CN109670826B - Anti-quantum computation block chain transaction method based on asymmetric key pool - Google Patents
Anti-quantum computation block chain transaction method based on asymmetric key pool Download PDFInfo
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- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
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- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
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- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3827—Use of message hashing
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
Abstract
The invention discloses an anti-quantum computation block chain transaction method based on an asymmetric key pool, which comprises a plurality of user sides, wherein the same key pool is stored in a quantum key card configured for each user side, an initiating user side uploads signed transactions to a network platform, a receiving user side for transaction verification combines a random number of a public key pointer of the initiating user side and a key pool of a self party to extract a public key of the initiating user side so as to extract a transferred signature, and the transaction verification is realized through the transferred signature. The method comprises the steps that a quantum key card is used for storing and disclosing a public key, the quantum key card is an independent hardware isolation device, the possibility that the secret key is stolen by malicious software or malicious operation is reduced, a corresponding private key is protected, a digital signature based on a public private key is further encrypted by a random number secret key, and the random number secret key is encrypted by the private key to form an encrypted digital signature. Even in the presence of quantum computers, it is difficult to derive the private key. Therefore, the scheme is not easy to crack by a quantum computer.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of block chains, in particular to a transaction method of a block chain.
Background
The block chain is a brand new distributed infrastructure and a calculation paradigm, stores data by using an ordered chain data structure, updates the data by using a consensus algorithm, and ensures data security by using a cryptography technology. In blockchain based transactions, ensuring data security for the transaction and privacy for the customer is a necessary condition for the blockchain to be able to develop further. For this reason, cryptography, and in particular public key cryptography, is widely used in blockchains.
As most people know, quantum computers have great potential in password cracking. The asymmetric (public key) encryption algorithms, such as the RSA encryption algorithm, which are mainstream today, are mostly based on two mathematical challenges, namely factorization of large integers or computation of discrete logarithms over a finite field. Their difficulty in breaking is also dependent on the efficiency with which these problems are solved. On a traditional computer, the two mathematical problems are required to be solved, and the time is taken to be exponential (namely, the cracking time increases in exponential order along with the increase of the length of the public key), which is not acceptable in practical application. The xiuer algorithm tailored for quantum computers can perform integer factorization or discrete logarithm calculation within polynomial time (i.e. the cracking time increases at the speed of k power along with the increase of the length of a public key, wherein k is a constant irrelevant to the length of the public key), thereby providing possibility for the cracking of RSA and discrete logarithm encryption algorithms.
The problems existing in the prior art are as follows:
(1) because the quantum computer can quickly obtain the corresponding private key through the public key, the existing blockchain transaction method is easy to crack by the quantum computer.
(2) In the prior art, the input and the output of a digital signature based on a public and a private key can be known by an adversary, and the private key can be deduced under the condition that a quantum computer exists, so that a block chain system is cracked by the quantum computer.
Disclosure of Invention
Based on this, it is necessary to provide a quantum computation resistant block chain transaction method based on an asymmetric key pool, including multiple user terminals, where a quantum key card configured for each user terminal stores the same key pool, and a key area of the quantum key card is composed of two parts, namely, an asymmetric key pool and an asymmetric key, where the asymmetric key pool is used to store public keys of all users, the asymmetric key is a private key of a self, when a transaction is initiated, an initiating user terminal obtains a random number of a public key pointer of a receiving user terminal and obtains a transfer-in wallet address by combining with a specific algorithm, the transfer-in wallet address, a transfer amount and transfer-out amount information obtain a first specific value by combining with a corresponding algorithm, and the initiating user terminal encrypts the first specific value to generate a transfer-out signature; the transfer-out amount information, the transfer amount, the transfer-in wallet address, the encrypted transfer-out signature, the encrypted true random number and the public key pointer random number of the initiating user end are used as a signed transaction and uploaded to a network platform, and the encrypted transfer-out signature is generated by generating the true random number encryption transfer-out signature by a quantum key card in the initiating user end; the encrypted true random number is obtained by encrypting the true random number by the private key of the initiating user side.
Each node in the block chain has a matched quantum key fob, the issuer of the quantum key fob is the master administrator of the quantum key fob, typically the management department of a certain enterprise or business entity, and the issuer of the quantum key fob is the member managed by the master administrator of the quantum key fob, typically the employees at each level of a certain enterprise or business entity. The user side keys in the quantum key fobs are all downloaded from the same quantum network service station, and the key pools stored in each quantum key fobs issued by the owner of the same quantum key fobs are completely consistent. Preferably, the key pool size stored in the quantum key fob may be 1G, 2G, 4G, 8G, 16G, 32G, 64G, 128G, 256G, 512G, 1024G, 2048G, 4096G, and so forth. The capacity depends on the requirement of the supervisor on safety, and the larger the capacity is, the higher the safety is.
In the invention, the key area of the quantum key card consists of an asymmetric key pool (public key) and an asymmetric key (private key). The public key area possesses the public keys of all users of the organization, and the private key area stores the private keys of the users.
The storage method of the public key is shown in fig. 3, and the specific steps are as follows: the random number rk of the public key pointer is randomly taken for a certain user, the public key pointer rkp is obtained by combining a specific public key pointer function frkp, and the public key krk of the user is stored from the corresponding position in the corresponding asymmetric key pool.
Optionally, there are one or more receiving clients, and the initiating client obtains a corresponding transfer-to-wallet address by using the public key pointer random number pair disclosed by each receiving client and combining with a specific algorithm, where the specific algorithm is a hash algorithm.
Optionally, the amount of money transferred out is one or more, the initiating user side performs corresponding operations on each amount of money transferred out, the transfer amount and the amount of money transferred out, respectively, to obtain one or more first specific values, wherein an algorithm of the corresponding operations is a hash algorithm. A quantum computation resistant block chain transaction method based on asymmetric key pools comprises a plurality of user sides, wherein the same key pool is stored in a quantum key card configured for each user side, when a transaction is initiated, an initiating user side uploads transfer-out amount information, a transfer amount, a transfer wallet address, an encrypted transfer-out signature, an encrypted true random number and a public key pointer random number of the initiating user side as a signed transaction to a network platform, a receiving user side for transaction verification combines the public key pointer random number of the initiating user side with a self-side key pool to extract a public key of the initiating user side so as to extract the transfer-out signature, the receiving user side decrypts the transfer-out signature by using the public key of the initiating user side to obtain a first specific value, calculates the transfer-in wallet address, the transfer-out amount information and the transfer amount by using corresponding algorithms to obtain a second specific value, and compares the first specific value with the second specific value, transaction verification is achieved.
Optionally, the method for generating a public key of the initiating user end includes: and combining the random number of the public key pointer of the initiating user side with a public key pointer function to obtain a public key pointer, and extracting a corresponding public key from the own asymmetric key pool by using the public key pointer.
Optionally, the method for extracting the rolling-out signature includes: and the initiating user side public key decrypts the encrypted true random number to obtain a true random number, and the true random number decrypts the encrypted roll-out signature to obtain a roll-out signature.
Optionally, the amount of money transferred out is one or more, and the receiving user performs corresponding operations on each amount of money transferred out, the transfer amount, and the amount of money transferred out to obtain one or more second specific values.
Optionally, an algorithm for calculating the wallet transfer address, the transfer amount, and the transfer-out amount information to obtain a second specific value is the same as an algorithm for calculating the first specific value, and the receiving user side compares the first specific value with the second specific value to verify the transaction, where the algorithm is a hash algorithm.
A quantum computation resistant block chain transaction method based on an asymmetric key pool comprises a plurality of user sides, wherein the same key pool is stored in a quantum key card configured for each user side, a key area of the quantum key card consists of the asymmetric key pool and an asymmetric key, the asymmetric key pool is used for storing public keys of all users, the asymmetric key is a private key of a personal party, and the method comprises the following steps:
the initiating user side uploads the signed transaction to a network platform, wherein the transfer-out amount information, the transfer amount, the transfer-in wallet address, the encrypted transfer-out signature, the encrypted true random number and the public key pointer random number of the initiating user side are used as the signed transaction, and the encrypted transfer-out signature is generated by generating the true random number encryption transfer-out signature by a quantum key card in the initiating user side; the encrypted true random number is obtained by encrypting the true random number by the private key of the initiating user end, wherein the initiating user end combines the public key pointer random number disclosed by the receiving user end with a specific algorithm to obtain a transfer-in wallet address, the transfer amount and the transfer-out amount information with a corresponding algorithm to obtain a first specific value, and the initiating user end encrypts the first specific value to generate a transfer-out signature;
traffic is broadcast to all nodes of this blockchain network;
each node in the block chain network verifies the transaction, wherein a receiving user end for verifying the transaction combines a public key pointer random number of an initiating user end with a private key pool to extract a public key of the initiating user end so as to extract a roll-out signature, the receiving user end decrypts the roll-out signature by using the public key of the initiating user end to obtain a first specific value, calculates the transfer amount of a roll-in wallet address and roll-out amount information by using a corresponding algorithm to obtain a second specific value, and compares the first specific value with the second specific value to realize transaction verification;
forming a block for each transaction;
adding a new block into a block chain;
the transaction is completed.
The quantum computation resistant block chain transaction method based on the asymmetric key pool comprises a plurality of user sides, the same key pool is stored in a quantum key card configured for each user side, the signed transaction is uploaded to a network platform by an initiating user side, a receiving user side for transaction verification combines a public key pointer random number of the initiating user side and a private key pool of a self party to extract a public key of the initiating user side so as to extract a transferred signature, and the transaction verification is realized through the transferred signature. The method comprises the steps that a quantum key card is used for storing and disclosing a public key, the quantum key card is an independent hardware isolation device, the possibility that the secret key is stolen by malicious software or malicious operation is reduced, a corresponding private key is protected, a digital signature based on a public private key is further encrypted by a random number secret key, and the random number secret key is encrypted by the private key to form an encrypted digital signature. Even in the presence of quantum computers, it is difficult to derive the private key. Therefore, the scheme is not easy to crack by a quantum computer.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a process for generating a transaction according to an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a transaction signature process provided by an embodiment of the invention;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of a wallet address generation process according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a flowchart of a public key storage method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a public key reading method according to an embodiment of the present invention
Detailed Description
The block chain is a data structure formed by data blocks in a linked list-like mode according to the time sequence, and distributed decentralized account books which cannot be falsified and forged are guaranteed in a cryptographic mode. Among them, cryptography mainly uses public key cryptography. The overall idea of the transaction process in the block chain processing system is to replace a public key disclosed in the prior art with a public key which is stored in an asymmetric key pool and is only disclosed for a quantum key card.
Example 1
Taking a transaction from the user side a to the user side B as an example, wherein the initiating user side is the user side a, and the receiving user side is the user side B, the specific steps of the transaction are shown in fig. 1, and the specific steps are as follows:
step 1: initiating a transaction request by an initiating user end, namely a user end A: when a transaction is initiated, the transaction initiator, i.e. the user a, needs to sign the transaction using its own private key ka.
Step 1.1: obtaining the public key of the initiating user side:
as shown in fig. 2, the roll-out private key in fig. 2 is the private key ka of client a; the roll-out public key in fig. 2 is the public key kpa of the user a;
the public key kpa is obtained from the public key pointer rka of the user side a, and the process is as shown in fig. 4, and the specific steps are as follows:
the public key pointer rkp is obtained by using its own public key pointer random number rk in combination with a specific public key pointer function frkp, and then the public key kp is fetched from the corresponding position in the corresponding asymmetric key pool. And generating a public key hash by the public key pointer random number rka, and then generating the wallet address of A.
Step 1.2: and (3) obtaining and encrypting a roll-out signature:
as shown in fig. 2, the roll-out signature in fig. 2 is the signature made by the user a; the information of the roll-out amount in fig. 2 is information such as ID of the transaction to which the roll-out amount belongs; the shifted-to-wallet address in fig. 2, i.e., the wallet address of user B, includes the wallet addresses of other recipients, if any;
the user end A obtains public key hash through a hash algorithm by receiving the public key pointer random number rkb of the user end by the receiver of the transaction, and further obtains a transfer-in wallet address, and if other receivers exist in the transaction, also obtains wallet addresses of other receivers. Of course, the public key of the receiving user end can be calculated according to other algorithms known to those skilled in the art to further obtain the transfer-in wallet address according to design requirements. The method comprises the steps that a user side A hashes the contents of the transaction (the main contents are a transfer amount, a transfer wallet address and transfer-out amount information, wherein the transfer-out amount information indicates the source and the legality of the transfer-out amount, specifically comprises the ID of the transaction to which the amount belongs and the serial number of the amount in the transaction to which the amount belongs, so that all members can find the transfer-out amount in the history record of a block chain to prove the legality of the transfer-out amount, the transfer-out amount information can comprise 1 or more different transfer-out amount sources) to obtain a first specific value H, then the first specific value H is encrypted by using a private key ka of the user side A to obtain a transfer-out signature, and similarly, according to design requirements, the initiating user side can calculate the contents of the transaction according to other algorithms known by other technicians in the field to obtain the first specific value. The true random number generator in the quantum key fob that the user side a matches generates a true random number ksa for encrypting the roll-out signature and encrypts the true random number ksa with the private key ka. If the transfer-out amount information contains a plurality of different transfer-out amount sources, 1 encrypted transfer-out signature is respectively obtained for the plurality of transfer-out amounts by using the same method.
Step 1.3: the roll-out information, transfer amount, roll-to-wallet address, encrypted roll-out signature, encrypted true random number ksa, and the originating client public key pointer random number rka are used as a signed transaction.
Step 2: traffic is broadcast to all nodes of this blockchain network;
and step 3: each node in the blockchain network verifies the transaction;
in the transaction verification process, each node in the blockchain network can be used as a verification node. The verification node obtains the public key kpa of the user A through the public key pointer random number rka of the user A.
The verification node calculates the public key pointer random number rka to convert the public key into the wallet to obtain a wallet address, compares the wallet address with the wallet address corresponding to the transaction amount of the transaction A, if the wallet address is the same as the wallet address, the wallet address is proved to be correct, and if the transaction authentication fails, the transaction authentication is carried out; the wallet address corresponding to the transaction amount of the transaction A is derived from the transfer-out amount information of the transaction, namely the verification node can obtain the historical transaction of the transfer-out amount from the transfer-out amount information of the transaction, and reads the wallet address corresponding to the transaction amount of the transaction A from the historical transaction. The verifying node decrypts the encrypted true random number using the public key kpa of the user side a to obtain the true random number ksa, and further obtains the roll-out signature. And decrypting the transfer-out signature by using the public key kpa of the initiating user side to obtain a transfer amount, transfer-out amount information and hash H of the transfer-in wallet address, namely a first specific value, calculating hash H 'of the transaction content, namely a second specific value, comparing the first specific value H with the second specific value H', finishing verification, and if the transfer-out amount information contains a plurality of different transfer-out amount sources, verifying the encrypted transfer-out signatures corresponding to the plurality of transfer-out amounts respectively by using the same method. The algorithm for calculating the wallet transfer address and the transfer amount to obtain the second specific value is the same as the algorithm for calculating the first specific value, and the algorithm for calculating the wallet transfer address and the transfer amount to obtain the second specific value is not limited to a hash algorithm according to design requirements as long as a characteristic value can be obtained through calculation.
And 4, step 4: a plurality of transactions form a block;
and 5: adding a new block into a block chain;
step 6: the transaction is completed.
Using a public key that is only public to the quantum key fob, and using the quantum key fob to store the public key, the quantum key fob is a separate hardware-isolated device, and the likelihood of stealing keys by malware or malicious operations is greatly reduced. Because the quantum computer can not obtain the public key of the user, and can not obtain the corresponding private key, the scheme is not easy to be cracked by the quantum computer. In addition, in the present invention, the digital signature based on the public and private keys is further encrypted by the random number key, which is encrypted by the private key to form an encrypted digital signature. Even in the presence of quantum computers, it is difficult to derive the private key. Therefore, the scheme is not easy to crack by a quantum computer.
The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the embodiments described above are not described, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the inventive concept, which falls within the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.
Claims (6)
1. The quantum computation resistant block chain transaction method based on the asymmetric key pool is characterized by comprising a plurality of user sides, wherein the same key pool is stored in a quantum key card configured for each user side, a key area of the quantum key card consists of the asymmetric key pool and an asymmetric key, the asymmetric key pool is used for storing public keys of all users, the asymmetric key is a private key of a self party, when the transaction is initiated, an initiating user side obtains a random number of a public key pointer of a receiving user side and obtains a transfer-in wallet address by combining with a specific algorithm, the transfer-in wallet address, a transfer amount and transfer-out amount information are combined with a corresponding algorithm to obtain a first specific value, and the initiating user side encrypts the first specific value by using the private key of the self party to generate a transfer-out signature; the transfer-out amount information, the transfer amount, the transfer-in wallet address, the encrypted transfer-out signature, the encrypted true random number and the public key pointer random number of the initiating user end are used as a signed transaction and uploaded to a network platform, and the encrypted transfer-out signature is generated by generating the true random number encryption transfer-out signature by a quantum key card in the initiating user end; the encrypted true random number is obtained by encrypting the true random number by a private key of the initiating user side;
a receiving user end of transaction verification combines a public key pointer random number of an initiating user end with a public key pointer function to obtain a public key pointer, and extracts a public key of the initiating user end from a self-side asymmetric key pool by using the public key pointer; decrypting the encrypted true random number by using a public key of the initiating user side to obtain a true random number, and decrypting the encrypted roll-out signature by using the true random number to obtain a roll-out signature;
the receiving user end decrypts the roll-out signature by using the public key of the initiating user end to obtain a first specific value, calculates the address of a roll-in wallet, roll-out amount information and the transfer amount by using a corresponding algorithm to obtain a second specific value, and compares the first specific value with the second specific value to realize transaction verification.
2. The quantum computation resistant blockchain transaction method based on the asymmetric key pool as claimed in claim 1, wherein the receiving clients have one or more, and the initiating client obtains the corresponding transfer-in wallet address by using the public key pointer random number pair disclosed by each receiving client in combination with a specific algorithm, wherein the specific algorithm is a hash algorithm.
3. The quantum computation resistant blockchain transaction method based on the asymmetric key pool as claimed in claim 1, wherein the amount of money transferred out is one or more, the initiating user side combines each amount of money transferred out with the address of the wallet transferred in, the amount of money transferred and the amount of money transferred out to perform corresponding operation to obtain one or more first specific values, wherein the algorithm of the corresponding operation is a hash algorithm.
4. The quantum computation resistant blockchain transaction method based on the asymmetric key pool as claimed in claim 1, wherein the amount of money transferred out is one or more, and the receiving user end combines each amount of money transferred out with the address of the wallet transferred in, the amount of money transferred in, and the amount of money transferred out to perform corresponding operation to obtain one or more second specific values.
5. The quantum computation resistant blockchain transaction method based on the asymmetric key pool as claimed in claim 1, wherein an algorithm for obtaining a second specific value by computing the wallet transferring address, the transfer amount and the transfer-out amount information is the same as an algorithm for obtaining the first specific value by computing, and the receiving user side compares the first specific value with the second specific value to realize transaction verification, wherein the algorithm is a hash algorithm.
6. A quantum computation resistant block chain transaction method based on an asymmetric key pool comprises a plurality of user sides, wherein the same key pool is stored in a quantum key card configured for each user side, a key area of the quantum key card consists of an asymmetric key pool and an asymmetric key, the asymmetric key pool is used for storing public keys of all users, the asymmetric key is a private key of a personal party, and the method is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
the initiating user side uploads the signed transaction to a network platform, wherein the transfer-out amount information, the transfer amount, the transfer-in wallet address, the encrypted transfer-out signature, the encrypted true random number and the public key pointer random number of the initiating user side are used as the signed transaction, and the encrypted transfer-out signature is generated by generating the true random number encryption transfer-out signature by a quantum key card in the initiating user side; the encrypted true random number is obtained by encrypting the true random number by the private key of the initiating user end, wherein the initiating user end combines the public key pointer random number disclosed by the receiving user end with a specific algorithm to obtain a transfer-in wallet address, the transfer amount and the transfer-out amount information with a corresponding algorithm to obtain a first specific value, and the initiating user end encrypts the first specific value to generate a transfer-out signature;
traffic is broadcast to all nodes of this blockchain network;
each node in the block chain network verifies the transaction, wherein a receiving user end for verifying the transaction combines a public key pointer random number of an initiating user end with a public key pointer function to obtain a public key pointer, and the public key pointer is used for extracting a public key of the initiating user end from an own asymmetric key pool; decrypting the encrypted true random number by using a public key of an initiating user end to obtain a true random number, decrypting the encrypted roll-out signature by using the true random number to obtain a roll-out signature, decrypting the roll-out signature by using the public key of the initiating user end by using a receiving user end to obtain a first specific value, calculating the transfer amount of the roll-in wallet address and the roll-out amount information by using a corresponding algorithm to obtain a second specific value, and comparing the first specific value with the second specific value to realize transaction verification;
a plurality of transactions form a block;
adding a new block into a block chain;
the transaction is completed.
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| CN110365472B (en) * | 2019-05-30 | 2023-08-04 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Quantum communication service station digital signature method and system based on asymmetric key pool pair |
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