CN110730455B - Underwater node authentication method based on symmetric polynomial and ECC algorithm - Google Patents

Underwater node authentication method based on symmetric polynomial and ECC algorithm Download PDF

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CN110730455B
CN110730455B CN201910997937.3A CN201910997937A CN110730455B CN 110730455 B CN110730455 B CN 110730455B CN 201910997937 A CN201910997937 A CN 201910997937A CN 110730455 B CN110730455 B CN 110730455B
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cluster head
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王大宇
张锦灿
王志欣
唐立赫
黄杰
黄亮平
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CETC 54 Research Institute
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B11/00—Transmission systems employing sonic, ultrasonic or infrasonic waves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B13/00—Transmission systems characterised by the medium used for transmission, not provided for in groups H04B3/00 - H04B11/00
    • H04B13/02—Transmission systems in which the medium consists of the earth or a large mass of water thereon, e.g. earth telegraphy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity

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Abstract

The invention discloses an underwater node authentication method based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm, which comprises the following steps: initialization, authentication and key exchange, group key exchange. The initialization means that a base station in the network distributes security parameters and algorithms for member nodes such as buoys, cluster heads, common nodes and the like, wherein the security parameters and the algorithms comprise symmetric polynomial shares, public and private keys, encryption algorithms and message authentication code functions. The authentication and key exchange mean that the cluster head and the common node realize the bidirectional authentication between the nodes through three times of communication, and the symmetric session key is successfully exchanged. The group key exchange means that after the authentication of the cluster head and all the member nodes in the cluster is successful, the cluster head needs to generate a unique symmetric group key shared with all the member nodes, so that the encrypted transmission of the cluster head broadcast message is realized, and the management of the cluster head to the member nodes is facilitated. The method solves the problem of higher communication overhead of underwater node authentication, and effectively reduces the probability of data collision.

Description

Underwater node authentication method based on symmetric polynomial and ECC algorithm
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of node authentication, in particular to an underwater node authentication method based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm.
Background
Abundant ocean resources and a large number of ocean application scenes make global researchers increasingly interested in the development of ocean resources and the technical research of underwater acoustic communication networks. Researchers around the world participate in the research of marine technology more widely, and the acquisition and processing of marine information are more and more emphasized in various countries. Ocean data is the key basis for all ocean technology applications, including data generation, acquisition, storage, transmission and processing, so the underwater acoustic communication gateway key technology gradually becomes the key research topic of each ocean nation. The underwater wireless communication network with low cost, high energy efficiency, safety and reliability is designed and developed, and plays a very important role in national defense and national economic construction.
Unlike wired or wireless transmission on land, unreliable underwater acoustic channels and complex underwater acoustic environments present many insurmountable obstacles for the design and study of underwater acoustic communication network security schemes. The underwater acoustic channel has the following basic characteristics: the transmission delay of sound waves in water can reach 0.67 s/km; when sound waves are transmitted in the sea, the received signals are easily distorted due to multipath effects caused by refraction and sea bottom and sea surface reflection; the transmission delay between Communication nodes of an Underwater Acoustic Communication Network (UACN) is a binary function of time and space, and the time-space uncertainty of an Underwater Acoustic channel increases the probability of receiving and transmitting collisions and collision of data packets. When designing a safety mechanism suitable for an underwater acoustic communication network, characteristics of low bandwidth, high time delay, multipath effect, communication conflict and the like of an underwater acoustic channel need to be considered, and requirements on clock synchronization are reduced.
The identity authentication technology is the first barrier of a security system, legal nodes and illegal nodes can be efficiently identified through identity authentication, an unauthorized third party is prohibited from accessing a network, authorized access of the legal nodes to the network is allowed, and legal service is provided for the network. The main purpose of identity authentication is to ensure that the identities of all nodes accessing the network are legitimate and to ensure the authenticity of the source of messages within the network. Due to the difference between the underwater acoustic communication Network and the Terrestrial Wireless Sensor Network (TWSN), the existing Terrestrial Wireless Sensor Network security technology and mechanism cannot be directly transplanted into the underwater acoustic communication Network. Therefore, in order to secure the underwater acoustic communication network, an authentication and intrusion detection technology suitable for the underwater acoustic communication network must be designed and proposed.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide an underwater node authentication method based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm, solve the problem of high communication overhead of underwater node authentication and effectively reduce the probability of data collision.
In order to solve the technical problems, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
an underwater node authentication method based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm comprises the following steps:
(1) carrying out initialization;
(101) the base station selects and generates security parameters required by network authentication and stores the security parameters in all network nodes; the network nodes comprise gateway nodes, cluster head nodes and common nodes;
(102) the base station distributes unique identity IDs for all network nodes;
(103) the base station calculates public and private key Pairs (PUs) for all network nodesi，PRi) Unique identity key pair (ID)i，PUi，PRi) Storing in corresponding network nodes, then the base station deletes the private keys of all network nodes, and only stores the identity public key pair (ID) of each network nodei，PUi)；
(104) The base station selects a ternary high-order symmetric polynomial f (x, y, z), generates a random number r, obtains f (x, y, r) by making z equal to r, and distributes the f (x, y, r) to all network nodesPolynomial share f (ID)i，y，r)；
(105) The base station selects a symmetric encryption algorithm and a message authentication code function for realizing the encryption transmission of the key data of the network node and verifying the integrity of the message;
(106) the base station selects a binary hash function H (x, y) as a message authentication code function, and inputs the ID and the symmetric encryption key K of a cluster head node j and a common node iijObtain the corresponding MAC key MKij，
Figure BDA0002240342900000021
(2) Authentication and key exchange are carried out between the cluster head node j and the common node i;
(201) cluster head node j broadcasting including cluster head identification IDjAnd a temporary interaction number n1Authentication request M of0；
(202) Reception of M by ordinary node i in network0Then, according to the ID of the cluster headjAnd polynomial share f (ID) in memoryiY, r), generating temporary message authentication key MTK between local node and cluster head nodeji＝f(IDi，IDjR) and generates a random number as a temporary interaction number n2The temporary interaction number n of the node is used2ID, ID informationiPublic key PUiAnd the temporary message authentication code is packaged in M1Is sent to the cluster head node;
(203) cluster head node receives M1Then, the identity information ID of the common node is obtainediAnd public key PUiUsing M1Identity information ID in (1)iAnd polynomial share generating temporary authentication key f (ID)j，IDiR) from the symmetry f (ID) of a polynomiali，IDj，r)＝f(IDj，IDiR) to verify M1If the matching result shows that the message is not tampered, the cluster head node calculates the symmetric key K of the cluster head node and the common nodeji＝PRjPUi＝PRjPRiG and generates a corresponding MAC key
Figure BDA0002240342900000031
The cluster head sends the identity information ID of the nodejPublic key PUjTemporary interaction number and temporary message authentication code are packaged in M2Sending the data to a common node; wherein G is a conversion function of the public key and the private key;
(204) when the common node receives the message M2Thereafter, using the temporary authentication key MTKjiGenerating a temporary message authentication code by a message authentication code function, verifying M2If the message integrity is matched, the message is not tampered, and the common node calculates the symmetric key K of the common node and the cluster head nodeji＝PRiPUj＝PRiPRjG＝PRjPUiAnd generates a corresponding MAC key
Figure BDA0002240342900000032
The cluster head and the common node complete key exchange, and the two have the same symmetric encryption key KjiAnd the same authentication key MKji；
(3) Group key exchange is carried out between the cluster head node j and the common node i;
(301) when the authentication between the cluster head node j and all the common nodes i is finished, the cluster head node calculates the public value PUjiThe calculation method is as follows
Figure BDA0002240342900000033
Wherein N isjRepresenting the number of common nodes in the cluster j, wherein i represents the ID of the common nodes;
(302) cluster head node j performs NjSub-broadcast, broadcast message being MiMessage MiThe contents contained are as follows:
Mi＝IDi||PUji||MAC(MTKji，IDi|PUji)
(303) ordinary node i receives MiThen, calculating to obtain a group key K of the cluster jj：
Figure BDA0002240342900000034
Wherein KijIndicating the process of the session key exchanged by the cluster head j and the member node i in the networking authentication phase or the new node joining phase.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the invention adopts an authentication mode based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm to realize key exchange of the cluster head and the node, realizes authentication of the cluster head and the node only by three times of communication, reduces communication conflicts and collisions of underwater nodes, generates an MAC key by using the symmetric polynomial to verify the message integrity of an initial plaintext, can effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks in the communication process, generates a group key which can be used for encrypting broadcast messages in a cluster, is convenient for the management of the cluster head to member nodes, and has less communication overhead and higher safety strength.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a topology structure of a deep sea underwater acoustic communication network in the invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of secure communication of a network node according to the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of an authentication method of a cluster head and a node according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
As shown in fig. 1 and fig. 2, a method for authenticating an underwater node based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm includes the following steps:
(1) initialization
1) The base station selects and generates security parameters required by network authentication and stores the security parameters in all network nodes. The network nodes comprise gateway nodes, cluster head nodes and common nodes.
2) The base station assigns a unique identity ID to all physical components within all networks.
3) The base station calculates public and private key Pairs (PUs) for all network nodesi，PRi) And storing the private keys in the corresponding nodes, deleting the private keys of all the nodes by the base station after the calculation is finished, and only storing the private keys of the nodesShare public key pair (ID)i，PUi). After the public and private keys of all nodes are calculated, the unique identity key pair (ID) is usedi，PUi，PRi) Stored in IDiAmong the nodes of (1). Then the base station deletes the private keys of all the nodes and only stores the identity public key pair (ID) of each nodei，PUi)。
4) The base station selects a ternary high-order symmetric polynomial f (x, y, z), generates a random number r, makes z equal to r to obtain f (x, y, r), and distributes polynomial share f (ID) to all network nodesi，y，r)；
5) The base station selects a symmetric encryption algorithm and a message authentication code function which are respectively used for realizing encryption transmission of key data of the network node and verifying the integrity of the message, such as authentication data and collected important service data.
6) The base station selects a binary hash function H (x, y) as a message authentication code function, and inputs the ID and the symmetric encryption key K of a cluster head node j and a common node iijObtain the corresponding MAC key MKij，
Figure BDA0002240342900000041
(2) The cluster head node and all the common nodes perform authentication and key exchange, and the cluster head 1 and the common nodes 2 are taken as an example for explanation;
1) cluster head 1 broadcast including cluster head identification ID1And a temporary interaction number n1Authentication request M of0，M0The composition is shown in figure 3;
2) reception of M by a common node 2 within the network0Then, according to the ID of the cluster head1And polynomial share f (ID) in memory2Y, r), generating an interim message authentication key MTK between the own node and the cluster head 112＝f(ID2，ID1R), the ordinary node generates a random number as a temporary interaction number n2ID of the identity information of the common node2Temporary interaction number and public key PU2And the temporary message authentication code is packaged in M1To cluster head 1, M1Composition ofAs shown in FIG. 3;
3) cluster head 1 receives M1Then, the identity information ID of the node 2 is acquired2And public key PU2. Using M1Node ID and polynomial share in (c) generates a temporary authentication key f (ID)1，ID2R) from the symmetry of the polynomial f (ID)1，ID2，r)＝f(ID2，ID1R) to verify M1Message integrity of (2). Once the MAC match indicates that the message has not been tampered with, the cluster head 1 can calculate its symmetric key K with the node 212＝PR1PU2＝PR1PR2G and generates a corresponding K12MAC key of
Figure BDA0002240342900000051
The cluster head 1 sends the identity information ID of the nodejPublic key PUjTemporary interaction number and temporary message authentication code are packaged in M2To the ordinary node, M2The composition is shown in figure 3; where G is the transfer function of the public and private keys. And a symmetric encryption algorithm is adopted when the temporary interaction number is packaged.
4) When node 2 receives message M2Then, firstly, using temporary authentication key MTK12Generating a message authentication code with a message authentication function, verifying M2Message integrity of (2). The MAC matching indicates that the message is not tampered, and the node 2 calculates the symmetric key K of the node and the cluster head 112＝PR2PU1＝PR2PR1G＝PR1PU2And generating K12Corresponding MAC key of
Figure BDA0002240342900000052
Thus, the cluster head 1 and the node 2 realize key exchange, and the two have the same symmetric encryption key K12And the same authentication key MK12。
(3) Group key exchange
When the authentication between the cluster head node j and all the common nodes i is finished, the cluster head calculates the public value PUjiThe calculation method is as follows
Figure BDA0002240342900000053
Wherein N isjRepresents the number of common nodes in the cluster j, and i represents the ID of the common nodes.
Cluster head node j performs NjSub-broadcast, broadcast message being MiMessage MiThe contents contained are as follows:
Mi＝IDi||PUji||MAC(MTKji，IDi||PUji)
ordinary node i receives MiThen, calculating to obtain a group key K of the cluster jj：
Figure BDA0002240342900000061
Wherein KijIndicating the process of the session key exchanged by the cluster head j and the member node i in the networking authentication phase or the new node joining phase.
The invention adopts an authentication mode based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm to realize key exchange of the cluster head and the node, realizes authentication of the cluster head and the node only by three times of communication, reduces communication conflicts and collisions of underwater nodes, generates an MAC key by using the symmetric polynomial to verify the message integrity of an initial plaintext, can effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks in the communication process, generates a group key which can be used for encrypting broadcast messages in a cluster, is convenient for the management of the cluster head to member nodes, and has less communication overhead and higher safety strength.

Claims (1)

1. An underwater node authentication method based on a symmetric polynomial and an ECC algorithm is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) carrying out initialization;
(101) the base station selects and generates security parameters required by network authentication and stores the security parameters in all network nodes; the network nodes comprise gateway nodes, cluster head nodes and common nodes;
(102) the base station distributes unique identity IDs for all network nodes;
(103) the base station calculates public and private key Pairs (PUs) for all network nodesi,PRi) Unique identity key pair (ID)i,PUi,PRi) Storing in corresponding network nodes, then the base station deletes the private keys of all network nodes, and only stores the identity public key pair (ID) of each network nodei,PUi)；
(104) The base station selects a ternary high-order symmetric polynomial f (x, y, z), generates a random number r, makes z equal to r to obtain f (x, y, r), and distributes polynomial share f (ID) to all network nodesi,y,r)；
(105) The base station selects a symmetric encryption algorithm and a message authentication code function for realizing the encryption transmission of the key data of the network node and verifying the integrity of the message;
(106) the base station selects a binary hash function H (x, y) as a message authentication code function, and inputs the ID and the symmetric encryption key K of a cluster head node j and a common node iijObtain the corresponding MAC key MKij，
Figure FDA0003467156340000011
(2) Authentication and key exchange are carried out between the cluster head node j and the common node i;
(201) cluster head node j broadcasting including cluster head identification IDjAnd a temporary interaction number n1Authentication request M of0；
(202) Reception of M by ordinary node i in network0Then, according to the ID of the cluster headjAnd polynomial share f (ID) in memoryiY, r), generating an interim message authentication key MTK between the regular node i and the cluster head node jji＝f(IDi,IDjR) and generates a random number as a temporary interaction number n2The temporary interaction number and the identity information ID of the common node iiPublic key PUiAnd the temporary message authentication code is packaged in M1Is sent to a cluster head node j;
(203) cluster head node j receives M1After that, the air conditioner is started to work,obtaining identity information ID of common node iiAnd public key PUiUsing M1Identity information ID in (1)iAnd polynomial share generating temporary authentication key f (ID)j,IDiR) from the symmetry f (ID) of a polynomiali,IDj,r)＝f(IDj,IDiR) to verify M1If the matching result shows that the message is not tampered, the cluster head node j calculates the symmetric key K of the cluster head node j and the common node iji＝PRjPUi＝PRjPRiG and generates a corresponding MAC key
Figure FDA0003467156340000021
Identify information ID of cluster head node jjPublic key PUjTemporary interaction number and temporary message authentication code are packaged in M2Sending the information to a common node i; wherein G is a conversion function of the public key and the private key;
(204) when the common node i receives the message M2Thereafter, using the temporary authentication key MTKjiGenerating a temporary message authentication code by a message authentication code function, verifying M2If the two are matched, the message is not tampered, and the common node i calculates the symmetric key K of the common node i and the cluster head node jji＝PRiPUj＝PRiPRjG＝PRjPUiAnd generates a corresponding MAC key
Figure FDA0003467156340000022
The cluster head node j and the common node i complete key exchange, and the two nodes have the same symmetric encryption key KjiAnd the same authentication key MKji；
(3) Group key exchange is carried out between the cluster head node j and the common node i;
(301) when the authentication between the cluster head node j and all the common nodes i is finished, the cluster head node calculates the public value PUjiThe calculation method is as follows
Figure FDA0003467156340000023
Wherein N isjRepresenting the number of common nodes in the cluster j, wherein i represents the number of the common nodes;
(302) cluster head node j performs NjSub-broadcast, broadcast message being MiMessage MiThe contents contained are as follows:
Mi＝IDi||PUji||MAC(MTKji,IDi||PUji)
(303) ordinary node i receives MiThen, calculating to obtain a group key K of the cluster jj：
Figure FDA0003467156340000024
Wherein KijAnd indicating the session key exchanged between the cluster head node j and the common node i in the networking authentication stage or the new node joining stage.
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