CN109922475A - Vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment - Google Patents
Vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment Download PDFInfo
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- CN109922475A CN109922475A CN201910317847.5A CN201910317847A CN109922475A CN 109922475 A CN109922475 A CN 109922475A CN 201910317847 A CN201910317847 A CN 201910317847A CN 109922475 A CN109922475 A CN 109922475A
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Abstract
The invention proposes the vehicle authentication and message verification method under a kind of In-vehicle networking environment, steps are as follows: trust authority initializes system；On board unit is registered, and roadside unit is registered；The publication of roadside unit temporary key；The vehicle authentication stage；Trust authority passes through the legitimacy of digital signature authentication roadside unit, trust authority extracts message and verifies the legitimacy of automobile, the identification identifier of automobile is sent to roadside unit by trust authority, and private key and temporary master are sent to automobile by roadside unit, and automobile extracts temporary master；Automobile calculates temporary identifier and temporary private, generates traffic message and is signed and broadcasted；It broadcasts the message when other automobiles receive automobile, passes through the validity of bilinear map verifying broadcast message.The present invention can guarantee that the vehicle under car networking environment accesses safety, also ensure the safety for the traffic information that legal vehicle is issued, and have biggish application value in the application environment under locomotive support grid environment.
Description
Technical field
A kind of vehicle authentication under the technical field calculated the present invention relates to mobile network more particularly to In-vehicle networking environment
With message verification method, vehicle authentication and message authentication are realized based on public key algorithm, recognized based on Bilinear map vehicle
Card carries out message authentication based on interim pseudo-random identifier.
Background technique
In recent years, with the fast development of the communication technology and microelectric technique, there are many intelligence based on wireless communication
It can apply.A kind of intelligent transportation system constructed using wireless communication technique: car networking (Vehicular Ad-hoc
Network, VANET) just more and more attention has been paid to.Car networking VANET is a kind of special self-organizing used in field of traffic
Mobile network.In general, car networking VANET mainly includes trust authority (Trusted Authority, TA), on board unit
(On-board-unit, OBU) and three parts of roadside unit (Road-side-unit, RSU).Among these, trust authority TA
It is mainly responsible for the initialization of system, necessary network connection is provided on board unit OBU and roadside unit RSU and saves all vehicles
The information of carrier unit OBU and roadside unit RSU.It is relevant that the on board unit OBU of insertion in the car is mainly responsible for offer vehicle
Information is simultaneously communicated with other on board unit OBU or roadside unit RSU.And roadside unit RSU is to be deployed in roadside to be
On board unit OBU communication provides the necessary infrastructure supported.In car networking VANET, vehicle can be wirelessly
The communication (V2V) between vehicle and vehicle or the communication (V2R) between vehicle and roadside unit RSU are completed to complete information
It is interactive with it is shared.
In current car networking VANET practice, either V2V or V2R, current used communication mode is substantially all
It is based on dedicated short-range communication technical protocol (Dedicated Short Range Communications, DSRC).According to
DSRC agreement, each vehicle can periodic broadcasting various information relevant to traffic safety, including position, speed, traffic condition
Deng.By means of interior on board unit OBU and the DSRC agreement of insertion, each vehicle can be with other vehicles or trust machine
Structure TA is communicated.However, the message that DSRC agreement is transmitted is substantially the mode of plaintext.Due to the open spy of wireless network
Property, there is the possibility for being ravesdropping or distorting by the various types of messages that DSRC agreement is transmitted.Attacker can pass through eavesdropping
The communication of DSRC agreement easily obtains the relevant all kinds of personal informations of vehicle, such as identity information, driving trace, personal preference
Etc..Therefore, car networking VANET success apply and the key promoted first is that can it provide peace for the message transmitted
Complete and privacy guarantee.So allowing vehicle to transmit in car networking VANET during disposing car networking VANET application
Before information, it should carry out authentication to vehicle and negotiate to generate communication key.In addition, trust authority TA must have detection vehicle
The ability of the integrality of the information interacted, this will be helpful to prevent information from being distorted by attacker.Another, in car networking
It must be noted that the protection of privacy of user during carrying out authentication to vehicle in VANET, otherwise, attacker need to only capture vehicle
Message be readily available the information such as the travel route of vehicle.In order to hide the true identity of vehicle, in car networking VANET
In can pass through the technologies such as anonymous or random assumed name and realize.
Different from other ad hoc mobile networks, the high maneuverability that vehicle has is the notable feature of car networking VANET.
For this reason that the call duration time for leaving roadside unit RSU and vehicle in car networking VANET is very short.Therefore, it is other from
Safety proposed in tissue network or other kinds of network or the solution of secret protection can not directly apply to
Car networking VANET.In addition, large number of due to vehicle, it is necessary to which having can be to the method that certification message carries out batch processing, ability
The case where guarantee is not in certification congestion.
Summary of the invention
It is shorter for the call duration time of roadside unit and vehicle in existing car networking, it can not achieve the skill of privacy of user protection
Art problem, the present invention propose the vehicle authentication and message verification method under a kind of In-vehicle networking environment, by wireless communication technique reality
The secure accessing for having showed the vehicle under car networking environment protects the privacy of vehicle, improves the efficiency of vehicle authentication, so that vehicle
It can transmit various information safe and efficiently in car networking VANET.
In order to achieve the above object, the technical scheme of the present invention is realized as follows: a kind of vehicle under In-vehicle networking environment
Certification and message verification method, its step are as follows:
Step 1: trust authority initializes system: trust authority selects a basic point on elliptic curve, is based on
Basic point choice bilinear map；Three safe hash functions are initialized, using the private key and two secret values of generation oneself, are utilized
The private key of oneself calculates public key；It is single that the initiation parameter of system is disclosed on board unit and roadside all in car networking
Member；
Step 2: the registration of on board unit: it is mounted with the jth automobile V of on board unitjBy on board unit by itself
Identification identifier and key composition message are sent to trust authority, and trust authority generates intermediate variable and automobile VjPrivate key and public affairs
Simultaneously automobile V is written in keyjTamper resistant device in, trust authority is by automobile VjPublic key and identification identifier be stored in tracking list
In；The registration of roadside unit: trust authority generates i-th of roadside unit RSUiPrivate key and public key, trust authority utilize one
Secret value and distribute to roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier generate digital signature, and by digital signature and roadside unit RSUi
Private key and public key be stored in roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device in；
Step 3: roadside unit temporary key is issued: roadside unit RSUiIt generates random number and is faced using the calculating of its private key
When master key, using temporary master calculate temporary public key, periodic broadcasting temporary public key and random number in its region；
Step 4: vehicle authentication stage: automobile VjOn board unit verifying user input identification identifier and key be
It is no correct, if incorrect continue to input；Otherwise, time stamp T is generatedvjAnd by itself and automobile VjIdentification identifier and public key group
At message M1It is sent to roadside unit RSUi, roadside unit RSUiReceive message M1Message M is detected afterwards1Freshness, then
Message M will be received1Time and roadside unit RSUiPublic key and identification identifier composition message be sent to trust authority；
Step 5: vehicle Qualify Phase: trust authority receives roadside unit RSUiThe new of message is checked after the message of transmission
Fresh property passes through digital signature authentication roadside unit RSUiLegitimacy, trust authority extract message M1And verify the legal of automobile
Property, trust authority will include automobile VjThe information of identification identifier be sent to roadside unit RSUi, roadside unit RSUiTo include
Roadside unit RSUiPrivate key and the information of temporary master be sent to automobile Vj, automobile VjIt is extracted from received message interim
Master key；
Step 6: information signature stage: automobile VjUtilize roadside unit RSUiTemporary master calculate oneself interim mark
Know symbol and temporary private, generates the traffic message M comprising current road conditions and timestamps；Automobile VjUsing temporary private to friendship
Logical message MsIt signs, and by signature, temporary identifier, traffic message MsWith the identification identifier RID of roadside unitriComposition
Message is broadcasted；
Step 7: information authentication stage: when other automobiles receive automobile VjAfter the message of broadcast, tested by bilinear map
Demonstrate,prove automobile VjThe validity of broadcast message.
The implementation method that the step 1 system is initialized are as follows:
Step I1: one big prime number p of selection, and select a building on the finite field gf (p) being made of prime number p
Elliptic curve Ep(a, b): y1 2=x1 3+ax1+ b and meet 4a3+27b2≠0(mod p)；Trust authority is in elliptic curve Ep(a,b)
It is upper to choose the basic point P that a rank is q, a circled addition group G and a circulation multiplicative group G are constructed based on basic point P respectivelyT, letter
Appoint mechanism bilinear mapAnd meetWherein, a and b is finite fieldOn constant, x1And y1Table respectively
Show elliptic curve EpThe independent variable and dependent variable prime number of (a, b)；
Step I2: trust authority selects three safe hash function h (), H () and H1(), and functionFor 0,1 character string to finite fieldHash function；Function H:Ep(a,b)→{0,1}lFor elliptic curve Ep
Point on (a, b) is to when the hash function for spending 0,1 character string for l；H1:{0,1}*→ G is 0,1 character string to elliptic curve Ep
The hash function of point on (a, b)；
Step I3: trust authority generates a random numberAnd as the private key of oneself；It is calculated using private key s
Public key P outpub=sP；Trust authority generates two random number x,It is saved as secret value, and by secret value；
Step I4: trust authority is by step I1Step I3In initiation parameter as common parameter { Ep(a,b),q,P,
G,GT,h(·),H(·),H1(·),PpubDisclosure is carried out, all on board units and roadside unit in system pass through open way
Diameter obtains common parameter.
The method that on board unit is registered in the step 2 are as follows:
Step VR1: automobile VjIdentification identifier ID is selected by board unitvjAnd corresponding key PWvj, automobile VjIt generates
Random numberAnd calculate intermediate variable Bvj=h (bvj||PWvj)；Automobile VjOn board unit utilize identification identifier IDvjWith
Intermediate variable BvjGenerate message { IDvj,Bvj, and by message { IDvj,BvjBy secure communication channel pass to trust authority；
The automobile VjIdentification identifier IDvjPass through safe hash letter for the information of vehicle motor number, Vehicle Identify Number or purchase vehicle time
Number generates；
Step VR2: receive message { IDvj,BvjAfter, trust authority generates random numberAnd calculate intermediate variable:
Avj=h (x | | rvj)、And Dvj=h (IDvj||Bvj||Avj)；Trust authority generates random numberMake
For automobile VjPrivate key, and calculate automobile VjPublic key upukvj=uprkvj·P；Wherein, P is basic point；
Step VR3: trust authority is by information { Cvj,Dvj,rvj,h(·),H(·),q,uprkvj,upukvjIt is written to automobile
VjTamper resistant device in, and by information < IDvj,upukvj> it is stored in automobile VjTracking list in.
The method of roadside unit (ONU) registration in the step 2 are as follows:
Step RR1: trust authority generates random numberAs i-th of roadside unit RSUiPrivate key, trust authority
Calculate roadside unit RSUiPublic key rpuki=rprki·P；
Step RR2: trust authority utilizes saved secret value y to calculate digital signature Signri=h (RIDri| | y), trust
Mechanism is by message { RIDri,Signri,rprki,rpukiIt is injected into roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device in；Wherein, RIDri
It is that trust authority distributes to roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier.
Roadside unit RSU in the step 3iGenerate random number δiAnd calculate temporary masterRoadside unit RSUiCalculate corresponding temporary public key RPKi=MKi·P；Then, roadside unit RSUi?
Periodic broadcasting temporary public key RPK in its regioni=MKiP and corresponding random number δi；The trust authority, automobile Vj
With roadside unit RSUiRandom number is generated using Generating Random Number, Generating Random Number is Mason's Rotation Algorithm.
The method of vehicle authentication in the step 4 are as follows:
Step A1: automobile VjUser by identification identifier IDvjAnd key PWvjIt is input in its on board unit, automobile
VjOn board unit calculate intermediate variable:WithVapour
Vehicle VjOn board unit compare equationIt is whether true；If equationIt is invalid, it is desirable that user's input is correct
Identification identifier and password；Otherwise step A is carried out2；Wherein, bvjIt is automobile VjGenerating Random Number is utilized in registration process
The random number of generation, CvjIt is automobile VjTamper resistant device in the intermediate variable that stores；
Step A2: on board unit generates time stamp TvjAnd calculate intermediate variableAnd Certvj=h
(Avj||IDvj||Tvj)；On board unit generates message M1={ TIDvj,rvj,Tvj,upukvj,CertvjAnd by the message by general
Logical wireless channel passes to roadside unit RSUi；Wherein, AvjFor automobile VjThe intermediate variable generated in registration process, IDvjFor vapour
Vehicle VjIdentification identifier；
Step A3: receive message M1Afterwards, roadside unit RSUiFirst check for Tc1-TvjWhether≤Δ T is true, if Tc1-Tvj
≤ Δ T is set up, roadside unit RSUiCalculate intermediate variableAnd
Generate message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1, by message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1Pass through overt channel
Pass to trust authority；Wherein, Tc1It is roadside unit RSUiReceive message M1Time, Δ T be system it is permitted it is maximum between
Every rprkiFor roadside unit RSUiPrivate key, PpubFor the public key of trust authority, SignriFor roadside unit RSUiAnti-tamper set
The digital signature of standby middle storage.
The method that vehicle is verified in the step 5 are as follows:
Step V1: receive message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1After, trust authority checks Tc2-Tc1Whether≤Δ T
It sets up；If Tc2-Tc1≤ Δ T is set up, and trust authority calculates intermediate variableWithTrust authority extracts digital signature SignriAnd judge etc.
FormulaIt is whether true；IfIt sets up, trust authority thinks roadside unit RSUiFor legal road
Side unit, enters step V2；Wherein, Tc2It is that trust authority receives message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1Time；
Step V2: trust authority extracts message M1And calculate intermediate variableWithTrust authority checks equationIt is whether true, ifIt sets up, enters step V3；
Step V3: then, trust authority calculates intermediate variableAnd by message { CertTA,Tc2Pass through normal communication channel
Pass to roadside unit RSUi；Receive message { CertTA,Tc2After, roadside unit RSUiCalculate messageAnd by message C1Automobile V is passed to by wireless channelj；
Step V4: receive message C1Afterwards, automobile VjIt calculatesAnd from
In extract temporary master MKi。
The method of the step 6 information signature are as follows:
Step S1: automobile VjGenerate random numberAnd temporary identifier is calculated using random number σAnd temporary privateAndWith
Step S2: automobile VjGenerate the traffic message M comprising current road conditions and timestamps, automobile VjTo traffic message
MsIt signs:
Step S3: automobile VjGenerate message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiAnd by message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiBroadcasted；
Wherein, RIDiIt is roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier.
The implementation method of the step 7 is: when other vehicles receive message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiAfter, it can obtain
Take basic point P, roadside unit RSUiTemporary public key RPKi, random number δi, traffic message and signature θjWith automobile VjTemporary identifier
Accord with pIDj, by judging equationWhether at
The validity of Rob Roy verifying message；The derivation method of equation are as follows:
When a recipient receives the message to come transmitted by the n automobile in the same roadside unit simultaneously
{{pID1,θ1,Ms1,RIDi},{pID2,θ2,Ms2,RIDi},…,{pIDn,θn,Msn,RIDiWhen, take the mode of batch to verify
The validity of these message verifies formula are as follows:
Wherein, pID1、pID2…pIDnThe temporary identifier of respectively n automobile；θ1、θ2…θnRespectively n automobile hair
The traffic message M sents1、Ms2…Ms nSignature.
Beneficial effects of the present invention: the vehicle authentication method based on elliptic curve cryptography and Bilinear map is guaranteeing vehicle
While legal access, vehicle associated privacy information is protected not to be leaked so that vehicle in car networking VANET can safely,
Efficiently transmit various information；Traffic information verification method based on interim pseudo-random identifier guarantees all process certifications
The integrality and verifiability for the traffic information that vehicle is issued prevent the communication information in car networking by security attack, protect
Protect the privacy of vehicle；In order to improve the efficiency of vehicle authentication, give it is a kind of both vehicle can be verified using single mode,
The recipient of message can be enabled to verify multiple message simultaneously and connect without one using the method for batch mode verifying
One ground is tested.In addition, trust authority TA and roadside unit RSU can be tracked and be cancelled in authentication protocol of the invention
The information of vehicles captured by attacker.The present invention can guarantee the same of the access safety of the vehicle under car networking environment
When, also ensure the safety for the traffic information that legal vehicle is issued.The present invention is mainly suitable for municipal intelligent traffic systems
In the communication security based on car networking VANET, in the application environment under locomotive support grid environment have it is biggish apply valence
Value.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to more clearly explain the embodiment of the invention or the technical proposal in the existing technology, to embodiment or will show below
There is attached drawing needed in technical description to be briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawings in the following description is only this
Some embodiments of invention for those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts, can be with
It obtains other drawings based on these drawings.
Fig. 1 is the system model figure of vehicle-mounted net of the invention.
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of vehicle authentication of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of information authentication of the invention.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art are obtained every other under that premise of not paying creative labor
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The system model of car networking VANET used in the present invention is as shown in Figure 1, car networking VANET mainly includes trusting
Mechanism TA, on board unit OBU and tri- parts roadside unit RSU.In system model according to the present invention, all roadsides
Unit R SU passes through Internet and is connected with trust authority TA.The present invention includes two big parts altogether, is vehicle respectively
The certification for the message that authentication and vehicle are issued.This two parts includes initialization, vehicle and the roadside unit of system altogether
Several differences such as the registration of RSU, the publication of roadside unit RSU temporary key, the verifying of vehicle, the verifying of the signature of message and message
Stage.
Step 1: trust authority TA initializes system: trust authority TA selects a basic point on elliptic curve,
Based on basic point choice bilinear map；Trust authority initializes three safe hash functions, and trust authority utilizes generating random number
Algorithm generates the private key and two secret values of oneself, calculates corresponding public key using the private key of oneself；Trust authority is by system
Initiation parameter be disclosed on board unit and roadside unit all in car networking.
The stage mainly completes the verifying of the vehicle based on car networking VANET and various Encryption Algorithm required for information authentication
Selection, initial value the work such as setting.As previously described, trust authority TA is considered as the believable management of car networking VANET
Center, entire initial work are implemented by the trust authority TA of car networking.Various symbols used in the present invention such as 1 institute of table
Show.
The symbol used in the present invention of table 1 and meaning
Step I1: one big prime number p of selection, and select a building on the finite field gf (p) being made of prime number p
Elliptic curve Ep(a, b): y1 2=x1 3+ax1+ b and meet 4a3+27b2(mod p) ≠ 0, wherein a and b indicates elliptic curve Ep
Two parameters of (a, b), a and b are finite fieldOn constant, x1And y1Respectively indicate elliptic curve EpThe independent variable of (a, b) and
Dependent variable.Then, trust authority TA is in elliptic curve EpThe basic point P that a rank is q is chosen on (a, b).Basic point P is once it is determined that just
It no longer changes, it can be treated as system parameter.Subsequently, based on basic point P, construct respectively a circled addition group G and
One circulation multiplicative group GT.Trust authority TA selects suitable bilinear mapMake its satisfactionPrime number p needs
Reach commercial security rank, specific requirement is referring to the close SM2 algorithm of state.Elliptic curve Ep(a, b) has enough safeties, to protect
Card is not broken through by opponent using Brute Force.
Step I2: trust authority TA selects three safe hash function h (), H () and H1(·).Wherein,For 0,1 character string to finite fieldHash function；H:Ep(a,b)→{0,1}lFor elliptic curve Ep(a,b)
On point to when the hash function that spend 0,1 character string for l；H1:{0,1}*→ G is 0,1 character string to elliptic curve Ep(a,b)
On point hash function.
Step I3: trust authority TA generates a random number using Generating Random NumberAnd as oneself
Private key.Meanwhile corresponding public key P is calculated using the private keypub=sP.Then, trust authority TA is used at random again
Number generating algorithm generates two random numbersIt properly saves as secret value, and by secret value with leakage-preventing.Random number is raw
Mason's Rotation Algorithm (Mersenne twister) popular at present is selected at algorithm.Mason's Rotation Algorithm 1997 by
The village loose reality He Xi opens up scholar's exploitation, the matrix linear recurrence being based primarily upon on limited binary field, can make up it is classic with
Many defects of machine number generation algorithm.
Step I4: trust authority TA is by step I1Step I3Middle initiation parameter is as common parameter used in system
{Ep(a,b),q,P,G,GT,h(·),H(·),H1(·),PpubDisclosure is carried out, any participant in system includes all
On board unit OBU and roadside unit RSU can obtain above-mentioned common parameter by open approach.
Step 2: the registration of on board unit OBU: it is mounted with the jth automobile V of on board unitjIt will by board unit OBU
Identification identifier and key the composition message of itself are sent to trust authority TA, and trust authority TA generates intermediate variable and automobile Vj
Private key and public key and automobile V is writtenjTamper resistant device in, trust authority TA is by automobile VjPublic key and identification identifier protect
There are in the tracking list of vehicle；The registration of roadside unit RSU: trust authority TA is generated i-th using Generating Random Number
Roadside unit RSUiPrivate key and calculate roadside unit RSUiPublic key, trust authority TA is using a secret value and distributing to road
Side unit R SUiIdentification identifier generate digital signature, and by digital signature and roadside unit RSUiPrivate key and public key save
In roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device in.
The stage includes that the registration of on board unit OBU and the registration of roadside unit RSU, their registration process are chatted respectively
It states as follows:
The registration of on board unit OBU: in order to complete subsequent certification work, each needs to service using car networking VANET
Any automobile VjIt requires to be registered at trust authority TA, jth automobile VjOn be mounted on board unit, the maximum of j takes
Value is the total quantity of automobile in car networking, for specific step is as follows:
Step VR1: automobile VjSelect an identification identifier ID with uniquenessvjAnd corresponding key PWvj.In order to
Meet uniqueness requirement, automobile VjIdentification identifier to can use vehicle motor number, Vehicle Identify Number, purchase vehicle time etc. information logical
Safe hash function is crossed to generate.Key PWvjBy user according to the habit of oneself and hobby selection.Then, automobile VjUsing with
Machine number generating algorithm generates random numberAnd calculate intermediate variable Bvj=h (bvj||PWvj).And then, automobile VjGeneration disappears
Cease { IDvj,BvjAnd it is passed into trust authority TA by secure communication channel.
Step VR2: receive message { IDvj,BvjAfter, trust authority TA generates random number using Generating Random NumberAnd calculate intermediate variable:
Avj=h (x | | rvj),
Dvj=h (IDvj||Bvj||Avj)。
Then, trust authority TA utilizes Generating Random Number to generate random number againAs automobile VjUser
Private key and calculate its corresponding public key upukvj=uprkvj·P.P is basic point.
Step VR3: trust authority TA is by information { Cvj,Dvj,rvj,h(·),H(·),q,uprkvj,upukvjIt is written to vapour
Vehicle VjTamper resistant device (Tamper Proof Device, TPD) in, and by information < IDvj,upukvj> it is stored in vehicle oneself
Tracking list (tracking list, a database table) in.
The registration of roadside unit RSU: each roadside unit RSU be deployed in roadside participate in car networking VANET work it
Before, it requires to be registered at trust authority TA.I-th of roadside unit RSUiRegistration process be described as follows:
Step RR1: trust authority TA generates random number using Generating Random NumberAnd as roadside
Unit R SUiPrivate key, then, trust authority TA calculates public key rpuk corresponding to the private keyi=rprki·P.The maximum of i takes
Value is the total quantity of roadside unit in car networking.
Step RR2: then, trust authority TA utilizes the secret value y oneself saved to calculate Signri=h (RIDri||y)。
Wherein, RIDriIt is that trust authority TA distributes to roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier with uniqueness.Then, trust authority
TA is by message { RIDri,Signri,rprki,rpukiIt is injected into roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device TPD in.
Step 3: roadside unit RSU temporary key is issued: roadside unit RSUiIt is generated using Generating Random Number random
It counts and its private key is utilized to calculate temporary master, calculate temporary public key using temporary master, it is periodically wide in its region
Broadcast temporary public key and random number.
In order to improve the authentication efficiency of vehicle, roadside unit RSU is responsible for the automobile periodic allocation into its communication range
Its local temporary key.When automobile enters the range of a new roadside unit RSU during traveling, needs are asked
Ask the master key for obtaining local roadside unit RSU to generate the temporary identifications symbol that it has anonymous property.In turn, should
Automobile can use temporary identifications symbol and issue information relevant to traffic.
Firstly, roadside unit RSUiRandom number δ is generated using Generating Random NumberiAnd calculate its temporary masterThen, roadside unit RSUiCalculate corresponding temporary public key RPKi=MKi·P.Then, roadside unit
RSUiIts temporary public key of periodic broadcasting RPK in its regioni=MKiP and corresponding random number δi。
Step 4: vehicle authentication stage: automobile VjOn board unit OBU verifying user input identification identifier and password
It is whether correct, if incorrect continue to input；Otherwise, time stamp T is generatedvjAnd by itself and automobile VjIdentification identifier and public key
The message M of composition1It is sent to roadside unit RSUi, roadside unit RSUiReceive message M1Message M is detected afterwards1Freshness, so
Message M will be received afterwards1Time and roadside unit RSUiPublic key and group identifier at message be sent to trust authority TA.
As shown in Fig. 2, as an automobile VjDrive to a roadside unit RSUiWhen the region covered, road is detected first
Side unit R SUiIdentification identifier whether once recorded.It is new if it is one, then automobile VjIt needs in the roadside unit
RSUiPlace carries out authentication and obtains roadside unit RSUiTemporary master.Subsequent automobile VjUtilize the temporary master
The temporary identifications that it has anonymous property are generated to accord with to issue related news.At this stage, automobile VjOn board unit
OBU is accorded with firstly the need of a temporary identifications are generated, it is therefore an objective to be carried out privacy of identities protection, be avoided automobile VjTrue identity
Information leakage, and utilize authentication request message required for temporary identifications symbol construction authentication.Detailed certification
Process is as described below:
Step A1: automobile VjUser by automobile VjIdentification identifier IDvjAnd corresponding password PWvjIt is input to vehicle
On board unit OBU in.Automobile VjOn board unit OBU carry out following calculating intermediate variable:
Wherein, bvjIt is automobile VjThe random number generated in registration process using Generating Random Number, CvjIt is automobile Vj's
The intermediate variable stored in tamper resistant device.
Then, automobile VjOn board unit OBU compare equationIt is whether true.If above equation is invalid,
On board unit OBU will continue to that user is required to input correct identification identifier and corresponding password, until success.
Step A2If: equationIt sets up, on board unit OBU generates time stamp TvjAnd calculate intermediate variableAnd Certvj=h (Avj||IDvj||Tvj)。AvjFor automobile VjThe intermediate change generated in registration process
Amount, IDvjFor automobile VjIdentification identifier.Then, on board unit OBU generates message M1={ TIDvj,rvj,Tvj,upukvj,
CertvjAnd the message is passed into roadside unit RSU by common wireless channeli。
Step A3: receive message M1Afterwards, roadside unit RSUiFirst check for Tc1-TvjWhether≤Δ T is true.Wherein, Tc1
It is roadside unit RSUiThe time of the message is received, Δ T is the permitted largest interval of system.If Tc1-Tvj≤ Δ T is invalid,
Then reacquire message.If above formula is set up, roadside unit RSUiCalculate intermediate variableWherein, rprkiFor roadside unit RSUiPrivate key, PpubFor
The public key of trust authority TA, SignriFor roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device TPD in the digital signature that stores.Then, roadside
Unit R SUiGenerate message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1And the message is passed into trust authority by overt channel
TA。
Step 5: vehicle Qualify Phase: trust authority TA receives roadside unit RSUiMessage is checked after the message of transmission
Then freshness passes through digital signature authentication roadside unit RSUiLegitimacy, trust authority TA extract outbound message M1And verify vapour
The legitimacy of vehicle, roadside unit RSUiIt will include automobile VjThe information of identification identifier be sent to roadside unit RSUi, roadside list
First RSUiIt will include roadside unit RSUiPrivate key and the information of temporary master be sent to automobile Vj, automobile VjDisappear from received
Temporary master is extracted in breath.
Step V1: receive message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1After, trust authority TA first checks for Tc2-Tc1≤
Whether Δ T is true.Wherein, Tc2It is the time that trust authority TA receives the message.If Tc2-Tc1≤ Δ T is invalid, then terminates
This verification process.If it is satisfied, trust authority TA carries out following calculating intermediate variable:
Then, trust authority TA extracts Sign from above formulariAnd judge equationIt is whether true.IfIt is invalid, then it is assumed that the roadside unit is illegal, terminates subsequent operation.If above formula is set up, machine is trusted
Structure TA thinks roadside unit RSUiFor legal roadside unit.
Step V2: and then, trust authority TA extracts outbound message M1And continue to calculate intermediate variable:
Then, trust authority TA checks equationIt is whether true.If they are equal, trust authority TA
Think automobile VjFor the legal participant of car networking VANET.If equationInvalid, trust authority TA recognizes
For automobile VjIt is not legal participant, trust authority TA terminates subsequent operation.
Step V3: then, trust authority TA calculates intermediate variableAnd by message { CertTA,Tc2Pass through normal communication channel
Pass to roadside unit RSUiTo inform automobile VjFor legal participant.After receiving above-mentioned message, RSUiCalculate messageAnd it is passed into automobile V by wireless channelj。
Step V4: receive message C1Afterwards, automobile VjIt calculatesAnd from
In the temporary master that extracts.The temporary master provides basis for the transmission of subsequent progress message.
Step 6: information signature stage: automobile VjIt calculates temporary identifier and calculates temporary private using temporary identifier,
Then the traffic message M comprising current road conditions and timestamp is generateds.Then, automobile VjUsing temporary private to traffic message
MsIt signs, and by signature, temporary identifier, traffic message MsWith the identification identifier RID of roadside unitriForm message into
Row broadcast.
As shown in figure 3, the vehicle under car networking VANET environment needs regular driving on the road according to DSRC agreement
Broadcast traffic security-related message.In order to protect the privacy of identities of sender, the sender of traffic information needs to have using it
The temporary identifications symbol of anonymous property signs to the message transmitted by oneself.In the present invention, vehicle authentication and disappear
Breath certification is to guarantee that vehicle obtains the integrality of identity legitimacy and message and the verifiability of message source respectively.Verify vehicle
The integrality of transmitted traffic information plays very important effect in terms of the safety of enhancing car networking VANET.Therefore,
The certification of traffic information is also considered as one of most important safety measure in car networking VANET.
The recipient of traffic information mainly ensures the complete of received traffic information by verifying signature correctness
Property and validity.The detailed step in the stage can be described as follows:
Step S1: automobile VjIt generates first with Generating Random Number with random numberAnd utilize the nonce count
Calculate its temporary identifier:And corresponding private keyIt is as follows:
Step S2: automobile VjGenerate the traffic message M comprising current road conditions and timestamps.Then, automobile VjTo friendship
Logical message MsIt signs with the following method:
Step S3: automobile generates message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiAnd broadcast the message.Wherein, RIDiIt is roadside
Unit R SUiIdentification identifier.
Step 7: information authentication stage: when other automobiles receive automobile VjAfter the message of broadcast, tested by bilinear map
Demonstrate,prove automobile VjThe validity of broadcast message.
When other vehicles receive message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiAfter, they can by judge equation whether at
The validity of Rob Roy verifying message:
The reason of the equation can be at power is as follows: the verifier (recipient) of the message can obtain system parameter basic point P,
Roadside unit RSUiTemporary public key RPKiWith random number δi.Receiving vehicle VjSecurity-related message after, they can be obtained
Obtain security-related message Ms, the message signature θjAnd the anonymous Identity pID of senderj.The equation can be in the following way
It derives:
In addition, if a recipient receives mistake transmitted by the n automobile in the same roadside unit RSU simultaneously
The message { { pID come1,θ1,Ms1,RIDi},{pID2,θ2,Ms2,RIDi},…,{pIDn,θn,Msn,RIDiWhen, it can also adopt
The mode of batch is taken to verify the validity of these message, verifies formula are as follows:
For example above similar of the derivation mode of the formula, omits derivation process herein.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, is not intended to limit the invention, all in essence of the invention
Within mind and principle, any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement and so on be should all be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. vehicle authentication and message verification method under a kind of In-vehicle networking environment, which is characterized in that its step are as follows:
Step 1: trust authority initializes system: trust authority selects a basic point on elliptic curve, is based on basic point
Select bilinear map；Three safe hash functions are initialized, using the private key and two secret values of generation oneself, utilize oneself
Private key calculate public key；The initiation parameter of system is disclosed to on board unit and roadside unit all in car networking；
Step 2: the registration of on board unit: it is mounted with the jth automobile V of on board unitjBy on board unit by the identity of itself
Identifier and key composition message are sent to trust authority, and trust authority generates intermediate variable and automobile VjPrivate key and public key simultaneously
Automobile V is writtenjTamper resistant device in, trust authority is by automobile VjPublic key and identification identifier be stored in tracking list in；Road
The registration of side unit: trust authority generates i-th of roadside unit RSUiPrivate key and public key, trust authority utilize a secret value
With distribute to roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier generate digital signature, and by digital signature and roadside unit RSUiPrivate key
Roadside unit RSU is stored in public keyiTamper resistant device in；
Step 3: roadside unit temporary key is issued: roadside unit RSUiIt generates random number and is temporarily led using the calculating of its private key close
Key calculates temporary public key, periodic broadcasting temporary public key and random number in its region using temporary master；
Step 4: vehicle authentication stage: automobile VjOn board unit verifying user input identification identifier and key whether just
Really, if incorrect continue to input；Otherwise, time stamp T is generatedvjAnd by itself and automobile VjIdentification identifier and public key composition
Message M1It is sent to roadside unit RSUi, roadside unit RSUiReceive message M1Message M is detected afterwards1Freshness, then will connect
Receive message M1Time and roadside unit RSUiPublic key and identification identifier composition message be sent to trust authority；
Step 5: vehicle Qualify Phase: trust authority receives roadside unit RSUiThe freshness of message is checked after the message of transmission,
Pass through digital signature authentication roadside unit RSUiLegitimacy, trust authority extract message M1And the legitimacy of automobile is verified, trust
Mechanism will include automobile VjThe information of identification identifier be sent to roadside unit RSUi, roadside unit RSUiIt will be single comprising roadside
First RSUiPrivate key and the information of temporary master be sent to automobile Vj, automobile VjTemporary master is extracted from received message；
Step 6: information signature stage: automobile VjUtilize roadside unit RSUiTemporary master calculate oneself temporary identifier
And temporary private, generate the traffic message M comprising current road conditions and timestamps；Automobile VjDisappeared using temporary private to traffic
Cease MsIt signs, and by signature, temporary identifier, traffic message MsWith the identification identifier RID of roadside unitriForm message
It is broadcasted；
Step 7: information authentication stage: when other automobiles receive automobile VjAfter the message of broadcast, vapour is verified by bilinear map
Vehicle VjThe validity of broadcast message.
2. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 1, which is characterized in that institute
State the implementation method of step 1 are as follows:
Step I1: one big prime number p of selection, and select ellipse of the building on the finite field gf (p) being made of prime number p
Curve Ep(a, b): y1 2=x1 3+ax1+ b and meet 4a3+27b2≠0(mod p)；Trust authority is in elliptic curve EpIt is selected on (a, b)
Taking a rank is the basic point P of q, constructs a circled addition group G and a circulation multiplicative group G respectively based on basic point PT, trust machine
Structure bilinear mapAnd meetG×G→GT；Wherein, a and b is finite fieldOn constant, x1And y1Respectively indicate ellipse
Curve EpThe independent variable and dependent variable prime number of (a, b)；
Step I2: trust authority selects three safe hash function h (), H () and H1(), and function h:{ 0,1 }*→
Zq *For 0,1 character string to finite fieldHash function；Function H:Ep(a,b)→{0,1}lFor elliptic curve EpOn (a, b)
Point is to when the hash function for spending 0,1 character string for l；H1:{0,1}*→ G is 0,1 character string to elliptic curve EpOn (a, b)
The hash function of point；
Step I3: trust authority generates a random numberAnd as the private key of oneself；Public affairs are calculated using private key s
Key Ppub=sP；Trust authority generates two random number x,It is saved as secret value, and by secret value；
Step I4: trust authority is by step I1Step I3In initiation parameter as common parameter { Ep(a,b),q,P,G,GT,h
(·),H(·),H1(·),PpubDisclosure is carried out, all on board units and roadside unit in system pass through open approach and obtain
Common parameter.
3. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 2, which is characterized in that institute
State the method that on board unit is registered in step 2 are as follows:
Step VR1: automobile VjIdentification identifier ID is selected by board unitvjAnd corresponding key PWvj, automobile VjIt generates random
NumberAnd calculate intermediate variable Bvj=h (bvj||PWvj)；Automobile VjOn board unit utilize identification identifier IDvjThe centre and
Variable BvjGenerate message { IDvj,Bvj, and by message { IDvj,BvjBy secure communication channel pass to trust authority；It is described
Automobile VjIdentification identifier IDvjPass through the life of safe hash function for the information of vehicle motor number, Vehicle Identify Number or purchase vehicle time
At；
Step VR2: receive message { IDvj,BvjAfter, trust authority generates random numberAnd calculate intermediate variable: Avj=h
(x||rvj)、And Dvj=h (IDvj||Bvj||Avj)；Trust authority generates random numberAs automobile
VjPrivate key, and calculate automobile VjPublic key upukvj=uprkvj·P；Wherein, P is basic point；
Step VR3: trust authority is by information { Cvj,Dvj,rvj,h(·),H(·),q,uprkvj,upukvjIt is written to automobile Vj's
In tamper resistant device, and by information < IDvj,upukvj> it is stored in automobile VjTracking list in.
4. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 2 or 3, feature exist
In the method for roadside unit (ONU) registration in the step 2 are as follows:
Step RR1: trust authority generates random numberAs i-th of roadside unit RSUiPrivate key, trust authority calculate
Roadside unit RSUiPublic key rpuki=rprki·P；
Step RR2: trust authority utilizes saved secret value y to calculate digital signature Signri=h (RIDri| | y), trust authority
By message { RIDri,Signri,rprki,rpukiIt is injected into roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device in；Wherein, RIDriIt is letter
Mechanism is appointed to distribute to roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier.
5. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 4, which is characterized in that institute
State the roadside unit RSU in step 3iGenerate random number δiAnd calculate temporary masterRoadside unit
RSUiCalculate corresponding temporary public key RPKi=MKi·P；Then, roadside unit RSUiPeriodic broadcasting is interim in its region
Public key RPKi=MKiP and corresponding random number δi；The trust authority, automobile VjWith roadside unit RSUiUtilize random number
Generating algorithm generates random number, and Generating Random Number is Mason's Rotation Algorithm.
6. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 5, which is characterized in that institute
The method for stating vehicle authentication in step 4 are as follows:
Step A1: automobile VjUser by identification identifier IDvjAnd key PWvjIt is input in its on board unit, automobile VjVehicle
Carrier unit calculates intermediate variable:WithAutomobile Vj's
On board unit compares equationIt is whether true；If equationIt is invalid, it is desirable that user inputs correct identity
Identifier and password；Otherwise step A is carried out2；Wherein, bvjIt is automobile VjIt is generated in registration process using Generating Random Number
Random number, CvjIt is automobile VjTamper resistant device in the intermediate variable that stores；
Step A2: on board unit generates time stamp TvjAnd calculate intermediate variableAnd Certvj=h (Avj|
|IDvj||Tvj)；On board unit generates message M1={ TIDvj,rvj,Tvj,upukvj,CertvjAnd the message is passed through into common nothing
Line channel transfer gives roadside unit RSUi；Wherein, AvjFor automobile VjThe intermediate variable generated in registration process, IDvjFor automobile Vj
Identification identifier；
Step A3: receive message M1Afterwards, roadside unit RSUiFirst check for Tc1-TvjWhether≤Δ T is true, if Tc1-Tvj≤ΔT
It sets up, roadside unit RSUiCalculate intermediate variableAnd it generates and disappears
Cease { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1, by message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1Passed to by overt channel
Trust authority；Wherein, Tc1It is roadside unit RSUiReceive message M1Time, Δ T is the permitted largest interval of system, rprki
For roadside unit RSUiPrivate key, PpubFor the public key of trust authority, SignriFor roadside unit RSUiTamper resistant device in deposit
The digital signature of storage.
7. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 6, which is characterized in that institute
State the method that vehicle is verified in step 5 are as follows:
Step V1: receive message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1After, trust authority checks Tc2-Tc1Whether≤Δ T is true；
If Tc2-Tc1≤ Δ T is set up, and trust authority calculates intermediate variableWithTrust authority extracts digital signature SignriAnd judge etc.
FormulaIt is whether true；IfIt sets up, trust authority thinks roadside unit RSUiFor legal road
Side unit, enters step V2；Wherein, Tc2It is that trust authority receives message { M1,Certri,RIDri,rpuki,Tc1Time；
Step V2: trust authority extracts message M1And calculate intermediate variableWithTrust authority checks equationIt is whether true, ifAt
It is vertical, enter step V3；
Step V3: then, trust authority calculates intermediate variableAnd by message { CertTA,Tc2Believed by common communications
Road passes to roadside unit RSUi；Receive message { CertTA,Tc2After, roadside unit RSUiCalculate messageAnd by message C1Automobile V is passed to by wireless channelj；
Step V4: receive message C1Afterwards, automobile VjIt calculatesAnd it therefrom mentions
Take out temporary master MKi。
8. vehicle authentication and message verification method under the In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 5 or 7, feature exist
In the method for the step 6 information signature are as follows:
Step S1: automobile VjGenerate random numberAnd temporary identifier is calculated using random number σ
And temporary privateAnd
With
Step S2: automobile VjGenerate the traffic message M comprising current road conditions and timestamps, automobile VjTo traffic message MsInto
Row signature:
Step S3: automobile VjGenerate message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiAnd by message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiBroadcasted；Wherein,
RIDiIt is roadside unit RSUiIdentification identifier.
9. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 8, which is characterized in that institute
The implementation method for stating step 7 is: when other vehicles receive message { pIDj,θj,Ms,RIDiAfter, basic point P, road can be obtained
Side unit R SUiTemporary public key RPKi, random number δi, traffic message and signature θjWith automobile VjTemporary identifier pIDj, pass through
Judge equationWhether disappear at Rob Roy verifying
The validity of breath；The derivation method of equation are as follows:
10. vehicle authentication and message verification method under In-vehicle networking environment according to claim 9, which is characterized in that
When a recipient receives the message { { pID to come transmitted by the n automobile in the same roadside unit simultaneously1,θ1,
Ms1,RIDi},{pID2,θ2,Ms2,RIDi},…,{pIDn,θn,Msn,RIDiWhen, take the mode of batch to verify these message
Validity, verify formula are as follows:
Wherein, pID1、pID2…pIDnThe temporary identifier of respectively n automobile；θ1、θ2…θnRespectively n automobile is sent
Traffic message Ms1、Ms2…MsnSignature.
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