; user C uses the address IDCAnd Random number Random2Authentication of construction of verification codes1And using the private key KRcAuthentication of verification code1Signing to obtain signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000117
User C reuses address IDtgs2Access to TGS1The bill
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000118
Authentication of Authentication code1And signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000119
Constructing a message M3(ii) a Using TGS1Public key pair message M3Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M3To TGS1Requesting cross-chain access to the ticket;
step S4, TGS1With the private key KRtgs1For message M3Decrypting to obtain bill
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000120
Authentication of Authentication code1And signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000121
Using public key KR of user CcVerifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000122
Verification of the correctness of the Authentication code1Is issued by user C; TGS1With the private key KRtgs1Decrypted access TGS1The bill
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000021
Obtaining a parameter Q2And signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000022
TGS1By AS1Of (2) a public key
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000023
Verifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000024
Acknowledgement parameter Q2By AS1Sending out; TGS1Using the parameter Q2Parameter (2) of
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000025
Authentication of decrypted Authentication codes1The obtained parameter IDcAnd parameter Random2Comparing IDcAnd Q2ID of (1)cIf they are consistent, the bill is confirmed
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000026
Owned by user C;
TGS1constructing cross-chain access tickets
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000027
TGS1With the private key KRtgs1For parameter Q3Signing to obtain signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000028
TGS1Accessing tickets for cross-chaining
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000029
Signing to obtain signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000210
TGS1According to the use of address IDtgs2Random number Random2+1, cross-chain access ticket
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000211
And signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000212
Constructing a message M4；TGS1Message M with public key of user C4Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M4Sending the data to a user C;
step S5, user C uses private key KRcFor message M4Decrypting to obtain parameters
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000213
Random2+1,
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000214
And confirms the Random number Random2+1 is the Random number Random sent in step 32+ 1; TGS for user C1Public key KPtgs1Verifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000215
Confirming cross-chain access Tickettgs2Is composed of TGS1The information is issued; for user C
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000216
Decrypting cross-chain access Tickettgs2To obtain a parameter Q3And signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000217
And will be
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000218
Stored as secret information, and parameter Q3And parameters
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000219
As proof-of-knowledge data for zero; user C constructs message M5(ii) a Message M5TGS Using Block chain B2Encrypting the public key; and will message M5TGS sent to Block chain B2；
Step S6 TGS of Block chain B2With the private key KRtgs2For message M5Decrypting to obtain parameter IDRealm，IDs，
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000220
KPc,Random3,Q3,
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000221
According to TGS2The parameter t and the parameter e which meet zero knowledge proof are calculated according to the trust value information which is stored in the block chain A; TGS of Block chain B2Obtaining a public parameter p and a parameter g, and selecting a random number n1,n2,...ni,...,ne},i∈[1,e]And n isi∈ (1, p-1), calculating
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000222
i∈[1,e](ii) a Restructuring a message M6As a query, message M6Sending the data to a user C;
step S7, user C receives message M6Then, the parameter T is obtained1,T2,...,TeFromThe third party obtains the public parameter p and the parameter g and uses the secret information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000031
Computing
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000032
(modp),i∈[1,e](ii) a Restructuring a message M7As a pair message M6In response to (2), message M7TGS sent to Block chain B2；
Step S8 TGS of Block chain B2Receiving message M7Then, the parameter C is obtained1,C2,...,Ce(ii) a Reusing TGS in Block chain A1Public key KPtgs1Parameter Q3And parameters
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000033
Verification equation
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000034
If it is true, where i ∈ [1, e](ii) a When verifying the equation
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000035
If yes, judging whether zero knowledge proving conditions are met, and if not, continuing to select e random numbers { n }1,n2,...ni,...,ne},i∈[1,e]And repeating steps S6 to S8; when the zero knowledge proof condition is satisfied after the repetition, the TGS of the block chain B2TGS based on Block chain A1Trusting, and confirming that the user C is a legal user; TGS of Block chain B2Ticket for user C to access service
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000036
Ticket for accessing servicesUsing the public key of the server S for encryption, wherein
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000037
Also for TGS2Ticket for accessing servicesSigning to obtain signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000038
TGS2Constructing a message M8Message M8Occurs to user C;
step 9, user C uses private key KRcFor message M8Decrypting to obtain parameters
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000039
Random3+1,Tickets,
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000310
Verifying the received Random number Random3+1 is the Random3 Random number +1 generated in step 5; TGS for user C2KR public keytgs2Verifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000311
If the verification is correct, a verification code is generated
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000312
Using the private key KRcAuthentication of verification code2Signature derivation (r)Auth2,sAuth2) (ii) a Finally, user C constructs message M9(ii) a Message M with public key pair of server S9Encrypting, and sending the encrypted message M9Sending the data to a server S;
step 10. Server S utilizes private Key KRsDecrypting message M9Get the Ticket Ticket of the access servicesAuthentication code2Public key KPcSignature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) And signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000313
Server S obtains by calculationTo Kc,sAlso using the public key KPcVerifying signature information (r)Auth2,sAuth2) Verification of the Authentication code2Generated by user C; the server S utilizes the private key KRsTicket for decrypting billsObtain the parameter Q4And signature information
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000314
Reusing TGS in Block chain B2Public key KPtgs2Verifying signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000041
Ticket to validate access to servicessFrom TGS2Issuing; server S using secret key Kc,sAuthentication of decrypted Authentication codes2To obtain a parameter IDRealm，Random4，
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000042
Judging Random number Random4Value of (D) and TicketsThe parameter values in the bill are consistent, and the bill is ensured to be held by a user C who initially applies for the bill; when the authentication of the user C is completed, the server S constructs a message M10Message M is paired with the session key of user C and server S in blockchain A10Encryption is performed.
2. The method for authenticating cross-chain identity of blockchain based on side chain of claim 1, wherein the message Q is utilized in step S11And signature information
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000043
Constructing a message M1Is of the formula
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000044
3. The side-chain based blockchain cross-chain identity of claim 1The authentication method is characterized in that in the step S2, the TGS is accessed1The bill
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000045
Message
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000046
4. The method for cross-chain identity authentication of a blockchain based on side chains according to claim 1, wherein the verification code is generated in step S3
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000047
Message
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000048
5. The method for authenticating a side-chain-based blockchain across-chain identity according to claim 1, wherein in step S4: cross-chain access ticket
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000049
Wherein, the parameter Q3＝h(IDtgs2,IDtgs1,IDc) H () is a one-way hash function; message
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000410
6. The method for authenticating cross-chain identity of blockchain based on side chain of claim 1, wherein in step S5, the message is
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000411
7. A side chain based block according to claim 1The method for authenticating chain cross-chain identity is characterized in that in the step S6, the message
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000412
8. The method for authenticating cross-chain identity of blockchain based on side chain of claim 1, wherein in step S7, the message is
Figure RE-FDA00025472023700000413
9. The method for authenticating cross-chain identity of blockchain based on side chain of claim 1, wherein in step S8, the message is
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000051
In said step 9, the message
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000052
10. The method for authenticating a side chain-based block chain cross-chain identity according to claim 1, wherein in the step 10: parameter(s)
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000053
Message
Figure RE-FDA0002547202370000054
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