CN108876399B - Finite field block chain system with closed-loop authentication system - Google Patents

Finite field block chain system with closed-loop authentication system Download PDF

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CN108876399B
CN108876399B CN201810464400.6A CN201810464400A CN108876399B CN 108876399 B CN108876399 B CN 108876399B CN 201810464400 A CN201810464400 A CN 201810464400A CN 108876399 B CN108876399 B CN 108876399B
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江峰
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K17/00—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations
    • G06K17/0022—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations arrangements or provisious for transferring data to distant stations, e.g. from a sensing device
    • G06K17/0029—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations arrangements or provisious for transferring data to distant stations, e.g. from a sensing device the arrangement being specially adapted for wireless interrogation of grouped or bundled articles tagged with wireless record carriers
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/018—Certifying business or products
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1433—Vulnerability analysis
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Abstract

The invention discloses a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system, which mainly comprises m authentication centers and n external nodes. Each authentication center mainly comprises a recorded event authentication information system and a block chain authentication accounting system. The basic database mainly stores basic authentication data and bibliographic event authentication information. And after scanning the RFID label of the commodity to be tested, the external node accesses the basic database and verifies the authenticity of the commodity to be tested by using a one-time one-certificate method of closed-loop authentication. According to the invention, through the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system, a counterfeiter can be effectively prevented from passing through the security loophole of the electronic tag or the security loophole of other anti-counterfeiting system components, and the scale amplitude value RFID electronic tag is effectively prevented, so that the security of the anti-counterfeiting system is ensured.

Description

Finite field block chain system with closed-loop authentication system
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of digital authentication, in particular to a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system.
Background
With the development of mobile communication technology, especially mobile internet and internet of things are permeating into the living field of people, and various demands for authentication services based on internet are appeared. Such as authentication of authenticity of goods, transaction information, collection information, virtual account information, virtual property, personal/enterprise identity information, credit investigation information, justice information, etc.
In the prior art, a server connected to the internet needs to be built, and then the server is accessed through an external node to inquire the information.
However, it is a difficult matter to hack the system server by means of hackers. Hackers often achieve illegal purposes by rewriting the information stored in the server. Accordingly, there is a need for an improvement in existing internet-based authentication systems.
According to the invention, through a closed-loop authentication mode, the security and reliability of authentication are improved, and the problem of double flowers in a block chain is well solved.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention is directed to solving the problems of the prior art.
The technical scheme adopted for achieving the purpose of the invention is that the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system mainly comprises m authentication centers and k external nodes. The authentication center is a main server. And m authentication centers have the same authority.
The external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the commodity RFID label.
Having digital identity certificate information E in RFID tag of any one articlei，j. Wherein i is a commodity production serial number. i is 1,2, …, l. j is the number of times the RFID tag writes a message. j is 1,2, …, k. Digital identity certificate information E of commodityi，jAnd corresponds to the commodity authentication information set Q. The digital identity certificate information is a random number.
When any commodity leaves factory for the first time, the RFID label arranged on the commodity writes a message Ei，1The basic database stores a commodity verification information set Q ═ { Q ═ Qi,1}，I.e., j equals 1.
Each authentication center mainly comprises a recorded event authentication information system and a block chain authentication accounting system.
Any of the authentication centers reads data from the underlying database. The basic database is a server with a data storage function and performs data interaction with a finite field blockchain system with a closed-loop authentication system.
The basic database mainly stores basic authentication data and bibliographic event authentication information.
The initial basic authentication data is provided by the authentication requirement of the authentication center node and is basic information of commodity authentication.
The basis is a commodity verification information set Q. Product authentication information set Q ═ Qi,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j}. And i is the commodity production serial number. i is 1,2, …, l. j is the number of times the RFID tag of the article writes a message. j is 1,2, …, k. Commodity authentication information Qi,jIs digital identity certificate information Ei,jAnd (4) carrying out hash operation on the obtained hash value.
The bibliographic event authentication information comprises verification information of the to-be-detected commodity and verified digital identity certificate information E of the to-be-detected commodityi，jAnd (4) forming.
The commodity to be tested is verified to be false, the commodity is true or false and suspicious or the commodity is false or true.
The bibliographic event information is the operation record information of the bibliographic event authentication information system to the basic database according to the external authentication requirement.
And the bibliographic event authentication information system generates bibliographic transaction information and basic bibliographic event authentication information according to the format requirement of the block chain authentication accounting system on the operation of the basic database according to the authentication requirement.
The bibliographic event authentication information system broadcasts bibliographic transaction information during a block record distribution period T.
The blockchain authentication billing system records the broadcasted bibliographic transaction information.
The block chain authentication and accounting system generates and stores block data according to a certain rule based on the received recorded transaction information.
The main steps of generating and storing block data are as follows:
1) and setting a block issuing period T of the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system and the block issuing mechanism.
2) In a block release period T, the authentication center node bibliographic event authentication information system carries out authentication operation on an authentication request according to an authentication rule on the basis of the basic authentication data according to external requirements; storing the corresponding generated bibliographic event authentication information in a basic database; and meanwhile, generating bibliographic transaction information and uploading the bibliographic transaction information to a block chain authentication and accounting system of each authentication center node in a broadcasting manner.
3) In a block issuing period T, the multi-center authentication system selects any n authentication centers as block issuing nodes in a random mode. The other m-n authentication centers are non-block issuing nodes. m and n are finite positive integers. n ≦ m.
4) And the block issuing node generates block data with a time stamp according to the bibliographic transaction information received in the authentication system within a period of time and broadcasts and issues the block data to the whole authentication system.
The block data includes a block header region and a block body region. The block area collects the recorded transaction information broadcasted during time t. And processing the bibliographic transaction information broadcasted in the time t into root data as a calculation parameter. The root data is processed into authentication data as a calculation parameter. The authentication data is recorded in a block header area.
5) And the block chain authentication accounting system of the block issuing node broadcasts the block data.
6) And the block chain authentication accounting system of each central node of the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system receives the broadcasted block data.
7) And the m authentication centers determine the finally determined new block data according to the set verification rule.
8) When a block data is verified and confirmed by the system, the block data is used as the latest block to be connected to the back of the previous block and is stored in a block chain; the system enters the next block record distribution cycle.
And after scanning the RFID label of the commodity to be tested, the external node accesses the basic database and verifies the authenticity of the commodity to be tested by using a one-time one-certificate method of closed-loop authentication.
The method for verifying the authenticity of the commodity by utilizing the closed-loop authentication one-time method mainly comprises the following steps:
1) and the external node scans the RFID label of the to-be-detected commodity and initiates a request for verifying the authenticity of the to-be-detected commodity to the finite field block chain system. The external node transmits digital identity certificate information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be detectedi，jAnd sending the information to a verification center node of a corresponding commodity with a closed-loop authentication system.
2) The digital identity certificate information E is authenticated by the bibliographic event authentication information system of the authentication centeri，jCarrying out Hash operation to obtain information Hi，j。
The authentication center sends information Hi，jAnd respectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q.
If the message Hi，jAnd if any element in the commodity verification information set Q is not matched, the commodity to be detected is a fake commodity, and the verification information of the commodity to be detected, which indicates that the commodity to be detected is fake, is generated.
If the message Hi，jAnd Q is divided from the commodity verification information set Qi,jAnd if other elements are matched, the commodity to be detected is suspicious, and verification information of the commodity to be detected is generated.
If the message Hi，1And Q in the commodity authentication information set Qi,jAnd if the verification information is matched, the commodity to be detected is a genuine commodity, and verification information of the commodity to be detected which is genuine is generated.
Each authentication center verifies the information of the commodity to be tested and the information Ei，jProcessed as bibliographic transaction information and broadcast the bibliographic transaction information in a finite field blockchain system.
3) And the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle. The checking principle is a majority principle.
And if the commodity is false, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. The external node displays that the commodity is false. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
And if the commodity is true or false and suspicious, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. And the external node displays that the commodity is true or false and suspicious. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
If the goods is true, go to step 4.
4) The authentication center generates digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1And transmitted to the external node. The external node sends digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1Writing into the RFID label of the tested commodity judged to be true to replace the original Ei，j. The digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1The information of the new commodity digital identity certificate is used for verifying the authenticity of the commodity to be tested next time by the external node.
For digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1Carrying out Hash operation to obtain a commodity verification message Qi,j+1. The base database stores and message corresponds to Ei，j+1Commodity authentication message Q ofi,j+1That is, the product authentication information set is updated to Q ═ Qi,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j、Qi,j+1}. The goods authentication message Qi,j+1And the product is used for verifying the authenticity of the next product. The second commodity verification message Q in the updated commodity verification information set Qi,2As event information, and broadcast with closed loop authentication systemCommodity authentication message Q of the first in a conventional finite field block chain systemi,1And newly generated commodity authentication information Qi,j+1And no broadcast. And the finite field block chain system enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
Update to Q ═ { Q ═ Q in the commodity authentication information seti,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j、Qi,j+1On the premise that the authentication center receives the information E sent by the external nodei，k. The authentication center the digital identity certificate information Ei，kCarrying out Hash operation to obtain information Hi，j+1. If the information Hi，j+1And commodity authentication information Q in the commodity authentication information set Qi,kMatching, and k is less than or equal to j, then the digital identity certificate information Ei，kHas been stolen and written into RFID tags of counterfeit goods. The finite field blockchain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node.
Further, the blockchain bibliographic accounting system at least comprises: self-checking parameters, health values and engagement.
The health parameter values form the following rules:
a) if the block data issued by one block issuing node is not verified as a majority, the health parameter value of the authentication center is decreased.
And/or b) the authentication center performs self-checking on the data in the basic database. The result of the self-test affects the value of the health parameter.
And/or c) the health value may be reduced if an authentication center does not issue the basic bibliographic information during the block record issuing period.
The participation degree value is formed according to the following rules:
a) if an authentication center participates in the distribution of block data, the participation degree value increases. And/or b) if an authentication center refuses to participate in issuing block data, the participation degree value is decreased.
And if the self-checking parameters, the health values and the participation degrees continuously agree that the issuing period of the blocks is not reduced, the issuing period is automatically recovered to be the normal initial value. If the self-verification parameters, health values and engagement levels are below the defined lower limits, the center will be alerted or kicked out of the multi-center blockchain system.
The technical effect of the present invention is undoubted. According to the invention, through the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system, a counterfeiter can be effectively prevented from passing through the security loophole of the electronic tag or the security loophole of other anti-counterfeiting system components, and the scale amplitude value RFID electronic tag is effectively prevented, so that the security of the anti-counterfeiting system is ensured. The invention constructs a brand-new mutual-aid system framework based on a 'people-oriented person-I-man' belt-block issuing machine system, and replaces a mining mechanism and a workload proving mechanism in a traditional block chain with a 'people-oriented person-I-man' mutual-aid mode. Therefore, a brand-new block issuing mechanism and a multi-center distributed authentication system architecture are established, and issuing functions of centers are different. The method can be applied to a high-fault-tolerance distributed computing system, and mixed consistency is possible. The invention also solves the problem of double flowers in the block chain. The invention has wide application value in the important fields of non-virtual currency application scenes, such as identity authentication, mastership currency issuance and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an authentication system;
FIG. 2 is a block data structure diagram.
Detailed Description
The present invention is further illustrated by the following examples, but it should not be construed that the scope of the above-described subject matter is limited to the following examples. Various substitutions and alterations can be made without departing from the technical idea of the invention and the scope of the invention is covered by the present invention according to the common technical knowledge and the conventional means in the field.
Example 1:
referring to fig. 1 and 2, a finite field blockchain system with a closed-loop authentication system mainly includes m authentication centers and n external nodes. The authentication center is a main server. And m authentication centers have the same authority.
The external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the commodity RFID label.
Having digital identity certificate information E in RFID tag of any one articlei，j. Wherein i is a commodity production serial number. i is 1,2, …, l. j is the number of times the RFID tag writes a message. j is 1,2, …, k. Digital identity certificate information E of commodityi，jAnd corresponds to the commodity authentication information set Q. The digital identity certificate information is a random number.
When any commodity leaves factory for the first time, the RFID label arranged on the commodity writes a message Ei，1The basic database stores a commodity verification information set Q ═ { Q ═ Qi,1I.e., j is 1.
Each authentication center mainly comprises a recorded event authentication information system and a block chain authentication accounting system.
Any of the authentication centers reads data from the underlying database. The basic database is a server with a data storage function and performs data interaction with a finite field blockchain system with a closed-loop authentication system.
The basic database mainly stores basic authentication data and bibliographic event authentication information.
The initial basic authentication data is provided by the authentication requirement of the authentication center node and is basic information of commodity authentication.
The basis is a commodity verification information set Q. Product authentication information set Q ═ Qi,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j}. And i is the commodity production serial number. i is 1,2, …, l. j is the number of times the RFID tag of the article writes a message. j is 1,2, …, k. Commodity authentication information Qi,jIs digital identity certificate information Ei,jAnd (4) carrying out hash operation on the obtained hash value. .
The bibliographic event authentication information comprises verification information of the to-be-detected commodity and verified digital identity certificate information E of the to-be-detected commodityi，jAnd (4) forming.
The commodity to be tested is verified to be false, the commodity is true or false and suspicious or the commodity is false or true.
The bibliographic event information is the operation record information of the bibliographic event authentication information system to the basic database according to the external authentication requirement.
And the bibliographic event authentication information system generates bibliographic transaction information and basic bibliographic event authentication information according to the format requirement of the block chain authentication accounting system on the operation of the basic database according to the authentication requirement.
The bibliographic event authentication information system broadcasts bibliographic transaction information during a block record distribution period T.
The blockchain authentication billing system records the broadcasted bibliographic transaction information.
The block chain authentication and accounting system generates and stores block data according to a certain rule based on the received recorded transaction information.
The main steps of generating and storing block data are as follows:
1) and setting a block issuing period T of the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system and the block issuing mechanism.
2) In a block release period T, the authentication center node bibliographic event authentication information system carries out authentication operation on an authentication request according to an authentication rule on the basis of the basic authentication data according to external requirements; storing the corresponding generated bibliographic event authentication information in a basic database; and meanwhile, generating bibliographic transaction information and uploading the bibliographic transaction information to a block chain authentication and accounting system of each authentication center node in a broadcasting manner.
3) In a block issuing period T, the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system selects any n central nodes as block issuing nodes in a random mode. The other m-n central nodes are non-block issuing nodes.
Further, the step of selecting the block issuing node is mainly as follows:
1.1) selecting the authentication center as a block issuing node in a random mode.
1.2) records the number of times d each authentication center was selected as a chunk issue node in the period of T2.
1.3) setting a time threshold epsilon.
1.4) judging the magnitude relation between d and a threshold epsilon. If d > epsilon, the corresponding authentication center is moved out of the random list in the next period and reset for a number of times d. If d is less than or equal to epsilon, directly resetting the times d.
4) And the block issuing node generates block data with a time stamp according to the bibliographic transaction information received in the authentication system within a period of time and broadcasts and issues the block data to the whole authentication system.
The block data includes a block header region and a block body region. The block area collects the recorded transaction information broadcasted during time t. And processing the bibliographic transaction information broadcasted in the time t into root data as a calculation parameter. The root data is used as a calculation parameter and is processed into authentication data; the authentication data is recorded in a block header area. the t time is a set time. .
5) And the block chain authentication accounting system of the block issuing node broadcasts the block data.
6) And the block chain authentication accounting system of each central node of the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system receives the broadcasted block data.
7) And the m authentication centers determine the finally determined new block data according to the set verification rule.
8) When a block data is verified and confirmed by the system, the block data is used as the latest block to be connected to the back of the previous block and is stored in a block chain; the system enters the next block record distribution cycle.
And after scanning the RFID label of the commodity to be tested, the external node accesses the basic database and verifies the authenticity of the commodity to be tested by using a one-time one-certificate method of closed-loop authentication.
The method for verifying the authenticity of the commodity by utilizing the closed-loop authentication one-time method mainly comprises the following steps:
a) and the external node scans the RFID label of the to-be-detected commodity and initiates a request for verifying the authenticity of the to-be-detected commodity to the finite field block chain system. The external node transmits digital identity certificate information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be detectedi，jAnd sending the information to a verification center node of a corresponding commodity with a closed-loop authentication system.
b) Bibliography of the authentication centerEvent authentication information system for said digital identity certificate information Ei，jCarrying out Hash operation to obtain information Hi，j。
The authentication center sends information Hi，jAnd respectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q.
If the message Hi，jAnd if any element in the commodity verification information set Q is not matched, the commodity to be detected is a fake commodity, and the verification information of the commodity to be detected, which indicates that the commodity to be detected is fake, is generated.
If the message Hi，jAnd Q is divided from the commodity verification information set Qi,jAnd if other elements are matched, the commodity to be detected is suspicious, and verification information of the commodity to be detected is generated.
If the message Hi，1And Q in the commodity authentication information set Qi,jAnd if the verification information is matched, the commodity to be detected is a genuine commodity, and verification information of the commodity to be detected which is genuine is generated.
Each authentication center verifies the information of the commodity to be tested and the information Ei，jProcessed as bibliographic transaction information and broadcast the bibliographic transaction information in a finite field blockchain system.
c) And the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle. The checking principle is a majority principle.
And if the commodity is false, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. The external node displays that the commodity is false. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
And if the commodity is false, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. The external node displays that the commodity is false. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
And if the commodity is true or false and suspicious, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. And the external node displays that the commodity is true or false and suspicious. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
If the goods is true, go to step 4.
d) The authentication center generates digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1And transmitted to the external node. The external node sends digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1Writing into the RFID label of the tested commodity judged to be true to replace the original Ei，j. The digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1The information of the new commodity digital identity certificate is used for verifying the authenticity of the commodity to be tested at the j +1 th time of the external node.
For digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1Carrying out Hash operation to obtain a commodity verification message Qi,j+1. The base database stores and message corresponds to Ei，j+1Commodity authentication message Q ofi,j+1That is, the product authentication information set is updated to Q ═ Qi,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j、Qi,j+1}. The second commodity verification message Q in the updated commodity verification information set Qi,2As the bibliographic event information, and broadcasting the first commodity verification message Q in the finite field blockchain system with closed-loop authentication systemi,1And newly generated commodity authentication information Qi,j+1And no broadcast. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
Update to Q ═ { Q ═ Q in the commodity authentication information seti,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j、Qi,j+1On the premise of the previous step, the authentication centerReceiving the digital identity certificate information E sent by the external nodei，k. The authentication center the digital identity certificate information Ei，kCarrying out Hash operation to obtain information Hi，j+1. If the information Hi，j+1And commodity authentication information Q in the commodity authentication information set Qi,kMatching, and k is less than or equal to j, then the digital identity certificate information Ei，kHas been stolen and written into RFID tags of counterfeit goods. The finite field blockchain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node.
Further, the blockchain bibliographic accounting system at least comprises: self-checking parameters, health values and engagement.
The health parameter values form the following rules:
a) if the block data issued by one block issuing node is not verified as a majority, the health parameter value of the authentication center is decreased.
And/or b) the authentication center performs self-checking on the data in the basic database. The result of the self-test affects the value of the health parameter.
And/or c) the health value may be reduced if an authentication center does not issue the basic bibliographic information during the block record issuing period.
The participation degree value is formed according to the following rules:
a) if an authentication center participates in the distribution of block data, the participation degree value increases.
And/or b) if an authentication center refuses to participate in issuing block data, the participation degree value is decreased.
And if the self-checking parameters, the health values and the participation degrees continuously agree that the issuing period of the blocks is not reduced, the issuing period is automatically recovered to be the normal initial value. If the self-verification parameters, health values and engagement levels are below the defined lower limits, the center will be alerted or kicked out of the multi-center blockchain system.
Example 2:
the method for verifying the authenticity of the Helianna Lvbao essence by using the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system mainly comprises the following steps:
1) and establishing a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system, wherein the finite field block chain system mainly comprises m authentication centers and k external nodes. The authentication center is a main server. And m authentication centers have the same authority. The external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the commodity RFID label.
2) A certain user utilizes a mobile phone with an RFID identification function as an external node. Scanning the RFID label on the essence bottle body of the Helianna Lvbao bottle by the external node to obtain digital identity certificate information E101，25. 101 is the production serial number of Helianna's bottle essence of green treasure, and 25 shows that this bottle essence has been written into and has been updated 25 times digital identity certificate information.
3) And the external node initiates a 25 th authenticity verification request of the commodity to be tested to the finite field block chain system. The external node transmits information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be tested101，25Sending the data to a finite field block chain system with a closed loop authentication system.
4) Each authentication center pairs the digital identity certificate information E101，25Carrying out Hash operation to obtain information H101，25。
Each authentication center sends information H101，25And respectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q. The commodity authentication information set Q ═ { Q ═ Q101,1、Q101,2、…、Q101，25}
The comparison results in this example are: the message H101，25And any element in the commodity verification information set Q is not matched. Therefore, the commodity to be tested is a fake commodity, and each authentication center generates verification information of the commodity to be tested, wherein the commodity to be tested is fake.
5) And the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle. The checking principle is a majority principle.
And the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node because the commodity is false. The external node displays that the commodity is false. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. The scanning time and the physical address are the possible fake making time and the address of a fake maker. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
Example 3:
the method for verifying the authenticity of the Helianna Lvbao essence by using the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system mainly comprises the following steps:
1) and establishing a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system, wherein the finite field block chain system mainly comprises m authentication centers and k external nodes. The authentication center is a main server. And m authentication centers have the same authority. The external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the commodity RFID label.
2) A certain user utilizes a mobile phone with an RFID identification function as an external node. Scanning the RFID label on the essence bottle body of the Helianna Lvbao bottle by the external node to obtain digital identity certificate information E102，27. 102 is the production serial number of Helianna' Lubao bottle essence, and 27 indicates that the bottle essence is written with the digital identity certificate information which is updated 27 times.
3) And the external node initiates a 27 th authenticity verification request of the commodity to be tested to the finite field block chain system. The external node transmits information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be tested102，27Sending the data to a finite field block chain system with a closed loop authentication system.
4) Each authentication center pairs the digital identity certificate information E102，27Carrying out Hash operation to obtain information H102，27。
Each authentication center sends information H101，25And respectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q. The commodity authentication information set Q ═ { Q ═ Q102,1、Q102,2、…、Q102，27}
The comparison results in this example are: the message Hi，jAnd Q is divided from the commodity verification information set Q102,27If other elements are matched, the commodity to be tested is true or false and the verification of the commodity to be tested is generatedAnd (4) information.
5) And the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle. The checking principle is a majority principle.
And if the commodity is true or false and suspicious, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. And the external node displays that the commodity is true or false and suspicious. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
Example 4:
the method for verifying the authenticity of the Helianna Lvbao essence by using the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system mainly comprises the following steps:
1) and establishing a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system, wherein the finite field block chain system mainly comprises m authentication centers and k external nodes. The authentication center is a main server. And m authentication centers have the same authority. The external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the commodity RFID label.
2) A certain user utilizes a mobile phone with an RFID identification function as an external node. Scanning the RFID label on the essence bottle body of the Helianna Lvbao bottle by the external node to obtain digital identity certificate information E103，30. 103 is the production serial number of Helianna' Lubao bottle essence, and 30 shows that the bottle essence is written in and updated with 30 times of digital identity certificate information.
3) And the external node initiates a 30-time authenticity verification request of the commodity to be tested to the finite field block chain system. The external node transmits information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be tested103，30Sending the data to a finite field block chain system with a closed loop authentication system.
4) Each authentication center pairs the digital identity certificate information E103，30Carrying out Hash operation to obtain information H103，30。
Each authentication center sends information H103，30And respectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q.The commodity authentication information set Q ═ { Q ═ Q103,1、Q103,2、…、Q103，30}
The comparison results in this example are: the message Hi，jAnd Q in the commodity authentication information set Q103，30If the matching result is positive, the commodity is true, and the authentication center generates digital identity certificate information E103，31And transmitted to the external node. The external node sends digital identity certificate information E103，31Writing into the RFID label of the tested commodity judged to be true to replace the original E103，30. The digital identity certificate information E103，31The digital identity certificate information of the new commodity is used for verifying the authenticity of the commodity to be tested at the 31 st time by the external node.
For digital identity certificate information E103，31Carrying out Hash operation to obtain a commodity verification message Qi,j+1. The base database stores and message corresponds to E103，31Commodity authentication message Q of103，31That is, the product authentication information set is updated to Q ═ Q103,1、Q103,2、…、Q103,j、Q103，31}. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
5) And the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle. The checking principle is a majority principle.
And if the commodity is true, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. And the external node displays that the commodity is true or false and suspicious. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
Example 5:
the method for verifying the authenticity of the Helianna Lvbao essence by using the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system mainly comprises the following steps:
1) and establishing a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system, wherein the finite field block chain system mainly comprises m authentication centers and k external nodes. The authentication center is a main server. And m authentication centers have the same authority. The external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the commodity RFID label.
2) A certain user utilizes a mobile phone with an RFID identification function as an external node. Scanning the RFID label on the essence bottle body of the Helianna Lvbao bottle by the external node to obtain digital identity certificate information E104，50. 104 is the production serial number of Helianna' Lubao bottle essence, and 50 indicates that the bottle essence is written in the digital identity certificate information which is updated 50 times.
3) And the external node initiates a request for verifying the authenticity of the commodity to be tested to the finite field block chain system. The external node transmits information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be tested104，50Sending the data to a finite field block chain system with a closed loop authentication system.
4) Each authentication center pairs the digital identity certificate information E104，50Carrying out Hash operation to obtain information H104，50。
Each authentication center sends information H104，50And respectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q. The commodity authentication information set Q ═ { Q ═ Q104,1、Q104,2、…、Q104，52}
The comparison results in this example are: the message H104，50And an element Q in the commodity authentication information set Q104,50The latest commodity verification information corresponding to the commodity with the serial number 104 in the commodity verification information set Q is Q104，52If the commodity to be tested is false, generating verification information of the commodity to be tested, wherein the commodity to be tested is false. Commodity digital identity certificate information E104，50Has been stolen and written into RFID tags of counterfeit goods. The finite field blockchain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. The scan time and physical address are the fake time and fake address of a possible counterfeiter.
5) And the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle. The checking principle is a majority principle.
And if the commodity is false, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node. The external node displays that the commodity is false. And the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node. And the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.

Claims (6)

1. A finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system is characterized in that: the system comprises m authentication centers and n external nodes; the authentication center is a main server; m authentication centers have the same authority; the external node is a mobile terminal with the function of reading and writing the RFID label of the commodity;
each authentication center comprises a recorded event authentication information system and a block chain authentication and accounting system;
any authentication center reads data from a basic database; the basic database is a server with a data storage function and used for carrying out data interaction with a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system;
the basic database stores basic authentication data and bibliographic event authentication information;
the initial basic authentication data is provided by the authentication requirement of the authentication center node and is basic information of commodity authentication; the basic authentication data is a commodity verification information set Q; product authentication information set Q ═ Qi,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j}; i is the commodity production serial number; 1,2, …, l; j is the number of times of writing messages into the RFID label of the commodity; j ═ 1,2, …, k; commodity authentication message Qi,jIs digital identity certificate information Ei,jCarrying out Hash operation on the obtained Hash value;
the bibliographic event authentication information comprises verification information of the to-be-detected commodity and verified digital identity certificate information E of the to-be-detected commodityi，jComposition is carried out;
after scanning the RFID label of the commodity to be tested, the external node accesses the basic database and verifies the authenticity of the commodity to be tested by using a one-time one-certificate method of closed-loop authentication; the commodity to be tested is verified to be whether the commodity is false, whether the commodity is true or false or whether the commodity is true;
the bibliographic event authentication information is operation record information of the bibliographic event authentication information system on a basic database according to external authentication requirements;
the bibliographic event authentication information system generates bibliographic transaction information and basic bibliographic event authentication information according to the format requirement of the block chain authentication accounting system on the operation of a basic database according to the authentication requirement;
the bibliographic event authentication information system broadcasts bibliographic transaction information in a block record release period T;
the blockchain authentication and accounting system records the broadcasted bibliographic transaction information;
the block chain authentication and accounting system generates and stores block data according to a certain rule on the basis of the received recorded transaction information;
the steps of verifying the authenticity of the commodity by using a one-time one-certificate method of closed-loop authentication are as follows:
1) the external node scans the RFID label of the commodity to be tested and initiates a request for verifying the authenticity of the commodity to be tested to the finite field block chain system; the external node transmits digital identity certificate information E in the RFID label of the commodity to be detectedi，jSending the information to a verification center node of a corresponding commodity in a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system;
2) the digital identity certificate information E is authenticated by the bibliographic event authentication information system of the authentication centeri，jCarrying out Hash operation to obtain a message Hi，j；
The authentication center sends a message Hi，jRespectively carrying out comparison operation with each element in the commodity verification information set Q;
if the message Hi，jIf the detected commodity is not matched with any element in the commodity verification information set Q, the commodity to be detected is a fake commodity, and verification information of the commodity to be detected, which is false, is generated;
if the message Hi，jAnd Q is divided from the commodity verification information set Qi,jIf other elements are matched, the commodity to be detected is suspicious, and verification information of the commodity to be detected is generated;
if the message Hi，jAnd Q in the commodity authentication information set Qi,jIf the verification information is matched with the commodity to be detected, the commodity to be detected is a genuine commodity, and verification information of the commodity to be detected which is genuine is generated;
each authentication center verifies the information of the commodity to be tested and the digital identity certificate information Ei，jProcessing the transaction information into bibliographic transaction information, and broadcasting the bibliographic transaction information in a limited domain blockchain system;
3) the finite field block chain system receives the judgment results of the m authentication centers and judges whether the commodity is true or false according to a set verification principle;
if the commodity is false, the finite field block chain system sends the judgment result to the external node; the external node displays that the commodity is false; the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node; the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node;
if the commodity is true or false and suspicious, the finite field block chain system sends a judgment result to the external node; the external node displays that the commodity is true or false and suspicious; the finite field block chain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node; the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node;
if the commodity is true, turning to the step 4;
4) the authentication center generates digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1And sending to the external node; the external node sends digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1Writing into the RFID label of the tested commodity judged to be true to replace the original Ei，j(ii) a The digital identity certificate information Ei, j+1Is a new commodity digital identity cardThe book information is used for verifying the authenticity of the commodity to be tested next time by the external node;
for digital identity certificate information Ei，j+1Carrying out Hash operation to obtain a commodity verification message Qi,j+1(ii) a The base database stores and message corresponds to Ei，j+1Commodity authentication message Q ofi,j+1That is, the product authentication information set is updated to Q ═ Qi,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j、Qi,j+1}; the goods authentication message Qi,j+1The method is used for verifying the authenticity of the next commodity; the second commodity verification message Q in the updated commodity verification information set Qi,2As the bibliographic event information, and broadcasting the first commodity verification message Q in the finite field blockchain system with closed-loop authentication systemi,1And newly generated goods authentication message Qi,j+1Not broadcasting;
and the finite field block chain system finishes the authenticity verification of the commodity, enters the next closed-loop authentication process and waits for the next commodity authenticity verification request of the external node.
2. The finite field blockchain system with closed-loop authentication system as claimed in claim 1, wherein: having digital identity certificate information E in RFID tag of any one articlei，j(ii) a Wherein i is a commodity production serial number; 1,2, …, l; j is the number of times that the RFID tag writes in the digital identity certificate information; j ═ 1,2, …, k; the digital identity certificate information is a random number;
when any commodity leaves factory for the first time, the RFID label arranged on the commodity is written in the digital identity certificate information E of the commodityi，1(ii) a The basic database of each authentication center stores a commodity verification information set Q ═ { Q ═ Qi,1I.e., j is 1.
3. The finite field blockchain system with closed loop authentication system as claimed in claim 2, wherein: the checking principle is a majority principle.
4. The finite field blockchain system with closed-loop authentication system as claimed in claim 3, wherein: update to Q ═ { Q ═ Q in the commodity authentication information seti,1、Qi,2、…、Qi,j、Qi,j+1On the premise that the authentication center receives the commodity digital identity certificate information E sent by the external nodei，k(ii) a The authentication center performs authentication on the commodity digital identity certificate information Ei，kCarrying out Hash operation to obtain a message Hi，j+1(ii) a If the message Hi，j+1And commodity authentication information Q in commodity authentication information set Qi,kMatching, and k is less than or equal to j, the commodity digital identity certificate information Ei，kHas been stolen and written into the RFID tag of a counterfeit article; the finite field blockchain system records the scanning time and the physical address of the external node.
5. The finite field blockchain system with closed-loop authentication system as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the steps of generating and storing tile data are as follows:
1) setting a block release period T of a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system and a block release mechanism;
2) in a block release period T, the authentication center node bibliographic event authentication information system carries out authentication operation on an authentication request according to an authentication rule on the basis of the basic authentication data according to external requirements; storing the corresponding generated bibliographic event authentication information in a basic database; meanwhile, generating bibliographic transaction information and uploading the bibliographic transaction information to a block chain authentication and accounting system of each authentication center node in a broadcasting manner;
3) in a block release period T, a finite field block chain system with a closed-loop authentication system selects any n central nodes as block release nodes in a random mode; the other m-n central nodes are non-block issuing nodes;
4) the block issuing node generates block data with a timestamp according to the bibliographic transaction information received in the authentication system within a period of time and broadcasts and issues the block data to the whole authentication system;
the block data comprises a block head area and a block body area; collecting the recorded transaction information broadcasted in a period of time in the block area, wherein the recorded transaction information is used as a calculation parameter and processed into root data; the root data is used as a calculation parameter and is processed into authentication data; the authentication data is recorded in a block header area;
5) the block chain authentication and accounting system of the block issuing node broadcasts the block data;
6) the block chain authentication accounting system of each central node of the finite field block chain system with the closed-loop authentication system receives the broadcasted block data;
7) the m authentication centers determine finally identified new block data according to a set check rule;
8) when a block data is verified and confirmed by the system, the block data is used as the latest block to be connected to the back of the previous block and is stored in a block chain; the system enters the next block record distribution cycle.
6. The finite field blockchain system with closed-loop authentication system as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the blockchain bibliographic accounting system at least comprises: self-checking parameters, health values and engagement;
the health value forms the following rules:
a) if the block data issued by one block issuing node is not verified as a plurality of blocks, the health value of the authentication center is reduced;
and/or b) the authentication center carries out self-checking on the data in the basic database; the health value is influenced by the self-checking result;
and/or c) if an authentication center does not issue basic bibliographic information during the tile record issuance period, the health value may decrease;
the participation degree value is formed according to the following rules:
a) if one authentication center participates in the data distribution of the block, the participation degree value is increased;
and/or b) if an authentication center refuses to participate in issuing block data, the participation degree value is reduced;
the self-checking parameters, the health values and the participation degrees continuously agree that the issuing period of each block is not reduced, and the issuing period is automatically recovered to be a normal initial value; if the self-verification parameters, health values and engagement levels are below the prescribed lower limit values, the center will be alerted or kicked out of the multi-center blockchain system.
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