CN109753453A - A kind of trusted system of storage isolation - Google Patents
A kind of trusted system of storage isolation Download PDFInfo
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- CN109753453A CN109753453A CN201811601919.0A CN201811601919A CN109753453A CN 109753453 A CN109753453 A CN 109753453A CN 201811601919 A CN201811601919 A CN 201811601919A CN 109753453 A CN109753453 A CN 109753453A
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- control module
- platform control
- credible platform
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of trusted systems of storage isolation, and the system comprises central processing units, credible platform control module (TPCM)；Credible platform control module accesses the mainboard of trusted system by PCIE bus；Credible platform control module obtains the data needed for actively measuring by the memory space of read-only access central processing unit, credible platform control module is based on Metric policy and measures to the data, and measurement results are stored in the memory space of the credible platform control module.The memory for accessing bus and the memory for handling chip interior can be carried out continuous memory space mapping by the present invention, to carry out the centralized management of multi-memory；By the address of cache of difference so that memory space be to members as it can be seen that and it is invisible to other, excessively such mode to store isolation between central processing unit and credible platform control module.
Description
[technical field]
The invention belongs to field of information security technology more particularly to a kind of trusted systems of storage isolation.
[background technique]
With the development of network technology, it is badly in need of a kind of safe and reliable server system, at present to eliminate safe hidden trouble.
The ecological environment comparative maturity of arm processor, more and more domestic system softwares, tool software, application software manufacturer are enclosing
Product development is carried out around arm processor.Trust computing, which is used as, promotes one of the important means of national network safety assurance ability,
Being widely recognized as industrial circle and expert is obtained.In trust computing field, storage safety is key technology therein.Only from
The bottom software such as the hardware configurations such as chip, mainboard and BIOS, operating system, memory rise, and relatively effective could improve whole
The safety of a system.A kind of trusted system of new storage isolation is needed now, and the present invention can will access the storage of bus
Device and the memory for handling chip interior carry out continuous memory space mapping, to carry out the concentrate tube of multi-memory
Reason；By the address of cache of difference, so that memory space is to members as it can be seen that and, excessively such side invisible to other
Formula to store isolation between central processing unit and credible platform control module.
[summary of the invention]
In order to solve the above problem in the prior art, the invention proposes a kind of trusted systems of storage isolation, this is
System includes: central processing unit, credible platform control module (TPCM)；Credible platform control module can by the access of PCIE bus
The mainboard of letter system；Credible platform control module TPCM accesses the mainboard of trusted system in a manner of pluggable card；Based on can
During the dynamic measurement for believing platform control module, credible platform control module passes through the monitoring number that trusted software base TSB is obtained
According to the carry out dynamic measurement to central processing unit and its operating system, application program successively；
Credible platform control module is obtained by the memory space of read-only access central processing unit needed for actively measurement
Data, credible platform control module is based on Metric policy and measures to the data, and measurement results is stored in described
In the memory space of credible platform control module.
Further, the memory space inside credible platform control module be credible platform control module itself it is visible,
Memory space inside central processing unit is that central processing unit itself is visible.
Further, credible platform control module and central processing unit share on credible platform mainboard by bus
It reads, readable and writable memory.
Further, read-only, the readable and writable memory on credible platform mainboard are mapped to by way of address of cache
In continuous address space.
Further, the continuous address space in the part is visible to central processing unit, and another part is continuous
Address space is sightless to central processing unit.
Further, the credible platform control module has the access authority higher than central processing unit, described credible flat
Platform control module can be read-only access central processing unit memory space.
Further, the controller on mainboard sends the central processing unit and credible platform control module
Read write command is arbitrated.
Further, central processing unit cannot access the system memory block of the credible platform control module.
The beneficial effect comprise that can will access the memory of bus and handle the memory of chip interior
Continuous memory space mapping is carried out, to carry out the centralized management of multi-memory；By the address of cache of difference, so that
Memory space be to members as it can be seen that and it is invisible to other, excessively such mode makes central processing unit and credible platform
Isolation is stored between control module.
[Detailed description of the invention]
Described herein the drawings are intended to provide a further understanding of the invention, constitutes part of this application, but
It does not constitute improper limitations of the present invention, in the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is the configuration diagram of the trusted system of storage isolation of the invention.
Fig. 2 is the connection schematic diagram of the trusted system of credible platform control module access storage isolation of the invention.
Fig. 3 is the hardware structural diagram of the trusted system of storage isolation of the invention.
[specific embodiment]
Come that the present invention will be described in detail below in conjunction with attached drawing and specific embodiment, illustrative examples therein and
Illustrate only to be used to explain the present invention, but not as a limitation of the invention.
As shown in Figure 1, a kind of trusted system of storage isolation applied by the present invention is described in detail, the system
System includes: central processing unit, credible platform control module, extension metric module EMM (EMM1, EMM2, EMM3), starting storage
Device, controller, credible platform mainboard；The component of the trusted system of the storage isolation is all set in the credible platform mainboard
On；Central processing unit and credible platform control module are connected to controller by system bus；
The trusted system of the storage isolation further include: random access memory, sequential control circuit, input and output connect
Mouthful；
Preferred: controller controls so that before central processing unit executes starting memory code, and credible platform controls
Module first starts, and credible platform control module is reliably read the initial guide module of starting memory code, credible platform control
Measurement root module RTM in molding block carries out integrity measurement to the initial guide module in starting memory code, and by degree
Amount result is stored in the memory space of credible platform control module；
The extension metric module EMM is used for and measures root module RTM cooperation to carry out integrity measurement, to realize
Transitive trust；
The central processing unit is used to complete the calculating task of the trusted system of storage isolation；It is preferred: the centre
Reason device is multi-core processor；
Preferred: bus includes control bus and data/address bus；
Credible platform control module includes credible platform control chip, credible platform control firmware, credible platform control branch
Support software, auxiliary tool etc.；The credible platform control chip is computing chip, including interior processing unit, memory, is also wrapped
SPI, GPIO etc. are included for accessing credible platform mainboard；The credible platform control firmware being implemented on credible platform control chip
It for embedded/Chip Operating System, is scheduled and executes for measuring the tasks such as control to active, to realize entire system
That unites is credible；The credible platform control support programs run on embedded/Chip Operating System inner nuclear layer, provide software layer
The interactive interface in face, credible platform control firmware and are controlled in support programs and central processing unit operating system by credible platform
Trusted software base carry out data interaction；The auxiliary tool include commissioning device, firmware write with a brush dipped in Chinese ink, firmware signature etc.；
Preferred: the credible platform control firmware includes command process module, initialization module, input and output driving
Module, trusted function module, active metric module；Wherein: command process module is responsible for the instruction sent to external entity and is carried out
Parsing and execution；Initialization module is responsible for module initialization, module self-test, platform status initialization etc.；Input and output drive mould
Block is mainly the Driver function library of input and output in module；Active metric module is responsible for the active to BootRom and is measured；It is credible
Functional module mainly provides basic credible support；
It is preferred: the credible platform control module it is minimum but be not limited to control the unlatching of following input/output interface or
It closes: USB, PS/2, PCIE, PCI, SATA, serial ports, network interface；
The controller is for controlling the component on credible platform mainboard；Including central processing unit and credible flat
Boot sequence, the permission height of platform control module are low；
The starting memory is for storing code needed for central processing unit starts and saving part divergence amount module
Code；Preferred: code needed for the starting is MBR, BOOTLOADER etc.；
Preferred: the extension metric module is realized in the form of ROM, saves static state in the extension metric module
Measurement code involved in measurement；
Preferred: the extension metric module includes 2 independent physical parts；A part is located in starting memory,
The independent access controller of another part；Wherein: the boot sequence of described a part is earlier than described another part；
It is preferred: USBkey and TCM module is also accessed in the trusted system；It is stepped on by USBkey and TCM module
Record the authentication certification of the user of the operating system of central processing unit；It is specific: device power-up login, trusted application software
When base logs in, identity legitimacy verifying is carried out to user information；
Preferred: the trusted program control is realized based on white list mechanism, is carried out based on LSM mechanism to HOOK function
The interception executed to executable file is realized in heavy duty；
As shown in Fig. 2, mainboard of the credible platform control module by the trusted system of PCIE bus access storage isolation,
And order and data are carried out by PCIE bus and the trusted software base TSB being set in the operating system on central processing unit
Interaction；In such a way that multiplexer is multiplexed GPIO/SPI/I2C, the measurement to controller and/or BIOS is realized
And it is attached with controller；
Preferred: credible platform control module TPCM accesses the trusted system of storage isolation in a manner of pluggable card
Mainboard；During based on the dynamic measurement of credible platform control module, credible platform control module passes through trusted software base
Carry out dynamic measurement of the monitoring data that TSB is obtained to central processing unit and its operating system, application program successively；
It is preferred: the memory space inside credible platform control module be credible platform control module itself it is visible, in
Memory space inside central processor is that central processing unit itself is visible；Credible platform control module and central processing unit are logical
Cross read-only, the readable and writable memory on the shared credible platform mainboard of bus；
It is preferred: read-only, readable and writable memory company of being mapped to by way of address of cache on credible platform mainboard
In continuous address space；The continuous address space in part is visible to central processing unit, and another part is continuously
Location space is sightless to central processing unit；Make central processing unit and credible platform control module in this way
Between store isolation；
Preferred: the credible platform control module has the access authority higher than central processing unit, the credible platform
Control module can be read-only access central processing unit memory space；Preferred: controller on mainboard is in described
The read write command that central processor and credible platform control module are sent is arbitrated；
Preferred: the credible platform control module is realized in the form of solid state hard disk；
Credible platform control module is obtained by the memory space of read-only access central processing unit needed for actively measurement
Data, credible platform control module is based on Metric policy and measures to the data, and measurement results is stored in described
In the memory space of credible platform control module；The system that central processing unit cannot access the credible platform control module is deposited
Storage area；In this way, it ensure that the independence of credible platform control module, and then ensure that its safety；
Preferred: the data needed for actively measuring are stored in the user data memory block of credible platform control module,
The central processing unit and credible platform control module are carried out based on the user data memory block of the credible platform control module
Data interaction, to carry out the intermodule communication based on mainboard；
Preferred: central processing unit and credible platform control module are counted by the shared memory space of address of cache
According to interaction；The shared memory space is mapped as visible to central processing unit and credible platform control module；
Central processing unit and the memory space of credible platform control module include system memory block and user data storage
Area, system memory block are invisible to hard disk user (using the user of standard disk store function), and use a variety of secure storages
Wherein content realizes piecemeal protection to key pair；
The user data saved in user data memory block is the data that hard disk user behavior generates, and (is used using with region
Family) corresponding media key M-Key carries out data encrypting and deciphering；Preferred: user storage area includes one or more regions,
Each region corresponds to one or more user；There is its corresponding media key in each region；It realizes in this way
Solid state hard disk is independent for the physics of user, to ensure that the safety of user storage space；
It is described that using a variety of secure storage key pairs, wherein content realizes piecemeal protection, specifically: credible platform controls mould
Include credible platform control firmware storage areas, solid state hard disk firmware storage areas, sensitive data storage in the system memory block of block
Area, policies store, the memory block NV, log memory block, TSB program storage area, the memory block OPROM；
Credible platform control firmware storage areas is encrypted using R-key；
The solid state hard disk firmware is encrypted using S-KEY, and S-KEY must be in trusted firmware and security information success
After load, use just can be carried out；
Sensitive data storage section mainly saves the critical datas such as endorsement key (EK) and storage root key (SMK),
And by the encipherment protection of R-key key；
The policies store be can not tampered region, for storing under the trusted software base of credible platform control module side
The configuration strategy of hair；The configuration strategy is for configuring credible platform control module；
The memory block NV is nonvolatile storage, can be used to store the certificate for being measured and being encrypted
And key；
The log memory block is for storing integrity measurement log and command operation record information；
The memory block OPROM is used to store expansion ROM program；
As shown in figure 3, storage isolation trusted system hardware configuration in include: central processing unit, host interface HIF,
On-chip memory, memory etc. are connected by bus；Credible platform control module TPCM accesses bus by host interface HIF；
Preferred: the host interface HIF is PCIE host interface；
Preferred: the trusted system of the storage isolation further includes that SPI is responsible for TCM offer low speed data access interface,
It is mainly used for transmission metric information, core data etc.；SMx is responsible for providing national secret algorithm computing capability, mainly includes SM2/SM3/
SM4 three classes algorithm；OTP is responsible for storage hardware configuration information and the unique root key of chip and the part public key for sign test
Data；CPU is responsible for running the execution of service logic control；GPIO is responsible for issuing control signal and status signal to outside；LDPC
It is responsible for providing correcting data error recovery capability, lifting system reliability；The external SDRAM of DDR connection expands the RAM appearance of platform
Amount；TIMER timer is to piece internal clock step-by-step counting；On Chip Memory on piece memory is mainly used for caching interim data
It is used with internal firmware；DMA is connected memory and the peripheral hardware with DMA ability by dedicated bus；Responsible pair of RAID
Data on flash provide higher level protection, lifting system reliability；Sign test function for the first time when ROM mainly includes volume production
It can be with the safe guiding function of system after volume production；TRNG real random number generator, for generating a random number at random.It is main
It is used for key and generates application；I2C is responsible for TPCM and provides low speed data access interface, is mainly used for custom command interaction；
Preferred: media key M-Key is protected by encryption key En-Key；Encryption key En-Key must be in user PIN
Code and security information could be obtained correctly after all matching is correct；Security information is encrypted by root key R-KEY.
A set of mechanism in this way guarantees that each user has independent encryption key En-Key and media key M-Key, together
When protection by a whole set of key management system and encryption system again；
In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that disclosed method and terminal can pass through
Other modes are realized.For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely exemplary, for example, the module is drawn
Point, only a kind of logical function partition, there may be another division manner in actual implementation.
In addition, the technical solution in above-mentioned several embodiments can be combined with each other and replace in the case where not conflicting
It changes.
The module as illustrated by the separation member may or may not be physically separated, as module
The component of display may or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, or may be distributed over more
In a network unit.Some or all of the modules therein can be selected to realize this embodiment scheme according to the actual needs
Purpose.
It, can also be in addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present invention can integrate in one processing unit
It is that each unit physically exists alone, can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units.Above-mentioned integrated list
Member both can take the form of hardware realization, can also realize in the form of hardware adds software function module.
It is obvious to a person skilled in the art that invention is not limited to the details of the above exemplary embodiments, Er Qie
In the case where without departing substantially from spirit or essential attributes of the invention, the present invention can be realized in other specific forms.Therefore, nothing
By from the point of view of which point, the present embodiments are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the present invention is by institute
Attached claim rather than above description limit, it is intended that will fall within the meaning and scope of the equivalent elements of the claims
All changes be included in the present invention.Any attached associated diagram label in claim should not be considered as involved in limitation
Claim.Furthermore, it is to be understood that one word of " comprising " does not exclude other units or steps, odd number is not excluded for plural number.System claims
The multiple modules or device of middle statement can also be implemented through software or hardware by a module or device.The first, the second
Equal words are used to indicate names, and are not indicated any particular order.
Finally it should be noted that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical scheme of the present invention and are not limiting, although reference
Preferred embodiment describes the invention in detail, those skilled in the art should understand that, it can be to of the invention
Technical solution is modified or equivalent replacement, without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of trusted system of storage isolation, which is characterized in that the system includes: central processing unit, credible platform control mould
Block TPCM；Credible platform control module accesses the mainboard of trusted system by PCIE bus；Credible platform control module TPCM with
The mode of pluggable card accesses the mainboard of trusted system；It is credible during based on the dynamic measurement of credible platform control module
The monitoring data that platform control module is obtained by trusted software base TSB are to central processing unit and its operating system, application program
Carry out dynamic measurement successively；
Credible platform control module obtains the number needed for actively measuring by the memory space of read-only access central processing unit
Metric policy is based on according to, credible platform control module to measure the data, and measurement results is stored in described credible
In the memory space of platform control module.
2. the trusted system of storage isolation according to claim 1, which is characterized in that inside credible platform control module
Memory space is that credible platform control module itself is visible, memory space inside central processing unit is central processing unit itself
It is visible.
3. the trusted system of storage isolation according to claim 2, which is characterized in that credible platform control module and center
Processor shares read-only, readable and writable memory on credible platform mainboard by bus.
4. it is according to claim 3 storage isolation trusted system, which is characterized in that on credible platform mainboard it is read-only,
Readable and writable memory is mapped in continuous address space by way of address of cache.
5. the trusted system of storage isolation according to claim 4, which is characterized in that the continuous address space in part
It is visible to central processing unit, and the continuous address space of another part is sightless to central processing unit.
6. the trusted system of storage isolation according to claim 5, which is characterized in that the credible platform control module tool
There is the access authority higher than central processing unit, the storage for the access central processing unit that the credible platform control module can be read-only
Space.
7. the trusted system of storage isolation according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the controller on mainboard is to institute
The read write command for stating central processing unit and the transmission of credible platform control module is arbitrated.
8. the trusted system of storage isolation according to claim 7, which is characterized in that central processing unit cannot access described
The system memory block of credible platform control module.
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