CN110244323A - Micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detection and air navigation aid - Google Patents
Micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detection and air navigation aid Download PDFInfo
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- CN110244323A CN110244323A CN201910439369.5A CN201910439369A CN110244323A CN 110244323 A CN110244323 A CN 110244323A CN 201910439369 A CN201910439369 A CN 201910439369A CN 110244323 A CN110244323 A CN 110244323A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/015—Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/42—Determining position
- G01S19/43—Determining position using carrier phase measurements, e.g. kinematic positioning; using long or short baseline interferometry
- G01S19/44—Carrier phase ambiguity resolution; Floating ambiguity; LAMBDA [Least-squares AMBiguity Decorrelation Adjustment] method
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Abstract
The invention discloses micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detects and air navigation aid, wherein system specifically: GNSS signal diversity reception array includes 3 GNSS receiving units；GNSS receiving unit is made of 1 GNSS receiving module and 1 corresponding GNSS antenna, wherein 3 GNSS antennas are fixedly mounted on unmanned plane by isosceles triangle non-colinear, for acquiring GNSS satellite signal；GNSS receiving module captures GNSS satellite signal, is tracked, and pseudorange observation initial data or carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data are generated；Computing unit receives pseudorange observation initial data or carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data, carries out curve detection and navigation, comprising: curve and the corresponding data of non-curve are distinguished, to unmanned plane signal an alert.And in the case where non-curve quantity reaches setting number, according to non-curve, the true positioning result of unmanned plane and posture result are calculated.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to information security and GNSS field of navigation technology, and in particular to the GNSS of micro-, light-duty small unmanned plane is anti-
Fraud system and curve detection and air navigation aid.
Background technique
GNSS full name is Global Navigation Satellite System (Global Navigation Satellite System), is referred to so far
Modern all satellite navigation system in the world, as the GPS system in the U.S., the dipper system of China, Europe GALILEO system,
The GLONASS system etc. of Russia.Its basic working principle is by disposing navigation satellite constellation, to adjacent ground surface user
Navigational range signal is broadcast, user returns the position that principle resolves its own based on spherical surface by the signal of at least 4 satellites of reception
It sets and the time.
While GNSS applies increasingly widespread, also quietly there is GNSS perturbation technique and corresponding equipment.It is most traditional
GNSS interference means be the powerful throttle signal of broadcast in GNSS signal frequency range, force receiver user cannot normal work
Make.Although pressing type interference can effective defence normal GNSS signal, user can direct feeling to interference signal work
With, then other navigation means can be taken to navigate.On the basis of traditional briquettability electromagnetic interference, send out in recent years
The Cheat Jamming Technique based on single station or multistation Pseudolite signal source is put on display.Technological approaches under single pseudo satellite, pseudolite station configuration
It is, first high-precision (ns grades) time synchronization between realization pseudo satellite, pseudolite station and GNSS system, then referring to the letter of real satellite
Number format, copys the signal of one group of (multi-satellite) complete navigation satellite, then sends to user, inveigles user's satellite navigation
Receiver is locked on false satellite-signal, and then achievees the purpose that deception.Technological approaches under the configuration of more pseudo satellite, pseudolite stations is,
High-precision (ns grades) time synchronization between pseudo satellite, pseudolite and GNSS system and multiple pseudo satellite, pseudolites is realized, then referring to really defending
The signal of a navigation satellite is copied at the signal format of star, each pseudo satellite, pseudolite station, then is sent to user, and user's satellite is inveigled
Navigation neceiver is locked on false satellite-signal, achievees the purpose that deception.2013, by Texas ,Usa university branch campus
The wireless navigation laboratory that Tod Humphries (Todd Humphreys) professor leads is set by using GPS signal interference
It is standby, using GPS inherent shortcoming, emit wrong GPS data to the navigation system of the super yacht of rose white number.This is caused to carry
The yacht of over one hundred human nature life is not steered person completely and plays in applause in the case where no any alarm is without any prompt
Between.It is not unique, but has its counterpart, and 2016, two were loaded with U.S.'s guard boat of 10 naval because driving into Iranian waters, is detained by the Iranian military.
For this event, American side, which does not appear to official, to make reasonable solution to the reason of those well-trained soldier's off-courses
It releases.But always makes us guessing unavoidably, be that Iran utilizes GPS defect to issue GPS spoofing attack to American side's guard boat, lure that ship deviates into
A possibility that course, is very high.
The development of GNSS perturbation technique promotes being constantly progressive for Anti-Jamming Technique again in turn.For suppression jamming,
Occur time domain Anti-Jamming Technique, solution in frequency domain technology, airspace Anti-Jamming Technique, space-time joint Anti-Jamming Technique etc. successively.
It interferes, occurs based on signal strength (signal-to-noise ratio) detection, angle of arrival detection, time detection, almanac data core for duplicity
Reality, the detection of multifrequency point signal cross-correlation test, inertial navigation auxiliary, speed such as check at a variety of interference monitoring methods.But these sides
Method, which requires to design and build special user terminal, to be realized, and has been only focused on and how to have been found Deceiving interference, to can
It is detected by ground while interfere, the targeted design as much as possible provided a user in terms of correct navigation Service is less.
In recent years, the production and application of civilian unmanned plane at home and abroad flourish, and are especially with low latitude, slower flight
Small-sized (miniature, light-duty) the unmanned plane quantity of feature quicklys increase, and accounts for the overwhelming majority of civilian unmanned plane." civil aviation
Device system driver management temporary provisions " regulation, following 4 class is divided into according to empty weight for civilian unmanned plane: (1) miniature
Unmanned plane: 0 kilogram of light-duty unmanned plane of miniature drone≤7 kilogram < (2): 7 kilograms of light-duty unmanned plane≤116 kilogram < (3) are small
Type unmanned plane: the large-scale unmanned plane of 116 kilograms of small drone≤5700 kilogram < (4): 5700 kilograms of < large size unmanned planes.Wherein
The operation flight of miniature and light-duty unmanned plane largely relies on navigation Service provided by GNSS system, is related to nobody
Take off, cruise in machine flight course, returning, height control, landing etc. links.As other GNSS users, unmanned plane
Equally face the threat of GNSS interference.Especially unmanned plane during flying in the sky, once obtain the positioning of mistake because cheated
With test the speed as a result, and unmanned plane itself is still unaware, it is possible to lead to some serious consequences.Therefore, development is directed to nobody
The anti-spoofing perturbation technique of machine user, has great importance.For light and small unmanned plane, the power that can carry
Ability is lower, load weight and size carrying capacity are all extremely limited, and cost is also relatively low.Existing dedicated anti-spoofing is set
Standby cost is generally all very high, and weight, power consumption, size are also all bigger, it is difficult to be directly used in and meet miniature and light-duty unmanned plane
Application demand.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the present invention provides micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detections and navigation
Method can realize unmanned plane GNSS navigation, and can effectively distinguish GNSS and take advantage of based on the GNSS receiving module of general low cost
Signal and normal GNSS signal are deceived, the present invention is suitable for miniature and light-duty unmanned plane.
In order to achieve the above objectives, the technical scheme is that；
Light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system, including GNSS signal diversity reception array and computing unit.
GNSS signal diversity reception array includes 3 GNSS receiving units.
GNSS receiving unit is made of 1 GNSS receiving module and 1 corresponding GNSS antenna, wherein 3
GNSS antenna is fixedly mounted on unmanned plane by isosceles triangle non-colinear, number of the spacing of 3 GNSS antennas between any two in setting
It is worth in range, GNSS antenna acquires GNSS satellite signal, and is sent by radio-frequency cable to its corresponding GNSS receiving module
GNSS satellite signal；
GNSS receiving module captures GNSS satellite signal, is tracked, and pseudorange observation initial data and carrier wave phase are generated
Position observation initial data and almanac data.
Pseudorange and carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data are sent to computing unit.
Computing unit receives pseudorange observation initial data or carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data, into
The detection of row curve and navigation, comprising: distinguish curve and the corresponding data of non-curve, sounded an alarm to unmanned plane
Signal, and in the case where non-curve quantity reaches setting number, calculate unmanned plane positioning result and posture result.
The present invention also provides the detection of the curve of micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and air navigation aids, adopt
With above-mentioned micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system, computing unit obtains pseudorange observation data or carrier phase observes number
According to and almanac data, 3 GNSS antennas therein be denoted as No. 1 antenna, No. 2 antennas and No. 3 antennas respectively, using following step
It is rapid to carry out curve detection and navigation:
The first step calculates satellite position according to almanac data；And obtain the carrier phase observation data of all satellites in view.
From N satellites in view, 4 one group is grouped combination, and the satellites in view between any two grouping is not repeated, obtained
M grouping is obtained, kth is taken to be grouped, executes second step and third step, k initial value is 1, and value range is [1, M].For total satellite
Not the case where number N is not 4 integral multiple, with the elevation angle of the ephemeris computation satellite under the corresponding topocentric coordinate system of user's coarse position, row
Except 1~3 satellite that the elevation angle is minimum, it is not involved in grouping.Cheat combined number McheatWith non-deception combined number Mnon-cheatInitial value
It is all taken as 0, into second step.
Second step is grouped building double difference carrier phase observational equation group for kth, solves baseline length estimator.
Third step, the gap between baseline length when using baseline length estimator and actual installation is as inspected number, inspection
When the amount of testing is no more than inspection thresholding, kth is grouped into non-deception combination, Mnon-cheatAdd 1；Otherwise kth is grouped into deception combination,
McheatAdd 1.
The 4th step is executed as k=M, otherwise k returns to second step from increasing 1.
4th step, obtaining and cheating combined number is Mcheat, the combined number of non-deception is Mnon-cheat。
Work as Mnon-cheatWhen ≠ 0, for Mcheat4 satellites in each of a deception combination grouping, in total 4
McheatA satellite is denoted as possible deception satellite.
From Mnon-cheatOne group of optimal non-deception combinations of satellites is chosen in a non-deception combination, the rule of selection is to resolve
Discrepancy delta d between baseline length and true baseline lengthnon-cheat=Δ d12+Δd13+Δd23It is minimum.
From current McheatIn a deception combinations of satellites, possible deception satellite is selected one by one, substitutes optimal non-deception satellite
A satellite in combination, forms new combinations of satellites, which is rebuild observational equation group, is solved again
Baseline length estimator, and further judge whether the new combinations of satellites is deception combination, if so, current possible deception
Satellite is deception satellite；Otherwise, current possible deception satellite is non-deception satellite, continues to choose next possible cheat and defend
Star continues to judge；Until traversing all possible deception satellites, all deception satellites and non-deception are finally distinguished
Satellite.On the basis of identifying all possibility deception satellites respectively, defended for ungrouped 1~3 in the further identification first step
Star completes the identification to all satellites.
5th step utilizes the corresponding pseudo range observed quantity of non-deception satellite or carrier phase observed quantity and corresponding ephemeris
Data position and determine appearance, and send positioning result to unmanned plane and navigate；Meanwhile the information that satellite will be cheated, one
And send unmanned plane to, curve alarm is carried out to unmanned plane.Wherein, method for determining posture can be based on the non-deception satellite identified
Observed quantity takes traditional carrier phase to determine appearance algorithm.
Further, the first step, specifically:
Previously known unmanned plane coarse position (x0,y0,z0)；(x0,y0,z0) be unmanned plane space coordinate.
Position (the x of whole N satellites in view is calculated by almanac dataa, ya, za),a=l~N is a visual
The space coordinate of satellite.
Obtain the corresponding carrier phase observation data of N satellites in view are as follows:It is a
The corresponding carrier phase observation data of satellites in view.
Further, second step, specifically:
It is grouped building observational equation group for kth, wherein 4 satellites in view number in kth grouping is respectively (k1,k2,
k3,k4), calculate double difference:
Wherein, { } indicates to operate in round；{ }=- [+1/2]；For j antenna phase
For i antenna in the double-differential carrier phase observed quantity between a satellites in view and the r satellites in view,
Ambiguityij,a,rForInteger ambiguity；Wherein i and j is the integer number value between 1~3；A and r is 1
Integer number value between~N.
The baseline constituted to No. 1 antenna and No. 2 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
The baseline constituted to No. 1 antenna and No. 3 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
The baseline constituted to No. 2 antennas and No. 3 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
Wherein, λ is the wavelength of GNSS system；(Δxij,Δyij,Δzij) it is the baseline that i antenna and j antenna are constituted
Triaxial coordinate in three-dimensional coordinate system is poor；(lx,a,ly,a,lz,a) it is a satellites in view signal with respect to user's coarse position
Come to vector, the projection of three in three-dimensional coordinate system change in coordinate axis direction.
According to equation group shown in (2) formula and (3) formula, (Δ x is resolved respectively12,Δy12,Δz12) and (Δ x13,Δy13,
Δz13)；Obtain 8 groups of Baseline solutions；To each group of Baseline solution, baseline length estimator is solved
Further, third step specifically:
It by obtain 8 groups of baseline length estimators, is compared with baseline length when actual installation, constructs inspected number:
It sets baseline length and examines thresholding T；Wherein d12、d13、d23For true baseline length, | | for the behaviour that takes absolute value
Make；Inspected number is compared judgement with T.
If Δ d12、Δd13With Δ d23Any one of three inspecteds number are more than to examine thresholding T, and kth grouping is denoted as deception
Combination.
If Δ d12、Δd13With Δ d23Three without departing from thresholding is checked, then kth grouping is denoted as non-deception and combines.
Further, in the 4th step, if Mnon-cheat=0, then to all N satellites in view, changes packet mode and carry out weight
Group forms recombination and combines, every to obtain one group of recombination combination i.e. building observational equation group, and solution baseline length estimator is simultaneously further
Judge whether recombination combination is deception combination, until thering is one group of recombination group to be combined into after non-deception combination, according to Mnon-cheat≠
0 the case where, executes the 4th step.
Further, the specific steps positioned in the 5th step are as follows:
Non- deception number of satellite Nnon-cheatIn the case where >=4, for the corresponding point of 1~No. 3 antenna, puppet is listed respectively
Away from location observation equation；
The corresponding pseudo- square location observation equation of No. 1 antenna is:
Wherein, ρi,aIt indicates to be exported by GNSS signal diversity receiver array, corresponding to No. i-th antenna and a satellite
Pseudo range observed quantity；Corresponding to according to unmanned plane coarse position (x0,y0,z0), pass through the calculated satellites in view position of almanac data
It sets, the initial distance between calculated i antenna and a satellites in view；(Δx1,Δy1,Δz1) it is in unmanned plane coarse positioning
Set (x0,y0,z0) on the basis of intend solve unmanned plane position vector reduction, (Δ T1,ΔT2,ΔT3) it is 1~No. 3 antenna difference
Corresponding GNSS receiver clock deviation；C is the light velocity.
The corresponding observational equation of No. 2 antennas is:
The corresponding observational equation of No. 3 antennas is:
Wherein, (Δ x12,Δy12,Δz12) basic lineal vector between No. 1 antenna and No. 2 antennas；(Δx13,Δy13,Δ
z13) it is basic lineal vector between No. 1 antenna and No. 3 antennas；
By (21) formula, (22) formula and (23) formula simultaneous, the pseudorange positioning equation group of three antennas of joint is constituted, with minimum
Two multiply iterative solution algorithm, solve the corresponding unmanned plane position of No. 1 antenna.
Further, the specific steps positioned in the 5th step are as follows:
Non- deception number of satellite Nnon-cheatIn the case where > 4, point corresponding to 1~No. 3 antenna lists carrier wave phase respectively
Potential difference divides location observation equation.
Wherein double difference carrier phase observed quantity is:
Wherein, 1,2,3 in subscript indicate that three antennas, subscript b indicate terrestrial reference station；A and r in subscript distinguish table
Show a satellite and the r satellite；{ } indicates to operate in round；On the basis of [+1/2], taking for progress is small
Number operation, mutual mathematical relationship is: { }=- [+1/2]；It is terrestrial reference station b for known quantity
The a observed and the corresponding original observed quantity of carrier phase of the r satellite；With
It is the original observed quantity of carrier phase that three antennas observe a and the acquisition of the r satellite respectively；WithIt is the double-differential carrier phase observed quantity of construction on the basis of original observed quantity respectively.
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 1 antenna is:
Wherein,It is defended corresponding to according to unmanned plane coarse position, base station known location, and from what ephemeris computation went out
Championship sets the double difference initial distance being calculated,Correspond to the pass the calculated double difference integer ambiguity of (24) formula；
(Δx1,Δy1,Δz1) it is the correction of baseline between No. 1 antenna in terrestrial reference station and unmanned plane on the basis of unmanned plane coarse position
Vector.
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 2 antennas is:
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 3 antennas is:
Wherein, Ambiguity12,arAnd Ambiguity13,arFor on unmanned plane between 1, No. 2 antenna and 1, No. 3 antenna
Ambiguity of carrier phase.
The observed quantity of equation group left end is obtained by (24) formula, and by (25) formula, (26) formula and (27) formula simultaneous, is constituted special
Determine the observational equation group under epoch of observation, by the observational equation group simultaneous of persistently multiple epoch, root is solved corresponding to No. 1 antenna
Unmanned plane location parameter.
The utility model has the advantages that
1, micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system provided by the invention utilize by general GNSS receiving unit and based on
Calculate the hardware system of unit composition, hardware configuration is simple and clear, power consumption, volume, in terms of requirement to unmanned plane
It is low, have the characteristics that at low cost, Yi Shixian, easily disposed on unmanned plane, is particularly suitable for miniature and light-duty unmanned plane.
2, the present invention gives a kind of curve inspection on the basis of above-mentioned micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system
Survey and air navigation aid, be utilized in existing Cheat Jamming Technique, curve it is practical come to be difficult to completely with ephemeris indicate
The loophole that direction of signal matches carries out curve inspection based on simple triantennary array and corresponding general observation data
It surveys, can effectively identify curve and non-curve from the GNSS signal received, realize unmanned plane GNSS navigation,
And it can effectively distinguish GNSS curve and normal GNSS signal.
3, the present invention provides curve detection and air navigation aid, is utilized during unmanned plane practical flight, due to taking advantage of
Deceive that signal broadcast sighting distance is blocked, broadcast power swing, broadcast antenna are directed toward inaccurate, curve and do not cover whole normal satellites
The reasons such as signal, the GNSS module on unmanned plane are possible to the advantage of intermittence locking normal satellite signal, timely land productivity
With the signal of normal satellite, carry out attitude measurement, pseudorange positioning and carrier phase positioning, integrally realize anti-spoofing,
Attitude measurement, pseudorange positioning, carrier phase differential positioning function.
4, effectively comprehensive sharp The present invention gives attitude measurement, pseudorange positioning and carrier phase location observation equation group
The pseudorange and carrier phase data obtained with the corresponding GNSS receiver unit measurement of three antennas is based on three antenna diversities
The independence for installing bring multipath error independence and random error can effectively promote attitude measurement, pseudorange positioning and carry
The performance of wave phase positioning.The calculating process of various functions is accepted mutually, and the various intermediate results in calculating process are shared, and is calculated
It is high-efficient, be conducive to realize on the platform of this low bearing capacity of unmanned plane.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing the system composition block diagram that the embodiment of the present invention provides.
Fig. 2 is that the curve applied to micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system that the embodiment of the present invention provides is examined
It surveys and air navigation aid flow chart.
Specific embodiment
The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
The present invention provides micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing systems, as shown in Figure 1, including that GNSS signal diversity connects
Receive array and computing unit.
GNSS signal diversity reception array includes 3 GNSS receiving units.
GNSS receiving unit is made of 1 GNSS receiving module and 1 corresponding GNSS antenna, wherein 3
GNSS antenna is fixedly mounted on unmanned plane by isosceles triangle non-colinear, number of the spacing of 3 GNSS antennas between any two in setting
It is worth in range, GNSS antenna acquires GNSS satellite signal, and is sent by radio-frequency cable to its corresponding GNSS receiving module
GNSS satellite signal.
Specifically, 3 GNSS antennas are attended class in small-sized unmanned plane is fixedly mounted on circular metal according to circumference isosceles triangle
On antenna pallet.Wherein 3 GNSS antenna spacing be GNSS system L1 frequency point signal half-wavelength (if GPS system, then λ/2
≈ 9.5cm, λ are the wavelength of GPS system L1 frequency point signal, λ ≈ 19.04cm), to double difference carrier phase in the subsequent calculating of simplification
The calibration process of observed quantity integer ambiguity, and by the control of metal tray radius within 7cm, it is ensured that unmanned plane load is installed
The occupancy of area is minimum.
Anti-spoofing system provided by the present invention, the subsequent detection and navigation for needing to carry out curve, it is therefore desirable to extremely
Few 3 GNSS receiving units are just achievable, comprehensively consider load and power consumption, and the embodiment of the present invention chooses 3 GNSS receiving units.
3 GNSS antennas are mounted on unmanned plane, consider that factors, the installations of circumference isosceles triangle such as occupied area can to take up an area
Area is minimum, therefore the circumference isosceles triangle of the 3 GNSS receiving units and 3 GNSS antennas provided in the embodiment of the present invention
It is minimum to install and design cost, is particularly suitable for carrying for small-sized unmanned plane.
GNSS receiving module captures GNSS satellite signal, is tracked, and pseudorange observation initial data or carrier wave are generated
Phase observations initial data and almanac data；
Pseudorange and carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data are sent to computing unit；
Computing unit receives pseudorange observation initial data or carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data, into
The detection of row curve and navigation, comprising: distinguish curve and the corresponding data of non-curve, sounded an alarm to unmanned plane
Signal, and in the case where non-curve quantity reaches setting number, calculate unmanned plane positioning result and posture result.
Ephemeris can be combined using pseudo- square observation initial data or carrier phase observation initial data in computing unit
Data carry out curve detection and navigation, wherein carrier phase observation initial data compare pseudo- square observation initial data its into
Accuracy is higher when row resolves.
The hardware configuration of GNSS anti-spoofing system based on above-mentioned light and small row unmanned plane, the embodiment of the invention also provides take advantage of
Deceive signal detection and air navigation aid, in the method, computing unit obtain pseudorange observation data or carrier phase observation data,
And almanac data, 3 GNSS antennas therein are denoted as No. 1 antenna, No. 2 antennas and No. 3 antennas respectively, this method is using as follows
Step carries out curve detection and navigation, detailed process are as shown in Figure 2:
The first step calculates satellite position according to almanac data；And obtain the carrier phase observation data of all satellites in view.
Specifically, previously known unmanned plane coarse position (x0,y0,z0)；(x0,y0,z0) be unmanned plane space coordinate；
Position (the x of whole N satellites in view is calculated by almanac dataa, ya, za), a=l~N；(xa,ya,za) be
The space coordinate of a satellites in view；
Obtain the corresponding carrier phase observation data of N satellites in view are as follows:It is a
The corresponding carrier phase observation data of satellites in view.
From N satellites in view, 4 one group is grouped combination, and the satellites in view between any two grouping does not repeat, can
Number of packet is utmostly reduced, M grouping is obtained altogether, kth is taken to be grouped, executes second step and third step, k initial value is 1, is taken
Being worth range is [1, M].
When carrying out 4 one group of packet assembling, the case where not being 4 integral multiple for N, then calculated using almanac data
The elevation angle of the satellites in view under the corresponding topocentric coordinate system of user's coarse position excludes 1~3 minimum satellite of the elevation angle, is not involved in
Grouping.
Second step is grouped building double difference carrier phase observational equation group for kth, solves baseline length estimator.
It is grouped building observational equation group for kth, wherein 4 satellites in view number in kth grouping is respectively (k1,k2,
k3,k4), calculate double difference:
Wherein, { } indicates to operate in round；On the basis of [+1/2], progress takes decimal to operate, mutually
Between mathematical relationship be: { }=- [+1/2]；It is visually defended relative to i antenna at a for j antenna
Double-differential carrier phase observed quantity between star and the r satellites in view, Ambiguityij,a,rForInteger ambiguity；
Wherein i and j is the integer number value between 1~3；A and r is the integer number value between 1~N.Not due to antenna spacing
More than λ/2, whenWhen, Ambiguity value in 0 or -1, whenWhen, Ambiguity takes in 0 or 1
Value.
The baseline constituted to No. 1 antenna and No. 2 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
The baseline constituted to No. 1 antenna and No. 3 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
The baseline constituted to No. 2 antennas and No. 3 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
Wherein, λ is the wavelength of GNSS system (if GPS system, λ ≈ 19cm, for GPS system L1The wavelength of frequency point)；(Δ
xij,Δyij,Δzij) it is that triaxial coordinate of the baseline that constitutes of i antenna and j antenna in three-dimensional coordinate system is poor；
(lx,a,ly,a,lz,a) it is that a satellites in view signal comes with respect to user's coarse position to vector, in three-dimensional coordinate system
The projection of three change in coordinate axis direction.
According to equation group shown in (2) formula and (3) formula, (Δ x is resolved respectively12,Δy12,Δz12) and (Δ x13,Δy13,
Δz13)；Since there are integral circumference ambiguity combinations for each double difference carrier phase observed quantity, 8 groups of Baseline solutions are obtained altogether；To each group
Baseline solution solves baseline length estimator
WhereinIt can also be solved by (4) formula, but normally more simple by the solution of (7) formula.
Third step, the gap between baseline length when using baseline length estimator and actual installation is as inspected number, inspection
When the amount of testing is no more than inspection thresholding, kth is grouped into non-deception combination, and otherwise kth is grouped into deception combination.
The 4th step is executed as k=M, otherwise k returns to second step from increasing 1.
It by obtain 8 groups of baseline length estimators, is compared with baseline length when actual installation, constructs inspected number:
It sets baseline length and examines thresholding T, general carrier phase observation random error level is in 1/100 λ or so, phase
That answers checks thresholding and can be set as λ/10 T=or so；Wherein d12、d13、d23For true baseline length, | | for the behaviour that takes absolute value
Make；Inspected number is compared judgement with T.
If Δ d12、Δd13With Δ d23Any one of three inspecteds number are more than to examine thresholding T, that is, determine that the kth is grouped
In 4 satellites in, at least one curve, kth grouping is denoted as deception combination；
If Δ d12、Δd13With Δ d23Three without departing from thresholding is checked, then kth grouping is denoted as non-deception and combines.
For 8 groups of different integer ambiguity Ambiguity combinations, 8 groups of baseline length inspecteds number that same baseline obtains,
Only one group possibly through inspection.
4th step obtains and cheats combined number as Mcheat, the combined number of non-deception is Mnon-cheat。
If Mnon-cheat=0, then to all N satellites in view, change packet mode and recombinated, forms recombination combination, often
It obtains one group of recombination combination and constructs observational equation group, solve baseline length estimator and whether further judge recombination combination
It is combined for deception, until thering is one group of recombination group to be combined into after non-deception combination, according to Mnon-cheat≠ 0 the case where, executes this step.
Work as Mnon-cheatWhen ≠ 0, for Mcheat4 satellites in each of a deception combination grouping, in total 4
McheatA satellite is denoted as possible deception satellite.
From Mnon-cheatOne group of optimal non-deception combinations of satellites is chosen in a non-deception combination, the rule of selection is to resolve
Discrepancy delta d between baseline length and true baseline lengthnon-cheat=Δ d12+Δd13+Δd23It is minimum.
From current McheatIn a deception combinations of satellites, possible deception satellite is selected one by one, substitutes optimal non-deception satellite
A satellite in combination, forms new combinations of satellites, which is rebuild observational equation group, solves baseline
Length estimate amount, and further judge whether the new combinations of satellites is deception combination, if so, current possible deception satellite
To cheat satellite；Otherwise, current possible deception satellite is non-deception satellite, continue to choose next possible deception satellite after
It is continuous to be judged；Until traversing all possible deception satellites, all deception satellite and non-deception satellite are finally distinguished.
On the basis of identifying all possibility deception satellites respectively, further identify ungrouped 1~3 satellite in the first step, it is complete
The identification of pairs of all satellites.
5th step utilizes the corresponding pseudo range observed quantity of non-deception satellite or carrier phase observed quantity and corresponding ephemeris
Data position and determine appearance, and send positioning result to unmanned plane and navigate；Meanwhile the information that satellite will be cheated, one
And send unmanned plane to, curve alarm is carried out to unmanned plane.
Unmanned plane anti-spoofing involved in the present invention determines appearance data processing scheme by embedded software mode, in hardware configuration
It is realized in curve detection and navigation computing unit in scheme.It is explained in detail below:
Based on the identification of aforementioned cheating interference as a result, in non-deception number of satellite signals Nnon-cheatIt is first in the case where >=4
A first optional antenna, carries out the pseudorange One-Point Location (specific algorithm can be found in pertinent literature, and which is not described herein again) of standard, single
Coarse position of the point location result as unmanned plane calculates (lx,ly,lz).On this basis, double difference carrier wave phase is calculated according to (1) formula
Position observed quantity, and further construct by (Nnon-cheat- 1) the double-difference equation group that a equation is constituted.
It is to the equation group of No. 2 antenna baselines for No. 1:
It is to the equation group of No. 3 antenna baselines for No. 1:
Wherein the double-differential carrier phase observed quantity of equation left end is obtained according to (1) formula.
Using least square method, (Δ x is resolved respectively from (11) formula and (12) formula12,Δy12,Δz12) and (Δ x13,Δ
y13,Δz13), it is denoted as (x again respectively12,0,y12,0,z12,0) and (x13,0,y13,0,z13,0), and enable:
(x23,0,y23,0,z23,0)=(x13,0-x12,0,y13,0-y12,0,z13,0-z12,0) (13)
First (the 0th time) iteration result to baseline coordinate two-by-two is indicated, by carrying out based on fine iteration on this basis
It calculates.It is noted that due to the influence of integer ambiguity, possible value that there are two types of each double-differential carrier phase observed quantities,
When calculating basic lineal vector solution by (11) formula and (12) formula, integer ambiguity Ambiguity need to be determined.It is designed in view of the present invention
Particular antenna layout, the corresponding integer ambiguity Ambiguity value in (0,1) or (0, -1) of (1) formula, can compare appearance
It changes places determining integer ambiguity, details are not described herein for specific algorithm.
It is further introduced into the prior information constraint of antenna arrangement.With the baseline length d between antenna two-by-two for known observation
The observational equation of amount is:
To (14) formula in (x12,0,y12,0,z12,0)、(x13,0,y13,0,z13,0) and (x23,0,y23,0,z23,0) nearby carry out line
Property:
Wherein,
(11) formula, (12) formula are rewritten into respectively:
By (15) formula, (17) formula and (18) formula simultaneous, and substitute into the integer ambiguity Ambiguity that front has been acquired, shape
The observational equation group of Cheng Xin.Minimum two is carried out into solution to equation group, rationally setting observation error matrix is paid attention in solution procedure,
(δ x can be acquired together12,δy12,δz12)、(δx13,δy13,δz13) and (δ x23,0,δy23,0,δz23,0).Further acquire new base
Line resolving value (x12,1,y12,1,z12,1)、(x13,1,y13,1,z13,1) and (x23,1,y23,1,z23,1):
New resolving value is used as initial value, further progress iteration, after resolving value reaches and stablizes, as final base
The output of line resolving value, is denoted as again:
From Baselines value (Δ x12,Δy12,Δz12)、(Δx13,Δy13,Δz13) and (Δ x23,Δy23,Δz23) go out
Hair, according to the general rule of reference axis rotation and coordinate system transformation, finally acquire pitch angle of the unmanned plane under topocentric coordinate system,
Roll angle and yaw angle, specific formula repeat no more.
It is worth noting that Ambiguity12,arAnd Ambiguity13,arIt can be between antenna one in the solution process of baseline
And it solves, and further use this specification followed by the unmanned plane carrier phase differential positioning method provided.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of non-pseudorange location data processing scheme cheated when satellite is no less than 4, application
In the positioning of the 5th step.
Pseudorange positioning is the basic mode of GNSS positioning, can further be subdivided into the direct positioning based on observation pseudorange and base
Both of which is positioned in the pseudo range difference of base station auxiliary.Scheme described below, it is all suitable to both the above pseudorange station-keeping mode
With.Non- deception number of satellite Nnon-cheatIn the case where >=4, for the corresponding point of 1~No. 3 antenna, pseudorange positioning is listed respectively
Observational equation；
The corresponding pseudo- square location observation equation of No. 1 antenna is:
Wherein, ρi,aIt indicates to be exported by GNSS signal diversity receiver array, corresponding to No. i-th antenna and a satellite
Pseudo range observed quantity；Corresponding to according to unmanned plane coarse position (x0,y0,z0), pass through the calculated satellites in view position of almanac data
It sets, the initial distance between calculated i antenna and a satellites in view；(Δx1,Δy1,Δz1) it is in unmanned plane coarse positioning
Set (x0,y0,z0) on the basis of intend solve unmanned plane position vector reduction, (Δ T1,ΔT2,ΔT3) it is 1~No. 3 antenna difference
Corresponding GNSS receiver clock deviation；C is the light velocity；
The corresponding observational equation of No. 2 antennas is:
The corresponding observational equation of No. 3 antennas is:
Wherein, (Δ x12,Δy12,Δz12) basic lineal vector between No. 1 antenna and No. 2 antennas；(Δx13,Δy13,Δ
z13) it is basic lineal vector between No. 1 antenna and No. 3 antennas；
By (21) formula, (22) formula and (23) formula simultaneous, the pseudorange positioning equation group of three antennas of joint is constituted, with minimum
Two multiply iterative solution algorithm, solve the corresponding unmanned plane position of No. 1 antenna.
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of non-carrier phase differential positioning data processing for cheating satellite more than 4 when simultaneously
Scheme, the positioning applied to the 5th step.
It is based on the identification of aforementioned cheating interference as a result, using three antennas corresponding carrier phase observation data, it can be achieved that
Carrier phase differential positioning.The specific steps of positioning are as follows:
Non- deception number of satellite Nnon-cheatIn the case where > 4, point corresponding to 1~No. 3 antenna lists carrier wave phase respectively
Potential difference divides location observation equation；
Wherein double difference carrier phase observed quantity is:
Wherein, 1,2,3 in subscript indicate that three antennas, subscript b indicate terrestrial reference station；A and r in subscript distinguish table
Show a satellite and the r satellite；{ } indicates to operate in round；On the basis of [+1/2], taking for progress is small
Number operation, mutual mathematical relationship is: { }=- [+1/2]；It is terrestrial reference station b for known quantity
The a observed and the corresponding original observed quantity of carrier phase of the r satellite；With
It is the original observed quantity of carrier phase that three antennas observe a and the acquisition of the r satellite respectively；WithIt is the double-differential carrier phase observed quantity of construction on the basis of original observed quantity respectively；
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 1 antenna is:
Wherein,It is defended corresponding to according to unmanned plane coarse position, base station known location, and from what ephemeris computation went out
Championship sets the double difference initial distance being calculated,Correspond to the pass the calculated double difference integer ambiguity of (24) formula；(Δ
x1,Δy1,Δz1) be on the basis of unmanned plane coarse position, between No. 1 antenna in terrestrial reference station and unmanned plane the correction of baseline to
Amount；
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 2 antennas is:
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 3 antennas is:
Wherein, Ambiguity12,arAnd Ambiguity13,arFor on unmanned plane between 1, No. 2 antenna and 1, No. 3 antenna
Ambiguity of carrier phase；The observed quantity building equation provided in combination with (24) formula, by determine to provide during appearance nobody
Geometrical relationship on machine two-by-two between the vector solution and unmanned plane and GNSS satellite of antenna baseline acquires, and specific algorithm is herein not
It repeats again.(Δx12,Δy12,Δz12)、(Δx13,Δy13,Δz13) it is base between three antennas for determining to calculate in appearance step
Line vector as a result, known quantity is had become herein, as shown in (20) formula.In addition, it is necessary to it is emphasized that (26) formula and (27)
The first item of equal sign right end is all in formulaRather thanOrEqually, in (26) formula and (27) formula
The integer ambiguity unknown quantity of equal sign right end is allRather thanOr
The observed quantity of equation group left end is obtained by (24) formula, and by (25) formula, (26) formula and (27) formula simultaneous, is constituted special
The observational equation group under epoch of observation is determined, by the observational equation group simultaneous of persistently multiple epoch, according to the existing carrier phase of tradition
Difference resolves universal method, can solve the unmanned plane location parameter corresponding to No. 1 antenna.
The core of GNSS Deception Principle is to copy the signal of normal GNSS satellite, and GNSS receiver user is made to be locked to imitation
Signal on so that GNSS user obtain mistake location information.Imitation to normal GNSS satellite signal is following several nothing but
A aspect: first is that signal format (modulation system, message format, signal power, the time delay of signal, signal containing signal it is more
It is general to strangle frequency displacement etc.) it is comprehensive copy, second is that coming different satellite-signals to imitation.
In the embodiment of deception, it is generally divided into real-time reception actual signal-relay type broadcast, is autonomously generated imitation
GNSS signal-broadcast, real-time reception-three kinds of signal transformation-broadcast mode.Imitation to signal format is mainly reflected in above-mentioned
The first half of three kinds of modes, and the imitation to direction of signal, are mainly reflected in the broadcast link of signal.In the side of signal broadcast
In formula, general there are two types of modes, first is that be in the same localities, it is unified to copy GNSS signal, broadcast is carried out to GNSS user；Second is that
Using multiple launch points for being in different location, broadcast curve is cooperateed with.Wherein second way broadcast mode, needs more
High-precision collaboration is carried out on a geographical location, with the continuous development of background technique, multi-point cooperative broadcast curve,
It is increasingly becoming the developing direction of Cheating Technology.In terms of current Cheating Technology development, even if by the way of multiple spot broadcast
It copys direction of signal, is still difficult to the matched well of the satellite ephemeris position in direction of signal and signal text, is existing
The protrusion weakness of GNSS Cheating Technology is worth being used in anti-spoofing technology.
Corresponding with GNSS signal imitation technology, in terms of anti-spoofing, the technological approaches of the anti-spoofing of signal grade is (for base
In the anti-spoofing measure of other external auxiliary information, such as inertia measurement information, it is not discussed here), it is identification signal nothing but
Format and two kinds of direction of signal.With the development of the background techniques such as data processing chip, high precision clock, microwave electron technology,
Emulation to GNSS signal format has reached very high level at present, and can become more and more true to nature.From the angle of anti-spoofing
It sees, detects whether to receive deception merely by identification signal format, difficulty will be increasing.From development trend,
Signal format identification is identified into the anti-spoofing measure being combined together with direction of signal, there is huge development prospect.
Core physical essence of the present invention is, from satellite on high in position (GNSS SkyMap) dimension, pass through and compare star
It counts the GNSS SkyMap characterized according to the GNSS SkyMap characterized with actual physics signal one by one, passes through one between the two
Cause property, to differentiate curve.
To sum up, the above is merely preferred embodiments of the present invention, it is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.It is all
Within the spirit and principles in the present invention, any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement and so on should be included in protection of the invention
Within the scope of.
Claims (8)
1. micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system, which is characterized in that including GNSS signal diversity reception array and calculating
Unit；
GNSS signal diversity reception array includes 3 GNSS receiving units；
The GNSS receiving unit is made of 1 GNSS receiving module and 1 corresponding GNSS antenna, wherein 3
GNSS antenna is fixedly mounted on unmanned plane by isosceles triangle non-colinear, number of the spacing of 3 GNSS antennas between any two in setting
It is worth in range, the GNSS antenna acquires GNSS satellite signal, and receives mould to its corresponding described GNSS by radio-frequency cable
Block sends the GNSS satellite signal；
The GNSS receiving module captures the GNSS satellite signal, is tracked, generate pseudorange observation initial data or
Carrier phase observes initial data and almanac data；
The pseudorange and carrier phase observation initial data and almanac data are sent to the computing unit；
The computing unit receives the pseudorange observation initial data or carrier phase observation initial data and ephemeris number
According to progress curve detection and navigation, comprising: distinguish curve and the corresponding data of non-curve, sent out to unmanned plane
Alarm signal out, and in the case where non-curve quantity reaches setting number, calculate unmanned plane positioning result and posture
As a result.
2. the curve of micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system detects and air navigation aid, which is characterized in that using as weighed
Benefit require 1 described in micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system, the computing unit obtains pseudorange observation data or carrier wave
Phase observations data and almanac data, 3 GNSS antennas therein are denoted as No. 1 antenna, No. 2 antennas and No. 3 antennas respectively,
Curve detection and navigation are carried out using following steps:
The first step calculates satellite position according to the almanac data；And obtain the carrier phase observation data of all satellites in view；
From the N satellites in view, 4 one group is grouped combination, and the satellites in view between any two grouping is not repeated, obtained
M grouping is obtained, kth is taken to be grouped, executes second step and third step, k initial value is 1, and value range is [1, M]；For total satellite
Not the case where number N is not 4 integral multiple, with the elevation angle of the ephemeris computation satellite under the corresponding topocentric coordinate system of user's coarse position, row
Except 1~3 satellite that the elevation angle is minimum, it is not involved in grouping.Cheat combined number McheatWith non-deception combined number Mnon-cheatInitial value
It is all taken as 0, into second step.
Second step is grouped building double difference carrier phase observational equation group for kth, solves baseline length estimator；
Third step, the gap between baseline length when using the baseline length estimator and actual installation is as inspected number, inspection
When the amount of testing is no more than inspection thresholding, kth is grouped into non-deception combination, and otherwise kth is grouped into deception combination；
The 4th step is executed as k=M, otherwise k returns to second step from increasing 1；
4th step obtains and cheats combined number as Mcheat, the combined number of non-deception is Mnon-cheat；
Work as Mnon-cheatWhen ≠ 0, for Mcheat4 satellites in each of a deception combination grouping, in total 4McheatIt is a
Satellite is denoted as possible deception satellite；
From Mnon-cheatOne group of optimal non-deception combinations of satellites is chosen in a non-deception combination, the rule of selection is to resolve baseline
Discrepancy delta d between length and true baseline lengthnon-cheat=Δ d12+Δd13+Δd23It is minimum；
From current McheatIn a deception combinations of satellites, possible deception satellite is selected one by one, substitutes optimal non-deception combinations of satellites
In a satellite, form new combinations of satellites, which rebuild into observational equation group, solves baseline length
Estimator, and further judge whether the new combinations of satellites is deception combination, if so, current possible deception satellite is to take advantage of
Deceive satellite；Otherwise, current possible deception satellite is non-deception satellite, continue to choose next possible deception satellite continue into
Row judgement；Until traversing all possible deception satellites, all deception satellite and non-deception satellite are finally distinguished；Dividing
On the basis of not identifying all possibility deception satellites, further identify ungrouped 1~3 satellite in the first step, completion pair
The identification of all satellites；
5th step, using the corresponding pseudo range observed quantity of non-deception satellite or carrier phase observed quantity and corresponding almanac data,
Position and determine appearance, and sends positioning result to unmanned plane and navigate；Meanwhile the information that satellite will be cheated, it passes together
Unmanned plane is given, curve alarm is carried out to unmanned plane.
3. method according to claim 2, which is characterized in that the first step, specifically:
Previously known unmanned plane coarse position (x0,y0,z0)；(x0,y0,z0) be the unmanned plane space coordinate；
Position (the x of whole N satellites in view is calculated by the almanac dataa, ya, za), a=1~N；(xa,ya,za) be
The space coordinate of a satellites in view；
Obtain the corresponding carrier phase observation data of the N satellites in view are as follows:It is a
The corresponding carrier phase observation data of satellites in view.
4. method as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that the second step, specifically:
It is grouped building observational equation group for kth, wherein 4 satellites in view number in kth grouping is respectively (k1,k2,k3,
k4), calculate double difference:
Wherein, { } indicates to operate in round；{ }=- [+1/2]；It is j antenna relative to i
Number antenna is in the double-differential carrier phase observed quantity between a satellites in view and the r satellites in view, Ambiguityij,a,rForInteger ambiguity；Wherein i and j is the integer number value between 1~3；A and r is that the integer between 1~N is compiled
Number value；
The baseline constituted to No. 1 antenna and No. 2 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
The baseline constituted to No. 1 antenna and No. 3 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
The baseline constituted to No. 2 antennas and No. 3 antennas establishes double difference carrier phase observational equation group:
Wherein, λ is the wavelength of GNSS system；(Δxij,Δyij,Δzij) it is i antenna and the baseline of j antenna composition three
Triaxial coordinate in dimension space coordinate system is poor；(lx,a,ly,a,lz,a) it is that a satellites in view signal comes with respect to user's coarse position
To vector, the projection of three change in coordinate axis direction in three-dimensional coordinate system；
According to equation group shown in (2) formula and (3) formula, (Δ x is resolved respectively12,Δy12,Δz12) and (Δ x13,Δy13,Δ
z13)；Obtain 8 groups of Baseline solutions；To each group of Baseline solution, baseline length estimator is solved
。
5. method as claimed in claim 4, which is characterized in that the third step specifically:
It by obtain 8 groups of baseline length estimators, is compared with baseline length when actual installation, constructs inspected number:
It sets baseline length and examines thresholding T；Wherein d12、d13、d23For true baseline length, | | for the operation that takes absolute value；It will
The inspected number is compared judgement with T；
If Δ d12、Δd13With Δ d23Any one of three inspecteds number are more than to examine thresholding T, and kth grouping is denoted as deception group
It closes；
If Δ d12、Δd13With Δ d23Three without departing from thresholding is checked, then kth grouping is denoted as non-deception and combines.
6. method according to claim 2, which is characterized in that in the 4th step, if Mnon-cheat=0, then to all N
Satellites in view changes packet mode and is recombinated, and forms recombination combination, every to obtain one group of recombination combination i.e. building observational equation
Group solves baseline length estimator and further judges whether recombination combination is deception combination, until there is one group of recombination combination
After non-deception combination, according to Mnon-cheat≠ 0 the case where, executes the 4th step.
7. method as claimed in claim 5, which is characterized in that the specific steps positioned in the 5th step are as follows:
The non-deception number of satellite Nnon-cheatIn the case where >=4, for the corresponding point of 1~No. 3 antenna, puppet is listed respectively
Away from location observation equation；
The corresponding pseudo- square location observation equation of No. 1 antenna is:
Wherein, ρi,aIt indicates to be exported by GNSS signal diversity receiver array, the pseudorange corresponding to No. i-th antenna and a satellite
Observed quantity；Corresponding to according to unmanned plane coarse position (x0,y0,z0), by the calculated satellites in view position of almanac data, meter
Initial distance between the i antenna and a satellites in view of calculating；(Δx1,Δy1,Δz1) it is in unmanned plane coarse position
(x0,y0,z0) on the basis of intend solve unmanned plane position vector reduction, (Δ T1,ΔT2,ΔT3) it is that 1~No. 3 antenna is right respectively
The GNSS receiver clock deviation answered；C is the light velocity；
The corresponding observational equation of No. 2 antennas is:
The corresponding observational equation of No. 3 antennas is:
Wherein, (Δ x12,Δy12,Δz12) basic lineal vector between No. 1 antenna and No. 2 antennas；(Δx13,Δy13,Δz13)
It is the basic lineal vector between No. 1 antenna and No. 3 antennas；
By (21) formula, (22) formula and (23) formula simultaneous, the pseudorange positioning equation group of three antennas of joint is constituted, with least square
Algorithm is iteratively solved, the corresponding unmanned plane position of No. 1 antenna is solved.
8. method as claimed in claim 5, which is characterized in that the specific steps positioned in the 5th step are as follows:
The non-deception number of satellite Nnon-cheatIn the case where > 4, point corresponding to 1~No. 3 antenna lists carrier wave phase respectively
Potential difference divides location observation equation；
Wherein double difference carrier phase observed quantity is:
Wherein, 1,2,3 in subscript indicate that three antennas, subscript b indicate terrestrial reference station；A and r in subscript respectively indicate
A satellite and the r satellite；{ } indicates to operate in round；On the basis of [+1/2], progress takes decimal to grasp
Make, mutual mathematical relationship is: { }=- [+1/2]；It is terrestrial reference station b observation for known quantity
The a arrived and the corresponding original observed quantity of carrier phase of the r satellite；WithIt is three
A antenna observes the original observed quantity of carrier phase of a and the acquisition of the r satellite respectively；WithIt is the double-differential carrier phase observed quantity of construction on the basis of original observed quantity respectively；
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 1 antenna is:
Wherein,Corresponding to the satellite according to unmanned plane coarse position, base station known location, and from ephemeris computation out
The double difference initial distance that position is calculated,Correspond to the pass the calculated double difference integer ambiguity of (24) formula；(Δ
x1,Δy1,Δz1) be on the basis of unmanned plane coarse position, between No. 1 antenna in terrestrial reference station and unmanned plane the correction of baseline to
Amount；
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 2 antennas is:
The corresponding carrier phase differential positioning observational equation of No. 3 antennas is:
Wherein, Ambiguity12,arAnd Ambiguity13,arFor the carrier wave phase on unmanned plane between 1, No. 2 antenna and 1, No. 3 antenna
Position integer ambiguity；
The observed quantity of equation group left end is obtained by (24) formula, and by (25) formula, (26) formula and (27) formula simultaneous, constitutes specific sight
Survey the observational equation group under epoch, by the observational equation group simultaneous of persistently multiple epoch, root solve corresponding to No. 1 antenna nobody
Machine location parameter.
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