CN109525401B - Method and terminal for transmitting sensitive data - Google Patents
Method and terminal for transmitting sensitive data Download PDFInfo
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- CN109525401B CN109525401B CN201811579416.8A CN201811579416A CN109525401B CN 109525401 B CN109525401 B CN 109525401B CN 201811579416 A CN201811579416 A CN 201811579416A CN 109525401 B CN109525401 B CN 109525401B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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Abstract
The invention provides a method and a terminal for transmitting sensitive data, wherein a challenge value is sent to the terminal, a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to a first private key are used by a receiving terminal for signing the challenge value by using the first private key, the legality of the terminal is verified according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, if the terminal is legal, a second public key sent by the terminal is received, the sensitive data is encrypted by using the second public key, and the encrypted sensitive data is sent to the terminal; the first private key and the second public key are respectively used for signature and encryption of sensitive data, the uniqueness principle of key usage is followed, and the security of sensitive data transmission is improved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to a method and a terminal for transmitting sensitive data.
Background
In the electronic payment industry, all online transactions are completed based on data interaction between a server and a terminal, and data sent to the terminal by the server is often sensitive data, so that the server is required to verify the legality of the terminal before data interaction with the terminal, namely the server only needs to send data to a legal terminal and does not send data to an illegal terminal; second, there is a need for cryptographic protection of sensitive data, i.e., the delivery of sensitive data must be in ciphertext form, rather than in plaintext. How to deliver sensitive data to a legal terminal by a server side is currently in the following ways:
the first method is as follows: the method comprises the steps that a symmetric technology is adopted, a symmetric key is shared by a server and a legal terminal, the server sends a challenge value to the terminal, the terminal encrypts the challenge value by using the symmetric key or sends the challenge value to the server after the challenge value is calculated through an MAC algorithm, and the server verifies whether a response value of the terminal is correct or not to judge the legality of the terminal; meanwhile, the sensitive data is encrypted by using the symmetric key, so that the safe transmission of the sensitive data is realized;
the second method comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that a pair of first certificates and a private key are preset in a terminal, a superior first certificate is preset in a server, the server verifies the validity of the terminal first certificate by using the superior first certificate, then sends a challenge value to the terminal, the terminal signs the challenge value by using the private key and then sends the challenge value to the server, and the server verifies whether signature information of the terminal is correct or not to judge the validity of the terminal. And meanwhile, the public key in the first certificate of the terminal is used for encrypting the sensitive data, so that the safe transmission of the sensitive data is realized.
In the first mode, a symmetric technology is used, and if all terminals share one symmetric key (namely, under the condition of multiple terminals and one secret), the security is not enough, and the key of one terminal is leaked, so that the key of all terminals is leaked; if each terminal and the server share the unique secret key, the difficulty of managing the symmetric secret keys by the server is increased along with the increase of the number of the terminals, and how to lead the symmetric secret keys into the order receiving server (or the order receiving server) needs a set of complex secret key filling scheme for management, so that the management difficulty is high;
the second method uses asymmetric technology, such as the first method, but has the following disadvantages:
first, this method cannot solve the problem of the server identifying the terminal in a targeted manner, assuming that the server a uses the upper first certificate a, and the first certificate of the legal terminal corresponding to the server is necessarily the lower first certificate of the first certificate a, if one server B is added, if the upper first certificate a is still used, the server A, B cannot identify the respective legal terminal in a targeted manner (since the terminals corresponding to the two servers are both the lower first certificates of the upper first certificate a, for the server A, B, the first certificates can be verified to pass). If the server B uses another superior first certificate B, although the problem of directional identification can be solved, as the number of servers increases, the number of superior first certificates inevitably increases, and the difficulty of managing the first certificates by the server is inevitably increased.
Secondly, the terminal first certificate and the private key in the method are used for authentication with the server and encryption and decryption of sensitive data, namely the asymmetric key is used for signature verification and encryption and decryption, and one key has two purposes, which violates the consistency principle of key purposes.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: the method and the terminal for transmitting the sensitive data follow the uniqueness principle of the key application and improve the security of sensitive data transmission.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts a technical scheme that:
a method of communicating sensitive data, comprising the steps of:
s1, sending the challenge value to the terminal, and receiving a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to the first private key after the terminal signs the challenge value by using the first private key;
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, and if the terminal is legal, executing the step S3;
s3, receiving a second public key sent by the terminal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
In order to solve the technical problem, the invention adopts another technical scheme as follows:
a terminal for delivering sensitive data, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the following steps when executing the computer program:
s1, sending the challenge value to the terminal, and receiving a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to the first private key after the terminal signs the challenge value by using the first private key;
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, and if the terminal is legal, executing the step S3;
s3, receiving a second public key sent by the terminal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the method comprises the steps that a challenge value is sent to a terminal, a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to a first private key after the challenge value is signed by the terminal through the first private key are received, the legality of the terminal is verified according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, if the terminal is legal, a second public key sent by the terminal is received, sensitive data are encrypted through the second public key, and the encrypted sensitive data are sent to the terminal; the first private key and the second public key are respectively used for signature and encryption of sensitive data, the uniqueness principle of key usage is followed, and the security of sensitive data transmission is improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method of communicating sensitive data in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal for transferring sensitive data according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a first detailed method of communicating sensitive data according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a second detailed method of communicating sensitive data in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
description of reference numerals:
1. a terminal for transmitting sensitive data; 2. a memory; 3. a processor.
Detailed Description
In order to explain technical contents, achieved objects, and effects of the present invention in detail, the following description is made with reference to the accompanying drawings in combination with the embodiments.
The most key concept of the invention is as follows: the challenge value is signed by using the first private key and the sensitive data is encrypted by using the second public key, so that the uniqueness principle of the key purpose is followed, and the security of sensitive data transmission is improved.
Referring to fig. 1, a method for transferring sensitive data includes the steps of:
s1, sending the challenge value to the terminal, and receiving a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to the first private key after the terminal signs the challenge value by using the first private key;
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, and if the terminal is legal, executing the step S3;
s3, receiving a second public key sent by the terminal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
From the above description, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: the method comprises the steps that a challenge value is sent to a terminal, a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to a first private key after the challenge value is signed by the terminal through the first private key are received, the legality of the terminal is verified according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, if the terminal is legal, a second public key sent by the terminal is received, sensitive data are encrypted through the second public key, and the encrypted sensitive data are sent to the terminal; the first private key and the second public key are respectively used for signature and encryption of sensitive data, the uniqueness principle of key usage is followed, and the security of sensitive data transmission is improved.
Further, the first signature value in S1 is obtained by signing the challenge value and the terminal serial number with the first private key, and also receives the terminal serial number sent by the terminal;
the step S2 includes:
verifying the validity of the first certificate according to a root certificate corresponding to the first certificate;
if the terminal serial number is legal, judging whether the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct or not;
if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal or not by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the random number;
if it is legal, go to step S3.
According to the description, the validity of the first certificate is verified by using the root certificate corresponding to the first certificate, so that the authenticity of whether the terminal is verified to be legal or not is guaranteed, and in addition, the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the first signature value are sequentially verified, so that the safety of terminal verification is improved.
Further, the extended domain of the first certificate is written with a server number;
after the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is judged to be correct, the method further comprises the following steps:
and analyzing the first certificate, extracting a server serial number in a first certificate extension domain, judging whether the server serial number is correct, and if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the challenge value.
According to the description, whether the server serial number in the extended domain of the first certificate is correct or not is verified, so that the oriented identification of a legal terminal is realized, and the authenticity of terminal verification is improved.
Further, step S1 is preceded by:
s01, importing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate, and storing the corresponding relation into a corresponding relation table;
the judging whether the corresponding relationship between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct comprises:
and judging whether the terminal serial number and the first certificate exist in the corresponding relation table.
According to the description, whether the relation between the received terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct or not is judged by pre-storing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate, so that the verification accuracy is ensured.
Further, parsing the first certificate, extracting a server number in a first certificate extension domain, and determining whether the server number is correct includes:
and analyzing the first certificate, judging whether the analysis is successful, if not, the terminal is an illegal terminal, otherwise, extracting a server number in the first certificate extended domain, and judging whether the server number is correct.
As can be seen from the above description, since the server serial number is written in the legal first certificate extension domain, if the first certificate fails to be analyzed, it is indicated that the server serial number is not written in the extension domain of the first certificate, and the determination result is an illegal terminal, it is not necessary to further verify the correctness of the server serial number, so that the validity of the verification is improved.
Further, determining whether the server serial number is correct includes:
and judging whether the server serial number is equal to the server serial number distributed by the CA center, if so, the server serial number is correct, otherwise, the server serial number is incorrect.
According to the description, the numbers of the service ends are uniformly managed and controlled through the CA center, and the uniformity of management and control is improved.
Further, when the first certificate is analyzed, a first public key corresponding to the first certificate is also extracted;
said verifying that said first signature value is legitimate using said first certificate, terminal serial number and challenge value comprises:
performing public key operation on the first signature value by using the first public key to obtain a first digest value;
piecing the challenge value and the terminal serial number to obtain a second digest value;
comparing whether the first abstract value is equal to the second abstract value;
if yes, the first signature value is legal;
otherwise, the first signature value is illegal.
From the above description, the validity of the first signature value is verified by comparing the first digest value obtained by public key operation with the second digest value obtained by piecing together, and the verification accuracy is high.
Further, the S3 includes:
receiving a second public key sent by a terminal and a second signature value obtained by using the first private key to sign the second public key;
and verifying the validity of the second signature value by using the first public key, if the second signature value is legal, encrypting sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
As can be seen from the above description, the first public-private key pair is used for authentication, and the second public key is used for encryption of sensitive data, which ensures the uniqueness of the key usage.
Further, a second signature value sent by the terminal is obtained by signing the digest value of the second public key by using the first private key;
verifying the validity of the second signature value using the first public key comprises:
performing public key calculation on the second signature value by using the first public key to obtain a third digest value;
calculating the abstract value of the second public key to obtain a fourth abstract value;
judging whether the third abstract value and the fourth abstract value are equal;
if yes, the second signature value is legal;
otherwise, the second signature value is not legitimate.
As can be seen from the above description, the validity of the second signature value is verified by comparing the calculated third digest value with the fourth digest value, and the verification reliability is high.
Further, the second public key is pre-installed and generated when the terminal leaves a factory or randomly generated by the terminal after verifying that the terminal is legal.
As can be seen from the above description, the generation policy of the second public key can be adjusted adaptively according to the efficiency of the terminal for generating the secret key, and if the efficiency of the terminal for generating the secret key is low, the terminal can be selected to pre-install the second public key when leaving the factory, otherwise, the terminal randomly generates the second public key after verifying that the terminal is legal, thereby improving the flexibility of the terminal for generating the second public key.
Referring to fig. 2, a terminal for transferring sensitive data includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the following steps:
s1, sending the challenge value to the terminal, and receiving a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to the first private key after the terminal signs the challenge value by using the first private key;
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, and if the terminal is legal, executing the step S3;
s3, receiving a second public key sent by the terminal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
From the above description, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: the method comprises the steps that a challenge value is sent to a terminal, a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to a first private key after the challenge value is signed by the terminal through the first private key are received, the legality of the terminal is verified according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, if the terminal is legal, a second public key sent by the terminal is received, sensitive data are encrypted through the second public key, and the encrypted sensitive data are sent to the terminal; the first private key and the second public key are respectively used for signature and encryption of sensitive data, the uniqueness principle of key usage is followed, and the security of sensitive data transmission is improved.
Further, the first signature value in S1 is obtained by signing the challenge value and the terminal serial number with the first private key, and also receives the terminal serial number sent by the terminal;
the step S2 includes:
verifying the validity of the first certificate according to a root certificate corresponding to the first certificate;
if the terminal serial number is legal, judging whether the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct or not;
if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal or not by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the random number;
if it is legal, go to step S3.
According to the description, the validity of the first certificate is verified by using the root certificate corresponding to the first certificate, so that the authenticity of whether the terminal is verified to be legal or not is guaranteed, and in addition, the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the first signature value are sequentially verified, so that the safety of terminal verification is improved.
Further, the extended domain of the first certificate is written with a server number;
after the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is judged to be correct, the method further comprises the following steps:
and analyzing the first certificate, extracting a server serial number in a first certificate extension domain, judging whether the server serial number is correct, and if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the challenge value.
According to the description, whether the server serial number in the extended domain of the first certificate is correct or not is verified, so that the oriented identification of a legal terminal is realized, and the authenticity of terminal verification is improved.
Further, step S1 is preceded by:
s01, importing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate, and storing the corresponding relation into a corresponding relation table;
the judging whether the corresponding relationship between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct comprises:
and judging whether the terminal serial number and the first certificate exist in the corresponding relation table.
According to the description, whether the relation between the received terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct or not is judged by pre-storing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate, so that the verification accuracy is ensured.
Further, parsing the first certificate, extracting a server number in a first certificate extension domain, and determining whether the server number is correct includes:
and analyzing the first certificate, judging whether the analysis is successful, if not, the terminal is an illegal terminal, otherwise, extracting a server number in the first certificate extended domain, and judging whether the server number is correct.
As can be seen from the above description, since the server serial number is written in the legal first certificate extension domain, if the first certificate fails to be analyzed, it is indicated that the server serial number is not written in the extension domain of the first certificate, and the determination result is an illegal terminal, it is not necessary to further verify the correctness of the server serial number, so that the validity of the verification is improved.
Further, determining whether the server serial number is correct includes:
and judging whether the server serial number is equal to the server serial number distributed by the CA center, if so, the server serial number is correct, otherwise, the server serial number is incorrect.
According to the description, the numbers of the service ends are uniformly managed and controlled through the CA center, and the uniformity of management and control is improved.
Further, when the first certificate is analyzed, a first public key corresponding to the first certificate is also extracted;
said verifying that said first signature value is legitimate using said first certificate, terminal serial number and challenge value comprises:
performing public key operation on the first signature value by using the first public key to obtain a first digest value;
piecing the challenge value and the terminal serial number to obtain a second digest value;
comparing whether the first abstract value is equal to the second abstract value;
if yes, the first signature value is legal;
otherwise, the first signature value is illegal.
From the above description, the validity of the first signature value is verified by comparing the first digest value obtained by public key operation with the second digest value obtained by piecing together, and the verification accuracy is high.
Further, the S3 includes:
receiving a second public key sent by a terminal and a second signature value obtained by using the first private key to sign the second public key;
and verifying the validity of the second signature value by using the first public key, if the second signature value is legal, encrypting sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
As can be seen from the above description, the first public-private key pair is used for authentication, and the second public key is used for encryption of sensitive data, which ensures the uniqueness of the key usage.
Further, a second signature value sent by the terminal is obtained by signing the digest value of the second public key by using the first private key;
verifying the validity of the second signature value using the first public key comprises:
performing public key calculation on the second signature value by using the first public key to obtain a third digest value;
calculating the abstract value of the second public key to obtain a fourth abstract value;
judging whether the third abstract value and the fourth abstract value are equal;
if yes, the second signature value is legal;
otherwise, the second signature value is not legitimate.
As can be seen from the above description, the validity of the second signature value is verified by comparing the calculated third digest value with the fourth digest value, and the verification reliability is high.
Further, the second public key is pre-installed and generated when the terminal leaves a factory or randomly generated by the terminal after verifying that the terminal is legal.
As can be seen from the above description, the generation policy of the second public key can be adjusted adaptively according to the efficiency of the terminal for generating the secret key, and if the efficiency of the terminal for generating the secret key is low, the terminal can be selected to pre-install the second public key when leaving the factory, otherwise, the terminal randomly generates the second public key after verifying that the terminal is legal, thereby improving the flexibility of the terminal for generating the second public key.
Example one
Referring to fig. 1, a method for transferring sensitive data includes the steps of:
s201, the terminal generates a pair of first public and private keys, wherein the first private key is marked as PRK1, the private keys are encrypted by a terminal top-level encryption key and stored in a secure area, and the first public key is marked as PUK 1;
s202, the terminal sends the terminal serial number SN and the generated first public key PUK1 to a CA center, and requests the CA center to sign and issue a certificate for the first public key PUK 1;
s203, the CA center issues a certificate to the first public key PUK1 to obtain a first certificate POS _ WCRT, the format of the first certificate POS _ WCRT can be determined according to actual conditions, preferably the standard x509 format is used, and the CA center maintains the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT;
preferably, the CA center may record the correspondence between the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT in an SN-POS _ WCRT table, such as:
SN1，POS_WCRT1；
SN2，POS_WCRT2；
SN3，POS_WCRT3；
…
SNN，POS_WCRTN；
s204, the CA center leads the first certificate POS _ WCRT into the terminal, the terminal verifies whether the first certificate POS _ WCRT is correct,
if the key is correct, the terminal finishes pre-installation of the key, and at the moment, the terminal stores a first randomly generated private key PRK1 and a first certificate POS _ WCRT corresponding to the first private key PRK 1;
s301, a root certificate corresponding to a first certificate POS _ WCRT of a terminal is imported to a server side by a CA center, wherein the root certificate is a superior certificate of the certificate;
the root certificate does not belong to private data, and can be transferred in a public manner, and existing solutions in the prior art, such as:
the CA center appoints a special member A to transmit a root certificate to the server side on site, an appointing special member B transmits the summary data of the root certificate to the server side, the server side verifies whether the summary data of the root certificate transmitted by the special member A is consistent with the summary data of the root certificate of the special member B, and if yes, the root certificate is represented to be credible;
s01, importing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT, and storing the corresponding relation into a corresponding relation table;
the CA center imports a corresponding relation table of the issued first certificate POS _ WCRT and the terminal serial number SN into an existing scheme in the prior art of the server, and the specific method can refer to the scheme of transmitting the root certificate;
before a server and a terminal establish a channel, a challenge value is generated;
s1, the server side sends the challenge value to the terminal, and the receiving terminal uses a first private key PRK1 to sign the challenge value, the first signature value and the challenge value and a first certificate POS _ WCRT corresponding to the first private key PRK 1;
the challenge value may be determined according to an actual requirement, and preferably, the challenge value in this scheme is a random number R;
the first signature value is obtained by signing the random number R and the terminal serial number SN by using a first private key PRK1, and the terminal serial number SN sent by the terminal is also received;
after receiving the random number R, the terminal signs the random number R and the terminal serial number SN by using a first private key PRK1 to obtain a first signature value S, where the formula is: s ═ Sign (PRK1, R | SN);
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the random number R and the first certificate POS _ WCRT, and if the terminal is legal, executing a step S3;
the step S2 includes:
verifying the validity of the first certificate POS _ WCRT according to a root certificate corresponding to the first certificate POS _ WCRT;
if the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT are legal, judging whether the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT exist in the corresponding relation table;
if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal or not by using the first certificate POS _ WCRT, the terminal serial number SN and the random number R;
if yes, go to step S3;
s3, the terminal randomly generates a pair of second public and private keys, the second private key is recorded as POS _ PRK, and the second public key is recorded as POS _ PUK;
and receiving a second public key POS _ PUK sent by the terminal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key POS _ PUK, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
The S3 includes:
receiving a second public key POS _ PUK sent by a terminal and a second signature value S ' obtained by signing the second public key POS _ PUK by using the first private key PRK1, wherein the second signature value S ' sent by the terminal is obtained by signing the digest value of the second public key POS _ PUK by using the first private key PRK1, and the validity of the second signature value S ' is verified by using the first public key PUK 1;
if the second signature value S' is legal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key POS _ PUK, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal;
and the terminal decrypts the encrypted sensitive data by using a second private key POS _ PRK to obtain the sensitive data.
Example two
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 3 and fig. 4, the present embodiment is taken as a first technical solution, and the present embodiment is different from the present embodiment in that:
before S201, the method further includes:
s101, a terminal applies for a Server ID number to a CA center;
s102, a CA center manages Server number Server _ ID information and distributes a unique Server number Server _ ID to a Server, wherein the Server can indicate a receipt background;
the S202 further includes: the CA center finds out the corresponding order receiving background serial number Server _ ID based on the terminal serial number SN;
the S203 further includes: and writing the Server-ID number into the extended domain of the certificate to obtain a first certificate POS _ WCRT.
The step S204 comprises the following steps:
(1) the terminal analyzes the first certificate POS _ WCRT according to the certificate format, and extracts a Server number Server _ ID and a first public key PUK1 in the extension domain of the first certificate POS _ WCRT;
(2) the terminal compares the extracted Server-ID with the Server-ID corresponding to the terminal to determine whether the extracted Server-ID is the same as the Server-ID, if so, the terminal refuses to import the Server-ID and prompts error reporting, otherwise, the step (3) is executed;
(3) the terminal performs public key operation on a section of random value Rnd by using the extracted first public key PUK1 to obtain a public key operation result DATA, performs private key operation on the DATA by using a first private key PRK1 generated by the terminal, judges whether the operation result is equal to the random value Rnd, and if the operation result is equal to the random value Rnd, the first public key PUK1 corresponding to the first certificate POS _ WCRT is generated by the terminal and the terminal allows importing; otherwise, the terminal refuses to import and prompts to report errors.
After the step of judging that the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT exist in the corresponding relationship table in S2, the method further includes:
analyzing the first certificate POS _ WCRT according to a certificate format, and judging whether the analysis is successful;
if not, the terminal is an illegal terminal;
otherwise, extracting a Server number Server _ ID in the first certificate POS _ WCRT extension domain and a first public key PUK1 corresponding to the first certificate POS _ WCRT, and determining whether the Server number Server _ ID is correct, that is: judging whether the Server ID number is equal to the Server ID number distributed by the CA center or not;
if not, the operation is incorrect;
otherwise, continuously using the first certificate POS _ WCRT, the terminal serial number SN and the random number R to verify whether the first signature value is legal or not.
EXAMPLE III
Referring to fig. 1, the present embodiment is different from the present embodiment in that:
in S1, the specific signing step of signing the random number R and the terminal serial number SN using the first private key PRK1 to obtain the first signature value S includes (where the formula of obtaining the first signature value S is: S ═ Sign (PRK1, R | SN)):
(1) the random number R and the terminal serial number SN are pieced together, and a fifth abstract value HASH is calculated;
(2) and carrying out private key operation on the fifth digest value HASH by using a first private key PRK1, wherein the operation result is the first signature value S.
Verifying in the S2 whether the first signature value is legitimate using the first certificate POS _ WCRT, the terminal serial number SN, and the random number R includes:
performing public key operation on the first signature value by using the first public key PUK1 to obtain a first digest value HASH 1;
the random number R and the terminal serial number SN are pieced together to obtain a second digest value HASH 2;
comparing the first summary value HASH1 with the second summary value HASH2 to see if they are equal;
if not, the first signature value is illegal;
if yes, the first signature value is legal.
The step of receiving the second public key POS _ PUK sent by the terminal and the second signature value S' signed by using the first private key PRK1 in S3 includes:
(1) calculating a sixth abstract value HASH' of the second public key POS _ PUK;
(2) and performing private key operation on the sixth digest value HASH 'by using the first private key PRK1 to obtain a second signature value S'.
Verifying the validity of the second signature value S' using the first public key PUK1, comprising:
performing public key calculation on the second signature value S 'by using the first public key PUK1 to obtain a third digest value HASH 1';
calculating the digest value of the second public key POS _ PUK to obtain a fourth digest value HASH 2';
judging whether the third summary value HASH1 'and the fourth summary value HASH 2' are equal;
if not, the second signature value S' is illegal;
if so, the second signature value S' is legitimate.
Example four
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 3 and fig. 4, taking this embodiment as a second technical solution, a method for transferring sensitive data includes the steps of:
s101, a terminal applies for a Server ID number to a CA center;
s102, a CA center manages Server number Server _ ID information and distributes a unique Server number Server _ ID to a Server, wherein the Server can indicate a receipt background;
s201, the terminal generates a pair of first public and private keys and a pair of second public and private keys, wherein the first private key is recorded as PRK1, the second private key is recorded as PRK2, the private keys are encrypted by a terminal top-level encryption key and stored in a secure area, the first public key is recorded as PUK1, and the second public key is recorded as PUK 2;
s202, the terminal sends the terminal serial number SN, the generated first public key PUK1 and the second public key PUK2 to a CA center, the CA center finds out the corresponding order receiving background serial number Server _ ID based on the terminal serial number SN, and the terminal requests the CA center to sign and issue a certificate for the first public key PUK 1;
s203, the CA center issues certificates for the first public key PUK1 and the second public key PUK2 to obtain a first certificate POS _ WCRT and a second certificate POS _ WCRT2, the formats of the first certificate POS _ WCRT and the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 can be determined according to actual conditions, preferably the standard x509 format is used, and the CA center maintains the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT and the second certificate POS _ WCRT 2;
preferably, the CA center may record the correspondence between the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT in an SN-POS _ WCRT table (the correspondence between the terminal serial number SN and the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 may refer to the following table), such as:
SN1，POS_WCRT1；
SN2，POS_WCRT2；
SN3，POS_WCRT3；
…
SNN，POS_WCRTN；
s204, the CA center leads the first certificate POS _ WCRT and the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 into the terminal, the terminal verifies whether the first certificate POS _ WCRT and the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 are correct,
if the key is correct, the terminal completes the pre-installation of the key, and at this time, the terminal stores the first private key PRK1 and the second private key PRK2 which are randomly generated, and the first certificate POS _ WCRT corresponding to the first private key PRK1 and the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 corresponding to the second private key PRK2, and the specific steps are as follows:
(1) the terminal analyzes the first certificate POS _ WCRT and the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 according to the certificate format, and extracts the Server-ID, the first public key PUK1 and the second public key PUK2 of the extension domains of the first certificate POS _ WCRT and the second certificate POS _ WCRT 2;
(2) the terminal compares the extracted Server-ID with the Server-ID corresponding to the terminal to determine whether the extracted Server-ID is the same as the Server-ID, if so, the terminal refuses to import the Server-ID and prompts error reporting, otherwise, the step (3) is executed;
(3) the terminal respectively carries out public key operation on a section of random value Rnd by using the extracted first public key PUK1 and second public key PUK2 to obtain public key operation results DATA and DATA2, respectively carries out private key operation on the DATA and DATA2 by using a first private key PRK1 and a second private key PRK2 generated by the terminal, judges whether the operation results are equal to the random value Rnd, and if the operation results are equal, shows that a first public key PUK1 corresponding to a first certificate POS _ WCRT and a second public key PUK2 corresponding to a second certificate POS _ WCRT2 are generated by the terminal and the terminal allows importing; otherwise, the terminal refuses to import and prompts to report errors.
S301, a root certificate corresponding to a first certificate POS _ WCRT and a second certificate POS _ WCRT2 of a terminal is imported to a server side by a CA center, wherein the root certificate is a superior certificate of the certificates;
the root certificate does not belong to private data, and can be transferred in a public manner, and existing solutions in the prior art, such as:
the CA center appoints a special person A to transmit a root certificate to the server side on site, an appointing special person B transmits summary data (such as the HASH value of the root certificate) of the root certificate to the server side, the server side verifies whether the summary data of the root certificate transmitted by the special person A is consistent with the summary data of the root certificate of the special person B, and if so, the root certificate is represented to be credible;
s01, importing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number SN and the first certificate POS _ WCRT, and storing the corresponding relation into a corresponding relation table;
the CA center imports a corresponding relation table of a first certificate POS _ WCRT, a second certificate POS _ WCRT2 and a terminal serial number SN which are issued into an existing scheme in the prior art of the server, and the specific method can refer to the scheme of transmitting the root certificate;
before a server and a terminal establish a channel, a challenge value is generated;
s1, the server side sends the challenge value to the terminal, and the receiving terminal uses a first private key PRK1 to sign the challenge value, so as to obtain a first signature value S, a challenge value and a first certificate POS _ WCRT corresponding to the first private key PRK 1;
the challenge value may be determined according to an actual requirement, and preferably, the challenge value in this scheme is a random number R;
the first signature value is obtained by signing the random number R and the terminal serial number SN by using a first private key PRK1, and the terminal serial number SN sent by the terminal is also received;
after receiving the random number R, the terminal signs the random number R and the terminal serial number SN by using a first private key PRK1 to obtain a first signature value S, where the formula is: s ═ Sign (PRK1, R | SN), the specific signature procedure is as follows:
(1) the random number R and the terminal serial number SN are pieced together, and a fifth abstract value HASH is calculated;
(2) and carrying out private key operation on the fifth digest value HASH by using the first private key PRK, wherein the operation result is the first signature value S.
S2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the random number R and the first certificate POS _ WCRT, and if the terminal is legal, executing a step S3;
the step S2 includes:
verifying the validity of the first certificate POS _ WCRT according to a root certificate corresponding to the first certificate POS _ WCRT;
if yes, analyzing the first certificate POS _ WCRT according to a certificate format, and judging whether the analysis is successful;
if not, the terminal is an illegal terminal;
otherwise, extracting a Server number Server _ ID in the first certificate POS _ WCRT extension domain and a first public key PUK1 corresponding to the first certificate POS _ WCRT, and determining whether the Server number Server _ ID is correct, that is: judging whether the Server ID number is equal to the Server ID number distributed by the CA center or not;
if not, the operation is incorrect;
if yes, using the first certificate POS _ WCRT, the terminal serial number SN and the random number R to verify whether the first signature value is legal or not, wherein the steps of:
performing public key operation on the first signature value by using the first public key PUK1 to obtain a first digest value HASH 1;
the random number R and the terminal serial number SN are pieced together to obtain a second digest value HASH 2;
comparing the first summary value HASH1 with the second summary value HASH2 to see if they are equal;
if not, the first signature value is illegal;
if yes, executing step S3, if the first signature value is legal;
s3, receiving a second public key PUK2 sent by the terminal, encrypting the sensitive data by using the second public key PUK2, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal.
The S3 includes:
receiving a second public key PUK2 sent by the terminal and a second signature value S 'signed by the first private key PRK1 on the second public key PUK2, wherein the second signature value S' sent by the terminal is obtained by signing the digest value of the second public key PUK2 by the first private key PRK1, and the specific steps are as follows:
(1) calculating a sixth digest value HASH' of the second certificate POS _ WCRT 2;
(2) and carrying out private key operation on the sixth digest value HASH 'by using the first private key PRK to obtain a second signature value S'.
Verifying the validity of the second signature value S' using the first public key PUK1, comprising:
performing public key calculation on the second signature value S 'by using the first public key PUK1 to obtain a third digest value HASH 1';
calculating the digest value of the second certificate POS _ WCRT2 to obtain a fourth digest value HASH 2';
judging whether the third summary value HASH1 'and the fourth summary value HASH 2' are equal;
if not, the second signature value S' is illegal;
if so, the second signature value S' is legal, the sensitive data is encrypted by using a second public key PUK2 of the second certificate POS _ WCRT2, and the encrypted sensitive data is sent to the terminal;
and the terminal decrypts the encrypted sensitive data by using a second private key PRK2 to obtain the sensitive data.
EXAMPLE five
Referring to fig. 2, a terminal 1 for transferring sensitive data includes a memory 2, a processor 3, and a computer program stored on the memory 2 and executable on the processor 3, wherein the processor 3 implements the steps of the first embodiment when executing the computer program.
EXAMPLE six
Referring to fig. 2, a terminal 1 for transferring sensitive data includes a memory 2, a processor 3 and a computer program stored in the memory 2 and capable of running on the processor 3, wherein the processor 3 implements the steps of the second embodiment when executing the computer program.
EXAMPLE seven
Referring to fig. 2, a terminal 1 for transferring sensitive data includes a memory 2, a processor 3 and a computer program stored in the memory 2 and capable of running on the processor 3, wherein the processor 3 implements the steps in the third embodiment when executing the computer program.
Example eight
Referring to fig. 2, a terminal 1 for transferring sensitive data includes a memory 2, a processor 3 and a computer program stored in the memory 2 and executable on the processor 3, wherein the processor 3 implements the steps of the fourth embodiment when executing the computer program.
In summary, according to the method and the terminal for transmitting sensitive data provided by the present invention, the asymmetric key of the terminal is randomly generated by the terminal, and the public and private key pairs of each terminal are different, so that one terminal is provided with one secret, and the uniqueness of the terminal key is ensured; the terminals of the two schemes are provided with two pairs of public and private keys, wherein one pair of public and private keys is used for authentication of the server side, the other pair of public and private keys is used for decryption of private data of the server side, and one pair of private keys is used for one purpose, so that the uniqueness of the private keys is ensured; the asymmetric key pair of the terminal is randomly generated by the terminal, the generated private key is encrypted by a terminal top-level encryption key and is stored in a safe area, and after the attack alarm is carried out, the data of the safe area can be self-destroyed, so that the safety is improved; the public key is exported to a CA center to sign a certificate, when the generated certificate is imported to the terminal, the terminal verifies the certificate by using a private key, and simultaneously verifies whether the 'server side number' of the certificate expansion domain is correct or not, so that the correctness of the terminal certificate is ensured, and the terminal is directionally identified as a legal terminal corresponding to the server side; the sensitive data sent to the terminal by the server side is encrypted by using the second public key of the terminal and transmitted in a ciphertext mode, only a legal terminal can decrypt the sensitive data by using the second private key, and the security of the sensitive data is ensured.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and all equivalent changes made by using the contents of the present specification and the drawings, or applied directly or indirectly to the related technical fields, are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (18)
1. A method of communicating sensitive data, comprising the steps of:
s1, sending the challenge value to the terminal, and receiving a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to the first private key after the terminal signs the challenge value by using the first private key;
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, and if the terminal is legal, executing the step S3;
s3, receiving a second public key sent by a terminal and a second signature value obtained by signing the second public key by using the first private key, verifying the legality of the second signature value by using the first public key, if the second signature value is legal, encrypting sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal;
the first public key is obtained by analyzing the first certificate.
2. The method for transferring sensitive data according to claim 1, wherein the first signature value in S1 is obtained by signing the challenge value and the terminal serial number with a first private key, and further receiving the terminal serial number sent by the terminal;
the step S2 includes:
verifying the validity of the first certificate according to a root certificate corresponding to the first certificate;
if the terminal serial number is legal, judging whether the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct or not;
if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal or not by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the random number;
if it is legal, go to step S3.
3. The method for transferring sensitive data according to claim 2, wherein the extended field of the first certificate is written with a server number;
after the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is judged to be correct, the method further comprises the following steps:
and analyzing the first certificate, extracting a server serial number in a first certificate extension domain, judging whether the server serial number is correct, and if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the challenge value.
4. The method for transferring sensitive data according to claim 2 or 3, wherein before step S1, comprising:
s01, importing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate, and storing the corresponding relation into a corresponding relation table;
the judging whether the corresponding relationship between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct comprises:
and judging whether the terminal serial number and the first certificate exist in the corresponding relation table.
5. The method of claim 3, wherein parsing the first certificate, extracting a server number in a first certificate extension domain, and determining whether the server number is correct comprises:
and analyzing the first certificate, judging whether the analysis is successful, if not, the terminal is an illegal terminal, otherwise, extracting a server number in the first certificate extended domain, and judging whether the server number is correct.
6. The method of claim 3 or 5, wherein determining whether the server number is correct comprises:
and judging whether the server serial number is equal to the server serial number distributed by the CA center, if so, the server serial number is correct, otherwise, the server serial number is incorrect.
7. The method for transferring sensitive data according to claim 3 or 5, wherein the first public key corresponding to the first certificate is further extracted when the first certificate is parsed;
said verifying that said first signature value is legitimate using said first certificate, terminal serial number and challenge value comprises:
performing public key operation on the first signature value by using the first public key to obtain a first digest value;
piecing the challenge value and the terminal serial number to obtain a second digest value;
comparing whether the first abstract value is equal to the second abstract value;
if yes, the first signature value is legal;
otherwise, the first signature value is illegal.
8. The method for transferring sensitive data according to claim 1, wherein the second signature value sent by the terminal is obtained by signing the digest value of the second public key with the first private key;
verifying the validity of the second signature value using the first public key comprises:
performing public key calculation on the second signature value by using the first public key to obtain a third digest value;
calculating the abstract value of the second public key to obtain a fourth abstract value;
judging whether the third abstract value and the fourth abstract value are equal;
if yes, the second signature value is legal;
otherwise, the second signature value is not legitimate.
9. The method for transferring sensitive data according to claim 1, wherein the second public key is pre-generated by the terminal at factory or randomly generated by the terminal after verifying that the terminal is legal.
10. A terminal for transferring sensitive data, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to perform the steps of:
s1, sending the challenge value to the terminal, and receiving a first signature value, the challenge value and a first certificate corresponding to the first private key after the terminal signs the challenge value by using the first private key;
s2, verifying the legality of the terminal according to the first signature value, the challenge value and the first certificate, and if the terminal is legal, executing the step S3;
s3, receiving a second public key sent by a terminal and a second signature value obtained by signing the second public key by using the first private key, verifying the legality of the second signature value by using the first public key, if the second signature value is legal, encrypting sensitive data by using the second public key, and sending the encrypted sensitive data to the terminal;
the first public key is obtained by analyzing the first certificate.
11. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 10, wherein the first signature value in S1 is obtained by signing the challenge value and the terminal serial number with a first private key, and further receiving the terminal serial number sent by the terminal;
the step S2 includes:
verifying the validity of the first certificate according to a root certificate corresponding to the first certificate;
if the terminal serial number is legal, judging whether the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct or not;
if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal or not by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the random number;
if it is legal, go to step S3.
12. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 11, wherein the extended field of the first certificate is written with a server number;
after the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is judged to be correct, the method further comprises the following steps:
and analyzing the first certificate, extracting a server serial number in a first certificate extension domain, judging whether the server serial number is correct, and if so, verifying whether the first signature value is legal by using the first certificate, the terminal serial number and the challenge value.
13. Terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 11 or 12, characterized in that it comprises, before step S1:
s01, importing the corresponding relation between the terminal serial number and the first certificate, and storing the corresponding relation into a corresponding relation table;
the judging whether the corresponding relationship between the terminal serial number and the first certificate is correct comprises:
and judging whether the terminal serial number and the first certificate exist in the corresponding relation table.
14. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 12, wherein parsing the first certificate, extracting a server number in a first certificate extension domain, and determining whether the server number is correct comprises:
and analyzing the first certificate, judging whether the analysis is successful, if not, the terminal is an illegal terminal, otherwise, extracting a server number in the first certificate extended domain, and judging whether the server number is correct.
15. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 12 or 14, wherein determining whether the server number is correct comprises:
and judging whether the server serial number is equal to the server serial number distributed by the CA center, if so, the server serial number is correct, otherwise, the server serial number is incorrect.
16. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 12 or 14, wherein the first public key corresponding to the first certificate is further extracted when the first certificate is parsed;
said verifying that said first signature value is legitimate using said first certificate, terminal serial number and challenge value comprises:
performing public key operation on the first signature value by using the first public key to obtain a first digest value;
piecing the challenge value and the terminal serial number to obtain a second digest value;
comparing whether the first abstract value is equal to the second abstract value;
if yes, the first signature value is legal;
otherwise, the first signature value is illegal.
17. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 10, wherein the second signature value sent by the terminal is obtained by signing the digest value of the second public key with the first private key;
verifying the validity of the second signature value using the first public key comprises:
performing public key calculation on the second signature value by using the first public key to obtain a third digest value;
calculating the abstract value of the second public key to obtain a fourth abstract value;
judging whether the third abstract value and the fourth abstract value are equal;
if yes, the second signature value is legal;
otherwise, the second signature value is not legitimate.
18. The terminal for transferring sensitive data according to claim 10, wherein the second public key is pre-generated at the time of terminal shipment or randomly generated by the terminal after verifying that the terminal is legal.
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