CN111198387A - Space-time sampling navigation positioning method capable of resisting deception jamming - Google Patents
Space-time sampling navigation positioning method capable of resisting deception jamming Download PDFInfo
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- 238000005070 sampling Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 37
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/24—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system
- G01S19/30—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system code related
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Abstract
The invention provides a space-time sampling navigation positioning method for resisting deception jamming, which mainly solves the problem that the positioning accuracy of a traditional receiver is poor under the condition of deception jamming, and adopts the technical scheme that: 1) acquiring a receiving signal, and performing frequency mixing, despreading and complex conjugate operation to obtain a target signal; 2) sampling a target signal to obtain a sampling signal matrix; 3) calculating a correlation coefficient between each column in the sampling signal matrix; 4) judging a threshold value of the correlation coefficient; 5) detecting a deception signal, and dividing a real signal and the deception signal; 6) and obtaining the target positioning coordinate by using the divided real signal. On the premise of not changing the structure of the traditional receiver, the invention ensures that the receiver not only has the capability of detecting the deception interference, but also can accurately position the target in the interference environment, overcomes the limitation that the receiver needs to move under the condition of single-antenna receiving, and effectively improves the robustness of the satellite navigation receiver in the deception interference environment.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and further relates to an information processing technology, in particular to a deception jamming resistant space-time sampling navigation positioning method which can be used for a satellite navigation system.
Background
The satellite navigation system plays a vital role in the aspects of traditional transportation, surveying and mapping, marine fishery, disaster prevention and relief and the like, and in the fields of emerging shared bicycles, unmanned driving, unmanned aerial vehicles and the like. Since the satellite signal is very weak when reaching the ground, the satellite signal is very easily affected by various interferences, so that the positioning accuracy is reduced, and even the positioning cannot be completed. Especially in the presence of spoofing interference, detection and suppression of spoofing interference is made more difficult by the fact that the spurious signals emitted by the interference source are very close in power and signal waveform to the true signals.
Patent applications with application numbers of 201810864041.3 and application publication numbers of CN 108594271A, which are proposed by Beijing aerospace university, disclose a deception jamming resistant combined navigation method based on layered filtering. The method comprises the steps of establishing a state model of the integrated navigation system based on an inertia and satellite integrated navigation system, considering the propagation characteristics of deception jamming, representing the deception jamming in a random process based on first-order Markov, and establishing a measurement model of the integrated navigation system containing the deception jamming, so that a composite layered filter is designed to inhibit the deception jamming. However, the combined navigation method based on hierarchical filtering and anti-spoofing interference requires inertial navigation support and changes of the original receiver structure, so that the method has a disadvantage in applicability.
Patent applications with application numbers of 201710791177.1 and application publication numbers of CN 107621645A, which are proposed by national defense science and technology university of China people liberation military, disclose a deception jamming resistant signal detection method based on a single receiver. After the position of a corrected satellite in an ECEF coordinate system is obtained, the corrected pseudo range is obtained by utilizing the clock error correction quantity and troposphere delay correction of the satellite, least square iterative solution is carried out to obtain a first position of a carrier in the ECEF coordinate system, and Taylor approximate expansion iterative solution is carried out based on a pseudo range double-difference model of the satellite to obtain a second position of the carrier in the ECEF coordinate system; and judging whether the current received signal is a deception jamming signal or not according to whether the deviation between the first position and the second position is larger than a preset threshold value or not. The disadvantages of this method are: 1. in a single-antenna scene, some factors such as atmospheric influence, receiver clock error and other interference positioning can not be eliminated by utilizing differential calculation; 2. only methods for detecting spoofed interfering signals are proposed and no effective suppression method is specifically presented.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a space-time sampling navigation positioning method for resisting deception interference aiming at overcoming the defects of the prior art, and aims to enable a receiver to have the capability of detecting deception interference and complete accurate positioning on the premise of not changing the structure of the traditional receiver, thereby improving the robustness of the satellite navigation receiver in a deception interference environment.
The specific idea for realizing the purpose of the invention is as follows: the method comprises the steps that linear array antennas are used for simulating single antenna movement to conduct space-time sampling to obtain target signals, the difference of real GPS signals and deceptive signals in channels under a mobile antenna receiving scene is used for detecting and classifying the two signals, and necessary number of signals are selected from a real signal group to conduct positioning to obtain target positioning coordinates resistant to deceptive interference; the method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) acquiring a target signal:
the receiver captures and tracks the GPS signal, and then carries out frequency mixing, despreading and complex conjugate operation on the GPS signal to obtain a target signal r (t):
where the superscripts A and S represent the true GPS signal and the spoofed GPS signal respectively, the subscript i represents the GPS signal number, L1Indicating the number of real GPS signals visible to the receiver, L2Indicating the number of spoofed GPS signals visible to the receiver, αi(t) random jitter of the i-th GPS signal generated at time t, A (t) channel gain, ci(. h) a spreading code for the ith GPS signal, d (t) navigation data transmitted by the satellite, fdIs Doppler frequency, w (t) is additive white noise, and tau is signal transmission delay; thetaiThe receiver measurement azimuth angle under the ith GPS signal is represented, sigma represents summation operation, and j represents the imaginary part of a complex number;
(2) l for receiver acquisition tracking1+L2A GPS signal, using M number of linesUniformly distributed array antennas sample a target signal r (t) to obtain a sampling signal matrix x:
(3) calculating the correlation coefficient between each column in the sampling signal matrix:
and respectively carrying out correlation coefficient calculation on each column of sampling data in the sampling signal matrix x and all columns containing the sampling data to obtain a correlation coefficient matrix rho:
(4) and (3) carrying out threshold judgment on the correlation coefficient:
setting a threshold value N of a screening signal, judging whether other correlation coefficients except the autocorrelation coefficient in the correlation coefficient matrix rho are larger than the threshold value N according to the threshold value, if so, entering the step (5), otherwise, directly entering the step (6);
(5) detecting a deception signal:
(5.1) presetting two empty groups, namely a real signal group and a deceptive signal group;
(5.2) sequentially detecting each row of the correlation coefficient matrix rho, and if the correlation coefficient which is larger than a threshold value N exists in the row except the autocorrelation coefficient, dividing the signal represented by the row into a deception signal group; if not, the real signal group is classified;
(5.3) judging whether the number of the signals in the real signal group is more than or equal to 4, if so, entering the step (6), otherwise, returning to the step (1);
(6) obtaining the positioning coordinates of the target:
and 4 signals are selected from the real signal group at will, 4 satellite coordinates corresponding to the signals are taken out respectively, and the positioning coordinates of the target are obtained by solving according to a GPS positioning calculation algorithm.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
first, the invention uses the array antenna receiver to perform space-time sampling, captures the time domain characteristics of the space domain channel, is suitable for the receiver in static and moving states, and overcomes the limitation that the receiver must move under the condition of single antenna reception.
Secondly, the invention can detect the deception signal and separate the interference signal to correctly position the target by using the difference of the statistical characteristics of the wireless channel experienced by the real signal and the deception signal, thereby not only realizing the simplicity and convenience, but also solving the problem that the interference is difficult to inhibit even the interference is detected by the existing method.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an implementation of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a graph of the real signal sampling characteristics of a simulation experiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a deception signal sampling signature of a simulation experiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a diagram of the characteristic difference between the spoofing limit and the real signal of the simulation experiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the attached drawing figures.
Referring to fig. 1, an implementation flowchart of a space-time sampling navigation positioning method for resisting deception jamming describes in detail implementation steps of the present invention:
The receiver captures and tracks signals according to the mode that the traditional receiver captures GPS signals; the GPS signals refer to all satellite signals, deception signals and noise in a visual range. The received signal is subjected to frequency mixing, despreading and complex conjugation operations to obtain a target signal r (t) which is expressed as follows:
wherein L is1Indicating the number of real GPS signals visible to the receiver, L2Indicating the number of spoofed GPS signals visible to the receiver; because of receiver clock instability, the GPS signal will generate a random jitter with random process variationThe movement of the movable mould is carried out,
representing the random jitter of the ith real GPS signal generated at time t,
random jitter representing the ith spoofed GPS signal generated at time t,
representing the channel gain of the ith real GPS signal at time t,
indicating the channel gain of the ith spoofed GPS signal at time t, i indicating the GPS signal number, dA(.) true navigation data transmitted for the satellite, dS() spoofed navigation data sent by the satellite, w (t) additive white noise, t represents time, τ is signal transmission delay,
indicating the doppler frequency of the ith real GPS signal at time t,
indicating the doppler frequency of the ith spoofed GPS signal at time t,
indicating the receiver measured azimuth angle under the ith real GPS signal,
indicating receiver measured azimuth angle under ith spoofed GPS signal, ci(. h) is the spreading code of the ith GPS signal, Σ represents the summation operation, and j represents the imaginary unit.
And 2, sampling the target signal to obtain a sampling signal matrix.
The linear array antenna now operates in a single antenna mode, each sub-antenna of the array antennaSimulating the position of the single antenna in motion at different times; l for receiver acquisition tracking1+L2Sampling a target signal r (t) by using M array antennas which are linearly and uniformly distributed to obtain a sampling signal matrix x:
the sampling signal matrix x is M x (L)1+L2) Wherein each column of the data matrix represents sampled data of a signal captured and tracked, including true signals and spoofed signals; the entire data matrix represents L at M antennas1+L2The sampling of the sampled data of each signal, in turn, on each sub-antenna of the array antenna simulates the sampling of a single antenna moving in the time-space domain.
And 3, calculating correlation coefficients among all columns in the sampling signal matrix.
The correlation coefficient ρ between the kth column and the vth column of the signal matrix x is calculated as followskv：
Wherein k is [1, L ]1+L2],v∈[1,L1+L2]E represents mathematical expectation, H represents conjugate transpose operation;
and respectively carrying out correlation coefficient calculation on each column of sampling data of the sampling signal matrix x and all columns containing the sampling data, thereby obtaining a correlation coefficient matrix rho:
due to rhoij＝ρjiThus ρ is a real symmetric matrix, in total (L)1+L2)×(L1+L2) And the correlation coefficients comprise the correlation coefficient between the deception signals, the correlation coefficient between the real signals and the deception signals.
And 4, judging the threshold value of the correlation coefficient.
Setting a threshold value N of a screening signal for measuring the correlation strength; in the present embodiment, the threshold is set to 0.8, and it is generally considered that when the correlation coefficient between two signals is greater than 0.8, the two signals have strong correlation. Judging the correlation coefficient according to the threshold, detecting whether the correlation coefficient matrix rho contains the correlation coefficient more than 0.8 except the autocorrelation coefficient, if so, indicating that a deception signal exists, and entering the step 5; otherwise, the positioning stage is directly entered, namely, the step 6 is jumped to.
And 5, detecting the deception signal.
Two empty packets are preset, representing the real signal group and the spoofed signal group respectively.
Sequentially detecting each row of a correlation coefficient matrix rho, wherein each row represents a correlation coefficient between a current row signal and other signals, and if the self-correlation coefficient and the correlation coefficient of the current row are more than a threshold value of 0.8, adding the signals represented by the row into a set deception signal group; if not, the signal is put into the set real signal group.
Judging whether the number of the signals in the real signal group is more than or equal to 4, if so, entering the step 6 to obtain a positioning coordinate; otherwise, returning to the step 1 to acquire the signal again.
And 6, obtaining the positioning coordinates of the target.
Randomly selecting 4 signals from the real signal set to position the target, and setting the satellite coordinates corresponding to the selected 4 signals as (x)1,y1,z1)、(x2,y2,z2)、(x3,y3,z3) And (x)4,y4,z4) And solving the positioning coordinates (x, y, z) of the target by a GPS positioning calculation algorithm:
wherein d is1Representing the selected 1 st signal pairDependent on the distance between the satellite and the target to be located, d2Indicating the distance between the satellite corresponding to the selected 2 nd signal and the target to be located, d3Indicating the distance between the satellite corresponding to the selected 3 rd signal and the target to be located, d4Representing the distance between the satellite corresponding to the selected 4 th signal and the target to be positioned; the distance is obtained by multiplying the difference between the satellite signal transmitting time and the receiver receiving time by the electromagnetic wave propagation speed c, and delta t is the receiver clock error.
The invention is further explained below with reference to the simulation diagram:
1. simulation conditions are as follows:
the simulation experiment is carried out on a computer with an Intel Pentium E58003.2GHz CPU and a memory of 2 GB. In the simulation, the maximum Doppler frequency is 1000Hz, and the simulation minimum time is 5 multiplied by 10-5s, simulation number of times 105Next, the process is carried out.
2. Simulation content:
the simulation experiments of the invention are three.
Simulation experiment 1:
the simulation experiment 1 of the present invention is that 5 real GPS signals are received by the signal acquisition processing method of the present invention, the channel characteristics of the signals are extracted, and the obtained real GPS signal channel characteristic result is shown in fig. 2. The abscissa in fig. 2 represents time in seconds and the ordinate represents channel gain in dB.
From fig. 2, it can be seen that the channels between the real signals under the signal acquisition processing method adopted by the present invention have no correlation, and the difference between the channels is obvious.
Simulation experiment 2:
the simulation experiment 2 of the present invention is that 5 deceptive GPS signals are received by using the signal acquisition processing method of the present invention, the channel characteristics of the deceptive GPS signals are extracted, and the obtained real GPS signal channel characteristic result is shown in fig. 3. The abscissa in fig. 3 represents time in seconds and the ordinate represents channel gain in dB.
As can be seen from fig. 3, channels between spoofed signals have strong correlation under the signal acquisition and processing method adopted by the present invention, and their channel characteristics are the same under the simulation condition, and will exhibit strong correlation under the real environment.
Simulation experiment 3:
the simulation experiment 3 of the present invention is to calculate the correlation coefficient of the real signal and the deceptive signal respectively by using the method for calculating the correlation coefficient of the present invention. The x-axis coordinate and the y-axis coordinate in fig. 3 are both mathematical representations of the real signal and the deceptive signal, and the z-axis coordinate is the resulting correlation coefficient.
Through the graph 3, it can be seen that the correlation coefficient between the real signals does not exceed 0.8, and the correlation coefficient between the deception signals is close to 1, the deception interference resisting method based on the space-time sampling can accurately detect the deception signals, and accurate target positioning coordinates are obtained from the real signals.
The invention has not been described in detail in part of the common general knowledge of those skilled in the art.
The above description is only one specific embodiment of the present invention and should not be construed as limiting the invention in any way, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations in form and detail can be made without departing from the principle of the invention after understanding the content and principle of the invention, but such modifications and variations are still within the scope of the appended claims.
Claims (6)
1. A space-time sampling navigation positioning method for resisting deception jamming is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) acquiring a target signal:
the receiver captures and tracks the GPS signal, and then carries out frequency mixing, despreading and complex conjugate operation on the GPS signal to obtain a target signal r (t):
wherein the superscripts A and S represent the true GPS signal and the spoofed GPS signal, respectively, and the subscript iNumber indicating GPS signal, L1Indicating the number of real GPS signals visible to the receiver, L2Indicating the number of spoofed GPS signals visible to the receiver, αi(t) random jitter of the i-th GPS signal generated at time t, A (t) channel gain, ci(. h) a spreading code for the ith GPS signal, d (t) navigation data transmitted by the satellite, fdIs Doppler frequency, w (t) is additive white noise, and tau is signal transmission delay; thetaiThe receiver measurement azimuth angle under the ith GPS signal is represented, sigma represents summation operation, and j represents the imaginary part of a complex number;
(2) l for receiver acquisition tracking1+L2Sampling a target signal r (t) by using M array antennas which are linearly and uniformly distributed to obtain a sampling signal matrix x:
(3) calculating the correlation coefficient between each column in the sampling signal matrix:
and respectively carrying out correlation coefficient calculation on each column of sampling data in the sampling signal matrix x and all columns containing the sampling data to obtain a correlation coefficient matrix rho:
(4) and (3) carrying out threshold judgment on the correlation coefficient:
setting a threshold value N of a screening signal, judging whether other correlation coefficients except the autocorrelation coefficient in the correlation coefficient matrix rho are larger than the threshold value N according to the threshold value, if so, entering the step (5), otherwise, directly entering the step (6);
(5) detecting a deception signal:
(5.1) presetting two empty groups, namely a real signal group and a deceptive signal group;
(5.2) sequentially detecting each row of the correlation coefficient matrix rho, and if the correlation coefficient which is larger than a threshold value N exists in the row except the autocorrelation coefficient, dividing the signal represented by the row into a deception signal group; if not, the real signal group is classified;
(5.3) judging whether the number of the signals in the real signal group is more than or equal to 4, if so, entering the step (6), otherwise, returning to the step (1);
(6) obtaining the positioning coordinates of the target:
and 4 signals are selected from the real signal group at will, 4 satellite coordinates corresponding to the signals are taken out respectively, and the positioning coordinates of the target are obtained by solving according to a GPS positioning calculation algorithm.
2. The positioning method according to claim 1, wherein: and (2) the GPS signals comprise all satellite signals, deception signals and noise in the visible range of the receiver.
3. The positioning method according to claim 1, wherein: the correlation coefficient in the step (3) is calculated according to the following formula:
wherein k is [1, L ]1+L2],v∈[1,L1+L2]E represents mathematical expectation, H represents conjugate transpose operation; rhokvRepresenting the correlation coefficient between the kth and the vth columns in the signal matrix x.
4. The positioning method according to claim 1, wherein: and (4) taking 0.8 as the threshold N for measuring the correlation strength.
5. The positioning method according to claim 1, wherein: the calculation formula of the GPS positioning calculation algorithm in the step (6) is as follows:
wherein, pair (x)1,y1,z1)、(x2,y2,z2)、(x3,y3,z3) And (x)4,y4,z4) Coordinates corresponding to 4 satellites respectively; d1、d2、d3And d4Respectively the distances between 4 satellites and the target to be positioned; Δ t is the receiver clock error; and solving the above formula to obtain the positioning coordinates (x, y, z) of the target.
6. The positioning method according to claim 5, wherein: the distance between the satellite and the target to be positioned is obtained by multiplying the difference between the satellite signal transmitting time and the receiving time of the receiver by the propagation speed of the electromagnetic wave.
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| CN117348040A (en) * | 2023-12-04 | 2024-01-05 | 北京航空航天大学 | GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression device and method |
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| CN117348040A (en) * | 2023-12-04 | 2024-01-05 | 北京航空航天大学 | GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression device and method |
| CN117348040B (en) * | 2023-12-04 | 2024-02-09 | 北京航空航天大学 | GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression device and method |
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