CN109491712B - Trusted boot method suitable for VxWorks environment - Google Patents
Trusted boot method suitable for VxWorks environment Download PDFInfo
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- CN109491712B CN109491712B CN201811293270.0A CN201811293270A CN109491712B CN 109491712 B CN109491712 B CN 109491712B CN 201811293270 A CN201811293270 A CN 201811293270A CN 109491712 B CN109491712 B CN 109491712B
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- vxworks
- mirror image
- image file
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
- G06F9/4401—Bootstrapping
- G06F9/4406—Loading of operating system
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of embedded information security, and particularly relates to a trusted boot method suitable for VxWorks environment. The method systematically encrypts the VxWorks image files and the user application programs, solves the problem of plaintext storage of the core intellectual property in the hard disk, enables cracking personnel not to directly perform static decompilation and dynamic debugging, effectively increases cracking difficulty and system safety, and further protects the core intellectual property.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of embedded information security, and particularly relates to a trusted boot method suitable for a VxWorks environment, which is designed for embedded trusted computing and secure boot (bootrom) and is applied to a scene with higher requirements of a user on the security of an operating system and the security of a user application program in the VxWorks environment.
Background
The VxWorks operating system is an embedded real-time operating system designed by Windriver company in the United states, and the VxWorks operating system has good reliability and excellent real-time performance and is widely applied to the fields of communication, military, aviation, aerospace and the like, such as satellite communication, ballistic guidance, aircraft navigation and the like. How to better ensure the mirror image of the VxWorks operating system and the user application program and improve the overall security of the system becomes a problem concerned by people.
At present, a BootRom mode is designed for power-on booting of a VxWorks operating system, a BootRom program is run after power-on booting is carried out, operations such as hardware initialization and the like are completed in the BootRom, meanwhile, a VxWorks operating system mirror image is loaded into a memory, a mirror image inlet is jumped to, and an operating system kernel is started. And after the kernel of the operating system is started, switching to a system user mode, calling a user-defined application program, out files and starting a user program.
In the current more applications, a trusted boot design is not performed on a VxWorks operating system mirror image and a user application program, and at the moment, the compiled mirror image program or the user application program can be cracked through means such as static decompilation and dynamic debugging, and an illegal person obtains a source code or thinking intention of a developer, so that intellectual property is infringed, and even operating system and application program files are tampered and damaged, and unpredictable serious consequences are caused.
Disclosure of Invention
Technical problem to be solved
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: how to solve the safety problems of the operating system mirror image and the user application program under the VxWorks environment so as to effectively improve the safety of software.
(II) technical scheme
In order to solve the technical problem, the invention provides a trusted boot method suitable for VxWorks environment, which comprises the following steps:
step 1: in a BootRom program of the system, opening a VxWorks mirror image file, reading structural body data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file, and judging whether the VxWorks mirror image file is encrypted or not;
if not, reading the length of the VxWorks mirror image file, applying for an equal memory space, and reading binary data of the VxWorks mirror image file into the corresponding memory space;
if the encryption is carried out, jumping to the step 5;
step 2: generating an HMAC authentication code for the read binary data of the VxWorks mirror image file;
supplementing k bits of 0 according to the length tlen of the VxWorks image file obtained in the step 1, obtaining that the length of the supplemented binary data meets the condition that tlen + k is 448mod512, and performing HMAC authentication processing on the supplemented binary data to generate an HMAC authentication code serving as a software integrity check reference value;
and step 3: encrypting the binary data of the read VxWorks mirror image file;
filling km bits 0 in the binary data read in the step 1, so that tlen + km is 0mod128, and forming the length of the filled binary data to be len; encrypting the filled binary data to generate encrypted ciphertext data with len ═ tlen + km bits;
and 4, step 4: writing the encrypted ciphertext data back to the VxWorks mirror image file, writing the encrypted structure data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file as an encrypted file mark, writing the ciphertext data and the file mark back to the VxWorks mirror image file to form the encrypted VxWorks mirror image file, and then closing the encrypted VxWorks mirror image file;
and 5: under the condition that the VxWorks mirror image file is confirmed to be encrypted, opening the existing encrypted VxWorks mirror image file, and reading encrypted structure body data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file; and carrying out decryption operation on the ciphertext data with the length of len by adopting a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain an HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption, and finishing the safe guidance of the VxWorks mirror image file according to the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption.
In step 2, HMAC authentication is performed by using a SHA2 one-way hash algorithm to generate an HMAC authentication code.
Wherein, in the step 2, the generated HMAC authentication code is 256 bits.
In the step 3, the read binary data is encrypted by a block encryption algorithm AES.
In the step 5, the encrypted structure data includes: the encrypted file flag, the ciphertext data length len.
In step 5, firstly, the ciphertext data with len bit length is decrypted to obtain the original binary data of the plaintext, then the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption is compared with the HMAC authentication code generated in step 2 as the integrity check reference value, if the HMAC authentication code is consistent with the HMAC authentication code, trusted boot is completed, otherwise, the authentication fails, and the boot process is exited.
Therein, the len-bit cipher text data is decrypted by using the AES decryption algorithm.
(III) advantageous effects
Compared with the prior art, the invention systematically encrypts the VxWorks image file and the user application program, solves the problem of plaintext storage of the core intellectual property right in the hard disk, enables cracking personnel not to directly perform static decompilation and dynamic debugging, effectively increases cracking difficulty and system safety, and further protects the core intellectual property right.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the technical scheme of the invention.
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the technical solution of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, contents, and advantages of the present invention clearer, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and examples.
In order to solve the above technical problem, as shown in fig. 1, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: according to the design idea of embedded trusted computing, a VxWorks mirror image file is read in a BootRom system, the VxWorks mirror image file is encrypted by adopting a grouping algorithm AES, an HMAC authentication code of mirror image data is generated by adopting SHA2 and is used as an integrity check reference value, and the safe guiding of a system mirror image is completed. Reading out a user application program in a system VxWorks mirror image file, encrypting the user application program by adopting a grouping algorithm AES, generating an HMAC authentication code of mirror image data by adopting SHA2 as an integrity check reference value, and finishing the safe guide of the user application program.
Specifically, to solve the problems in the prior art, the present invention provides a trusted boot method suitable for a VxWorks environment, as shown in fig. 2, where the method includes the following steps:
step 1: in a BootRom program of the system, opening a VxWorks mirror image file, reading structural body data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file, and judging whether the VxWorks mirror image file is encrypted or not;
if not, reading the length of the VxWorks mirror image file, applying for an equal memory space, and reading binary data of the VxWorks mirror image file into the corresponding memory space;
if the encryption is carried out, jumping to the step 5;
step 2: generating an HMAC authentication code for the read binary data of the VxWorks mirror image file;
supplementing k bits of 0 according to the length tlen of the VxWorks image file obtained in the step 1, obtaining that the length of the supplemented binary data meets the condition that tlen + k is 448mod512, and performing HMAC authentication processing on the supplemented binary data to generate an HMAC authentication code serving as a software integrity check reference value;
and step 3: encrypting the binary data of the read VxWorks mirror image file;
filling km bits 0 in the binary data read in the step 1, so that tlen + km is 0mod128, and forming the length of the filled binary data to be len; encrypting the filled binary data to generate encrypted ciphertext data with len ═ tlen + km bits;
and 4, step 4: writing the encrypted ciphertext data back to the VxWorks mirror image file, writing the encrypted structure data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file as an encrypted file mark, writing the ciphertext data and the file mark back to the VxWorks mirror image file to form the encrypted VxWorks mirror image file, and then closing the encrypted VxWorks mirror image file;
and 5: under the condition that the VxWorks mirror image file is confirmed to be encrypted, opening the existing encrypted VxWorks mirror image file, and reading encrypted structure body data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file; and carrying out decryption operation on the ciphertext data with the length of len by adopting a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain an HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption, and finishing the safe guidance of the VxWorks mirror image file according to the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption.
In step 2, HMAC authentication is performed by using a SHA2 one-way hash algorithm to generate an HMAC authentication code.
Wherein, in the step 2, the generated HMAC authentication code is 256 bits.
In the step 3, the read binary data is encrypted by a block encryption algorithm AES. AES (advanced encryption standard) is an algorithm published in NIST (national institute of standards and technology) 2001, and has high security.
In the step 5, the encrypted structure data includes: the encrypted file flag, the ciphertext data length len.
In step 5, firstly, the ciphertext data with len bit length is decrypted to obtain the original binary data of the plaintext, then the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption is compared with the HMAC authentication code generated in step 2 as the integrity check reference value, if the HMAC authentication code is consistent with the HMAC authentication code, trusted boot is completed, otherwise, the authentication fails, and the boot process is exited.
Therein, the len-bit cipher text data is decrypted by using the AES decryption algorithm.
After the technical scheme is adopted, core intellectual property rights such as VxWorks mirror image files, user application programs and the like are stored in the hard disk by adopting the ciphertext, and cracking personnel cannot directly perform static decompilation and dynamic debugging, so that the cracking difficulty and the system safety are effectively increased, and the core intellectual property rights are further protected.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several modifications and variations can be made without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and these modifications and variations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. A trusted boot method suitable for VxWorks environment is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: in a BootRom program of the system, opening a VxWorks mirror image file, reading structural body data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file, and judging whether the VxWorks mirror image file is encrypted or not;
if not, reading the length of the VxWorks mirror image file, applying for an equal memory space, and reading binary data of the VxWorks mirror image file into the corresponding memory space;
if the encryption is carried out, jumping to the step 5;
step 2: generating an HMAC authentication code for the read binary data of the VxWorks mirror image file;
supplementing k bits of 0 according to the length tlen of the VxWorks image file obtained in the step 1, obtaining that the length of the supplemented binary data meets the condition that tlen + k is 448mod512, and performing HMAC authentication processing on the supplemented binary data to generate an HMAC authentication code serving as a software integrity check reference value;
and step 3: encrypting the binary data of the read VxWorks mirror image file;
filling km bits 0 in the binary data read in the step 1, so that tlen + km is 0mod128, and forming the length of the filled binary data to be len; encrypting the filled binary data to generate encrypted ciphertext data with len ═ tlen + km bits;
and 4, step 4: writing the encrypted ciphertext data back to the VxWorks mirror image file, writing the encrypted structure data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file as an encrypted file mark, writing the ciphertext data and the file mark back to the VxWorks mirror image file to form the encrypted VxWorks mirror image file, and then closing the encrypted VxWorks mirror image file;
and 5: under the condition that the VxWorks mirror image file is confirmed to be encrypted, opening the existing encrypted VxWorks mirror image file, and reading encrypted structure body data at the head of the VxWorks mirror image file; and (3) carrying out decryption operation on the ciphertext data with the length of len by adopting a symmetric encryption algorithm, obtaining the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption, obtaining the original binary data of the plaintext, then comparing the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption with the HMAC authentication code which is generated in the step (2) and serves as the integrity check reference value, if the HMAC authentication code obtained by decryption is consistent with the HMAC authentication code, finishing trusted guidance, and otherwise, failing to authenticate, and exiting the guidance process.
2. The trusted boot method for VxWorks environments of claim 1, wherein in step 2, HMAC authentication is performed through a SHA2 one-way hash algorithm to generate an HMAC authentication code.
3. The trusted boot method for a VxWorks environment according to claim 1, wherein in step 2, the generated HMAC authentication code is 256 bits.
4. The trusted boot method for VxWorks environments according to claim 1, wherein in said step 3, the read binary data is encrypted by AES (block encryption algorithm).
5. The trusted boot method applicable to a VxWorks environment according to claim 1, wherein in the step 5, the encryption structure data includes: and marking the encrypted file.
6. The trusted boot method for a VxWorks environment according to claim 5, wherein the len-bit ciphertext data is decrypted using an AES decryption algorithm.
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