CN106685639A - Encrypted safe transmission method for sequential cipher based on artificial added noise in 5G communication system - Google Patents
Encrypted safe transmission method for sequential cipher based on artificial added noise in 5G communication system Download PDFInfo
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- CN106685639A CN106685639A CN201611161639.3A CN201611161639A CN106685639A CN 106685639 A CN106685639 A CN 106685639A CN 201611161639 A CN201611161639 A CN 201611161639A CN 106685639 A CN106685639 A CN 106685639A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
- H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses an encrypted safe transmission method for a sequential cipher based on an artificial added noise in a 5G communication system. In an uplink time slot step, a single antenna user delivers a pilot frequency sequence and a negotiation result and an encrypted massage of a secret key; then, a base station side finishes an acceptance of a signal and updates the secret key; finally, the base station side adds the artificial added noise into the encrypted massage to form a mixed signal and delivers the mixed signal to a user premise and the user premise receives the mixed signal. According to a generating algorithm of the sequential cipher, the encrypted safe transmission method uses the 'secret key' to form the sequential cipher, and then uses the sequential cipher encrypts the encrypted massage and updates the secret key continuously matched with the secret key negotiation, thus a hacking node cannot track a change of the secret key.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of safe transmission method of wireless communication system, and in particular to based on artificial in 5G communication systems
Plus the stream cipher encryption safe transmission method made an uproar.
Background technology
Radio signal as the carrier of information, has been broken away from beam of the wire communication to communication terminal position by radio communication
Tie up, be rooted in the hearts of the people rapidly with its motility and portability, in last decade development at full speed is obtained.However, with wireless
The development and application of communication technology is more and more universal, and the safety problem in communication process also gradually comes out.Radio communication
While bringing convenient, the opening of the wireless channel that the broadcast characteristic of electromagnetic wave is caused.In this physical layer
Opening cause radio communication security facing more stern challenge, that is, it has often been said that " radio communication is than wired
Communication is more dangerous ".
In mobile communication system, network present it is highly asymmetric the characteristics of, i.e. the available empty spectrum resource in base station enriches very much,
And terminal is typically only capable to be equipped with one to two antennas due to the restriction of physical size and energy consumption, available empty spectrum resource is limited.
In highly asymmetric mimo system, up-downgoing safe capacity is also highly asymmetric, and downlink capacity will be much higher than up appearance
Amount.
In the technical elements of existing safety of physical layer transmission,《Based on the up of downstream feedback auxiliary in 5G communication systems
Safe transmission method》Patent in, it is proposed that a kind of up safe transmission method aided in based on downstream feedback, it is existing to solve
Some safety of physical layer transmission technologys cannot be directly applied for 5G ascending communication systems, or limited safe performance can only be brought to increase
The problem of benefit.Although this method can to a certain extent solve the unbalanced problem of up-downgoing safe capacity, in the presence of
The accumulation of row estimation difference is to up situation.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to overcome above-mentioned deficiency, there is provided close based on sequence that is artificial plus making an uproar in a kind of 5G communication systems
Code encryption safe transmission method, the information of the base-station node transmitting user Bob that is merely able to be expected to receives and extracts useful information, and
Eavesdropping user then can not extract useful information from the signal for receiving, so as to reach the purpose of secure communication.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is comprised the following steps：
The first step, in the ascending time slot stage, single-antenna subscriber sends pilot frequency sequence and key agreement result and negotiation passes through
Cipher key encryption information；
Second step, base station end completes the reception of signal, and more new key；
Encryption information addition man made noise is formed mixed signal and is sent to user side by the 3rd step, base station end, and user side is received
To signal.
The first step is comprised the following steps：
Step one, before transmission safety information, single-antenna subscriber node Bob sends to base-station node Alice lead first
Frequency sequence information, base-station node Alice using pre-share pilot sequence information and the information that receives, estimate from Bob to
The M dimensional vector channel informations of Alice；
Step 2, multi-antenna base station node Alice is using the frequency domain channel information H for estimatingAB, choose frequency domain decline minimum
A frequency sub-carrier channels HAB,i, i is the corresponding frequency of subcarrier, by carrier channel H for estimatingAB,i, calculate
The null space matrix Ψ of the subchannelAB, wherein ΨAB∈CM*(M-1)And
Step 3, base-station node Alice generates new key K of the length for N bitn, to KnCarry out CRC codings and obtain Kn',
Meanwhile, the key K passed through using negotiationo, by stream cipher generating algorithm formation sequence password key, using the sequence for producing
Password key is encrypted to security information.
In the step one, M >=3.
The concrete grammar of the second step is as follows：
The key K that base-station node Alice is generated step 3n' mixed signal s is combined into encryption information, and in sub- load
Ripple channel HAB,iKernel on add man made noise η；The signal that user node Bob is received is Wherein nBFor the reception noise at single-antenna subscriber node Bob, it is assumed that obey
Gauss is distributed；Bob obtains launching the estimated value of symbol using maximum-likelihood decoding methodDue to base-station node Alice and surreptitiously
Listen the channel H between node EveAEDifferent from the channel H between base-station node and expectation user node BobAB, signal is through stealing
Listen channel HAEEavesdropping node Eve is reached, the signal for receiving is：Wherein nEFor list
Reception noise at antenna eavesdropping node Eve；The information that Eve is received is the random scrambling to prime information s, and this causes eavesdropping section
Point Eve expects that node Bob is directly decoded like that by maximum likelihood without the image of Buddha.
3rd step is comprised the following steps：
Step one, single-antenna subscriber node Bob extracts encryption information and key K using the mixed signal for receivingn',
The key K passed through using negotiationoThe stream cipher generating algorithm formation sequence password key same with base-station node Alice, and profit
Encryption information is decrypted with the stream cipher for producing, obtains security information；
Step 2, user node Bob is to the K comprising check bitn' CRC check is carried out, and extract key KnIf verification is logical
Cross, update Ko, i.e. Ko=Kn, and up transmission ACK notifies that Alice updates Ko；If verification does not pass through, K is abandonedn, and up
NACK is sent to notify that Alice abandons Kn。
Compared with prior art, the invention has the advantages that：
1st, the present invention is by the continuous renewal of key so that the transmission of security information is safer, traditional artificial plus make an uproar
The essence of method is, using multiple antennas sending signal or noise in multiple wave beams, to allow the kernel of noise wave beam to be directed at legal
User so that interference only produces impact to eavesdropping user.Traditional method is limited due to its transmitting terminal antenna number, and in space it is seen
What is added is not direction-free white noise, but directive coloured noise.Therefore, as long as listener-in's antenna number is enough
It is many, just there is the possibility of decryption signal in theory.And pass through stream cipher generating algorithm, " key " formation sequence password is used, then use
Stream cipher is encrypted to security information, coordinates key agreement to constantly update key so that eavesdropping node cannot be traced into
The change of key；
2nd, the present invention obtains stream cipher to " key " by base-station node by stream cipher generating algorithm, and it is right to realize
The encryption of " key ", so as to consolidate the safety of cipher key delivery, also can be effectively blocked eavesdropping user to key updating with
Track；
3rd, in the present invention, by being encrypted to " key ", the information transmission guarantee of and safety sane using downlink
The safety of uplink data transmission so that close due to obtaining even if eavesdropping user receives the information that user is sent to base station
Key information also cannot solution obtain security information.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the schematic diagram of the present invention；
Wherein, Fig. 1 (A) is the up stage, and Fig. 1 (B) is descending phase.M antenna base station A in figure represent M root antenna bases
Tiny node Alice, single-antenna subscriber B represent that single-antenna subscriber node Bob, single antenna eavesdropping node E represent that single antenna is passive and steal
Listen node Eve；
Fig. 2 is the system frame structure schematic diagram of the present invention；
Wherein, ascending time slot is expressed as user node Bob and sends information, base-station node Alice receive informations；Descending time slot
Represent that base-station node Alice sends information, user node Bob receive informations.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings the present invention will be further described.
The present invention's is embodied as middle base-station node antenna number M=8.Safe transmission refers to the information that base-station node is launched
The user Bob that can be expected to receives and extracts useful information, and eavesdrop user then can not extract useful from the signal for receiving
Information.Eavesdropping user only does passive eavesdropping, not transmission signal.Additionally, when channel becomes slowly, can be by the biography of time division duplex
Defeated mode fully ensures that the reciprocity of channel.Embodiment is comprised the following steps：
If the key K that Alice, Bob two ends are cached with length to be passed through for N and negotiationo, and save base station by key agreement
Point Alice and user node Bob synchronized update key Ko。
Step 1, before transmission safety information, single-antenna subscriber node Bob (single-antenna subscriber Bob in figure) is first to base
Tiny node Alice (M antenna base stations Alice in figure) sends pilot sequence information.Base-station node Alice utilizes the pilot tone of pre-share
Sequence information and the information for receiving, estimate the M dimensional vector channel informations from Bob to Alice；
Step 2, multi-antenna base station node Alice is using the frequency domain channel information H for estimatingAB, choose frequency domain decline minimum
A frequency sub-carrier channels HAB,i(i is the corresponding frequency of subcarrier), by carrier channel H for estimatingAB,i, calculate
Go out the null space matrix Ψ of the subchannelAB
Wherein ΨAB∈CM*(M-1), and
Step 3, base-station node Alice generates new key K of the length for N bitn, to KnCarry out CRC codings and obtain Kn'.Together
When, the key K passed through using negotiationo, it is close using the sequence for producing by stream cipher generating algorithm formation sequence password key
Code key is encrypted to security information；
Step 4, the key K that base-station node Alice is generated step 3n' mixed signal s is combined into encryption information, and
In sub-carrier channels HAB,iKernel on add man made noise η；The signal that user node Bob is received is
nBFor the reception noise at single-antenna subscriber node Bob, it is assumed that obey Gauss distributions；Bob can be using maximum seemingly
So interpretation method obtains launching the estimated value of symbolDue to the channel H between base-station node Alice and eavesdropping node EveAENo
It is same as base-station node and expects the channel H between user node BobAB, signal is through tapping channel HAEEavesdropping node Eve is reached,
The signal for receiving is：
Wherein nEThe reception noise at node Eve is eavesdropped for single antenna；The information that Eve is received be to prime information s with
Machine scramble, this causes eavesdropping node Eve to expect that node Bob is directly decoded like that by maximum likelihood without the image of Buddha.
Step 5, single-antenna subscriber node Bob extracts encryption information and key K using the mixed signal for receivingn',
The key K passed through using negotiationoThe stream cipher generating algorithm formation sequence password key same with base-station node Alice, and profit
Encryption information is decrypted with the stream cipher for producing, obtains security information.
Step 6, user node Bob is to the K comprising check bitn' CRC check is carried out, and extract key KnIf verification is logical
Cross, update Ko, i.e. Ko=Kn, and up transmission ACK notifies that Alice updates Ko；If verification does not pass through, K is abandonedn, and up
NACK is sent to notify that Alice abandons Kn。
In above-mentioned steps, the downlink reception stage completes the verification of the information after demodulating, and will verify errorless key storage
Get up, then up transmission phase again, the key of storage is carried out into scrambler to safety information waiting for transmission, finally up process again
Data after middle transmission scrambler.Descending safe transmission ensure that the safety of " key ", even if listener-in intactly intercepts
The data that validated user sends in uplink communication, but due to " key " cannot be known, also just cannot be correctly decoded out true
Information.On the other hand, due to the data that " key " inherently base-station node is sent in downlink communication, it knows naturally
Key information, therefore can be descrambled so as to recover data using " key " is somebody's turn to do.
When next secret signal transmission stage is proceeded to, the process in repeat step 1 to 6.
In view of uplink and downlink communication in time division duplex alternately, and on a large scale antenna causes descending secret communication speed
It is sufficiently large, therefore secret communication speed can be divided into two parts by base station during downlink communication, a part is used for sending oneself
Security information, another part be used for send " key ".Base-station node will with secret communication speed by way of safe coding
This two parts information is sent to user node, therefore user node can completely decode this two parts information, and listener-in without
Method obtains this two parts information.During ensuing uplink communication, user node can using decode come " key "
Encryption oneself will issue the information of base-station node.Although eavesdropping node can receive the information that user node sends,
Due to not knowing " key ", so as to the real information that user node is sent to base-station node cannot be untied.For base-station node comes
Say, due to known to " key " inherently oneself, therefore can using should " key " solve safety information.Communication every time all may be used
To change key, therefore it is truly realized " one-time pad ".
Fig. 2 is the system frame structure of two sections of transmitting-receiving, and ascending time slot stage, user node Bob to base-station node Alice sends
Pilot frequency sequence and key agreement result, if key agreement passes through, transmitting-receiving two-end synchronized update key；If key agreement loses
Lose, transmitting-receiving two-end gives up new key, continue to continue to use old key.Descending time slot stage, base-station node passes through the pilot tone sequence for receiving
Row do channel estimation, and the key formation sequence password passed through with negotiation, and security information is encrypted.
Claims (5)
- Based on stream cipher encryption safe transmission method that is artificial plus making an uproar in 1.5G communication systems, it is characterised in that including following Step：The first step, ascending time slot stage, single-antenna subscriber sends pilot frequency sequence and key agreement result and encryption information；Second step, base station end completes the reception of signal, and more new key；Encryption information addition man made noise is formed mixed signal and is sent to user side by the 3rd step, base station end, and user side receives letter Number.
- 2. based on stream cipher encryption safe transmission method that is artificial plus making an uproar in 5G communication systems according to claim 1, Characterized in that, the first step is comprised the following steps：Step one, before transmission safety information, single-antenna subscriber node Bob sends pilot tone sequence to base-station node Alice first Column information, base-station node Alice is estimated from Bob to Alice using the pilot sequence information and the information for receiving of pre-share M dimensional vector channel informations；Step 2, multi-antenna base station node Alice is using the frequency domain channel information H for estimatingAB, choose the one of frequency domain decline minimum Sub-carrier channels H of individual frequencyAB,i, i is the corresponding frequency of subcarrier, by carrier channel H for estimatingAB, i calculates this The null space matrix Ψ of subchannelAB, wherein ΨAB∈CM*(M-1)AndStep 3, base-station node Alice generates new key K of the length for N bitn, to KnCarry out CRC codings and obtain Kn', meanwhile, The key K passed through using negotiationo, by stream cipher generating algorithm formation sequence password key, using the stream cipher for producing Key is encrypted to security information.
- 3. based on stream cipher encryption safe transmission method that is artificial plus making an uproar in 5G communication systems according to claim 2, Characterized in that, in the step one, M >=3.
- 4. based on stream cipher encryption safe transmission method that is artificial plus making an uproar in 5G communication systems according to claim 1, Characterized in that, the concrete grammar of the second step is as follows：The key K that base-station node Alice is generated step 3n' mixed signal s is combined into encryption information, and in subcarrier letter Road HAB,iKernel on add man made noise η；The signal that user node Bob is received is Wherein nBFor the reception noise at single-antenna subscriber node Bob, it is assumed that obey Gauss is distributed；Bob obtains launching the estimated value of symbol using maximum-likelihood decoding methodDue to base-station node Alice and surreptitiously Listen the channel H between node EveAEDifferent from the channel H between base-station node and expectation user node BobAB, signal is through stealing Listen channel HAEEavesdropping node Eve is reached, the signal for receiving is：Wherein nEFor list Reception noise at antenna eavesdropping node Eve；The information that Eve is received is the random scrambling to prime information s, and this causes eavesdropping section Point Eve expects that node Bob is directly decoded like that by maximum likelihood without the image of Buddha.
- 5. based on stream cipher encryption safe transmission method that is artificial plus making an uproar in 5G communication systems according to claim 1, Characterized in that, the 3rd step is comprised the following steps：Step one, single-antenna subscriber node Bob extracts encryption information and key K using the mixed signal for receivingn', utilize The key K that negotiation passes throughoThe stream cipher generating algorithm formation sequence password key same with base-station node Alice, and using product Raw stream cipher is decrypted to encryption information, obtains security information；Step 2, user node Bob is to the K comprising check bitn' CRC check is carried out, and extract key KnIf verification passes through, Update Ko, i.e. Ko=Kn, and up transmission ACK notifies that Alice updates Ko；If verification does not pass through, K is abandonedn, and up transmission NACK notifies that Alice abandons Kn。
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| CN111934863A (en) * | 2020-08-11 | 2020-11-13 | 南方电网科学研究院有限责任公司 | Secret key sharing method based on artificial noise and safety coding in edge calculation |
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| CN113727340A (en) * | 2021-08-27 | 2021-11-30 | 西安交通大学 | Physical layer secret key generation method for wireless secure communication |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN109412797A (en) * | 2018-11-05 | 2019-03-01 | 北京邮电大学 | Cryptographic key negotiation method and client based on bit error rate judgement state base |
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| CN111934863A (en) * | 2020-08-11 | 2020-11-13 | 南方电网科学研究院有限责任公司 | Secret key sharing method based on artificial noise and safety coding in edge calculation |
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| CN113473457A (en) * | 2021-06-25 | 2021-10-01 | 暨南大学 | Non-orthogonal security coding method based on privacy protection |
| CN113473457B (en) * | 2021-06-25 | 2023-06-27 | 暨南大学 | Non-orthogonal security coding method based on privacy protection |
| CN113727340A (en) * | 2021-08-27 | 2021-11-30 | 西安交通大学 | Physical layer secret key generation method for wireless secure communication |
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