CN110289955A - A kind of key management method for serving certificate agency based on threshold cryptography model - Google Patents
A kind of key management method for serving certificate agency based on threshold cryptography model Download PDFInfo
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- CN110289955A CN110289955A CN201910554976.6A CN201910554976A CN110289955A CN 110289955 A CN110289955 A CN 110289955A CN 201910554976 A CN201910554976 A CN 201910554976A CN 110289955 A CN110289955 A CN 110289955A
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- Prior art keywords
- key
- fragment
- private
- threshold
- signature
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of key management method for serving certificate agency based on threshold cryptography model, this method are saved key fragment on multiple machines by the Threshold Signature technology based on multi-party computations；When needing to create digital signature using key, multi-party computations being operated together by several fragments of key and are signed, signature still can pass through unique public key verifications.This method is by being stored in many places for key fragment, in signature process, primary key will not in any form exist in calculation medium, to reduce the single-point risk of traditional secrete key management system；Meanwhile in the case where part fragment is lost, legal digital signature can be created using several in key fragment, this characteristic is to the redundancy backup in current key management system and to restore the strong supplement of function.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to key management systems, and in particular to a kind of to serve certificate agency based on threshold cryptography model
Key management method.
Background technique
Key management system
The key management system of narrow sense is referred exclusively to be responsible in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to provide the generation of key to CA, be protected
The system for the functions such as depositing, back up, updating and restoring, is most important subsystem in PKI.
The key management system of broad sense on the basis of above-mentioned function, support include symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography it is complete
Life cycle management, and necessary audit function is provided.
Current key management system externally provides service by standardized key management system sets of interfaces, relies on dedicated
Encryption device (such as encryption equipment), encryption device safety with higher and outstanding performance, but at high cost, expansibility compared with
Difference: it when the cryptographic algorithm in PKI and network communication protocol is newly-increased or modification, needs to purchase dedicated encryption device again.
Threshold cryptography model
Threshold cryptography model (or threshold cryptography model) is a kind of cryptographic technique of multiparty, in n participant
In, the threshold cryptography model that at least k member could complete relevant operation is referred to as k-n threshold cryptography model.
Multi-party computations
Multi-party computations are equally a kind of cryptographic techniques of multiparty, i.e., utilize respective private data in many ways
Certain calculating is completed jointly, is disclosed as a result, but not leaking respective private data.
Traditional key management system supports PKI system well, is a vital ring in Network Communicate Security.
However it excessively relies on special purpose system equipment, maintenance and the higher cost updated, and the upgrading of network communication protocol is rung
Should be able to power it is poor；Meanwhile key management system itself introduces higher single-point risk, once key damage or loss, system
Function and safety will be badly damaged.
Summary of the invention
In view of the deficiencies of the prior art, what the invention proposes a kind of based on threshold cryptography model serves certificate agency
Key fragment is stored in multiple general-purpose computations media by key management method, does not rely on special purpose system equipment by force；Pass through safety
Multi-party calculate completes correlation function, and key is integrally not present in any medium in the process, reduces single-point risk, improves and is
It unites fault-tolerant.Specific technical solution is as follows:
A kind of key management method for serving certificate agency based on threshold cryptography model, which is characterized in that described
Method includes key creation, key fragment and distribution, key use, key updating, cipher key backup and recovery, specific as follows:
(1) key creates
When needing to provide cipher key service for signature algorithm, pass through the randomizer or key derivation letter of standard first
Number generates intensity and is t private key sk, and obtains corresponding public key pk；
(2) key fragment and distribution
Private key sk is divided for n piece using k-n threshold technique, further by each fragment sk_i usage threshold Shamir ' s
Secret Sharing algorithm splits into n piece, and every is identified as sk_ij, last constructor's private key k_j=Sum (sk_1j,
sk_2j,...,sk_nj)；Member's private key k_j is distributed in multiple calculation mediums of key management system, according to holding for standard
Longization mode marks and is stored and backed up；The k-n threshold technique refers at least k participation ability in n member
Operation needed for completing；
(3) key uses
When needing grant a certificate, multiple calculation mediums of storage member's private key run the door based on multi-party computations
Signature algorithm is limited, creates legal digital signature jointly for certificate；
(4) key updating
When being more than certain time limit in the service life of key, need to be updated key；It is destroyed in multiple calculation mediums first
Member's private key of storage repeats the key creation process in step (1)；
(5) cipher key backup and recovery
Member's private key should back up in removable media according to the cipher key backup method of standard；When member's private key damage or
When loss, by standardized authorization flow, it can restore from removable media；Allow most (n-k) a member's private keys
Permanent lost/damaged, remaining fragment still can normally generate digital signature.
Beneficial effects of the present invention: the present invention is applied on key management system, provides decentralized key storage, assists
The key of assimilation is used safely, and more powerful fault tolerant mechanism；Present invention reduces the centralizations of traditional secrete key management system
Single-point risk does not depend on expensive specialized hardware, has stronger adaptability.Method of the invention is by believable CA mechanism or close
Key service provider implements and maintenance, on the basis of meeting existing key management system demand, without additional special purpose system
Equipment (such as encryption equipment)；It generates in signature process, it is only necessary to which it is legal that the random k participation in n calculation medium produces
Signature, any w < k member private key are obtained by attacker, can not also construct legal signature；And original private keys are not in
In calculation medium, key safety when operation is protected.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the 2-3 thresholding ECDSA key management schematic diagram based on this method.
Specific embodiment
Below according to the drawings and specific embodiments the present invention is described in detail, the objects and effects of the present invention will become brighter
It is aobvious.
As shown in Figure 1, including the following steps: by taking the key management of 2-3 thresholding ECDSA algorithm as an example
Step 1: key creation
By taking the key management demand for serving certificate agency as an example, when needing to provide cipher key service for ECDSA signature algorithm
When, key generates randomizer/cipher key derivation function of the sub-services by standard, the private key sk that intensity is t is generated, and
Obtain corresponding public key pk；
Step 2: key fragment and distribution
It is 3 by private key sk points, further calculates each fragment sk_j using 2-3Shamir ' s Secret Sharing
Method splits into 3, and every is identified as sk_ij, last constructor's private key k_j=Sum (sk_1j, sk_2j, sk_3j)；It will be at
Member private key k_j is distributed in multiple calculation mediums of key management system, is marked and is deposited according to the persistence mode of standard
Storage and backup；The k-n threshold technique refers to that at least k participation could complete required operation in n member；
Step 3: key uses
When needing grant a certificate, signature sub-services randomly choose two calculation mediums, and operation is based on multi-party computations
Threshold signature scheme, create legal digital signature jointly for certificate；
Step 4: key updating
When being more than certain time limit in the service life of key, need to be updated key；It is destroyed in multiple calculation mediums first
Member's private key of storage repeats the key creation process in (1)；
Step 5: cipher key backup and recovery
Member's private key should back up in removable media according to the cipher key backup method of standard；When member's private key damage or
When loss, by standardized authorization flow, restore from the removable media.Allow at most (n-k) a member
Private key it is permanent lost/damaged, remaining fragment still can normally generate digital signature.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of key management method for serving certificate agency based on threshold cryptography model, which is characterized in that the side
Method includes key creation, key fragment and distribution, key use, key updating, cipher key backup and recovery, specific as follows:
(1) key creates
When needing to provide cipher key service for signature algorithm, pass through the randomizer or cipher key derivation function of standard first,
It generates intensity and is t private key sk, and obtain corresponding public key pk.
(2) key fragment and distribution
Private key sk is divided for n piece using k-n threshold technique, further by each fragment sk_i usage threshold Shamir ' s
Secret Sharing algorithm splits into n piece, and every is identified as sk_ij, last constructor's private key k_j=Sum (sk_1j,
sk_2j,...,sk_nj)；Member's private key k_j is distributed in multiple calculation mediums of key management system, according to holding for standard
Longization mode marks and is stored and backed up；The k-n threshold technique refers at least k participation ability in n member
Operation needed for completing.
(3) key uses
When needing grant a certificate, multiple calculation mediums of storage member's private key run the thresholding label based on multi-party computations
Name algorithm, creates legal digital signature jointly for certificate.
(4) key updating
When being more than certain time limit in the service life of key, need to be updated key；It destroys and is stored in multiple calculation mediums first
Member's private key, repeat the key creation process in step (1).
(5) cipher key backup and recovery
Member's private key should back up in removable media according to the cipher key backup method of standard；When member's private key damages or loses
When, by standardized authorization flow, can restore from above-mentioned removable media；Allow most (n-k) a member's private keys
Permanent lost/damaged, remaining fragment still can normally generate digital signature.
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Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN112084525A (en) * | 2020-10-23 | 2020-12-15 | 北京东方通科技股份有限公司 | Distributed key encryption method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112800479A (en) * | 2021-04-07 | 2021-05-14 | 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Multi-party combined data processing method and device by using trusted third party |
| CN113362065A (en) * | 2021-07-07 | 2021-09-07 | 上海特高信息技术有限公司 | Online signature transaction implementation method based on distributed private key |
| CN114666066A (en) * | 2022-05-20 | 2022-06-24 | 杭州天谷信息科技有限公司 | Private key recovery method and system and private key updating method and system |
| WO2024000428A1 (en) * | 2022-06-30 | 2024-01-04 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | Security implementation method and apparatus, system, communication device, chip, and storage medium |
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Application publication date: 20190927 |
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| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |