CN111008836B - Privacy security transfer payment method, device, system and storage medium - Google Patents
Privacy security transfer payment method, device, system and storage medium Download PDFInfo
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- CN111008836B CN111008836B CN201911120359.1A CN201911120359A CN111008836B CN 111008836 B CN111008836 B CN 111008836B CN 201911120359 A CN201911120359 A CN 201911120359A CN 111008836 B CN111008836 B CN 111008836B
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
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- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
Abstract
The invention provides a privacy safe transfer payment method, a device, a system and a storage medium based on a manageable blockchain, wherein the privacy safe transfer payment method comprises the following steps: privacy protection step of transaction amount: privacy protection is carried out on transaction amount in the transaction; a transaction address protection step: protecting addresses of both transaction sides; and a transaction supervision step. The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows: the invention solves the problem that the traditional account transfer payment scheme excessively depends on a third party mechanism; the privacy information to be protected in the transaction is defined, and a corresponding privacy protection scheme is designed aiming at the transaction amount in the transaction block, the transaction balance of the transaction parties, the address information of the transaction initiator and the address information of the transaction receiver; and establishing a system for supervising the blockchain users, wherein a supervisor can keep track of the responsibility of the buyer and the seller on the blockchain.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of network transfer payment, in particular to a privacy security transfer payment method, device, system and storage medium based on a manageable blockchain.
Background
Abbreviations and key term definitions:
UTXO: unspent Transaction Output, unused transaction output.
Ring signature: the ring signature is a digital signature scheme, originally proposed by Rivest et al, is a simplified group signature, and only ring members in the ring signature have no manager and do not need cooperation among the ring members.
Homomorphic encryption: homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic technique based on the theory of computational complexity of mathematical problems. The homomorphically encrypted data is processed to obtain an output, and the output is decrypted, the result of which is the same as the output result obtained by processing the unencrypted original data by the same method.
The following describes the background technology in detail:
1. background of the related Art (background Art)
With the development of the internet, great influence is generated on the life style of people, and most commodity transactions are carried out in a network transfer payment mode. In conventional transfer payment transaction systems, when we conduct transactions, the transaction is validated by a third party institution, and the asset is also stored in the third party institution's database. This way of storage and transaction places high demands on the stability and security of third party institutions. On the one hand, since the system is completely centralized, only one central mechanism is provided, the transaction in the system needs to be confirmed, and once the system fails, the whole system is paralyzed and cannot normally operate. On the other hand, the attacker and the manager can modify the database data, and the data recovery difficulty and the cost of the database are high. Therefore, the traditional transfer payment system relies on the trust and security of a third party, and has certain potential safety hazards.
In 2008, nakamoto S published a paper on an electronic cash system, which proposed a bitcoin network. With the advent and development of cryptocurrency such as bitcoin, blockchain technology is slowly becoming known, and more expert students are beginning to explore blockchain related technologies and applications. Blockchain techniques are generated by a combination of database techniques and a variety of cryptographic techniques, including elliptic curve cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography mechanisms, hash algorithms, consensus algorithms, and the like. Blockchains can be considered as a distributed shared ledger (Distributed Shared Ledger), with the recording and storage of transaction information being accomplished jointly by all nodes in the blockchain network. That is, any node in the blockchain network may record transaction information in the transaction block and write to the blockchain after verification, rather than having a third party authority that is fully centralized to complete the validation and recording of the transaction information; any node in the blockchain network may store all transaction information from the creation of the block rather than being centrally stored by a fully centralized third party. The transaction data of the blockchain is stored in time sequence, and adjacent transaction blocks are mutually connected through a cryptography technology, so that the formed blockchain is trusted and untampered.
Blockchain fundamentally solves the problem of relying on third parties in transfer payment transactions, using modern cryptography that is both manager and practice proven secure. The method has higher security and can protect the privacy of the identity of the user transaction to a certain extent. The distributed account book reduces the pressure of the traditional database to store the asset transaction information, and the multi-node joint maintenance ensures the stability of the blockchain system.
In the blockchain, the ledger of the blockchain is commonly maintained by nodes in all networks, any node can participate in the generation of the blocks and connect the blocks to the blockchain, and even nodes which are mutually not trusted can verify the transaction data in the blocks, and the nodes agree through a consensus mechanism. The account balance of the user can be found on the blockchain, and the plaintext information is not encrypted, and all nodes on the blockchain can acquire the public information. Meanwhile, when the user performs the transfer payment transaction, the verification of the transaction needs to be participated by other nodes on the chain, so that the information such as the transaction amount in the block main body is also clear. This results in the user's transaction privacy data being exposed on the blockchain, and it is apparent that no one wishes to have his own privacy information compromised. For example, all transaction data in the system up to now is approximately 190G from generation of the token system creation block. If an attacker performs analysis and integration on the historical transaction data, all transaction information of any one appointed account can be acquired. Even if the same user has a plurality of account addresses, the adversary can analyze which addresses belong to the same user with high probability through technologies such as behavior analysis based on clustering and the like. And since all transactions made with the corresponding account address can be found in the blockchain, if the transaction is associated with a true identity, both the transactor identity information and the associated transaction record in the transaction will be compromised.
Therefore, based on the blockchain technology, how to keep the anonymity, the trust, the non-falsifiability and the like of the blockchain is researched, and meanwhile, the privacy protection is carried out on transaction data through the technical means, so that the blockchain technology can be reasonably applied to the aspect of transfer payment transaction. There is also a need to study the supervision of blockchain technology from a technical level because of the fully de-centralised nature of blockchains, which results in illegal transactions on the chain not being effectively supervised.
2. Prior art related to the invention
2.1 Technical solution of the prior art)
Payment is the fundamental link in the circulation of funds. In the field of cross-border transfer and clearing, transactions present high cost, time consuming, security issues, and the like. With the development of blockchain technology, both the bottom technology developer and the traditional financial institutions pay attention to whether blockchain can play an advantage in terms of reducing settlement risk, improving payment efficiency, saving bank resources and the like, so that the existing transfer payment mode is improved. The characteristics of the blockchain, such as decentralization, distrust, collective maintenance, data transparency and the like, are well combined with the financial field, and particularly in the aspect of transfer payment transaction. The data of fund transfer is completely recorded on the digital ledger, each transaction can track and trace, and the safety and reliability of the transaction are ensured; by using the blockchain and distributed account book technology, an intermediate mechanism is not available, the step of manual processing by bank staff is not available, the transfer payment is point-to-point, and the processing time is directly reduced; the intermediate mechanism is canceled, so that the transaction processes and transaction information of payment and collection are transparent to both transaction parties; the participation of an intermediate mechanism is avoided, the cost is reduced, and the operation efficiency of the system is improved.
2.2 Evaluation of the disadvantages of the prior art
Existing blockchain techniques do not provide privacy protection well for users. Androoulaki E et al evaluate the ability of traditional blockchain technology to protect user privacy by simulating the transactions of bitcoins, and experimental results show that 40% of the true identity of users can be exposed through a behavior-based clustering method. There are two main reasons for user privacy disclosure. One is an open transaction amount, transaction metadata and a full-net account book, which allows an attacker to acquire a large amount of identity information about a user, and the other is a transaction system with obvious correlation characteristics between the account of a transaction initiator and the account of a transaction receiver in a transaction, so that the attacker can track down corresponding historical transactions.
The prior art has no effective regulatory mechanism. In addition to the development and application of blockchain technology, we also consider that due to the completely decentralised nature of blockchains, illegal transactions on chains cannot be effectively supervised and sensitive transactions cannot be checked.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a privacy security transfer payment method based on a manageable blockchain, which comprises the following steps:
privacy protection step of transaction amount: privacy protection is carried out on transaction amount in the transaction;
a transaction address protection step: protecting addresses of both transaction sides;
and a transaction supervision step: the system comprises a central bank, mintes and users, wherein the mintes are authorized by the central bank to record transactions, a public key is generated for each mintes by a central bank, authorized mintes lists are issued to the whole system regularly, each mintes maintains a low-level account book, direct or indirect communication exists among the mintes, and the mintes can issue the low-level account books to the central bank when the conditions are met, so that a global account book is generated, and the global account book has visibility to the outside.
As a further improvement of the present invention, in the privacy protection step of the transaction amount, a privacy protection algorithm based on homomorphic encryption is adopted: let x be 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 Respectively represent P 1 Before transaction balance, P 2 Before transaction balance, P 1 Post-transaction balance and P 2 Post-transaction balance), P 1 And P 2 Respectively representing two institutions participating in transfer transactions, currently having two pairs of ciphertext (E pk (x 1 ),E pk (y 1 )),(E pk (x 2 ),E pk (y 2 ) With the goal of guaranteeing x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 While privacy is achieved, E pk (x 1 +y 1 ),E pk (x 2 +y 2 ) And judges whether the two are equal.
As a further improvement of the invention, the transaction address protection step adopts a coin mixing algorithm based on a one-time hidden address, P 1 Initiate a transaction, need to go to P 2 Payment, P 1 By analysis of P 2 Wallet address get P 2 Wherein a=ag, b=bg; p (P) 1 Generating a random number r E [1, l-1 ]]And calculates a one-time public key p=h s (rA)G+B；P 1 Using P as the output destination address public key, simultaneously writing r=rg to the transaction block, P for the same address 1 Different disposable public key addresses, P, can be generated by selecting different random numbers r 1 Will beAnd->Writing the result into a transaction block; p (P) 1 Broadcasting the transaction through the whole network; p (P) 2 Calculating P' =h using his private key (a, b) s (aR) G+B, when P is detected 1 The transaction issued to him, P' =p, since ar= arG =ra; p (P) 2 Calculating a disposable private key x=h corresponding to the disposable public key p=xg according to the private keys (a, b) s (aR)+b；P 2 P is received by using the own disposable public key 1 Is to be used for the payment of (a); for other users in the system, the one-time public key address of the transaction is not associated with the true identity of the user; />And->For the supervision of third party supervision authorities, when the current transaction needs to be checked, the supervision party uses sk BCP Can decrypt to obtain r and rA, combining with P=H s (rA) G+B, and then (A, B), namely the real address of the receiver;
g represents one base point of the elliptic curve,l represents a prime order of the base point, H s Representing an encrypted hash function 0,1 * →F q E represents an elliptic curve expression.
As a further improvement of the present invention, the transaction address protection step adopts a coin mixing algorithm based on a revocable anonymity ring signature, and includes: (x, P) ≡Gen (1) k ) Gen is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, a pair of secret keys (x, P) are output, x is a private key, P is a public key, and a secret key mirror image I is obtained through calculation according to the (x, P);
σ←Sig(1 k x, L, m), sig is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, x is a private key, L is n user public key sets participating in ring signature, the user public key sets contain public keys corresponding to x, m is a signed message, and output is signature sigma;
1/0←Ver(1 k l, m, σ), ver is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, L is a set of n public keys of users participating in ring signature, m is a signed message, σ is a signature, output 1 indicates that verification passes, and output 0 indicates that verification does not pass;
1/0←Lnk(1 k k, sigma), lnk is a polynomial time algorithm, K is a security parameter, K is a set of all I's historically produced, sigma is a signature, output 1 indicates that the signature is linked, output 0 indicates that the signature is not linked;
1/0←Rev(1 k sigma, sk), rev is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, sigma is a signature, sk is a private key in the supervisor's hand, output 1 indicates that the signature is valid and the identity of the signer is confirmed, and output 0 indicates that the signature is invalid.
As a further improvement of the invention, in the transaction supervision step, mintes are first divided into a plurality of subgroups, each subgroup mintes only maintaining ledger contents in its own jurisdiction; when a user initiates a transaction, the system transmits corresponding mintettes to process according to corresponding rules; the exchange of information between the end user and the central bank does not take place directly, but rather the transaction records are summarized by this mintettes middle layer; the central bank plays a vital role in the system, and has unique supervision and audit authority on the global account book when transaction disputes or illegal transactions occur; if the transaction flow is according to the previously designed transfer payment transaction scheme, the verification and confirmation of the user transfer payment transaction are completed by other users in the system, the mintette does not verify and record the transaction independently, but plays a role in the supervision of a bottom layer, and a low-level account book is sent to a central bank in a specific time period; the transactions in different mintette areas are not interfered with each other, each mintette can only decrypt the transaction data in the jurisdiction of the mintette, and the central bank has the highest supervision right and can decrypt any transaction data.
The invention also provides a privacy security transfer payment system based on the manageable blockchain, which comprises the following steps:
privacy protection module of transaction amount: for privacy protection of transaction amounts in transactions;
transaction address protection module: the method is used for protecting addresses of both transaction sides;
and a transaction supervision module: the system comprises a central bank, mintes and users, wherein the mintes are authorized by the central bank to record transactions, a public key is generated for each mintes by a central bank, authorized mintes lists are issued to the whole system regularly, each mintes maintains a low-level account book, direct or indirect communication exists among the mintes, and the mintes can issue the low-level account books to the central bank when the conditions are met, so that a global account book is generated, and the global account book has visibility to the outside.
As a further improvement of the invention, in the privacy protection module of transaction amount, a privacy protection algorithm based on homomorphic encryption is adopted: let x be 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 Respectively represent P 1 Before transaction balance, P 2 Before transaction balance, P 1 Post-transaction balance and P 2 Post-transaction balance), P 1 And P 2 Respectively representing two institutions participating in transfer transactions, currently having two pairs of ciphertext (E pk (x 1 ),E pk (y 1 )),(E pk (x 2 ),E pk (y 2 ) With the goal of guaranteeing x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 While privacy is achieved, E pk (x 1 +y 1 ),E pk (x 2 +y 2 ) And judges whether the two are equal.
As a further improvement of the invention, in the transaction supervision module, mintes are first divided into a plurality of groups, and each group of mintes only maintains the account book content in its own jurisdiction; when a user initiates a transaction, the system transmits corresponding mintettes to process according to corresponding rules; the exchange of information between the end user and the central bank does not take place directly, but rather the transaction records are summarized by this mintettes middle layer; the central bank plays a vital role in the system, and has unique supervision and audit authority on the global account book when transaction disputes or illegal transactions occur; if the transaction flow is according to the previously designed transfer payment transaction scheme, the verification and confirmation of the user transfer payment transaction are completed by other users in the system, the mintette does not verify and record the transaction independently, but plays a role in the supervision of a bottom layer, and a low-level account book is sent to a central bank in a specific time period; the transactions in different mintette areas are not interfered with each other, each mintette can only decrypt the transaction data in the jurisdiction of the mintette, and the central bank has the highest supervision right and can decrypt any transaction data.
The invention also provides a privacy security transfer payment device based on the manageable blockchain, which comprises: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory, the computer program configured to implement the steps of the privacy-safe transfer payment method described in the present invention when called by the processor.
The present invention also provides a computer readable storage medium storing a computer program configured to implement the steps of the privacy-preserving transfer payment method described in the present invention when invoked by a processor.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows: the invention solves the problem that the traditional account transfer payment scheme excessively depends on a third party mechanism; the privacy information to be protected in the transaction is defined, and a corresponding privacy protection scheme is designed aiming at the transaction amount in the transaction block, the transaction balance of the transaction parties, the address information of the transaction initiator and the address information of the transaction receiver; and establishing a system for supervising the blockchain users, wherein a supervisor can keep track of the responsibility of the buyer and the seller on the blockchain.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a financial blockchain model.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a standard transaction structure.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of a two-level supervision architecture.
Fig. 4 is a system architecture diagram.
Fig. 5 is a flow chart of a method.
Fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of an initialization phase.
Fig. 7 is a ring signature schematic.
Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram of the verification phase.
Detailed Description
The invention discloses a privacy security transfer payment method based on a manageable blockchain, which is specifically described as follows:
brief description of the technical principle:
in the account transfer payment transaction scenario, assume that the participant has P 1 ,P 2 ,P 3 Three institutions and a supervisor S, as shown in fig. 1. When P 1 To P 2 A transaction with transfer amount x is performed, then this account t= (P 1 ,P 2 X) will be broadcast in the network, P 1 ,P 2 ,P 3 T this transaction is received. However, this transaction is P only 1 ,P 2 Transactions between, and P 3 Is not related, thus P 3 The actual content of this transaction should not be known. But P is 3 To record the transaction, ensure that the ledger records and P 1 ,P 2 The account book is consistent.
(1) At the condition of unaware of P 1 ,P 2 P in the case of address information and transaction contents 3 The validity of the transfer can be confirmed. Legitimacy here has two layers of meaning: p (P) 1 The method can prove that the asset is owned by the user, is abstracted into an asset identifier corresponding to a specific and globally unique ID, and is still invisible and hidden to other people; p (P) 1 It can prove that the resource is legal in the network, i.e. has uniqueness, is unused, P 1 A proof needs to be provided.
(2) At the condition of unaware of P 1 ,P 2 In case of transaction amount, P 3 The funds transaction settlement of the account book can be performed, and the accounting balance is confirmed. According to accounting rules, P 1 And P 2 After the transaction, the balance of the assets (e.g., credits) in the hand is equal. Namely, the following holds:
P 1 (Pre-trade balance) +P 2 (pre-trade balance) =p 1 (post-transaction balance) +P 2 (post-transaction balance)
(3) The supervisory party S can decrypt all encrypted transaction data and conduct supervisory audit on each transaction.
1. Aiming at the problem of transaction amount disclosure, the invention provides a privacy protection algorithm based on homomorphic encryption, and the validity of the transaction can be verified under the condition of protecting transaction data by utilizing homomorphic characteristics of the algorithm. Specifically, assume x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 Respectively represent P 1 (balance before transaction), P 2 (balance before transaction), P 1 (post-transaction balance) and P 2 (post-transaction balance). Currently there are two pairs of ciphertext (E pk (x 1 ),E pk (y 1 )),(E pk (x 2 ),E pk (y 2 ) With the goal of guaranteeing x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 While privacy is achieved, E pk (x 1 +y 1 ),E pk (x 2 +y 2 ) And judges whether the two are equal.
2. Aiming at the problem of address disclosure of both transaction parties, the invention provides a coin mixing algorithm based on a one-time hidden address and a coin mixing algorithm based on a revocable anonymity ring signature on the basis of a CryptoNote protocol, the address of the transaction initiator can be effectively protected by utilizing the characteristic of the ring signature, and a signer needs to encrypt a private key to participate in the construction of the signature, so that the revocation of anonymity of the signer under special conditions is ensured.
Based on the one-time hidden address coin-mixing algorithm, during the process of generating the one-time public key, we select EdDSA as the digital signature algorithm of the scheme, and the related parameter meaning is shown in table 1.
TABLE 1 EdDSA-related parameters and meanings
1)P 1 Initiate a transaction, need to go to P 2 And (5) paying. P (P) 1 By analysis of P 2 Wallet address get P 2 Wherein a=ag, b=bg;
2)P 1 generating a random number r E [1, l-1 ]]And calculates a one-time public key p=h s (rA)G+B；
3)P 1 P is used as the output destination address public key while r=rg is written to the transaction block. Here, for the same address, P 1 Different one-time public key addresses can be generated by choosing different random numbers r. In addition, to ensure effective supervision of transactions, P 1 It is necessary to connectAnd->Writing the result into a transaction block;
4)P 1 broadcasting the transaction through the whole network;
5)P 2 calculating P' =h using his private key (a, b) s (aR) G+B, when P is detected 1 The transaction issued to him, P' =p, since ar= arG =ra;
6)P 2 the disposable private key x=h corresponding to the disposable public key p=xg can be calculated according to the private keys (a, b) s (aR) +b, which also represents that he has possession and use of the money.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a standard transaction, to which P 2 P is received by using the own disposable public key 1 Is a payment for (a). For other users in the system, the one-time public key address of the transaction is not associated with the user's true identity.Andfor the supervision of third party supervision authorities, when the current transaction needs to be checked, the supervision party uses sk BCP Can decrypt to obtain r and rA, combining with P=H s (rA) G+B in turn yields (A, B), the real address of the recipient.
The use of ring signatures is to hide the association (untraceability) between user input and output addresses. With ring signatures, users can sign messages anonymously, and others can verify the signature without knowing which member in the ring signed the signature. Although ring signatures guarantee the anonymity of the user, another problem arises in how to prevent "double spending" and prevent the sender from sending the same money to different recipients. We can improve the traditional ring signature to be linkable, that is, if the user creates multiple ring signatures (the other user's public keys in the ring signature can be chosen arbitrarily) using their own same private key, these will be linked together, which means that the user has a double cost for a piece of capital.
In order to make the ring signature linkable we introduced the concept of a key mirror, which is a special tag that the user generates when creating the ring signature. The private key and the public key of the user are subjected to one-way hash operation with a certain rule to obtain a value which is the mirror image of the key. The unidirectional refers to that an attacker cannot reversely push the private key of the user only through the key mirror image and other public information. The key image can be regarded as an anonymous marking of the private key of the signer, all users retain the key image generated in all historical transactions in the system, and when verifying the validity of the ring signature, if the key image is already present in the historical key image library, whether the new ring signature passes verification or not is rejected.
The characteristic of ring signature is used to design a coin mixing scheme, and anonymity of the blockchain is enhanced by hiding the transaction address of the user. The security model of the scheme comprises the following five algorithms:
1)(x,P)←Gen(1 k ) Gen is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter; and outputting a pair of keys (x, P), wherein x is a private key, P is a public key, and calculating according to the keys (x, P) to obtain I.
2)σ←Sig(1 k X, L, m) Sig is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, x is a private key, L is a set of n user public keys (containing the public key corresponding to x) participating in the ring signature, and m is the signed message; the output is signature σ.
3)1/0←Ver(1 k Ver is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, L is a set of n users' public keys participating in ring signature, m is a signed message, and σ is a signature; output 1 indicates that the verification passed, and output 0 indicates that the verification failed.
4)1/0←Lnk(1 k Lnk is a polynomial time algorithm, K is a security parameter, K is a set of all I's historically generated, and σ is a signature; output 1 indicates that the signature is linked and output 0 indicates that the signature is not linked.
5)1/0←Rev(1 k Sigma, sk) Rev is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, sigma is a signature, sk is a private key in the supervisor's hand; output 1 indicates that the signature is valid and the identity of the signer is confirmed, and output 0 indicates that the signature is invalid.
3. Aiming at the problem of transaction supervision on the blockchain, the invention provides a scheme of a two-stage supervision architecture, and a supervisor can keep track of the responsibility of the buyer and the seller on the blockchain.
The system comprises three roles, namely a central bank, a mintette and a user. Initially, mintette and miners appear to have a bit image, both of which are used to confirm the occurrence of a transaction and then to bill. However, unlike the most critical point, mintette does not solve the computational difficulty problem, but is authorized by the central bank to record the transaction. This authorization is accomplished by PK public key encryption, where the central silver line would generate a public key for each mintette and periodically issue a list of authorized mintettes to the overall system. Each mintette maintains a low-level ledger with direct or indirect communication between mintettes. In a specific time, mintes sends the low-level ledgers to a central bank, so that a global ledger is generated, and the global ledger has visibility to the outside.
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a two-level supervisory architecture that utilizes the design considerations of multithreading to increase the processing power of the system. Mintes are first divided into multiple subgroups, with mintes for each subgroup maintaining only ledger contents in its jurisdiction. When a user initiates a transaction, the system is processed by corresponding mintettes according to corresponding rules, so that the operation efficiency of the system can be greatly improved. The exchange of information between the end user and the central bank does not take place directly, but rather the transaction records are summarized by this mintettes middle tier. The central bank plays a vital role in the system, and has unique supervision and audit authority on the global ledger when transaction disputes or illegal transactions occur.
In the transaction in each mintette jurisdiction, if the transaction flow is according to the previously designed transfer payment transaction scheme, the verification and confirmation of the user transfer payment transaction is completed by other users in the system, the mintette does not verify and record the transaction independently, but plays a role in the supervision of the bottom layer, and the low-level account book is sent to the central bank in a specific time period. The transactions in different mintette areas are not interfered with each other, each mintette can only decrypt the transaction data in the jurisdiction of the mintette, and the central bank has the highest supervision right and can decrypt any transaction data.
For the privacy protection step of the transaction amount, a zero knowledge proof scheme with better privacy protection effect can be used for the privacy protection of the transaction amount in the transaction, but the performance of the system may be reduced.
For the transaction address protection step of the invention, other coin mixing schemes, such as Mixcoin protocol, coinshubble protocol, coinpart protocol, etc., can be adopted for protecting the addresses of both transaction parties.
The invention also discloses a privacy security transfer payment system based on the manageable blockchain, which comprises:
privacy protection module of transaction amount: for privacy protection of transaction amounts in transactions;
transaction address protection module: the method is used for protecting addresses of both transaction sides;
and a transaction supervision module: the system comprises a central bank, mintes and users, wherein the mintes are authorized by the central bank to record transactions, a public key is generated for each mintes by a central bank, authorized mintes lists are issued to the whole system regularly, each mintes maintains a low-level account book, direct or indirect communication exists among the mintes, and the mintes can issue the low-level account books to the central bank when the conditions are met, so that a global account book is generated, and the global account book has visibility to the outside.
In the privacy protection module of transaction amount, privacy protection algorithm based on homomorphic encryption is adopted: let x be 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 Respectively represent P 1 Before transaction balance, P 2 Before transaction balance, P 1 Post-transaction balance and P 2 Post-transaction balance), P 1 And P 2 Respectively representing two institutions participating in transfer transactions, currently having two pairs of ciphertext (E pk (x 1 ),E pk (y 1 )),(E pk (x 2 ),E pk (y 2 ) With the goal of guaranteeing x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 While privacy is achieved, E pk (x 1 +y 1 ),E pk (x 2 +y 2 ) And judges whether the two are equal.
The transaction address protection module adopts a coin mixing algorithm based on a disposable hidden address, P 1 Initiate a transaction, need to go to P 2 Payment, P 1 By analysis of P 2 Wallet address get P 2 Wherein a=ag, b=bg; p (P) 1 Generating a random number r E [1, l-1 ]]And calculates a one-time public key p=h s (rA)G+B；P 1 Using P as the output destination address public key, simultaneously writing r=rg to the transaction block, P for the same address 1 Different disposable public key addresses, P, can be generated by selecting different random numbers r 1 Will beAnd->Writing the result into a transaction block; p (P) 1 Broadcasting the transaction through the whole network; p (P) 2 Calculating P' =h using his private key (a, b) s (aR) G+B, when P is detected 1 The transaction issued to him, P' =p, since ar= arG =ra; p (P) 2 Calculating a disposable private key x=h corresponding to the disposable public key p=xg according to the private keys (a, b) s (aR)+b；P 2 P is received by using the own disposable public key 1 Is to be used for the payment of (a); for other users in the system, the one-time public key address of the transaction is not associated with the true identity of the user; />And->For the supervision of third party supervision authorities, when the current transaction needs to be checked, the supervision party uses sk BCP Can decrypt to obtain r and rA, combining with P=H s (rA) G+B, and then (A, B), namely the real address of the receiver;
g represents a base point of the elliptic curve, l represents a prime order of the base point, H s Representing an encrypted hash function 0,1 * →F q E represents an elliptic curve expression.
The transaction address protection module adopts a coin mixing algorithm based on a revocable anonymity ring signature, and comprises the following steps: (x, P) ≡Gen (1) k ) Gen is oneA plurality of polynomial time algorithms, k is a security parameter, a pair of secret keys (x, P) are output, x is a private key, P is a public key, and a secret key mirror image I is obtained through calculation according to the secret keys (x, P);
σ←Sig(1 k x, L, m), sig is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, x is a private key, L is n user public key sets participating in ring signature, the user public key sets contain public keys corresponding to x, m is a signed message, and output is signature sigma;
1/0←Ver(1 k l, m, σ), ver is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, L is a set of n public keys of users participating in ring signature, m is a signed message, σ is a signature, output 1 indicates that verification passes, and output 0 indicates that verification does not pass;
1/0←Lnk(1 k k, sigma), lnk is a polynomial time algorithm, K is a security parameter, K is a set of all I's historically produced, sigma is a signature, output 1 indicates that the signature is linked, output 0 indicates that the signature is not linked;
1/0←Rev(1 k sigma, sk), rev is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, sigma is a signature, sk is a private key in the supervisor's hand, output 1 indicates that the signature is valid and the identity of the signer is confirmed, and output 0 indicates that the signature is invalid.
In the transaction supervision module, firstly, mintettes are divided into a plurality of groups, and each mintettes of each group only maintains account book contents in a jurisdiction of the mintettes; when a user initiates a transaction, the system transmits corresponding mintettes to process according to corresponding rules; the exchange of information between the end user and the central bank does not take place directly, but rather the transaction records are summarized by this mintettes middle layer; the central bank plays a vital role in the system, and has unique supervision and audit authority on the global account book when transaction disputes or illegal transactions occur; if the transaction flow is according to the previously designed transfer payment transaction scheme, the verification and confirmation of the user transfer payment transaction are completed by other users in the system, the mintette does not verify and record the transaction independently, but plays a role in the supervision of a bottom layer, and a low-level account book is sent to a central bank in a specific time period; the transactions in different mintette areas are not interfered with each other, each mintette can only decrypt the transaction data in the jurisdiction of the mintette, and the central bank has the highest supervision right and can decrypt any transaction data.
The invention also discloses a privacy security transfer payment device based on the manageable blockchain, which comprises: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory, the computer program configured to implement the steps of the privacy-preserving transfer payment method of the present invention when called by the processor.
The invention also discloses a computer readable storage medium storing a computer program configured to implement the steps of the privacy-preserving transfer payment method of the invention when invoked by a processor.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows: the invention solves the problem that the traditional account transfer payment scheme excessively depends on a third party mechanism; the privacy information to be protected in the transaction is defined, and a corresponding privacy protection scheme is designed aiming at the transaction amount in the transaction block, the transaction balance of the transaction parties, the address information of the transaction initiator and the address information of the transaction receiver; and establishing a system for supervising the blockchain users, wherein a supervisor can keep track of the responsibility of the buyer and the seller on the blockchain.
The foregoing is a further detailed description of the invention in connection with the preferred embodiments, and it is not intended that the invention be limited to the specific embodiments described. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that several simple deductions or substitutions may be made without departing from the spirit of the invention, and these should be considered to be within the scope of the invention.
Claims (8)
1. A method of privacy-preserving transfer payment, comprising:
privacy protection step of transaction amount: privacy protection is carried out on transaction amount in the transaction;
a transaction address protection step: protecting addresses of both transaction sides;
and a transaction supervision step: the system comprises a central bank, mintes and users, wherein the mintes are authorized by the central bank to record transactions, a public key is generated for each mintes by a central bank, an authorized mintes list is issued to the whole system regularly, each mintes maintains a low-level account book, direct or indirect communication exists among the mintes, and the mintes can issue the low-level account books to the central bank when the conditions are set, so that a global account book is generated, and the global account book has visibility to the outside;
in the transaction supervision step, firstly, mintettes are divided into a plurality of groups, and each mintettes of each group only maintains account book contents in a jurisdiction of the mintettes; when a user initiates a transaction, the system transmits corresponding mintettes to process according to corresponding rules; the exchange of information between the end user and the central bank does not take place directly, but rather the transaction records are summarized by this mintettes middle layer; the central bank plays a vital role in the system, and has unique supervision and audit authority on the global account book when transaction disputes or illegal transactions occur; if the transaction flow is according to the previously designed transfer payment transaction scheme, the verification and confirmation of the user transfer payment transaction are completed by other users in the system, the mintette does not verify and record the transaction independently, but plays a role in the supervision of a bottom layer, and a low-level account book is sent to a central bank in a specific time period; the transactions in different mintette areas are not interfered with each other, each mintette can only decrypt the transaction data in the jurisdiction of the mintette, and the central bank has the highest supervision right and can decrypt any transaction data.
2. The privacy-preserving transfer payment method of claim 1, wherein in the privacy-preserving step of the transaction amount, a privacy-preserving algorithm based on homomorphic encryption is adopted: let x be 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 Respectively represent P 1 Before transaction balance, P 2 Before transaction balance, P 1 Post-transaction balance and P 2 Post-transaction balance, P 1 And P 2 Respectively representing two institutions participating in transfer transactions, currently having two pairs of ciphertext (E pk (x 1 ),E pk (y 1 )),(E pk (x 2 ),E pk (y 2 ) With the goal of guaranteeing x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 While privacy is achieved, E pk (x 1 y 1 ),E pk (x 2 y 2 ) And judging whether the two are equal;
E pk (x 1 ) Represents ciphertext obtained by encrypting x1 with key pk, E pk (y 1 ) Represents ciphertext obtained by encrypting y1 with key pk, E pk (x 2 ) Represents ciphertext obtained by encrypting x2 with key pk, E pk (y 1 ) The ciphertext obtained by encrypting y1 with the key pk is shown.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the transaction address protecting step employs a one-time hidden address based mixed coin algorithm, P 1 Initiate a transaction, need to go to P 2 Payment, P 1 By analysis of P 2 Wallet address get P 2 Wherein a=ag, b=bg, (a, B) represents P 2 Is a private key of (a); p (P) 1 Generating a random number r E [1, l-1 ]]And calculates a one-time public key p=h s (rA) G+B, rA representing the product of the random number r and A on an elliptic curve; p (P) 1 Using P as the public key of the output destination address, simultaneously writing r=rg into the transaction block, R being a common parameter, P for the same address 1 Different disposable public key addresses, P, can be generated by selecting different random numbers r 1 Will beAnd->Results write transaction block,>and->Representing ciphertext encrypted using a BCP public key; p (P) 1 Broadcasting the transaction through the whole network; p (P) 2 Calculating P' =h using his private key (a, b) s (aR) G+B, P' represents a calculated one-time public key of the transaction receiver for verifying whether the information sent by the transaction sender is correct, when P is detected 1 The transaction issued to him, P' =p, since ar= arG =ra; p (P) 2 Calculating a disposable private key x=h corresponding to the disposable public key p=xg according to the private keys (a, b) s (aR)+b；P 2 P is received by using the own disposable public key 1 Is to be used for the payment of (a); for other users in the system, the one-time public key address of the transaction is not associated with the true identity of the user; />And->For the supervision of third party supervision authorities, when the current transaction needs to be checked, the supervision party uses sk BCP Can decrypt to obtain r and rA, combining with P=H s (rA) G+B and thus (A, B), i.e. the real address of the recipient, sk BCP Representing a BCP private key; g represents a base point of the elliptic curve, l represents a prime order of the base point, H s Representing an encrypted hash function 0,1 * →F q E represents an elliptic curve expression.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the transaction address protection step employs a coin-mixing algorithm based on a revocable anonymity ring signature, comprising: (x, P) ≡Gen (1) k ) Gen is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, a pair of keys (x, P) is output, x is a private key, P is a public key, and the key is used for the key(x, P) calculating to obtain a key mirror image I;
σ←Sig(1 k x, L, m), sig is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, x is a private key, L is n user public key sets participating in ring signature, the user public key sets contain public keys corresponding to x, m is a signed message, and output is signature sigma;
1/0←Ver(1 k l, m, σ), ver is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, L is a set of n public keys of users participating in ring signature, m is a signed message, σ is a signature, output 1 indicates that verification passes, and output 0 indicates that verification does not pass;
1/0←Lnk(1 k k, sigma), lnk is a polynomial time algorithm, K is a security parameter, K is a set of all I's historically produced, sigma is a signature, output 1 indicates that the signature is linked, output 0 indicates that the signature is not linked;
1/0←Rev(1 k sigma, sk), rev is a polynomial time algorithm, k is a security parameter, sigma is a signature, sk is a private key in the supervisor's hand, output 1 indicates that the signature is valid and the identity of the signer is confirmed, and output 0 indicates that the signature is invalid.
5. A privacy-preserving transfer payment system, comprising:
privacy protection module of transaction amount: for privacy protection of transaction amounts in transactions;
transaction address protection module: the method is used for protecting addresses of both transaction sides;
and a transaction supervision module: the system comprises a central bank, mintes and users, wherein the mintes are authorized by the central bank to record transactions, a public key is generated for each mintes by a central bank, an authorized mintes list is issued to the whole system regularly, each mintes maintains a low-level account book, direct or indirect communication exists among the mintes, and the mintes can issue the low-level account books to the central bank when the conditions are set, so that a global account book is generated, and the global account book has visibility to the outside;
in the transaction supervision module, firstly, mintettes are divided into a plurality of groups, and each mintettes of each group only maintains account book contents in a jurisdiction of the mintettes; when a user initiates a transaction, the system transmits corresponding mintettes to process according to corresponding rules; the exchange of information between the end user and the central bank does not take place directly, but rather the transaction records are summarized by this mintettes middle layer; the central bank plays a vital role in the system, and has unique supervision and audit authority on the global account book when transaction disputes or illegal transactions occur; if the transaction flow is according to the previously designed transfer payment transaction scheme, the verification and confirmation of the user transfer payment transaction are completed by other users in the system, the mintette does not verify and record the transaction independently, but plays a role in the supervision of a bottom layer, and a low-level account book is sent to a central bank in a specific time period; the transactions in different mintette areas are not interfered with each other, each mintette can only decrypt the transaction data in the jurisdiction of the mintette, and the central bank has the highest supervision right and can decrypt any transaction data.
6. The privacy secure transfer payment system of claim 5, wherein in the privacy preserving module of the transaction amount, a privacy preserving algorithm based on homomorphic encryption is employed: let x be 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 Respectively represent P 1 Before transaction balance, P 2 Before transaction balance, P 1 Post-transaction balance and P 2 Post-transaction balance, P 1 And P 2 Respectively representing two institutions participating in transfer transactions, currently having two pairs of ciphertext (E pk (x 1 ),E pk (y 1 )),(E pk (x 2 ),E pk (y 2 ) With the goal of guaranteeing x 1 ,y 1 ,x 2 ,y 2 While privacy is achieved, E pk (x 1 y 1 ),E pk (x 2 y 2 ) And judging whether the two are equal;
E pk (x 1 ) Represents ciphertext obtained by encrypting x1 with key pk, E pk (y 1 ) Representing encryption of y1 with key pkThe ciphertext E pk (x 2 ) Represents ciphertext obtained by encrypting x2 with key pk, E pk (y 1 ) The ciphertext obtained by encrypting y1 with the key pk is shown.
7. A privacy secure transfer payment device, characterized by: comprising the following steps: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory, the computer program configured to implement the steps of the privacy-safe transfer payment method of any of claims 1-4 when invoked by the processor.
8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized by: the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program configured to implement the steps of the privacy-safe transfer payment method of any one of claims 1-4 when invoked by a processor.
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