CN111460499A - Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy - Google Patents

Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN111460499A
CN111460499A CN202010243336.6A CN202010243336A CN111460499A CN 111460499 A CN111460499 A CN 111460499A CN 202010243336 A CN202010243336 A CN 202010243336A CN 111460499 A CN111460499 A CN 111460499A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
attribute
user
merkletree
attribute set
data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CN202010243336.6A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN111460499B (en
Inventor
陈宇翔
郝尧
董贵山
赵越
吴开均
彭海洋
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
CETC 30 Research Institute
Original Assignee
CETC 30 Research Institute
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by CETC 30 Research Institute filed Critical CETC 30 Research Institute
Priority to CN202010243336.6A priority Critical patent/CN111460499B/en
Publication of CN111460499A publication Critical patent/CN111460499A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN111460499B publication Critical patent/CN111460499B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
    • G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
    • G06F16/22—Indexing; Data structures therefor; Storage structures
    • G06F16/2228—Indexing structures
    • G06F16/2255—Hash tables
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
    • G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
    • G06F16/27—Replication, distribution or synchronisation of data between databases or within a distributed database system; Distributed database system architectures therefor

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of blockchain, and discloses a block chain user attribute set checking method for protecting privacy based on Merkletree.A user registers and releases attribute set data, an identity provider generates a global unique identifier for the released attribute set data, and a relying party confirms that the user data is legally issued and valid based on the Merkletree; and protecting the privacy of user sensitive authentication data based on zero knowledge proof, and binding and writing the root hash Merklehash of leaf node data and the global unique data identifier into a block. The invention adopts the Merkletree algorithm to carry out simple Hash calculation on the clues of all the attributes in the attribute set, reduces the calculation overhead and the storage overhead of attribute issuance of the identity provider and the block chain in the attribute verification time zone of the relying party, and ensures the high-efficiency confirmation of the legitimacy of the attribute issuance by the relying party.

Description

Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, in particular to a Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy.
Background
The traditional data storage technology stores electronic data on a server, and has the risks of being tampered, lost and damaged. The block chain technology has the characteristics of openness and transparency and non-falsification, and provides an important solution for the security risk of data storage. The current data storage technology based on the block chain generally adopts a hash algorithm to store data fingerprints and data in a binding mode, a user needs to provide all plaintext data to complete correct verification, and cannot provide verification of partial sub-data only, so that fine grains of the user data which are accessed are too coarse. At the same time, some specific sensitive data provides the verifier in clear text, also revealing user privacy.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the problems that user data is too coarse when being authenticated and sensitive authentication data plain text is leaked in identity verification, the invention provides a block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy based on a Merkletree.
A block chain user attribute set checking method based on Merkletree for protecting privacy comprises the steps that a user registers and releases attribute set data, an identity provider generates a global unique identifier for the released attribute set data, and a relying party confirms that user data is legally issued and valid based on the Merkletree; and protecting the privacy of user sensitive authentication data based on zero knowledge proof, and binding and writing the root hash Merklehash of leaf node data and the global unique data identifier into a block.
Further, the step of registering and publishing attribute set data by the user comprises the following steps:
s11, a user generates a private key K and a public key K which are kG, and inputs an ID/password request for registration;
s12, the identity provider proxy server detects whether the ID is registered, if not, the ID is issued, and an issuing ID and a bound public key PK are generated and returned;
s13, the user uploads the certificate according to the attribute interface template of the client, and the client reads the attribute set<attr>＝{m1，m2，m3，m4And will be<attr>Uploading to the identity provider proxy server.
Further, the identity provider generating a globally unique identifier for the published attribute set data includes the following steps:
s21, the identity provider verifies the attribute, signs the attribute set and records a random number set (<attr>||<E(mi)>||<Ri>) For each attribute, calculating Ai＝miG (i is 1,2,3,4), obtaining attribute mapping set<Ai>Generating a private key k; calculation of ci＝Hash(Ai||PK||Ri) And zi＝ri+ciPK, wherein i ═ 1,2,3, 4;
s22, let attrbutei＝ID||PK||Ri||Ek(mi)||ziIdentity provider attributes for each fine-grained sub-attributeiComputing Hashi＝Hash(attributei) Obtaining Hash1, Hash2, Hash3 and Hash4, then calculating Hash12, Hash34 and Merklehash, and signing and marking chains;
s23, the block chain intelligent contract verifies that the signature of the identity provider is successful, the MerkleHash is chained and returns a chain marking success message of the identity provider, and the identity provider returns the authenticated attribute set < attributei > to the user to indicate that the registration is successful.
Further, in step S21, the method for the identity provider to verify the attribute includes offline certificate authentication and real name authentication.
Further, the relying party confirms that the user data is legally issued based on the Merkletree and comprises the following steps:
s31, selecting the attribute to be presented by the user,wherein x ∈ [1,2,3,4 ]]Client background computing attribute set<attributei>Hash values of other attributes except attribute, and sends authentication information<attributex||<hashi>>To the dependent party, where attributex | | | PK | | | R | | | Ek(mx)||zx，i≠x；
S32, the relying party obtains an attribute set < attribute | < hashi > > selected by the user; calculating the attributex Hash after being processed and other attribute hashes in the attribute set < attr >, calculating Hash12 and Hash34 through Hash1, Hash2, Hash3 and Hash4, and then calculating MerkleHash;
s33, checking whether a block chain is compared with Merklehash which is the result of Merklehash according to the user ID, and verifying whether a MerkleHash root signature stored in the block chain is signed by an identity provider trusted by the relying party; if yes, the validity and the integrity of the attribute pass the verification.
Further, the relying party confirms that the user data is valid based on the Merkletree includes the following steps:
s41, a user selects attributes according to the authentication requirements of the relying party displayed on the client interface, accesses the relying party and sends authentication information < attributex | < hashi > >;
s42, the dependent party encrypts the received specific attribute ciphertexti＝ID||PK||Ri||Ek(mi)||ziVerification is performed, verifying equation Ek(mi)G＝Ai+ PK is established, if yes, the attribute anchor point A corresponding to the ciphertext attribute can be judged;
s43, the dependent party verifies the cipher key ciphertext and calculates ci＝Hash(Ai||PK||Ri) Verification of equation ziG＝Ri+ciIf PK is established, then E can be determinedk(mi) Is a key ciphertext z sent by the useriThe corresponding key is encrypted, and the user is judged to have the required attribute as above;
s44, judging whether the user is the legal holder of the attribute, and submitting an attribute receipt R by depending on the intelligent contract of the direction block chainiUser ofSubmitting credentials r to intelligent contractsiIntelligent contract calculation Ri＝riG, if the authentication is established, issuing an access pass to the user, and successfully authenticating; otherwise, returning verification failure.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) the Merkletree algorithm performs simple Hash calculation on clues of all attributes in the attribute set, reduces the calculation overhead and the storage overhead of attribute signing and issuing of an identity provider and block chains in attribute verification by a relying party, and ensures efficient confirmation of the validity of attribute signing and issuing by the relying party;
(2) when the relying party verifies the user attribute, the user can select the fine-grained attribute to be shown to the relying party, so that the attribute is prevented from being excessively shared, and the privacy of the user is protected; in addition, for the presentation of the sensitive attribute, the user can choose to finish the identity authentication by a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof method, so that the sensitive attribute information is protected from being leaked, and meanwhile, the communication overhead between the user and a relying party is reduced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of user registration and attribute publication in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a complete verification diagram of a corpus of attribute sets in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a partial attribute integrity check chart of the attribute set of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of validity and correctness verification for fine-grained attributes of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to more clearly understand the technical features, objects, and effects of the present invention, specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described. It should be understood that the detailed description and specific examples, while indicating the preferred embodiment of the invention, are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The embodiment provides a block chain user attribute set checking method for protecting privacy based on a Merkletree, wherein a user registers and publishes attribute set data, an identity provider generates a global unique identifier for the published attribute set data, and a relying party confirms that the user data is legally issued and valid based on the Merkletree; and protecting the privacy of user sensitive authentication data based on zero knowledge proof, and binding and writing the root hash Merklehash of leaf node data and the global unique data identifier into a block.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the method for checking the blockchain user attribute set is divided into two stages: the user registers and issues attributes and attribute verifications. System setting: a user credential attribute set attribute, attribute comprising sub-attributes: attribute1, attribute2, attribute3, attribute 4. Specifically, the method comprises the following steps:
1. user registration and attribute publication, as shown in fig. 1:
s11, a user generates a private key K and a public key K which are kG, and inputs an ID/password request for registration;
s12, the identity provider proxy server detects whether the ID is registered, if not, the ID is issued, and an issuing ID and a bound public key PK are generated and returned;
s13, the user uploads the certificate according to the attribute interface template of the client, and the client reads the attribute set<attr>＝{m1，m2，m3，m4And will be<attr>Uploading to the identity provider proxy server.
S14, the identity provider verifies the attribute (such as off-line certificate, real name and other modes), signs the attribute set, and records a random number set (<attr>||<E(mi)>||<Ri>) For each attribute, calculating Ai＝miG (i is 1,2,3,4), obtaining attribute mapping set<Ai>Generating a private key k; calculation of ci＝Hash(Ai||PK||Ri) And zi＝ri+ciPK, wherein i ═ 1,2,3, 4;
s15, enabling attrbutei＝ID||PK||Ri||Ek(mi)||ziIdentity provider attributes for each fine-grained sub-attributeiComputing Hashi＝Hash(attributei) To obtain Hash1, Hash2, Hash3 and Hassh4, calculating Hash12, Hash34 and MerkleHash, and signing and chaining;
and S16, the block chain intelligent contract verifies that the signature of the identity provider is successful, the MerkleHash is chained and returns a chain marking success message of the identity provider, and the identity provider returns the authenticated attribute set < attributei > to the user to indicate that the registration is successful.
2. Attribute validation
2.1 part and all attribute issuing validity and integrity verification:
s21, selecting attribute to be presented by a user, as shown in FIG. 3, wherein x ∈ [1,2,3,4]Client background computing attribute set<attributei>Hash values of other attributes except attribute, and sends authentication information<attributex||<hashi>>To the dependent party, where attributex | | | PK | | | R | | | Ek(mx)||zxI ≠ x; if the user needs to check the attribute set complete set, as shown in fig. 2, the hash value of the remaining attributes does not need to be sent, that is, the authentication information is sent<attribute1||……||attributen>Where n is 4, and broadly, the method can be generalized to n-attribute authentication paradigms;
s22, the relying party obtains an attribute set < attribute | < hashi > > selected by a user; after attributex Hash processing, the attributex Hash is calculated together with other attribute hashes in the attribute set < attr >, Hash1, Hash2, Hash3 and Hash4 are used for calculating Hash12 and Hash34, and then MerkleHash is calculated, as shown in fig. 3;
s23, checking whether a block chain is compared with Merklehash which is the result of Merklehash according to the user ID, and verifying whether a MerkleHash root signature stored in the block chain is signed by an identity provider trusted by the relying party; if yes, the validity and the integrity of the attribute pass the verification.
2.2 validation and correctness of fine-grained attributes, as shown in FIG. 4:
s31, a user selects attributes according to the authentication requirements of the relying party displayed on a client interface, access is initiated to the relying party, and authentication information < attributex | < hashi > >;
s32, the dependent party encrypts the received specific attribute ciphertexti＝ID||PK||Ri||Ek(mi)||ziVerification is performed, verifying equation Ek(mi)G＝Ai+ PK is established, if yes, the attribute anchor point A corresponding to the ciphertext attribute can be judged;
s33, the dependent party verifies the cipher key ciphertext and calculates ci＝Hash(Ai||PK||Ri) Verification of equation ziG＝Ri+ciIf PK is established, then E can be determinedk(mi) Is a key ciphertext z sent by the useriThe corresponding key is encrypted, and the user is judged to have the required attribute as above;
s34, judging whether the user is the legal holder of the attribute, and submitting an attribute receipt R by depending on the intelligent contract of the direction block chainiThe user submits a credential r to the smart contractiIntelligent contract calculation Ri＝riG, if the authentication is established, issuing an access pass to the user, and successfully authenticating; otherwise, returning verification failure.
The foregoing is illustrative of the preferred embodiments of this invention, and it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the precise form disclosed herein and that various other combinations, modifications, and environments may be resorted to, falling within the scope of the concept as disclosed herein, either as described above or as apparent to those skilled in the relevant art. And that modifications and variations may be effected by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

Claims (6)

1. A block chain user attribute set checking method based on Merkletree for protecting privacy is characterized in that a user registers and publishes attribute set data, an identity provider generates a global unique identifier for the published attribute set data, and a relying party confirms that the user data is legally issued and effective based on the Merkletree; and protecting the privacy of user sensitive authentication data based on zero knowledge proof, and binding and writing the root hash Merklehash of leaf node data and the global unique data identifier into a block.
2. The Merkletree-based blockchain user attribute set verification method according to claim 1, wherein the step of registering and publishing attribute set data by the user comprises the steps of:
s11, a user generates a private key K and a public key K which are kG, and inputs an ID/password request for registration;
s12, the identity provider proxy server detects whether the ID is registered, if not, the ID is issued, and an issuing ID and a bound public key PK are generated and returned;
s13, the user uploads the certificate according to the attribute interface template of the client, and the client reads the attribute set<attr>＝{m1，m2，m3，m4And will be<attr>Uploading to the identity provider proxy server.
3. The Merkletree-based blockchain user attribute set verification method according to claim 2, wherein the step of the identity provider generating the globally unique identifier for the published attribute set data comprises the steps of:
s21, the identity provider verifies the attribute, signs the attribute set and records a random number set (<attr>||<E(mi)>||<Ri>) For each attribute, calculating Ai＝miG (i is 1,2,3,4), obtaining attribute mapping set<Ai>Generating a private key k; calculation of ci＝Hash(Ai||PK||Ri) And zi＝ri+ciPK, wherein i ═ 1,2,3, 4;
s22, let attrbutei＝ID||PK||Ri||Ek(mi)||ziIdentity provider attributes for each fine-grained sub-attributeiComputing Hashi＝Hash(attributei) Obtaining Hash1, Hash2, Hash3 and Hash4, then calculating Hash12, Hash34 and Merklehash, and signing and marking chains;
s23, the block chain intelligent contract verifies that the signature of the identity provider is successful, the MerkleHash is chained and returns a chain marking success message of the identity provider, and the identity provider returns the authenticated attribute set < attributei > to the user to indicate that the registration is successful.
4. The Merkletree-based blockchain user attribute set verification method for privacy protection as claimed in claim 3, wherein the means for the identity provider to verify the attributes in step S21 includes offline certificate authentication and real name authentication.
5. The Merkletree-based blockchain user attribute set verification method for privacy protection according to claim 3, wherein the relying party confirms the legal issuance of user data based on Merkletree comprises the following steps:
s31, selecting attribute to be presented by a user, wherein x ∈ [1,2,3,4 ]]Client background computing attribute set<attributei>Hash values of other attributes except attribute, and sends authentication information<attributex||<hashi>>To the dependent party, where attributex | | | PK | | | R | | | Ek(mx)||zx，i≠x；
S32, the relying party obtains an attribute set < attribute | < hashi > > selected by the user; calculating the attributex Hash after being processed and other attribute hashes in the attribute set < attr >, calculating Hash12 and Hash34 through Hash1, Hash2, Hash3 and Hash4, and then calculating MerkleHash;
s33, checking whether a block chain is compared with Merklehash which is the result of Merklehash according to the user ID, and verifying whether a MerkleHash root signature stored in the block chain is signed by an identity provider trusted by the relying party; if yes, the validity and the integrity of the attribute pass the verification.
6. The Merkletree-based blockchain user attribute set verification method as claimed in claim 1, wherein said relying party validates the user data based on Merkletree comprises the following steps:
s41, a user selects attributes according to the authentication requirements of the relying party displayed on the client interface, accesses the relying party and sends authentication information < attributex | < hashi > >;
s42, the dependent party encrypts the received specific attribute ciphertexti＝ID||PK||Ri||Ek(mi)||ziVerification is performed, verifying equation Ek(mi)G＝Ai+ PK is established, if yes, the attribute anchor point A corresponding to the ciphertext attribute can be judged;
s43, the dependent party verifies the cipher key ciphertext and calculates ci＝Hash(Ai||PK||Ri) Verification of equation ziG＝Ri+ciIf PK is established, then E can be determinedk(mi) Is a key ciphertext z sent by the useriThe corresponding key is encrypted, and the user is judged to have the required attribute as above;
s44, judging whether the user is the legal holder of the attribute, and submitting an attribute receipt R by depending on the intelligent contract of the direction block chainiThe user submits a credential r to the smart contractiIntelligent contract calculation Ri＝riG, if the authentication is established, issuing an access pass to the user, and successfully authenticating; otherwise, returning verification failure.
CN202010243336.6A 2020-03-31 2020-03-31 Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy Active CN111460499B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010243336.6A CN111460499B (en) 2020-03-31 2020-03-31 Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010243336.6A CN111460499B (en) 2020-03-31 2020-03-31 Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN111460499A true CN111460499A (en) 2020-07-28
CN111460499B CN111460499B (en) 2022-03-15

Family

ID=71683450

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN202010243336.6A Active CN111460499B (en) 2020-03-31 2020-03-31 Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN111460499B (en)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111737675A (en) * 2020-08-14 2020-10-02 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 Block chain-based electronic signature method and device
CN115514502A (en) * 2021-06-03 2022-12-23 中移雄安信息通信科技有限公司 Block chain-based edge computing platform identity authentication method and device

Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106796688A (en) * 2016-12-26 2017-05-31 深圳前海达闼云端智能科技有限公司 Permission control method, device and system of block chain and node equipment
CN106911513A (en) * 2016-12-14 2017-06-30 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 A kind of credible equipment management method based on decentralization network
CN107682308A (en) * 2017-08-16 2018-02-09 北京航空航天大学 The electronic evidence preservation system for Channel Technology of being dived based on block chain
US20180078843A1 (en) * 2016-02-02 2018-03-22 Bao Tran Smart device
CN109858281A (en) * 2019-02-01 2019-06-07 杭州云象网络技术有限公司 A kind of block chain account model method for secret protection based on zero-knowledge proof
CN109891416A (en) * 2016-10-27 2019-06-14 株式会社电装 For authenticating and the system and method for authorization device
CN110414270A (en) * 2019-08-01 2019-11-05 谈建中 A kind of personal data protection system and method based on block chain

Patent Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20180078843A1 (en) * 2016-02-02 2018-03-22 Bao Tran Smart device
CN109891416A (en) * 2016-10-27 2019-06-14 株式会社电装 For authenticating and the system and method for authorization device
CN106911513A (en) * 2016-12-14 2017-06-30 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 A kind of credible equipment management method based on decentralization network
CN106796688A (en) * 2016-12-26 2017-05-31 深圳前海达闼云端智能科技有限公司 Permission control method, device and system of block chain and node equipment
CN107682308A (en) * 2017-08-16 2018-02-09 北京航空航天大学 The electronic evidence preservation system for Channel Technology of being dived based on block chain
CN109858281A (en) * 2019-02-01 2019-06-07 杭州云象网络技术有限公司 A kind of block chain account model method for secret protection based on zero-knowledge proof
CN110414270A (en) * 2019-08-01 2019-11-05 谈建中 A kind of personal data protection system and method based on block chain

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
YAXIAN JI等: "BMPLS: Blockchain-Based Multi-level Privacy-Preserving Location Sharing Scheme for Telecare Medical Information Systems等", 《网页在线公开：HTTPS://LINK.SPRINGER.COM/CONTENT/PDF/10.1007/S10916-018-0998-2.PDF》 *
YOGACHANDRAN RAHULAMATHAVAN等: "《Privacy-preserving Blockchain based IoT Ecosystem using Attribute-based Encryption》", 《网页在线公开：HTTPS://IEEEXPLORE.IEEE.ORG/STAMP/STAMP.JSP?TP=&ARNUMBER=8384164》 *
赵灵奇等: "基于区块链和分层加密的物流隐私保护机制", 《应用科学学报》 *

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111737675A (en) * 2020-08-14 2020-10-02 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 Block chain-based electronic signature method and device
US11356279B2 (en) 2020-08-14 2022-06-07 Alipay (Hangzhou) Information Technology Co., Ltd. Blockchain-based electronic signature method and apparatus
CN115514502A (en) * 2021-06-03 2022-12-23 中移雄安信息通信科技有限公司 Block chain-based edge computing platform identity authentication method and device

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN111460499B (en) 2022-03-15

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN109951489B (en) Digital identity authentication method, equipment, device, system and storage medium
US11133943B2 (en) Issuing virtual documents in a block chain
US9992189B2 (en) Generation and validation of derived credentials
CN108777684B (en) Identity authentication method, system and computer readable storage medium
KR101829729B1 (en) Method for certifying a user by using mobile id through blockchain and merkle tree structure related thereto, and terminal and server using the same
EP3701668B1 (en) Methods for recording and sharing a digital identity of a user using distributed ledgers
CN108696358B (en) Digital certificate management method and device, readable storage medium and service terminal
CN110945549A (en) Method and system for universal storage and access to user-owned credentials for cross-institution digital authentication
US8689003B2 (en) System and method for secure password-based authentication
JP3522447B2 (en) Authentication exchange method and additional public electronic signature method
US20020026578A1 (en) Secure usage of digital certificates and related keys on a security token
JP2020511017A (en) System and method for implementing blockchain-based digital certificates
CN112311538B (en) Identity verification method, device, storage medium and equipment
JP2020511018A (en) System and method for generating digital marks
CN111460499B (en) Merkletree-based block chain user attribute set verification method for protecting privacy
CN112165382A (en) Software authorization method and device, authorization server and terminal equipment
US20030221109A1 (en) Method of and apparatus for digital signatures
Gulati et al. Self-sovereign dynamic digital identities based on blockchain technology
JP2002215027A (en) Attribute certification program and device
CN108540447A (en) A kind of certification authentication method and system based on block chain
CN114785511A (en) Certificate generation method and device, electronic device and storage medium
CN113901424A (en) Method and device for selectively disclosing digital identity attribute
JPH1125045A (en) Access control method, its device, attribute certificate issuing device, and machine-readable recording medium
KR20220028870A (en) Method for mobile identification card authentication service using decentralized identifier based on blockchain networks and user device executing mobile identification card authentication service
CN114866260B (en) Chameleon hash distributed identity using method and system

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant