CN109417469A - The safe matching method of mimo system - Google Patents
The safe matching method of mimo system Download PDFInfo
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- CN109417469A CN109417469A CN201580083630.2A CN201580083630A CN109417469A CN 109417469 A CN109417469 A CN 109417469A CN 201580083630 A CN201580083630 A CN 201580083630A CN 109417469 A CN109417469 A CN 109417469A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0875—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords based on channel impulse response [CIR]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract
A kind of the first MIMO equipment for channel estimation and verifying, the first MIMO equipment includes: transmitter, for sending the first pilot frequency sequence；Receiver, for receiving the second pilot frequency sequence；Channel estimator estimates the first channel for being based on received second pilot frequency sequence；Key generator generates first key for the first channel based on the estimation；Key confirmation unit, for determining whether the first key corresponds to the second key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of first MIMO equipment, the 2nd MIMO equipment, systems and for the method for channel estimation.
The invention further relates to a kind of computer readable storage medium for storing program code, which includes referring to
It enables, for executing this method.
Background technique
It in order to guarantee the safety of communication system, is had been presented for recently using safety of physical layer technology: by having sent
Signal is suitably encoded, and allows specified receiver in the feelings not by any information leakage of the message to interception facility
Under condition, the signal is decoded completely.This technology is believed between the random nature and user for influencing the noise of physical layer transmission is utilized
The specific feature in road.When terminal can get more antennas, then it can get multiple-input and multiple-output and eavesdrop (multiple- more
Input-multiple-output-multiple-eavesdropper, abbreviation MIMOME) channel, multi channel availability into
And increase the safe potential of communication.To all technology reasonable functions, then all channel state between legitimate receipt device is needed
Information (channel state information, abbreviation CSI).
For example, giving legitimate receipt device by shaping signal beam, eavesdropping side, which (will be likely to) see, leads to transmitter
Channel is poor, thus, signal-to-noise ratio (signal-to-noise ratio, letter between resulting legitimate receipt device and eavesdropping side
Claim SNR) gap will become larger.Since the spectrum efficiency of classified information transmission is related to the SNR gap, so reasonable according to CSI
It is particularly important to design beam forming.It is worth noting that, if the channel for leading to eavesdropping side it is known that if may be implemented to protect completely
It is close.When eavesdropping side can not obtain CSI, data still be can get, then can assess eavesdropping side and obtain the information for having transmitted message
A possibility that.
In order to obtain CSI when channel reciprocity can get, receiver can be in training stage pilot signal transmitted, transmitter
It will estimate channel.However, having outlined pilot pollution attack in document, the principle is as follows: assuming that a kind of situation, Alice's
Purpose is that, to Bob progress beam forming, Eve purpose is to obtain the information of some classified information.All users are equipped with N
Root antenna.Assuming that H is the N x N channel matrix for describing the plural number of channel between Alice and Bob, if G1 and G2 are respectively
The matrix of Alice-Eve channel and Bob-Eve channel.Frequency pilot sign be it is well known, therefore, when Bob send pilot tone when, Eve
Same pilot can be sent.The channel of Alice estimation is then the sum of channel between Bob and Eve, that is, channel H+G1.Therefore, exist
Under this attack, Eve can modify channel estimation, and obtain advantage.When Alice carries out beam forming again, she will be in channel H
It is transmitted on+G1.Correspondingly, launching beam part flows to G1, and Eve can also receive some letters for being intended to be only sent to Bob
Breath.Therefore, transmission will be no longer safe.
The practical application of safety of physical layer technology only is just starting to increase recently.The pilot pollution of the extensive MIMO of safety is special
Different problem is also only inquired into the literature in the past few years.
A large amount of solutions are had proposed in document, with detect pilot pollution attack, but these schemes have high complexity and/
Or pilot pollution attack can not be reliably prevented.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of equipment for channel estimation, system and method, solve above-mentioned refer to
Problems one or more in the prior art.
First aspect present invention provides a kind of the first MIMO equipment for channel estimation and verifying, the first MIMO
Equipment includes:
Transmitter, for sending the first pilot frequency sequence；
Receiver, for receiving the second pilot frequency sequence；
Channel estimator estimates the first channel for being based on received second pilot frequency sequence；
Key generator generates first key for the first channel based on the estimation；
Key confirmation unit, for determining whether the first key corresponds to the second key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.
The first MIMO equipment according to first aspect can be interacted with another MIMO equipment, for example, as follows
The 2nd MIMO equipment, to safely check (based on channel estimation) first He again by interaction pilot frequency sequence
Whether the second key is unanimously estimated and authenticated channel.In order to avoid to eavesdropping side and preventing the forgery of the side of eavesdropping from disappearing channel leakage
Breath interaction, the comparison are carried out there is no open.On the contrary, two equipment extract private key from estimated result, then by close
Key confirms that process checks whether key is consistent.After completing to confirm process, the first MIMO equipment will detect eavesdropping side
Attempt modification channel.
The estimation and verifying of channel between two equipment are also referred to as device pairing.
In the first implementation of the first MIMO equipment according to first aspect, the key confirmation unit is used
In:
Generate random number；
The random number is encrypted using the first key, to obtain the first bit sequence；
Send first bit sequence；
Receive the second bit sequence；
Second bit sequence is decrypted using the first key；
If the mapping of the second bit sequence and the random number of decryption matches, it is determined that the first key corresponds to
Second key.
Therefore, the key confirmation unit can safely determine the first close of the first MIMO equipment with the 2nd MIMO equipment
Whether key corresponds to the second key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.Since first key is raw according to the channel estimation of the first MIMO equipment
At, and the second key is the 2nd MIMO equipment the channel estimation based on the 2nd MIMO equipment generates, so can determine the
Whether one MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment have estimated same channel.Therefore, first according to the first implementation
MIMO equipment is able to carry out safe lane verifying.
In one embodiment, the mapping is a kind of reversible, functions such as not.The mapping can be, for example, a kind of the
One MIMO equipment and the known random function of the 2nd MIMO equipment.
In second of implementation of the first MIMO equipment according to first aspect, the key confirmation unit is used
In: if the first key is identical at least predetermined portions of bit in second key, it is determined that the first key pair
Second key described in Ying Yu.
The advantage is that can carry out key comparison more quickly.For example, predetermined portions can be the first and second keys
The fixation first part of middle bit.If the first part of key is corresponding, it may be considered that entire key pair is answered.In addition,
In two kinds of implementations, security classification and/or the robustness of verifying process are improved.
In the third implementation of the MIMO equipment according to first aspect, the first MIMO equipment be used for from
First pilot frequency sequence is selected in one group of first pilot frequency sequence, the transmitter is used to send first pilot frequency sequence
Afterwards, the index of selected first pilot frequency sequence is sent.
The advantages of allowing the first MIMO equipment to select first pilot frequency sequence from one group of first pilot frequency sequence, is to add
The degree of difficulty that big eavesdropping side launches a offensive.It eavesdropping side can not be using pilot frequency sequence identical with the first MIMO equipment come " covering "
Channel, reason are that eavesdropping side can not know which pilot frequency sequence will be the first MIMO equipment will use in advance.
In addition, the first MIMO equipment can be used for receiving the index of selected second pilot frequency sequence, the channel estimator is also used
In based on the received index of institute, first channel is estimated.
It the advantage is that the 2nd MIMO equipment can select pilot frequency sequence from one group of pilot frequency sequence, to make the side's of eavesdropping nothing
Method covers the pilot frequency sequence that the 2nd MIMO equipment is sent.
In the 4th kind of implementation of the first MIMO equipment according to first aspect,
The receiver is for receiving another the second pilot frequency sequence；
The channel estimator is used to be based on another described received second pilot frequency sequence, estimates another the first letter
Road；
The key generator is used for based between estimated the first channel and another estimated first channel
Difference generates another first key；
The key confirmation unit is for determining whether another described first key corresponds to the 2nd MIMO equipment
Another second key.
This provides a kind of effective safe lane tracking mode, wherein only estimates the variation of channel.It particularly, can be with
Using data-signal as pilot frequency sequence (once decoding data).
Second aspect of the present invention refers to that a kind of the 2nd MIMO for carrying out channel estimation and verifying for the first MIMO equipment is set
Standby, the MIMO equipment includes:
Receiver, for receiving the first pilot frequency sequence；
Transmitter, for sending the second pilot frequency sequence；
Channel estimator estimates second channel for being based on received first pilot frequency sequence；
Key generator generates the second key for the second channel based on the estimation；
Key confirmation response unit, for being communicated with the first MIMO equipment, so that first equipment determines
Whether second key corresponds to the first key of the first MIMO equipment.
2nd MIMO equipment is for making the first MIMO equipment can determine whether the first key of the first MIMO equipment corresponds to
In the second key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.Therefore, the 2nd MIMO equipment enables the first MIMO equipment to interfere in no eavesdropping side
In the case where, whether authenticated channel estimation is correct.
2nd MIMO equipment can have the effect of opposite " passive " in channel estimation, that is, the 2nd MIMO equipment is available
In request of the response from the first MIMO equipment.
It is worth noting that, key confirmation can be carried out, so that the first MIMO equipment knows key after key confirmation
It is whether corresponding, but the 2nd MIMO equipment is not aware that whether key is corresponding.
MIMO equipment can be configured, so that the equipment is for the first MIMO equipment according to first aspect and according to second
2nd MIMO equipment described in aspect.In other words, MIMO equipment may include the spy of the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment
Sign.Therefore, MIMO equipment can be used as the promoter of channel estimation and verifying and the response list of channel estimation and verifying simultaneously
Member.
In the first implementation of the 2nd MIMO equipment according to second aspect, the key confirmation response is single
Member is used for:
Receive the first bit sequence；
First bit sequence is decrypted using second key；
The mapping of the first decrypted bit sequence is encrypted, using second key to obtain the second bit sequence；
Send second bit sequence.
Therefore, the 2nd MIMO equipment can assist the key confirmation unit of the first MIMO equipment to carry out key confirmation.
In second of implementation of the 2nd MIMO equipment according to second aspect, the transmitter is for connecing
After receiving first pilot frequency sequence, second pilot frequency sequence is sent, the 2nd MIMO equipment is used for: based on estimated
Second channel selects second pilot frequency sequence from one group of candidate sequence.
It the advantage is that the second pilot frequency sequence can be used for knowing the 2nd MIMO equipment by receiving from the first MIMO equipment
And assess the first pilot frequency sequence and the channel that obtains.
In the third implementation of the 2nd MIMO equipment according to second aspect,
The receiver is for receiving another the first pilot frequency sequence；
The channel estimator is used to be based on another described received first pilot frequency sequence, estimates another the second letter
Road；
The key generator is used for based between estimated former second channel and another estimated second channel
Difference, generate another the second key；
The key confirmation response unit is used for and the first MIMO equipment is communicated, with determine it is described another the
Whether two keys correspond to another first key of the first MIMO equipment.
In the 4th kind of implementation of the 2nd MIMO equipment according to first or second aspect, the key is generated
Device is used to, by carrying out advantage distillation, information synergism and secrecy enhancing stage, generate first based on estimated second channel
And/or second key.
This represent a kind of extremely effective modes for generating the first and/or second key.Particularly, key can be generated,
Allow to estimate for similar channel to generate same key.The advantage is that has slightly not even if the first and second MIMO equipment
Same channel estimation, for example, as caused by measurement error, but channel verifying can still succeed.
In another implementation of the MIMO equipment according to second aspect, the 2nd MIMO equipment be used for from
Second pilot frequency sequence is selected in one group of second pilot frequency sequence, the transmitter is used to send second pilot frequency sequence
Afterwards, the index of selected second pilot frequency sequence is sent.
In addition, the 2nd MIMO equipment can be used for receiving the index of selected first pilot frequency sequence, the channel estimator is also used
In based on a received index, the second channel is estimated.
Third aspect present invention refers to that one kind includes according to any one of first aspect or first aspect implementation institute
2nd MIMO equipment described in the first MIMO equipment and any one of second aspect or second aspect implementation stated is
System, it is preferable that the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment are used to use same map function.
The system according to the third aspect may include the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment, in which:
The transmitter of first MIMO equipment is used to send the first pilot frequency sequence to the 2nd MIMO equipment；
The receiver of first MIMO equipment is used to receive the second pilot frequency sequence of the 2nd MIMO equipment transmission；
The channel estimator of first MIMO equipment is used to be based on received second pilot frequency sequence, estimates the first channel；
The channel estimator of 2nd MIMO equipment is used to be based on received first pilot frequency sequence, estimates second channel；
The key generator of first MIMO equipment is used for the first channel based on the estimation, generates first key；Second
The key generator of MIMO equipment is used for the second channel based on the estimation, generates the second key；
The key confirmation response unit of 2nd MIMO equipment is used for and the first MIMO equipment is communicated, another to determine
Whether one the second key corresponds to another first key of the first MIMO equipment.
The mapping function can be predefined in the first and second MIMO equipment, can also use secure communication channel, for example,
Encryption channel distributes to equipment.
Fourth aspect present invention refers to a kind of method for channel estimation and verifying, which comprises
Send the first pilot frequency sequence；
Receive the second pilot frequency sequence；
Based on received second pilot frequency sequence, the first channel is estimated；
The first channel based on the estimation generates first key；
It is communicated with the 2nd MIMO equipment, whether corresponds to the second of the 2nd MIMO equipment with the determination first key
Key.
The method can be set by the first described according to a first aspect of the present invention MIMO according to a fourth aspect of the present invention
It is standby to execute.Other features of the method or implementation are able to carry out according to the present invention first according to a fourth aspect of the present invention
The function of first MIMO equipment described in aspect and its above-mentioned different implementation.
Fifth aspect present invention refers to a kind of method for carrying out channel estimation and verifying for the first MIMO equipment, the side
Method includes:
Receive the first pilot frequency sequence；
Send the second pilot frequency sequence；
Based on received first pilot frequency sequence, second channel is estimated；
Based on the second channel of the estimation, the second key is generated；
It is communicated with the first MIMO equipment, is set so that whether determination second key corresponds to the first MIMO
Standby first key.
The method can be set by the 2nd described according to a second aspect of the present invention MIMO according to a fifth aspect of the present invention
It is standby to execute.Other features of the method or implementation are able to carry out according to the present invention second according to a fifth aspect of the present invention
The function of 2nd MIMO equipment described in aspect and its above-mentioned different implementation.
Sixth aspect present invention refers to that one kind carries out channel estimation for the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment and tests
The method of card, which comprises
The first MIMO equipment sends the first pilot frequency sequence；
The 2nd MIMO equipment receives first pilot frequency sequence；Based on received first pilot frequency sequence, estimation
Second channel；Based on the second channel of the estimation, the second key is generated；
The 2nd MIMO equipment sends the second pilot frequency sequence；
The first MIMO equipment receives second pilot frequency sequence；Based on received second pilot frequency sequence, estimation
First channel；The first channel based on the estimation generates first key；
Whether the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment are communicated, corresponded to the determination first key
In second key.
Seventh aspect present invention refers to a kind of computer readable storage medium for storing program code, said program code
Including instruction, to execute method described in any one of fourth aspect, the 5th aspect, the 6th aspect or its implementation.
Detailed description of the invention
Technical characteristic in order to illustrate the embodiments of the present invention more clearly will make below to required in embodiment description
Attached drawing is briefly described.Drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the invention, these embodiments are not
In the case where violating protection scope as defined in the appending claims of the invention, it can modify.
Fig. 1 is the block diagram provided in an embodiment of the present invention for describing a kind of first MIMO equipment；
Fig. 2 is the block diagram for describing a kind of 2nd MIMO equipment that another embodiment of the present invention provides；
Fig. 3 is a kind of block diagram of system provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is a kind of method flow diagram for channel estimation that another embodiment of the present invention provides；
Fig. 5 is a kind of method stream for the first MIMO equipment safety estimation channel that another embodiment of the present invention provides
Cheng Tu；
Fig. 6 is a kind of side used for the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment that another embodiment of the present invention provides
Method flow chart；
Fig. 7 is a kind of block diagram for system that another embodiment of the present invention provides；
Fig. 8 is a kind of method flow diagram for safe lane estimation that another embodiment of the present invention provides；
Fig. 9 is a kind of method flow diagram for security key verifying that another embodiment of the present invention provides.
Specific embodiment
Fig. 1 shows a kind of the first MIMO equipment 100 for channel estimation and verifying, comprising: transmitter 110 receives
Device 120, channel estimator 130, key generator 140 and key confirmation unit 150.
Transmitter 110 is for sending the first pilot frequency sequence.First pilot frequency sequence can be predetermined pilot sequence, be also possible to
The pilot frequency sequence that transmitter is selected from one group of pilot frequency sequence.
Receiver 120 is for receiving the second pilot frequency sequence.Transmitter 110 and receiver 120 can be used for using same antenna
Send and receive the first and second pilot frequency sequences.
Channel estimator 130 is used to be based on received second pilot frequency sequence, estimates the first channel.For example, channel is estimated
Gauge 130 can be used for estimating channel matrix based on received second pilot frequency sequence.
Key generator 140 is used for the first channel based on the estimation, generates first key.Preferably, key is carried out
Estimation, so that identical first key can be generated in the first slightly different channel estimation.The length of first key can be,
For example, 128 bits or 256 bits.Key generator 140 can pass through transmitter 110 and receiver 120 and the 2nd MIMO equipment
It interacts.
Key confirmation unit 150 is for determining whether the first key corresponds to the second key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.
Key confirmation unit 150 can be used for being communicated with the 2nd MIMO equipment, for example, passing through transmitter 110 and receiver 120.
Preferably, key confirmation unit is for being communicated, so that eavesdropping side can not identify the first and/or second key.
Fig. 2 shows a kind of the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 that channel estimation and verifying are carried out for the first MIMO equipment, packets
It includes: receiver 210, transmitter 220, channel estimator 230, key generator 240 and key confirmation response unit 250.
Receiver 210 is for receiving the first pilot frequency sequence, for example, the pilot tone that the first MIMO equipment as shown in Figure 1 is sent
Sequence.
Transmitter 220 is for sending the second pilot frequency sequence.Second pilot frequency sequence can be predetermined second pilot frequency sequence, can also
To be pilot frequency sequence that the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 is selected from one group of pilot frequency sequence.
Channel estimator 230 is used to be based on received first pilot frequency sequence, estimates second channel.Channel estimator
230 can be similarly configured or identical with the channel estimator 130 of the first MIMO equipment 100.
Key generator 240 is used for the second channel based on the estimation, generates the second key.Key generator 240 can
It is similarly configured with the key generator 140 with the first MIMO equipment 100 or identical.
Key confirmation response unit 250 is used for and the first MIMO equipment 100 is communicated, so that the first MIMO
Equipment 100 determines whether second key corresponds to the first key of the first MIMO equipment 100.
It includes the first MIMO equipment 100 that Fig. 3, which is shown a kind of, for example, MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment in Fig. 1
200, for example, the MIMO equipment in Fig. 2, system 300.Wherein, the first MIMO equipment 100 and the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 are used for
Use same map function.
2nd MIMO equipment 200 is used to send pilot frequency sequence to the first MIMO equipment 100, so that the first MIMO equipment 100
Estimate the first channel 310.First MIMO equipment 100 is used to send pilot frequency sequence to the 2nd MIMO equipment 200, so that the 2nd MIMO
Equipment 200 estimates second channel 320.
First MIMO equipment 100 can be, for example, the access node of communication network, 200 company of can be of the 2nd MIMO equipment
It is connected to the mobile device of the access node.Alternatively, the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 can be the access node of communication network, first
MIMO equipment 100 can be the mobile device for being connected to the access node.
Fig. 4 shows a kind of for channel estimation and the method for verifying 400.
This method includes second step for sending first step 410 of the first pilot frequency sequence and receiving the second pilot frequency sequence
Rapid 420.Preferably, this method includes another step (being not shown in Fig. 4), wherein receiver is in transmitter receipt to first
After pilot frequency sequence, opens and receive channel, to receive the second pilot frequency sequence.In other words, it is assumed that the second pilot frequency sequence is only first
Pilot frequency sequence just receives after sending.
Third step 430 includes: to estimate the first channel based on received second pilot frequency sequence.
In 4th step 440, the first channel based on the estimation generates first key.Known use can be used
Carry out key generation in the transmitting for generating estimation or one of the method for receiving key corresponding to channel, for example, transmitting or
Receiving channel can be identified by channel matrix.
It is communicated in 5th step 450 with the 2nd MIMO equipment, whether corresponds to the determination first key
Second key of two MIMO equipment.The communication may include: to send to the 2nd MIMO equipment and receive from the 2nd MIMO equipment
Encryption information.
Method in Fig. 4 presents a kind of plain mode of detection pilot pollution attack, which is that safety of physical layer is answered
Chief threat in.With other methods on the contrary, the method in Fig. 4 relies only on the pairing based on key and binary map, and
Independent of the signal processing method for being easy to appear error because of noise and interference.
The application of this method includes: base station (i) and equipped with the communication between the mobile terminal of more antennas；(ii) it uses
More antennas keep WiFi transmission safer.Particularly, application of this method in extensive MIMO is also considered as a kind of related application,
Reason is that beam forming plays a significant role in the presence of a large amount of antennas.
Fig. 5 shows a kind of method 500 that channel estimation and verifying are carried out for the first MIMO equipment 100.This method can
To be executed by the 2nd MIMO equipment, for example, the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 shown in Fig. 2.
This method includes receiving first step 510 of the first pilot frequency sequence.Initial step before first step 510
Suddenly in (being not shown in Fig. 5), reception channel can be opened.When receiving the first pilot frequency sequence, this method starts.
In second step 520, the second pilot frequency sequence is sent；In third step 530, led based on described received first
Frequency sequence estimates second channel.The second pilot frequency sequence can be sent based on received first pilot frequency sequence of institute.For this purpose, third
Step 530 can execute before second step 520.
In 4th step 540, based on the second channel of the estimation, the second key is generated.
Communicated in 5th step 550 with the first MIMO equipment 100, with determination second key whether
First key corresponding to the first MIMO equipment 100.It is preferred here that the communication is to received from the first MIMO equipment
The response of 100 order.
Fig. 6 shows a kind of method for carrying out channel estimation and verifying for the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment
600。
First step 610 includes: that the first MIMO equipment 100 sends the first pilot frequency sequence.
Second step 620 includes: that the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 receives first pilot frequency sequence；It is connect based on described
The first pilot frequency sequence received estimates second channel；Based on the second channel of the estimation, the second key is generated.
Third step 630 includes: that the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 sends the second pilot frequency sequence.
4th step 640 includes: that the first MIMO equipment 100 receives second pilot frequency sequence；It is connect based on described
The second pilot frequency sequence received estimates the first channel；The first channel based on the estimation generates first key.
5th step 650 includes: that the first MIMO equipment 100 and the 2nd MIMO equipment 200 are communicated, with
Determine whether the first key corresponds to second key.
It includes the first equipment (" Alice ") shown in legend numbers 710 that Fig. 7, which is a kind of, second shown in legend numbers 720
The system 700 of interception facility (" Eve ") shown in equipment (" Bob ") and legend numbers 730.Letter between Alice and Bob
Road 712 is indicated by channel matrix H.Channel 732 between Alice and Eve is indicated by channel matrix G1.Letter between Eve and Bob
Road 734 is indicated by channel matrix G2.
Fig. 8 is the flow chart of another method 800 for safe lane estimation.In conjunction with the scene in Fig. 7, there are two led
Keep pouring in the defeated stage: firstly, Alice sends pilot tone (step 810) to Bob, secondly, Bob sends pilot tone (step 820) to Alice,
These pilot tones are regarded as well known.
Based on the received pilot tone of institute, Alice and Bob estimate channel.It is worth noting that, if Eve has initiated pilot tone dirt
Dye attack, then channel estimated by Alice and Bob will be different, and reason is that an estimation is H+G1, and another estimation is
H+G2.It is further noted that Eve is not aware that H, therefore, it is impossible to keep H+G1 and H+G2 equal.In order to not to Eve (its
It is subsequent to be benefited and knowing channel) consistency between two channels, step 830 are checked in the case where leakage channel
In, Alice and Bob extract private key from the channel of estimation (specific private key extract process, refers to Cambridge University
Publishing house Bloch in 2011, " safety of physical layer " of J.Barros).By this technology, two people obtain ratio from channel estimation
Special sequence (key).The key that Alice is generated is indicated with a, indicates the key that Bob is generated with b.Assuming that M is extracted key
Length (being indicated with bit number).
If do not attacked, despite the presence of the noise for influencing estimation, two bit sequences or identical.Occurring
Attack and the attack modified channel cause the difference between channel estimation be greater than noise level in the case where, Alice and Bob
Two bit sequences (key) will be different.
Therefore, in step 840, key confirmation process is used to check whether the key of two extractions to be consistent.If extracted
Key is inconsistent, then matches unsuccessfully (step 850).If extracted key agreement, successful matching (step 860).
Fig. 9 is a kind of flow chart of the whether corresponding exemplary method 900 of private key for confirming Alice and Bob.
Alice generates the sequence of M random bit, is indicated with r, using key a (two modulus of step-by-step and) by its exclusive or, to obtain x=a
+ r, that is, Alice carries out primary filling coding to random bit.Bit x in step 910, after coding is sent by channel.Step
In rapid 920, Bob detects the bit after these codings, and it is decrypted using the key b that itself is extracted, to obtain
The random bit sequence that Alice is generated: r '=x+b (two moduluses and).Then, Bob passes through a kind of reversible, functions h such as or not application
The bit map of decryption is another sequence of M-bit by (), to obtain mapping value h (r ').Bob uses the key of itself
The mapping value is once filled, and sends encryption message y=h (r ')+b to Alice in step 930.In step 940,
Alice checks whether the received message of institute is itself by removing primary filling decryption message z=y+a in step s 950
The random correct mapping value for generating bit, that is, Alice checks whether h (r) is equal to z.If two mapping values are equal, Alice
Conclude that there is no pilot pollutions to attack, successful matching.
If the mapping is same map, and the first and second key agreements, then the second equipment will send back r '=r, from
And original series are revealed to Eve.Then Eve can simply calculate x+r=a, to obtain a, it means that Eve knows channel
Some information, and the information can be used to promote the attack of itself.It is therefore preferred that this is mapped as Random Maps, prevent
Eve knows the information of sequence r when Bob is transmitted.
The following is worth noting: first, when Alice and Bob estimation same channel, extracted key is identical
, and whole flow process facilitates successful matching.On the contrary, if key that Alice and Bob are extracted and not corresponding to each other, Bob into
Capable solution secret meeting generates another message, to generate another mapping value, causes to match procedure failure.Second, Eve are in the mistake
Channel H is not aware that in journey.Third, if stage of the Eve after the training stage launches a offensive, Eve can not know that secret is close
Key, so that pairing process can not be destroyed.
Channel reciprocity between Alice and Bob is critically important.However, this is not only related with pilot pollution detection, also with
Alice will use to channel estimation it is related, that is, by private message beam forming to Bob.If since hardware damage causes
Channel is different, then Alice will not be correct by the channel estimation used after pairing process.In fact, Alice will use channel
Estimation, signal beam is shaped to Bob, but if channel estimation is incorrect, then signal will be unable to reach Bob, and Bob can not be solved
Code goes out the private information.Therefore, the medium hypothesis of hardware damage degree is to the estimation using related.This method is considered when specific
When to the robustness of (moderate) mismatch, it is notable that channel H is for extracting private key, and in existing literature
It includes that Alice and Bob has the fact that different channels estimation that obtainable private key, which extracts process,.It is therefore contemplated that
The program has robustness to hardware damage.However, damage can reduce the defence degree to attack due to underlying cause: making an uproar
Sound level is higher or the extent of damage is bigger, then the bit that can be extracted from channel is fewer, and therefore, private key is shorter.
Some variations of universal method are explained below.
Pilot frequency sequence selection
The pilot frequency sequence that first MIMO equipment is sent can be randomly choosed from one group of (a large amount of) sequence to be come out.By pilot tone
Sequence is sent to after the 2nd MIMO equipment, and the first MIMO equipment indicates another data of the pilot sequence index by sending
Packet.Hereafter, the 2nd MIMO equipment another pilot frequency sequence of random selection place from one group of (a large amount of) sequence, and it is sent to first
MIMO equipment.After pilot frequency sequence is sent to the first MIMO equipment, the 2nd MIMO equipment will send instruction this selected second
Another data packet of pilot sequence index.
The attack of third equipment initiation can be more readily detected out in the program, and reason is that there is no know third equipment in advance
Pilot frequency sequence, so that pilot frequency sequence " can not be covered ".
Use private key
Extracted first and/or second key can be used for encrypted data transmission or for selecting private key,
That is, the first and second keys can also be used for conventional security purpose.Particularly, first and/or the 2nd MIMO equipment can be used for adopting
It is encrypted with the first and/or second key pair message, and sends the message encrypted.
Channel tracking
It, can be with track channel change after initial channel estimation and verifying.This tracking can continue to carry out, to permit
Perhaps following lasting key authentication:
It can be using data-signal as pilot tone (once decoding data).This data guiding channel estimation avoids use and leads
Frequently.Still pilot tone (for example, to simplify channel estimation for data guidance method) can be interacted between the terminals.
First MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment can calculate the channel of new estimation between the channel previously estimated
Difference.
The two carries out private key extraction to calculated channel differences.
The two carries out key authentication according to two keys being described above to extraction.
Integrate private key extraction and key authentication
First private key is extracted and two steps of key authentication can be with thin consolidation together.It is above-mentioned to be used for secret
The method of cipher key-extraction provides that the first MIMO equipment sends bit sequence to the 2nd MIMO equipment, so that the 2nd MIMO equipment can be with
Correct a certain amount of difference between the key of the first MIMO equipment and the key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.Then, pass through key authentication
Process checks that whether practical the key of acquisition is identical.
Optinal plan provides that the first MIMO equipment sends bit sequence to the 2nd MIMO equipment, so that the first MIMO equipment can
With detection error, rather than correction error.By these bits, the 2nd MIMO equipment can be by determining the difference between two sequences
Whether value quantity is greater than threshold value, directly execution key authentication step.In general, bit number needed for detection error is less than correction error
Required bit number.In fact, this demonstrate an advantages (also simplifying algorithm).
Key confirmation process
Key confirmation process can be by, for example, the key confirmation unit of the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment
Key confirmation response unit executes as follows:
A. the first MIMO equipment generates the sequence of M random bit, is indicated with r, using private key (two modulus of step-by-step and)
By its exclusive or, to obtain x=a+r.
B. bit x is sent by channel, the 2nd MIMO equipment solves these bits using the key b that itself is extracted
It is close.
C. the 2nd MIMO equipment pass through application it is a kind of it is reversible, etc. the bit map of decryption is not M-bit by functions h ()
Another sequence, to obtain mapping value h (r ').
D. the 2nd MIMO equipment sends encryption by the bit exclusive or of mapping, and to the first MIMO equipment using the key of itself
Message y=h (r ')+b.
E. the first MIMO equipment is by removing primary filling decryption message z=y+a, and whether checks the received message of institute
For itself random correct mapping value for generating bit, that is, whether detection h (r) is equal to z.
F. pass through if checked, successful matching.
To sum up, safety of physical layer allows to by realizing effective encrypted transmission using the characteristic of wireless channel.Just
True channel state information (channel state information, abbreviation CSI) in the method for safety of physical layer very
It is important, especially in the case where equipment is equipped with more antennas.In channel acquisition stage, attacker can initiate pilot pollution
Attack implements mistake CSI, to can obtain information in subsequent transmission.
The present invention allow by prevent attacker initiate pilot pollution attack, two equipment equipped with more antennas it
Between carry out safety pairing process, to ensure that two legitimate device channel estimations obtained are consistent, can obtain correct
CSI, so that subsequent transmission is safe.
All the above description is only embodiments of the present invention, and the range that the present invention is protected is not limited to that.This
Field technical staff can carry out any change or replacement easily.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention is answered described with claim
Protection scope is.
Claims (15)
1. a kind of the first MIMO equipment for channel estimation and verifying, which is characterized in that the first MIMO equipment includes:
Transmitter, for sending the first pilot frequency sequence；
Receiver, for receiving the second pilot frequency sequence；
Channel estimator estimates the first channel for being based on received second pilot frequency sequence；
Key generator generates first key for the first channel based on the estimation；
Key confirmation unit, for determining whether the first key corresponds to the second key of the 2nd MIMO equipment.
2. the first MIMO equipment according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the key confirmation unit is used for:
Generate random number；
The random number is encrypted using the first key, to obtain the first bit sequence；
Send first bit sequence；
Receive the second bit sequence；
Second bit sequence is decrypted using the first key；
If the mapping of the second bit sequence and the random number of decryption matches, it is determined that the first key corresponds to described
Second key.
3. the first MIMO equipment according to claim 1 or 2, which is characterized in that the key confirmation unit is used for: if institute
It is identical at least predetermined portions of bit in second key to state first key, it is determined that the first key corresponds to described
Second key.
4. the first MIMO equipment according to preceding claims any one, which is characterized in that the first MIMO equipment
For selecting first pilot frequency sequence from one group of first pilot frequency sequence, the transmitter is used to send first pilot tone
The index for sending selected first pilot frequency sequence after sequence and/or the first MIMO equipment are for receiving selected second pilot tone sequence
The index of column, the channel estimator are also used to estimate first channel based on the received index of institute.
5. the first MIMO equipment according to preceding claims any one, which is characterized in that
The receiver is for receiving another the second pilot frequency sequence；
The channel estimator is used to be based on another described received second pilot frequency sequence, estimates another the first channel；
The key generator is used for based on the difference between estimated the first channel and another estimated first channel,
Generate another first key；
The key confirmation unit is for determining whether another described first key corresponds to the another of the 2nd MIMO equipment
One the second key.
6. a kind of the 2nd MIMO equipment for carrying out channel estimation and verifying for the first MIMO equipment, which is characterized in that described
MIMO equipment includes:
Receiver, for receiving the first pilot frequency sequence；
Transmitter, for sending the second pilot frequency sequence；
Channel estimator estimates second channel for being based on received first pilot frequency sequence；
Key generator generates the second key for the second channel based on the estimation；
Key confirmation response unit, for being communicated with the first MIMO equipment, so that described in first equipment is determining
Whether the second key corresponds to the first key of the first MIMO equipment.
7. the 2nd MIMO equipment according to claim 6, which is characterized in that the key confirmation response unit is used for:
Receive the first bit sequence；
First bit sequence is decrypted using second key；
The mapping of the first decrypted bit sequence is encrypted, using second key to obtain the second bit sequence；
Send second bit sequence.
8. the 2nd MIMO equipment according to any one of claim 6 to 7, which is characterized in that the transmitter is used for
After receiving first pilot frequency sequence, second pilot frequency sequence is sent, the 2nd MIMO equipment is used for: based on being estimated
The second channel of meter selects second pilot frequency sequence from one group of candidate sequence.
9. the 2nd MIMO equipment according to claim 6 to 8 any one, which is characterized in that
The receiver is for receiving another the first pilot frequency sequence；
The channel estimator is used to be based on another described received first pilot frequency sequence, estimates another second channel；
The key generator is used for based on the difference between estimated former second channel and another estimated second channel
Value, generates another first key；
The key confirmation response unit is used for and the first MIMO equipment is communicated, to determine that described another is second close
Whether key corresponds to another first key of the first MIMO equipment.
10. according to MIMO equipment described in preceding claims any one, which is characterized in that the key generator is used for base
In estimated second channel, by carrying out advantage distillation, information synergism and secrecy enhancing stage, first and/or the is generated
Two keys.
11. one kind include the first MIMO equipment as claimed in any of claims 1 to 5 and according to claim 6 to
The system of 2nd MIMO equipment described in any one of 10, which is characterized in that the first MIMO equipment and described second
MIMO equipment is used to use same map function.
12. a kind of method for channel estimation and verifying, which is characterized in that the described method includes:
Send the first pilot frequency sequence；
Receive the second pilot frequency sequence；
Based on received second pilot frequency sequence, the first channel is estimated；
The first channel based on the estimation generates first key；
It is communicated with the 2nd MIMO equipment, whether the second close of the 2nd MIMO equipment is corresponded to the determination first key
Key.
13. a kind of method for carrying out channel estimation and verifying for the first MIMO equipment, which is characterized in that the described method includes:
Receive the first pilot frequency sequence；
Send the second pilot frequency sequence；
Based on received first pilot frequency sequence, second channel is estimated；
Based on the second channel of the estimation, the second key is generated；
It is communicated with the first MIMO equipment, whether the first MIMO equipment is corresponded to determination second key
First key.
14. a kind of method for carrying out channel estimation and verifying for the first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment, which is characterized in that
The described method includes:
The first MIMO equipment sends the first pilot frequency sequence；
The 2nd MIMO equipment receives first pilot frequency sequence；Based on received first pilot frequency sequence, estimation second
Channel；Based on the second channel of the estimation, the second key is generated；
The 2nd MIMO equipment sends the second pilot frequency sequence；
The first MIMO equipment receives second pilot frequency sequence；Based on received second pilot frequency sequence, estimation first
Channel；The first channel based on the estimation generates first key；
The first MIMO equipment and the 2nd MIMO equipment are communicated, and whether correspond to institute with the determination first key
State the second key.
15. a kind of computer readable storage medium for storing program code, which is characterized in that said program code includes referring to
It enables, to execute method described in any one of 2 to 14 according to claim 1.
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2015/074037 WO2017063716A1 (en) | 2015-10-16 | 2015-10-16 | Secure paring method for mimo systems |
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| CN109417469B CN109417469B (en) | 2021-09-07 |
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| CN111953362A (en) * | 2020-07-16 | 2020-11-17 | 深圳安吉尔饮水产业集团有限公司 | Communication method, communication device, communication transceiver and readable storage medium |
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| US10447725B1 (en) | 2017-01-24 | 2019-10-15 | Apple Inc. | Secure ranging wireless communication |
| WO2022234454A1 (en) * | 2021-05-03 | 2022-11-10 | Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. | Key establishment using wireless channel information |
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| CN109417469B (en) | 2021-09-07 |
| WO2017063716A1 (en) | 2017-04-20 |
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