CN107749865B - A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography - Google Patents
A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/50—Network services
- H04L67/52—Network services specially adapted for the location of the user terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography, including a Cloud Server, a data service provider, several mobile subscribers；Data service provider SP carries out piecemeal according to the region in the concentration to map of query object, then the query object in each piecemeal is encrypted with symmetric encipherment algorithm, and each symmetric key is encrypted with homomorphic encryption algorithm, finally by all ciphertext storages to Cloud Server, secret saves the private key of homomorphic cryptography；User, from the ciphertext and corresponding symmetric key ciphertext of Cloud Server download and inquiry object, then carries out symmetric key ciphertext to blind processing, and be transmitted to data service provider according to the position where oneself；Data service provider will blind plaintext transmission to user after decryption, and end user decrypts corresponding query object and obtains final query result.Whole process will not reveal the location information where user, and the protection of location privacy is realized with this.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data encryptions and location privacy protection technical field, specifically a kind of to be suitable for mobile interchange
The querying method of location of mobile users privacy is protected in network.
Background technique
In the utilization of mobile Internet, location based service to people's lives and work bring it is huge just
Benefit, while the leakage of positional information of mobile subscriber may also be caused, to bring huge security risk.Therefore with LBS's
It is widely applied, the protection to mobile subscriber's privacy is essential.
Currently, common location privacy protection method has assumed name anonymity, position k anonymity, space anonymity etc..
(1) assumed name anonymity refers to through the position of an assumed name user actual position for hiding real user, the inquiry
Accuracy is determined that this will reduce the accuracy of inquiry, together by the distance of the position of assumed name user and the position of real user
When be also possible to cause the leakage of user information.
(2) k anonymity in position refers mainly to some band of position at least k user, and this k user can not pass through identity
It is distinguished, so also can not accurately be looked for from this k user even if attacker obtains the location information of some user
True user out.When k value is bigger, the information of user is less susceptible to be leaked, but will lead to communication overhead and become larger.
(3) space anonymity is mainly user when sending request, and the position for being sent to server becomes the point by some point
Some region at place.It is inaccurate due to location information, it will to reduce the accuracy of inquiry.
In conclusion there is also following disadvantages for existing location privacy protection:
1, the position that mobile subscriber is sent to data service quotient in existing location privacy protection is some region, so that logical
Letter expense becomes larger.
2, third party is introduced in existing location privacy protection and generates and manage key, may cause the part of mobile subscriber
Privacy leakage.
3, metadata provider needs to store a large amount of data in existing location privacy protection.
4, the exact value of oneself position can't be sent to data service quotient by mobile subscriber in existing location privacy, this
The accuracy of inquiry will be reduced.
Summary of the invention
The present invention is by Cloud Server, in conjunction with the thought of symmetric encipherment algorithm and homomorphic encryption algorithm, proposes that one kind is based on
The location privacy querying method of homomorphic cryptography, is asked to efficiently solve based on the location privacy protection in location-based service
Topic, while the storage cost and communication cost of data service provider SP is reduced, thus while guaranteeing user location privacy
Reduce overhead.
The present invention in order to solve the technical problem, adopts the following technical scheme that:
A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography of the present invention is to be applied to several mobile subscribers, one
In the mobile internet environment that data service provider and a Cloud Server are constituted, the mobile internet environment is located at
In the same region, remember any one mobile subscriber be U, data service provider SP, Cloud Server CS；Its main feature is that
Location privacy querying method is to carry out in accordance with the following steps:
Step 1, the data service provider SP are generated and the public key pk and private key sk of public address system parameter；；
Step 2, the data service provider SP generate ciphertext corresponding to the query object in different piecemeals；
Step 2.1, the data service provider SP are carried out according to the region in the concentration to map of query object
Piecemeal, and each piecemeal and its position on map are disclosed, wherein any i-th of piecemeal is denoted as Di, and by i-th of piecemeal Di
Interior all query objects are denoted as Mi, i=1,2 ..., n；
Step 2.2, the data service provider SP generate i-th of subregion DiSymmetric key ki；
Step 2.3, the data service provider SP utilize i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiTo the inquiry
Object MiAES encryption is carried out, ciphertext E (k is formedi,Mi) after send Cloud Server CS storage to, and the ciphertext E is disclosed
(ki,Mi)；
Step 3, the data service provider SP utilize Paillier homomorphism according to the public key pk in the system parameter
Encryption Algorithm is to i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiImplement encryption, forms ciphertext Epk(ki) after send the Cloud Server CS to
Storage, and the ciphertext E is disclosedpk(ki)；
Step 4, any one the described position of mobile subscriber U according to present position and each piecemeal on map
Confirm the piecemeal D where self-positionj, and place piecemeal D is obtained from the Cloud Server CSjInterior query object MjCiphertext E
(kj,Mj) and place piecemeal DjSymmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj)；
A random number s is randomly generated in step 5, any one described mobile subscriber Uj, and it is same using the Paillier
State Encryption Algorithm is to the random number sjIt is encrypted, then by the random number sjEncrypted ciphertext Epk(sj) and it is described symmetrical
Key kjCiphertext Epk(kj) carry out homomorphism multiply processing, obtain blinding result cj=Epk(sj)·Epk(kj), to realize to described
Symmetric key kjBlind；The mobile subscriber U blinds result c for describedjIssue the data service provider SP；
Step 6, the data service provider SP blind result c to described using own private key skjIt is decrypted, obtains
Blind plaintext yj；Plaintext y is blinded by described againjSend the mobile subscriber U to；
Step 7, any mobile subscriber U are according to the random number sjAnd described blind plaintext yjBlind processing is carried out, is obtained
To symmetric key kj=yj-sj；And according to the symmetric key kj, using AES decipherment algorithm to the ciphertext E (kj,Mj) carry out
Decryption, subregion D where obtainingjInterior query object Mj, thus according to the query object MjIt obtains and self-position minimum distance
Query result.
Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are embodied in:
1, the present invention encrypts the query object in each piecemeal with symmetric encipherment algorithm, to ensure that each piecemeal
The privacy of interior query object, and because symmetric cryptography compares public key cryptography faster, to improve enciphering rate；
2, present invention introduces Cloud Server, data service quotient stores encrypted ciphertext to Cloud Server, thus effectively
Ground reduces the storage cost of data service provider；
3, present invention introduces Cloud Server and homomorphic encryption algorithm, it is only necessary to implement homomorphic cryptography, one by user
Secondary homomorphism multiplies, and once subtracting operation can be obtained corresponding query result, on the one hand reduce the computing cost of user, another
Aspect is effectively protected the location privacy of user again；
4, the key in the present invention is generated is managed independently by data service provider completely with distribution, is not needed by other
Key Management Center or believable third party to reduce the cost of implementation of system also improve the safety of system.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is system model figure of the invention；
Fig. 2 is zoning plan of the invention, each piecemeal D in figureiCorresponding query object is Mi；
Fig. 3 is that Cloud Server of the invention stores ciphertext graph.
Specific embodiment
Technical solution of the present invention is described in detail below, but protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the embodiment.
In the present embodiment, as shown in Figure 1, a kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography is to be applied to several
It is specific real in the mobile internet environment that mobile subscriber, a data service provider and a Cloud Server are constituted
Body Model 1. mobile subscriber U as shown in Figure 1:.Service request is proposed to data service quotient according to the location of oneself；2. data
Service provider SP.Data owner is responsible for receiving the service request of mobile subscriber U and making correspondingly responding, the mechanism half
It is credible.3. Cloud Server CS.Data service provider SP can be stored data on CS by way of paying, Cloud Server CS
The ciphertext of upper storage is full disclosure, and the mechanism half is credible.The location privacy querying method is to carry out in accordance with the following steps:
Step 1, data service provider SP are generated and the public key pk and private key sk of public address system parameter；；
1. data service provider SP will be divided into the group of equal length in plain text, every group of length is 128, and the key of selection is long
Degree is 128；
2. data service provider SP randomly selects two prime number ps and q, and meets gcd (pq, (p-1) (q-1))=1；
3. calculating N=pq and Edward Carmichael function lambda=λ (N)=lcm (p-1, q-1)；
4. data service provider SP selects a random numberAnd meet u=(L (gλmodN2))-1ModN,
Wherein defined function L isPublic key pk=(N, g), private key sk=lcm (p-1, q-1)；
5. disclosing the key length and block length of AES encryption algorithm, furthermore the public key of Paillier Encryption Algorithm is disclosed
{N,g}。
Step 2, data service provider SP generate ciphertext corresponding to the query object in different piecemeals；
Step 2.1, data service provider SP carry out piecemeal according to the region in the concentration to map of query object,
And each piecemeal and its position on map are disclosed, wherein any i-th of piecemeal is denoted as Di, and by i-th of piecemeal DiInterior institute
There is query object to be denoted as Mi, i=1,2 ..., n；
(2.1.1) as shown in Fig. 2, data service provider SP according to the region in the concentration to map of query object
Piecemeal is carried out, by the region division at the piecemeal to differ in size, query object is more concentrated, then the piecemeal is smaller, otherwise piecemeal is got over
Greatly, and by each piecemeal it is labeled as Di(i=1,2 ..., n), the query object in each piecemeal is not more than 10.
(2.1.2) data service provider SP is by each piecemeal DiCorresponding query object total abstract is labeled as Mi(i=1,
2,...,n)。
Step 2.2, data service provider SP generate i-th of subregion DiSymmetric key ki；
Step 2.3, data service provider SP utilize i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiTo query object MiCarry out AES
Encryption forms ciphertext E (ki,Mi) after send Cloud Server CS storage, and open ciphertext E (k toi,Mi)。
(2.3.1) AES encryption process will be copied into a state array in plain text, carry out a wheel initial transformation.Then into
In nine capable wheel variations, each round is carried out according to the sequence of byte substitution, row displacement, column mixing and InvAddRoundKey, last
In one round transformation, byte substitution, row displacement, InvAddRoundKey are only carried out.
(2.3.2) is as shown in figure 3, Cloud Server CS stores ciphertext E (k for one piece of continuous region is distributedi,Mi), due to
Of different sizes, the institute ciphertext E (k for storage of each piecemeali,Mi) area size it is also variant.
Step 3, data service provider SP utilize Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm according to the public key pk in system parameter
To i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiImplement encryption, forms ciphertext Epk(ki) after send Cloud Server CS storage to, and openly
Ciphertext Epk(ki)；
Data service provider SP selects a random numberTo symmetric key kiIt is encrypted, it is specific to encrypt
Process is as follows:Data service provider SP is by ciphertext Epk(ki) store and arrive Cloud Server CS, this
So that data service provider SP does not have to save a large amount of symmetrical code key ki。
Step 4, any one location confirmation of mobile subscriber U according to present position and each piecemeal on map
Piecemeal D where self-positionj, and place piecemeal D is obtained from Cloud Server CSjInterior query object MjCiphertext E (kj,Mj) with
Place piecemeal DjSymmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj)；
A random number s is randomly generated in step 5, any one mobile subscriber Uj, and calculated using Paillier homomorphic cryptography
Method is to random number sjIt is encrypted, then by random number sjEncrypted ciphertext Epk(sj) and symmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj) into
Row homomorphism multiplies processing, obtains blinding result cj=Epk(sj)·Epk(kj), to realize to symmetric key kjBlind；It is mobile to use
Family U will blind result cjIssue data service provider SP；
A random number is randomly generated in any mobile subscriber UAny mobile subscriber U is in system parameter
Public key pk encrypted random number sj, specific ciphering process is as follows:Again by encrypted random number
sjWith symmetric key kjIt carries out homomorphism and multiplies processing, homomorphism multiplies processing, and specific step is as follows:
Step 6, data service provider SP are using own private key sk to blinding result cjIt is decrypted, obtains blinding in plain text
yj；Plaintext y will be blinded againjSend mobile subscriber U to；
Data service provider SP is with the private key sk of itself to cjIt is decrypted, specifically decrypting process is as follows:The result after decryption is sent to any mobile subscriber U again.
Step 7, any mobile subscriber U are according to random number sjAnd blind plaintext yjBlind processing is carried out, symmetric key k is obtainedj
=yj-sj；And according to symmetric key kj, using AES decipherment algorithm to ciphertext E (kj,Mj) be decrypted, subregion D where obtainingjIt is interior
Query object Mj, thus according to query object MjObtain the query result with self-position minimum distance.
Ciphertext is copied into a state array, carries out initial transformation by AES decrypting process.Then the nine wheel variations carried out
In, the sequence that each round is replaced according to the displacement of reverse row, reverse byte, InvAddRoundKey and reverse column are mixed carries out, last
In one round transformation, reverse row displacement, the replacement of reverse byte and InvAddRoundKey are only carried out.
The present invention is stored in each piecemeal of Cloud Server with AES symmetric encipherment algorithm encrypted data service provider SP
Query object, to ensure that the safety of the query object of each piecemeal.Any mobile subscriber U is sent to data service provider
Blinding for SP contains k in ciphertextjAnd sjThe two unknown numbers obtain although data service provider SP can decrypt the ciphertext
Only blind in plain text, the specific location of any mobile subscriber U can not be obtained.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography is to be applied to several mobile subscribers, a data service
In the mobile internet environment that provider and a Cloud Server are constituted, the mobile internet environment is located at the same area
In domain, remember any one mobile subscriber be U, data service provider SP, Cloud Server CS；It is characterized in that location privacy
Querying method is to carry out in accordance with the following steps:
Step 1, the data service provider SP are generated and the public key pk and private key sk of public address system parameter；
Step 2, the data service provider SP generate ciphertext corresponding to the query object in different piecemeals；
Step 2.1, the data service provider SP carry out piecemeal according to the region in the concentration to map of query object,
And each piecemeal and its position on map are disclosed, wherein any i-th of piecemeal is denoted as Di, and by i-th of piecemeal DiInterior institute
There is query object to be denoted as Mi, i=1,2 ..., n；
Step 2.2, the data service provider SP generate i-th of subregion DiSymmetric key ki；
Step 2.3, the data service provider SP utilize i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiTo the query object
MiAES encryption is carried out, ciphertext E (k is formedi,Mi) after send Cloud Server CS storage to, and the ciphertext E (k is disclosedi,
Mi)；
Step 3, the data service provider SP utilize Paillier homomorphic cryptography according to the public key pk in the system parameter
Algorithm is to i-th of piecemeal DiSymmetric key kiImplement encryption, forms ciphertext Epk(ki) after send the Cloud Server CS to and deposit
Storage, and the ciphertext E is disclosedpk(ki)；
Step 4, any one the described location confirmation of mobile subscriber U according to present position and each piecemeal on map
Piecemeal D where self-positionj, and place piecemeal D is obtained from the Cloud Server CSjInterior query object MjCiphertext E (kj,
Mj) and place piecemeal DjSymmetric key kjCiphertext Epk(kj)；
A random number s is randomly generated in step 5, any one described mobile subscriber Uj, and utilize the Paillier homomorphic cryptography
Algorithm is to the random number sjIt is encrypted, then by the random number sjEncrypted ciphertext Epk(sj) and the symmetric key kj
Ciphertext Epk(kj) carry out homomorphism multiply processing, obtain blinding result cj=Epk(sj)·Epk(kj), to realize to described symmetrical
Key kjBlind；The mobile subscriber U blinds result c for describedjIssue the data service provider SP；
Step 6, the data service provider SP blind result c to described using own private key skjIt is decrypted, is blinded
Plaintext yj；Plaintext y is blinded by described againjSend the mobile subscriber U to；
Step 7, any mobile subscriber U are according to the random number sjAnd described blind plaintext yjBlind processing is carried out, is obtained pair
Claim key kj=yj-sj；And according to the symmetric key kj, using AES decipherment algorithm to the ciphertext E (kj,Mj) be decrypted,
Subregion D where obtainingjInterior query object Mj, thus according to the query object MjAcquisition is looked into self-position minimum distance
Ask result.
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