CN109246129A - A kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method and system can verify that client identity - Google Patents
A kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method and system can verify that client identity Download PDFInfo
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- CN109246129A CN109246129A CN201811190701.0A CN201811190701A CN109246129A CN 109246129 A CN109246129 A CN 109246129A CN 201811190701 A CN201811190701 A CN 201811190701A CN 109246129 A CN109246129 A CN 109246129A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
- H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method that can verify that client identity and systems, wherein the described method includes: client generates multiple client private key component and corresponding public key component at random；The server receives the client public key component that the client is sent, and generates privacy key component at random and represent the public key of client identity；The client generates the verification information to presetting message based on the client private key component and presetting message, and the verification information is sent to the server；The server authentication client identity guarantees that illegitimate client can not forge verification information, and generates response message based on the verification information and the privacy key component, and to response message described in the client feedback；The client generates the signing messages of the presetting message based on client private key component and the response message.Technical solution provided by the present application can be improved and use the safety of SM2 private key in mobile terminal.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technical field of information processing, in particular to a kind of SM2 collaboration signature that can verify that client identity
Method and system.
Background technique
SM2 algorithm refers to " the information security technology SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm of GB/T 32918 (.1-.5) -2016
(having 5 minute mark standards) " public key algorithm specified in series standard, it can be applied to digital signature sign test.
In order to use private key for user safely, usually require that using special hardware cryptographic module, as safety chip,
USBKey, SD encrypted card save private key for user.In mobile terminal, using hardware cryptographic module, often convenience is insufficient.For this purpose, portion
SM2 private key is divided into two parts by offshoot program proposition, is respectively stored in client and server, two side's cooperated computings can just offset
Breath realizes signature operation, and operation both sides can not obtain any information of other side part private key and correspond in GB/T 32918
SM2 private key in (.1-.5) -2016 " information security technology SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm (having 5 minute mark standards) ", i.e.,
It controls either party by attacker, can not all forge a signature.
But at least there are the following problems in current implementation: when first communication party submits signature request, the
The signature request that two communication parties can not confirm that first communication party is submitted is legitimate request, can not confirm the identity of first communication party,
There are the identity that first communication party falsely uses other people, continuous data falsification requirement second communication party attempt the possibility of signature
Property, there is a certain security risk.Concurrently there are attacker distort or forge first communication party transmission message hash value can
It can property.
Summary of the invention
The application's is designed to provide a kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method and system that can verify that client identity, can
Improve the safety of SM2 private key.
To achieve the above object, the application provides a kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method that can verify that client identity, the side
Method includes: that client generates the first integer and the second integer at random, as client private key component, and is based respectively on described first
Integer and the second integer calculations client the first public key component value and client the second public key component value；Client will be described
Client the first public key component value and the client the second public key component value constitute client public key component, and by the client
End public key component is sent to server；The server receives the client public key component that the client is sent, random to generate
Third integer as privacy key component, and is based on the client public key component value and default basic point value, generates and represent
The public key of client identity；The client is generated based on the client private key component and presetting message to presetting message
Verification information, and the verification information is sent to the server；The server receives the verifying that the client is sent
Information verifies client identity using client public key component, and is based on the verification information and the privacy key component
Response message is generated, and to response message described in the client feedback；The client is based on client private key component and institute
State the signing messages that response message generates the presetting message.
To achieve the above object, the application also provides a kind of SM2 collaboration signature system that can verify that client identity, described
System includes client and server, in which: client generates the first integer and the second integer at random, as client private key point
Amount, and it is based respectively on first integer and the second integer calculations client the first public key component value and the second public affairs of client
Key component value；Client the first public key component value and the client the second public key component value are constituted client by client
Public key component, and the client public key component is sent to server；The server receives the visitor that the client is sent
Family end public key component, it is random to generate third integer, as privacy key component, and based on the client public key component value with
And default basic point value, generate the public key for representing client identity；The client is based on the client private key component and in advance
If message generates the verification information to presetting message, and the verification information is sent to the server；The server connects
The verification information that the client is sent is received, verifies client identity using client public key component, and believe based on the verifying
Breath and the privacy key component generate response message, and to response message described in the client feedback；The client
The signing messages of the presetting message is generated based on client private key component and the response message.
Therefore technical solution provided by the present application, SM2 private key is divided into multiple private key components, wherein server is gathered around
There is a private key component, client possesses remaining private key component.The part private key that client is possessed based on system parameter with it
Component submits signature request to server.The identity of server authentication client is to possess the client for specifying legal private key component
End receives signature request, generates relevant part and sign and reply client, signature request and clothes of the client before
The reply at business device end, the private key component possessed using it generate final SM2 signature.In this way, being assisted by server and client side
With the mode of running, the safety of SM2 private key can be improved.
Other features and advantages of the present invention will be illustrated in the following description.The objectives and other advantages of the invention can
It is achieved and obtained by structure specifically indicated in the written description, claims, and drawings.
Below by drawings and examples, technical scheme of the present invention will be described in further detail.
Detailed description of the invention
Attached drawing is used to provide further understanding of the present invention, and constitutes part of specification, with reality of the invention
It applies example to be used to explain the present invention together, not be construed as limiting the invention.In the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is the flow chart that SM2 cooperates with endorsement method in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the interaction schematic diagram that SM2 cooperates with signature system in the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that preferred reality described herein
Apply example only for the purpose of illustrating and explaining the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention.
Referring to Fig. 1, the application provides a kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method, which comprises
S1: client generates the first integer and the second integer at random, as client private key component, and is based respectively on described
First integer and the second integer calculations client the first public key component value and client the second public key component value；
S2: the client public key component is sent to server by client；
S3: the server receives the client public key component that the client is sent, random to generate third integer, as
Privacy key component, and it is based on the client public key component value and default basic point value, generation represents client identity
Public key；
S4: the client generates the verifying to presetting message based on the client private key component and presetting message and believes
Breath, and the verification information is sent to the server；
S5: the server receives the verification information that the client is sent, and verifies client using client public key component
It holds identity, and response message is generated based on the verification information and the privacy key component, and to the client feedback
The response message；
S6: the client generates the signing messages of the presetting message based on client private key and the response message.
Specifically, in practical applications, the present invention realizes one by the way that SM2 private key is divided into multiple (>=3) private key components
Kind can verify that the SM2 collaboration endorsement method of client identity, wherein server end can verify that when client submits signature request
Client identity.
System uses the elliptic curve parameter E (F of SM2 algorithmq), G and n, wherein E (Fq) it is to be defined on finite field FqOn
Elliptic curve E, is defined on FpElliptic curve equation on (p is greater than 3 prime number) is y2=x3+ ax+b, wherein a, b ∈ Fp, and
(4a3+27b2)mod p≠0。#E(Fq) indicate Point on Elliptic Curve number.G is a basic point of elliptic curve, (xG,yG) be
The coordinate of G point, xG、yGIt is FqIn two elements, n be basic point G rank (n is #E (Fq) prime factor), h be #E (Fq) it is remaining because
Son (h=#E (Fq)/n), [k] G indicates the multiplying of big number k and point G.
It is entlen that user A, which has length,ABit distinguishes mark IDA, remember ENTLAIt is by integer entlenAConversion and
At two bytes, use cryptographic Hash function H256(SM3) the Hash Value Z of user A is acquiredA=H256(ENTLA||IDA||a||b
||xG||yG||xA||yA), wherein (xA,yA) be user A public key PAThe coordinate of point.
1. public and private key generating algorithm
C1: client generates first integer and second integer according to following formula: generating d at random1∈[1,n-
2], d2∈[1,n-2]；d1Indicate first integer, d2Indicate second integer, (d1,d2) it is the client private key point
Amount；
C2: client generates client the first public key component value and the second public key of the client according to following formula
Component value: P1=[d1] G, P2=[d2]P1,P1Indicate first public key of client point
Magnitude, P2Indicate the second public key of client component value；
C3: client is by (P1,P2) client public key component is used as to be sent to server end；
D1: server end generates the third integer according to following formula: generating d at random3∈[1,n-2]；d3Described in expression
Third integer, as privacy key component；
D2: server end is calculated according to following formula: PA=[d3]P2- G,Wherein PAIndicate the representative
The public key of client identity, P2Indicate client the second public key component value that the client sends over；
D3: verifying [h] PAIt whether is infinite point, if [h] PAIt is infinite point, then returns to D1, it is whole regenerates third
Number, and the public key for representing client identity is generated again according to the third integer regenerated；[if h] PAIt is not infinite point,
By PAAs the public key for representing client identity.
2. cooperateing with signature algorithm
A1: client sets M '=ZA| | M calculates e=H256(M '), by standard (GB/T 32918.1-2016 " information security
Technology SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm part 1 general provisions ") in method by the data type conversion of e be integer；
A2: client generates integer k at random1∈[1,n-1]；
A3: client calculates Q1=[k1]P1=(x ', y ') calculates k '=x ' mod n.
A4: client calculates
A5: client is by (e, Q1, k ") and it is used as verification information to be sent to server end；
B1: server end parses Q1=(x ', y ') calculates k '=x ' mod n；
B2: server end calculates [(k ")-1e]G+[(k″)-1k′]P1=(x ", y "), verifying (x ", y ")=(x ', y ') are
No establishment is refused to execute downwards if invalid, be executed downwards if setting up.
B3: server end generates integer k at random2∈ [1, n-1], k3∈[1,n-1]；
B4: server end calculates Q2=[k2] G, Q3=[k3] G, Q '4=[k '] P1+[k2]Q1+Q3=(x '1,y′1)；
B5: server end calculates r '=(e+x '1) mod n, B3 is returned to if r '=0, if r ' does not carry out B6 for 0；
B6: server end calculates
B7: server end is by (Q2,Q3,s1,s2) in response information be sent to user client A；
A6: client calculates Q4=[k '] P1+[k1d1]Q2+Q3=(x1,y1), calculate r=(e+x1)mod n；
A7: client calculatesIf s=0 or s+r mod n=0
B1 is then returned, executes A8 if the two is not satisfied；
A8: client presses standard (GB/T 32918.1-2016 " information security technology SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm
Part 1 general provisions ") in method r, s are converted into byte serial, then the signing messages of presetting message M be (r, s).
A9: client call standard (" calculate GB/T 32918.2-2016 by information security technology SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher
Method part 2: Digital Signature Algorithm ") in signature verification algorithm (Verify) verifying signature correctness.
Any third party can verify user A and cooperate with signature (r, s) to presetting message M with server end.
Wherein, when generating signature components r, according to GB/T 32918.2-2016 " information security technology SM2 elliptic curve
Public key algorithm part 2: Digital Signature Algorithm " in definition, r=(e+x1)mod n.It signs and calculates in the collaboration of this programme
In method, k " is embedded in e in the signature request that client is submitted, and need to only calculate x ' in server end1Mod n, wherein x '1It is i.e. practical
The x used1, and it is utilized respectively k ", x '1Generate server-side portion signature s1、s2, finally calculated again by client corresponding
x1Mod n and r, and use s1、s2Synthesize last signature (r, s).
Referring to Fig. 2, the application also provides a kind of SM2 collaboration signature system that can verify that client identity, the system
Including client and server, in which:
Client generates the first integer and the second integer at random, as the private key component of client, and is based respectively on described
First integer and corresponding client the first public key component value of second integer calculations and client the second public key component value；
The client public key component is sent to server by client；
The server receives the client public key component that the client is sent, random to generate third integer, as clothes
Business device private key component, and it is based on the client public key component value and default basic point value, it generates and finally represents client identity
Public key；
The client generates the verification information to presetting message based on the client private key component and presetting message,
And the verification information is sent to the server；
The server receives the verification information that the client is sent, and verifies client body using client public key component
Part, and response message is generated based on the verification information and the privacy key component, and to described in the client feedback
Response message；
The client generates the signing messages of the presetting message based on client private key component and the response message.
In one embodiment, the client generates first integer and described second according to following formula at random
Integer:
d1∈ [1, n-2], d2∈[1,n-2]
(d1,d2) it is the client private key component.Wherein, d1Indicate first integer, d2Indicate that described second is whole
Number, n indicate the rank of default basic point value；
And the client generates described in client the first public key component value and client the according to following formula
Two public key component values:
P1=[d1] G, P2=[d2]P1,
Wherein, P1Indicate the first public key of client component value, P2Indicate the second public key of client component value, G table
Show the default basic point value；
Correspondingly, the client public key representation in components is (P1,P2)。
In one embodiment, the server generates the third integer according to following formula at random:
d3∈[1,n-2]
Wherein, d3The third integer is indicated, as privacy key component；
Correspondingly, the server is calculated according to following formula:
PA=[d3]P2- G,
Wherein, PAIndicate the public key for representing client identity, P2Indicate the client that the client sends over
Two public key component values.
SM2 provided by the present application cooperates with endorsement method, does not use threshold schemes, and private key is divided into multiple (n >=3) private
Key component, wherein server end possesses a private key component, and client possesses multiple private key components.Wherein, it is submitted in client
When signature request, the private key component or part private key component that client is possessed using it do authentication to server.
When client submits signature request, wherein having contained the online verification of client identity, to avoid client
Unauthorized use server end private key component.Any third party cannot disguise oneself as legitimate client, falsely use the identity of other users
It is required that server end achievement unit divides signature operation, with attack analysis client private key component or forge a signature.
Server end after legal client, is signed separately in authentication signature request using the private key component calculation part of oneself
Name, and send back to client.Client is signed using the part that client private key component and server end are replied, and is generated most
Meeting GB/T 32918.2-2016 eventually, " information security technology SM2 ellipse curve public key cipher algorithm part 2: digital signature is calculated
Method " format SM2 private key signature.
When generating signature components r, according to GB/T 32918.2-2016, " information security technology SM2 curve public key is close
Code algorithm part 2: Digital Signature Algorithm " in definition, r=(e+x1)mod n.In the collaboration signature algorithm of this programme,
K " is embedded in e in the signature request that client is submitted, and need to only calculate x ' in server end1Mod n, wherein x '1Actually use
x1, and it is utilized respectively k ", x '1Generate server-side portion signature s1、s2, corresponding x is finally calculated by client again1mod n
With r, and use s1、s2Synthesize last signature (r, s).
Therefore technical solution provided by the present application, SM2 private key is divided into multiple private key components, wherein server is gathered around
There is a private key component, client possesses remaining private key component.The part private key that client is possessed based on system parameter with it
Component submits signature request to server.The identity of server authentication client is to possess the client for specifying legal private key component
End receives signature request, generates relevant part and sign and reply client, signature request and clothes of the client before
The reply at business device end, the private key component possessed using it generate final SM2 signature.In this way, being assisted by server and client side
With the mode of running, the safety of SM2 private key can be improved.
Obviously, various changes and modifications can be made to the invention without departing from essence of the invention by those skilled in the art
Mind and range.In this way, if these modifications and changes of the present invention belongs to the range of the claims in the present invention and its equivalent technologies
Within, then the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of SM2 collaboration endorsement method that can verify that client identity, which is characterized in that the described method includes:
Client generates the first integer and the second integer at random, as the private key component of client, and is based respectively on described first
Integer and corresponding client the first public key component value of second integer calculations and client the second public key component value；
Client public key component is sent to server by client；
The server receives the client public key component that the client is sent, random to generate third integer, as server
Private key component, and it is based on client public key component value and default basic point value, generate the public key for finally representing client identity；
The client generates the verification information to presetting message based on the client private key component and presetting message, and will
The verification information is sent to the server；
The server receives the verification information that the client is sent, and verifies client identity using client public key component,
And response message is generated based on the verification information and the privacy key component, and respond to described in the client feedback
Information；
The client generates the signing messages of the presetting message based on client private key component and the response message.
2. the method according to claim 1, wherein generating first integer and institute at random according to following formula
State the second integer:
d1∈ [1, n-2], d2∈[1,n-2]
(d1,d2) it is the client private key component, wherein d1Indicate first integer, d2Indicate second integer, n table
Show the rank of default basic point value.
3. according to the method described in claim 2, it is characterized in that, generating first public key of client point according to following formula
Second public key component value described in magnitude and client:
Wherein, P1Indicate the first public key of client component value, P2Indicate that the second public key of client component value, G indicate institute
State default basic point value；
Correspondingly, the client public key representation in components is (P1,P2)。
4. according to the method described in claim 3, it is characterized in that, generating the third integer at random according to following formula:
d3∈[1,n-2]
Wherein, d3The third integer is indicated, as privacy key component；
Correspondingly, it is calculated according to following formula:
Wherein, PAExpression represents the public key of client identity, P2Indicate client the second public key component that client sends over
Value.
5. according to the method described in claim 4, it is characterized in that, the client be based on the client private key component and
Presetting message generates the verification information to presetting message, and the verification information is sent to the server, comprising:
A1: client sets M '=ZA∥ M calculates e=H256(M '), and be integer by the data type conversion of e；Wherein, ZAIt indicates
The Hash Value of user A, M indicate the presetting message；
A2: client generates integer k at random1∈[1,n-1]；
A3: client calculates Q1=[k1]P1=(x ', y '), and calculate k '=x ' mod n；
A4: client calculates
A5: client is by (e, Q1, k ") and it is used as verification information to be sent to server.
6. according to the method described in claim 5, it is characterized in that, the server receives the verifying letter that the client is sent
Breath verifies client identity using client public key component, and raw based on the verification information and the privacy key component
At response message, and to response message described in the client feedback, comprising:
B1: server parses Q1=(x ', y ') calculates k '=x ' mod n；
B2: server calculates [(k ")-1e]G+[(k″)-1k′]P1=(x ", y "), whether verifying (x ", y ")=(x ', y ') be true,
Refuse to execute downwards if invalid, be executed downwards if setting up；
B3: server generates integer k at random2∈ [1, n-1], k3∈[1,n-1]；
B4: server calculates Q2=[k2] G, Q3=[k3] G, Q '4=[k '] P1+[k2]Q1+Q3=(x '1,y′1)；
B5: server calculates r '=(e+x '1) mod n, B3 is returned to if r '=0, if r ' does not carry out B6 for 0；
B6: server calculates
B7: server is by (Q2,Q3,s1,s2) in response information be sent to client.
7. according to the method described in claim 6, it is characterized in that, the client is based on client private key component and the sound
Information is answered to generate the signing messages of the presetting message, comprising:
A6: client calculates Q4=[k '] P1+[k1d1]Q2+Q3=(x1,y1), calculate r=(e+x1)mod n；
A7: client calculatesIt is returned if s=0 or s+r mod n=0
B1 is returned, executes A8 if the two is not satisfied；
A8: r, s are converted to byte serial by client, and set (r, s) for the signing messages of the presetting message M.
8. method according to claim 6 or 7, it is characterised in that: k " is embedded in e in the signature request that client is submitted,
X ' need to be only calculated in server end1Mod n, and it is utilized respectively k ", x '1Generate the part signature s of server end1、s2, finally again
Corresponding x is calculated by client1Mod n and r, wherein x1With x '1It is equal, r=(e+x1) mod n, and use s1、s2Synthesize
Last signature (r, s).
9. a kind of SM2 cooperates with signature system, which is characterized in that the system comprises client and servers, in which:
Client generates the first integer and the second integer at random, as the private key component of client, and is based respectively on described first
Integer and corresponding client the first public key component value of second integer calculations and client the second public key component value；
The client public key component is sent to server by client；
The server receives the client public key component that the client is sent, random to generate third integer, as server
Private key component, and it is based on client public key component value and default basic point value, generate the public key for finally representing client identity；
The client generates the verification information to presetting message based on the client private key component and presetting message, and will
The verification information is sent to the server；
The server receives the verification information that the client is sent, and verifies client identity using client public key component,
And response message is generated based on the verification information and the privacy key component, and respond to described in the client feedback
Information；
The client generates the signing messages of the presetting message based on client private key and the response message.
10. system according to claim 9, which is characterized in that described in the client generates at random according to following formula
First integer and second integer:
d1∈ [1, n-2], d2∈[1,n-2]
(d1,d2) it is client private key component, wherein d1Indicate first integer, d2Indicate that second integer, n indicate pre-
If the rank of basic point value；
And the client generates client the first public key component value according to following formula and the client second is public
Key component value:
Wherein, P1Indicate the first public key of client component value, P2Indicate that the second public key of client component value, G indicate institute
State default basic point value；
Correspondingly, the client public key representation in components is (P1,P2)；
Also, the server generates the third integer according to following formula at random:
d3∈[1,n-2]
Wherein, d3The third integer is indicated, as privacy key component；
Correspondingly, the server is calculated according to following formula:
Wherein, PAExpression represents the public key of client identity, P2Indicate client the second public key component that client sends over
Value.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811190701.0A CN109246129B (en) | 2018-10-12 | 2018-10-12 | SM2 collaborative signature method and system capable of verifying client identity |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811190701.0A CN109246129B (en) | 2018-10-12 | 2018-10-12 | SM2 collaborative signature method and system capable of verifying client identity |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| CN109246129A true CN109246129A (en) | 2019-01-18 |
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| CN109787762A (en) * | 2019-02-28 | 2019-05-21 | 矩阵元技术（深圳）有限公司 | Key management method, the electronic equipment of each self-generating key components of server |
| CN110035065A (en) * | 2019-03-12 | 2019-07-19 | 华为技术有限公司 | Data processing method, relevant apparatus and computer storage medium |
| CN110224812A (en) * | 2019-06-12 | 2019-09-10 | 江苏慧世联网络科技有限公司 | A kind of method and equipment that the electronic signature mobile client calculated based on Secure is communicated with Collaboration Server |
| CN111245594A (en) * | 2019-12-31 | 2020-06-05 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | Homomorphic operation-based collaborative signature method and system |
| CN111490878A (en) * | 2020-04-09 | 2020-08-04 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Key generation method, device, equipment and medium |
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| CN110035065A (en) * | 2019-03-12 | 2019-07-19 | 华为技术有限公司 | Data processing method, relevant apparatus and computer storage medium |
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| CN113765670B (en) * | 2020-06-03 | 2024-01-26 | 成都天瑞芯安科技有限公司 | Trusted key generation method and system without certificate |
| CN113765670A (en) * | 2020-06-03 | 2021-12-07 | 成都天瑞芯安科技有限公司 | Certificateless trusted key generation method and certificateless trusted key generation system |
| CN111817848A (en) * | 2020-06-19 | 2020-10-23 | 天津赢达信科技有限公司 | ECDSA signature method and system for ECC private key segmented storage |
| CN111934877B (en) * | 2020-06-23 | 2023-07-18 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | SM2 collaborative threshold signature method, storage medium and electronic device |
| CN111934877A (en) * | 2020-06-23 | 2020-11-13 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | SM2 collaborative threshold signature method and electronic device |
| CN111756537A (en) * | 2020-07-13 | 2020-10-09 | 广州安研信息科技有限公司 | Two-party cooperative decryption method, system and storage medium based on SM2 standard |
| CN111756537B (en) * | 2020-07-13 | 2022-11-29 | 广州安研信息科技有限公司 | Two-party cooperative decryption method, system and storage medium based on SM2 standard |
| CN112187469A (en) * | 2020-09-21 | 2021-01-05 | 浙江省数字安全证书管理有限公司 | SM2 multi-party collaborative digital signature method and system based on key factor |
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| CN114039722A (en) * | 2021-01-26 | 2022-02-11 | 中安网脉(北京)技术股份有限公司 | Secret sharing hidden identity SM2 signature private key generation device and method thereof |
| CN112968773B (en) * | 2021-01-29 | 2023-11-07 | 北京无字天书科技有限公司 | Key authorization entrusting system and method of SM2 collaborative signature system |
| CN112968773A (en) * | 2021-01-29 | 2021-06-15 | 北京无字天书科技有限公司 | Secret key authorization entrusting system and method of SM2 collaborative signature system |
| CN113595985A (en) * | 2021-06-30 | 2021-11-02 | 江西海盾信联科技有限责任公司 | Internet of things security cloud platform implementation method based on state cryptographic algorithm security chip |
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