CN108111311A - A kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm - Google Patents
A kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm Download PDFInfo
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- CN108111311A CN108111311A CN201711415790.XA CN201711415790A CN108111311A CN 108111311 A CN108111311 A CN 108111311A CN 201711415790 A CN201711415790 A CN 201711415790A CN 108111311 A CN108111311 A CN 108111311A
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- Prior art keywords
- terminal
- state
- public key
- certificate
- close
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm, need to provide equipment end, terminal and server end, this method is：The equipment end generation close SM2 keys of state are issued a command under terminal to preserving, public key is given to server end by terminal；After server end receives public key, preserved by the close certificate of public key acquisition state and equipment end is transmitted to by terminal；The close certificate of equipment end parsing state, judges whether the public key of certificate and the public key itself preserved are consistent, by matching result reporting terminal；Terminal receive matching result it is consistent when, by PDF document be issued to equipment end displaying；After client submits handwriting, handwriting is synthesized in current PDF document by equipment end, and the PDF document after synthesis is digitally signed using the close certificate of state and SM2 private keys, and server end is transmitted to by terminal；Server end is filed after confirming the legitimacy of PDF document using the close certificate of state and public key.The present invention prevents document and signature to be tampered while the transmission security of tripartite's communication is ensured.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the bank field more particularly to a kind of sides that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm
Method.
Background technology
Current pimple bank all waits cabinets face device extension electronic handwritten signature service for clear outside traditional cabinet, to reduce paper
The expense of matter document.The electronic signature service flow of bank counter routine is as follows at present：PDF document is sent to terminal by backstage,
Terminal is handed down to equipment end and is shown by HID (anthroposomatology input equipment) or bluetooth again, and after customer signature, equipment end will be signed
Name data are uploaded to terminal (including picture and track data), and signed data is synthesized to after PDF by terminal and is uploaded to backstage clothes
Business device is preserved.The formation of signature track is carried out with synthesis in equipment end and terminal both ends respectively in the operation flow, service
End is only involved in preserving work, this can cause following risk：
(1) although ensure that equipment end to the transmission security of terminal, can not ensure to synthesize preceding PDF by key encryption
PDF with equipment end displaying is matched, i.e., there may be inconsistent for the document and the final document for participating in synthesis that client checks
Situation；
(2) terminal can not ensure that signed data source is legal, that is, the signed data for participating in synthesis may not be to come from
Correct equipment；
(3) server-side passively receives the final PDF document of terminal upload, can not ensure whether file is legal in itself, it is impossible to
Confirm whether document is tampered.
The content of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is to provide and a kind of realizes bank counter electronic signature based on national secret algorithm
Method prevents document and signature to be tampered while the transmission security of tripartite's communication is ensured.
What the present invention was realized in：A kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm, needs to provide
Equipment end, terminal and server end, described method includes following steps：
Step S1, by issuing a command to the equipment end under the terminal；
Step S2, after described equipment end receives the instruction of terminal, generation state close SM2 keys are to preserving, and by public key
On give terminal, server end is transmitted to by the terminal；
Step S3, after described server end receives public key, preserved and issued by the close certificate of public key acquisition state
To terminal, equipment end is transmitted to by the terminal；
Step S4, described equipment end parses the close certificate of state received, judges that certificate institute band public key is protected with itself
Whether the public key deposited is consistent, and matching result is reported to terminal；
Step S5, PDF document is issued to equipment end and shows visitor by terminal in the case where receiving matching result and being unanimous circumstances
Family；
Step S6, after client reads and handwriting is submitted, client's handwriting is synthesized to currently by the equipment end
In PDF document, and the PDF document after synthesis is digitally signed using the close certificate of state and SM2 private keys of preservation, by number
PDF after signature is sent to terminal, and server end is transmitted to by terminal；
Step S7, after described server end receives the PDF after digital signature, the close certificate of state and public key is used to confirm PDF texts
Filing processing is carried out after the legitimacy of shelves.
Further, the equipment end is clear equipment outside cabinet.
Further, the equipment end is using the hardware encryption chip for meeting the close certification of state.
Further, the equipment end is equipped with the electromagnetic screen with the close chip of state, by the electromagnetic screen to track of signing
Data source is acquired.
Further, " the close certificate of public key acquisition state is passed through " specifically, the server end carries in the step S3
Key and the row side's information of handing over to the collective or the state apply obtaining the close certificate of state to CA.
Further, " client's handwriting is synthesized in current PDF document by the equipment end " has in the step S6
Body is：The current dictionary object for treating signature page of the PDF of current presentation is obtained, area coordinate to be signed is calculated, finally with water
Signature track is synthesized in designated position by the form of print.
Further, in the step S6 " with the close certificate of state and SM2 private keys preserved to the PDF document after synthesis into
Row digital signature " is specially：Summary first is calculated using SM3 algorithms to PDF main bodys domain, then using SM2 algorithms to described
Summary carries out private key encryption, and encrypted result is formed to the label that PKCS7 data flows are synthesized to PDF document together with state close certificate
The PDF after digital signature is obtained in name domain.
Further, the step S7 is specially：After the server end receives the PDF after digital signature, from signature field
Middle taking-up PKCS7 streams, and go abroad close certificate and signed data are split, certificate authority person's information is then compared, confirms that certificate is legal
Afterwards, public key is taken out from the close certificate of state signed data is decrypted using SM2 algorithms, and PDF document is calculated according to SM3 algorithms
Middle main body domain generates new summary, by decrypted result with new summary compared with, when comparative result is consistent, expression sign test into
Work(carries out filing processing.
The invention has the advantages that：
1st, entirely SM2 public private key pairs are generated by equipment end in signature flow, and terminal is not required additionally as equipment end issues private
Key ensures that key is not leaked；
2nd, be shown in equipment end, sign, synthesizing and digital signature integration, utmostly ensure signed data not by
It distorts；
3rd, the document of output is digitally signed using the close certificate of state and can met people's row by sign test and added on finance data
Decryption will use the requirement of domestic Encryption Algorithm；
4th, server can carry out sign test to final document, it is ensured that and document is generated by designated equipment end, is reduced terminal and is participated in,
On the one hand reduce terminal capabilities pressure, on the other hand prevent sensitive data be stolen during transmission process or local cache or
The risk distorted.
Description of the drawings
The present invention is further illustrated in conjunction with the embodiments with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is the method for the present invention execution flow chart.
Fig. 2 is the flow diagram of the PDF digital signature of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the flow diagram of the PDF sign tests of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
It please refers to Fig.1 to Fig.3, a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm of the present invention need to carry
For equipment end, terminal (teller's operating terminal) and server end, the equipment end can be clear equipment outside cabinet, and the equipment end can be set
There is the electromagnetic screen with the close chip of state, signature track data source is acquired by the electromagnetic screen, it is soft application layer can be prevented
Part distorts the possibility of track, and the equipment end can be reduced software application and be added solution using the hardware encryption chip for meeting the close certification of state
The intervention of close result, described method includes following steps：
Step S1, by issuing a command to the equipment end under the terminal；
Step S2, after described equipment end receives the instruction of terminal, generation state close SM2 keys are to preserving, and by public key
On give terminal, server end is transmitted to by the terminal；
Step S3, after described server end receives public key, preserved and issued by the close certificate of public key acquisition state
To terminal, equipment end is transmitted to by the terminal；Wherein, " the close certificate of public key acquisition state is passed through " specifically, institute can be passed through
Stating server end submits public key and row side's information to apply obtaining the close certificate of state to CA, which can be third party CA or one's own profession CA.
Wherein, CA is certificate authority (Certificate Authority) or certification authority agent；
Step S4, described equipment end parses the close certificate of state received, judges that certificate institute band public key is protected with itself
Whether the public key deposited is consistent, and matching result is reported to terminal；
Step S5, PDF document is issued to equipment end and shows visitor by terminal in the case where receiving matching result and being unanimous circumstances
Family；
Step S6, after client reads and handwriting is submitted, client's handwriting is synthesized to currently by the equipment end
In PDF document, which is specially：The current dictionary object for treating signature page of the PDF of current presentation is obtained, calculates and waits to sign
Signature track is finally synthesized in designated position by the area coordinate of word in the form of watermark；It is described to set after completing synthetic operation
Standby end is digitally signed the PDF document after synthesis using the close certificate of state and SM2 private keys of preservation, after digital signature
PDF is sent to terminal, and server end is transmitted to by terminal；The process of the digital signature is specially：First PDF main bodys domain is used
Summary is calculated in SM3 algorithms, then private key encryption (signature) is carried out to the summary using SM2 algorithms, by encrypted knot
Fruit forms the PDF that PKCS7 data flows are synthesized to after digital signature is obtained in the signature field of PDF document together with state close certificate；
Step S7, after described server end receives the PDF after digital signature, the close certificate of state and public key is used to confirm PDF texts
Filing processing is carried out after the legitimacy of shelves, the step S7 is specially：After the server end receives the PDF after digital signature,
PKCS7 streams are taken out from signature field, and split go abroad close certificate and signed data, then compare certificate authority person's information, are confirmed
After certificate is legal, (sign test) is decrypted using SM2 algorithms to signed data in taking-up public key from state's close certificate, and according to SM3
Algorithm calculates main body domain in PDF document and generates new summary (summary 1), by decrypted result (summary 2) and new summary (summary 1)
It is compared, when comparative result is consistent, represents sign test success, carry out filing processing.
Signature field PDF document synthesis of the present invention is in the unified progress of equipment end, it is ensured that document and data match one by one, i.e. user
The document and participation synthesis document seen are same part data sources, avoid secondary data copy that data is brought to be tampered additional
Risk, while by the close chip of state, treated that track data is directly synthesized in PDF document by first-hand use for equipment end,
The risk that signature track is avoided to be tampered, equipment end are digitally signed the PDF document after synthesis using the close certificate of state, it is ensured that
The legitimacy of final document, effectively prevents document to be tampered, i.e., equipment needs to generate public private key pair in advance and is reported to public key
The close certificate of the unique state of server end application when being digitally signed, is generated using national secret algorithm and made a summary, together with certificate
It is synthesized in the signature field of PDF document, the close certificate of state of equipment end takes from terminal to background server application on final document
Business device end carries out digital sign test again, further strengthens file validation.Entire signature flow terminal works amount is few, reduces terminal
Performance pressures.
Although specific embodiments of the present invention have been described above, those familiar with the art should manage
Solution, our described specific embodiments are merely exemplary rather than for the restriction to the scope of the present invention, are familiar with this
The equivalent modification and variation that the technical staff in field is made in the spirit according to the present invention, should all cover the present invention's
In scope of the claimed protection.
Claims (8)
- A kind of 1. method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm, it is characterised in that：Equipment end, terminal need to be provided And server end, described method includes following steps：Step S1, by issuing a command to the equipment end under the terminal；Step S2, after described equipment end receives the instruction of terminal, the close SM2 keys of generation state will be sent to preserving on public key To terminal, server end is transmitted to by the terminal；Step S3, after described server end receives public key, preserved by the close certificate of public key acquisition state and be handed down to end End, equipment end is transmitted to by the terminal；Step S4, described equipment end parses the close certificate of state received, judge certificate with public key and itself preserve Whether public key is consistent, and matching result is reported to terminal；Step S5, PDF document is issued to equipment end and shows client by terminal in the case where receiving matching result and being unanimous circumstances；Step S6, after client reads and handwriting is submitted, client's handwriting is synthesized to current PDF texts by the equipment end In shelves, and the PDF document after synthesis is digitally signed using the close certificate of state and SM2 private keys of preservation, by digital signature PDF afterwards is sent to terminal, and server end is transmitted to by terminal；Step S7, after described server end receives the PDF after digital signature, PDF document is confirmed using the close certificate of state and public key Filing processing is carried out after legitimacy.
- 2. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 1, feature are existed In：The equipment end is clear equipment outside cabinet.
- 3. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 1, feature are existed In：The equipment end is using the hardware encryption chip for meeting the close certification of state.
- 4. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 1, feature are existed In：The equipment end is equipped with the electromagnetic screen with the close chip of state, and signature track data source is acquired by the electromagnetic screen.
- 5. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 1, feature are existed In：" pass through the close certificate of public key acquisition state " in the step S3 specifically, the server end submits public key and row side's letter It ceases and applies obtaining the close certificate of state to CA.
- 6. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 1, feature are existed In：" client's handwriting is synthesized in current PDF document by the equipment end " is specially in the step S6：Obtain current exhibition The current dictionary object for treating signature page of the PDF shown, calculates area coordinate to be signed, will finally sign rail in the form of watermark Mark is synthesized in designated position.
- 7. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 1, feature are existed In：" PDF document after synthesis is digitally signed with the close certificate of the state of preservation and SM2 private keys " in the step S6 specific For：Summary first is calculated using SM3 algorithms to PDF main bodys domain, then carrying out private key to the summary using SM2 algorithms adds It is close, it encrypted result together with state close certificate is formed into PKCS7 data flows is synthesized in the signature field of PDF document and obtain number PDF after signature.
- 8. a kind of method that bank counter electronic signature is realized based on national secret algorithm according to claim 7, feature are existed In：The step S7 is specially：After the server end receives the PDF after digital signature, PKCS7 streams are taken out from signature field, And go abroad close certificate and signed data are split, certificate authority person's information is then compared, after confirming that certificate is legal, from the close certificate of state It takes out public key signed data is decrypted using SM2 algorithms, and main body domain in PDF document is calculated according to SM3 algorithms and is generated newly Summary, by decrypted result compared with new summary, when comparative result is consistent, represent sign test success, carry out at filing Reason.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201711415790.XA CN108111311B (en) | 2017-12-25 | 2017-12-25 | Method for realizing bank counter electronic signature based on state cryptographic algorithm |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201711415790.XA CN108111311B (en) | 2017-12-25 | 2017-12-25 | Method for realizing bank counter electronic signature based on state cryptographic algorithm |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| CN108111311A true CN108111311A (en) | 2018-06-01 |
| CN108111311B CN108111311B (en) | 2021-11-19 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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| CN201711415790.XA Active CN108111311B (en) | 2017-12-25 | 2017-12-25 | Method for realizing bank counter electronic signature based on state cryptographic algorithm |
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110719162A (en) * | 2019-09-04 | 2020-01-21 | 浪潮金融信息技术有限公司 | Method for guaranteeing safety of bank self-service terminal system based on SM2 algorithm |
| CN111369364A (en) * | 2020-03-02 | 2020-07-03 | 中国农业银行股份有限公司 | Electronic signature method and device based on super counter |
| CN114499891A (en) * | 2022-03-21 | 2022-05-13 | 宁夏凯信特信息科技有限公司 | Signature server system and signature verification method |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN110719162A (en) * | 2019-09-04 | 2020-01-21 | 浪潮金融信息技术有限公司 | Method for guaranteeing safety of bank self-service terminal system based on SM2 algorithm |
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| CN114499891A (en) * | 2022-03-21 | 2022-05-13 | 宁夏凯信特信息科技有限公司 | Signature server system and signature verification method |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN108111311B (en) | 2021-11-19 |
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